(c) It is a conflict between two or more individuals, and so differs from war and sedition, which are conflicts between nations or parts of a mult.i.tude.
(d) It is conducted by means of physical violence, that is by the infliction of bodily injuries or harm. Thus, fighting differs from quarreling, which is a dispute in words. It makes no difference whether the attack be made by fists, fingernails or teeth, or by weapons or missiles, or whether the bodily harm be direct (e.g., a blackened eye) or indirect (e.g., a hat knocked off the head).
1429. Kinds of Fighting.--(a) As to its origin, fighting is provoked or unprovoked, according as one who fights is attacking another or defending himself against attack. (b) As to its manner, it is an ordinary fight or a duel, according as it takes place without or with previous arrangement and stipulated conditions. (c) As to its eject, the civil law distinguishes between a.s.sault and battery. a.s.sault is a show of violence against the person of another, as when one lifts one"s fist or cane in a threatening manner to put another in fear of bodily harm. Battery is the actual infliction of personal violence, as when one strikes, pushes, scratches, bites, or spits on another.
1430. The Sinfulness of Fighting.--(a) Unprovoked fighting is from its nature a mortal sin. It is cla.s.sed among the works of the flesh that exclude from the kingdom of heaven (Gal, v. 20, 21), and it is essentially opposed to the charity owed to a neighbor. It is frequently only a venial sin, either because the act is not entirely deliberate, as when one fights in sudden anger, or because the violence is of a trifling kind, as when school-children pull one another"s hair or throw s...o...b..a.l.l.s.
(b) Fighting under provocation is no sin at all, when one intends only to defend one"s rights and does not go beyond what is necessary for lawful defence, as when one struggles with a burglar who is trying to enter one"s house, and pushes him through the door. It is a venial sin, when the person who is resisting aggression acts with some slight degree of hate or revengefulness, or inflicts a little more injury than is really necessary. It is a mortal sin, when the person who was attacked fights in a spirit of hate and revenge, or deliberately and needlessly seeks to kill or seriously maim the adversary.
1431. Causes of Fighting.--The remedy of sinful fighting is the removal of its causes. The sources of fighting are proximate and remote.
(a) The immediate cause is anger. The angry man provokes fights (Prov., xv. 18, xxix. 22), for anger, being a desire of revenge, is not content to injure another secretly, but wishes to punish him--that is, to injure him in such a Way that he will know he is being punished and will feel grief on that account. Anger also blinds one to the foolishness of one"s actions, and so leads one precipitately into quarrels and fights (Prov., xviii. 6).
(b) The remote cause of fighting is an inordinate desire of temporal things, such as wealth, power, ease: "Why are there wars and disputes among you? Is it not because of the desires that war among your members?" (James, iv. 1). Those who are overmuch concerned with their own interests, easily take offense at what they consider slights or insults or opposition, their rage bursts forth, and they proceed at once to visit revenge on those at whom they are offended. It was greed and envy that caused the herdsmen of Palestine to fill up the wells dug by Isaac and to fight with his servants for possession (Gen., xxvi. 14 sqq.).
1432. Hatred and Fighting.--(a) Hatred is not necessarily a cause of fighting. The hater wishes evil to his neighbor, not as punishment, but absolutely; his pa.s.sion is calmer, more lasting, and more insatiable than that of the angry man. If it suits him, he will bide his time patiently, pretending friendship, but all the while plotting ruin to the one he hates. (b) Hatred at times does bring on fighting, for, if the hater sees that he can safely attack openly, he will use quarreling and fighting as a means to his purpose.
1433. Occasions that Frequently Bring On Fighting.--(a) Boasting about self or depreciation of others in the presence of persons who will take offense occasions fights, for "he that boasteth and puffeth himself up stirreth up quarrels" (Prov., xxviii. 25). Thus, disputes over the respective merits of nations or political parties often bring on b.l.o.o.d.y encounters. (b) Drunkenness occasions fights, for it so stupefies the mind that one minimizes one"s danger and exaggerates one"s own strength, and so is emboldened to attack others (Prov., xxiii. 29, 30).
1434. Evil Consequences of Fighting.--(a) Charity is wounded by fighting, wherefrom there often result lasting hates, discords, scandals. (b) Justice is wounded by fighting, as when a person unjustly maims or kills his neighbor, and is himself imprisoned or executed, to the disgrace and deprivation of his dependents.
1435. Duelling.--A duel is a prearranged combat between two persons fought with deadly weapons, for the purpose of settling a private quarrel.
(a) Thus, it is a combat, and hence the "suicide duel," in which the contenders draw lots with the understanding that the loser must kill himself within a specified time, is not properly a duel.
(b) A duel is prearranged, that is, the time, place, and weapons are determined in advance. Hence, if two feudists meet accidentally and proceed at once to shoot, their combat is not strictly a duel. It is not necessary, however, that a formal letter of challenge and a letter of acceptance precede the fight.
(c) It is between two persons, that is, a determinate combatant is matched against a determinate opponent. A true duel, however, might be carried on between many couples simultaneously, as in the fight between the twelve soldiers of Abner and the twelve soldiers of Joab (II Kings, ii. 13-17). The presence of seconds or witnesses is not essential to a duel.
(d) A duel is fought with deadly weapons, that is, with such arms as are capable of inflicting severe wounds, so that there is serious danger of grave wound or mutilation or death. There is no duel, therefore, if one fights with weapons that cannot do serious harm (such as fists, light sticks, mud), or if by agreement one uses dangerous weapons in a way that precludes injury (e.g., by padding the edge of one"s sword, loading one"s revolver with blanks, firing into the air, as in sham or mock duels). But academic duels, in which students try to stab each other in the face with small daggers, are true duels; for, while the fighters are well protected in vital parts and serious or fatal wounds rarely happen, it remains true that this manner of fighting is mortally dangerous. The same remark applies to duels fought on condition that only one or two rounds of shots shall be fired, or that fighting shall cease as soon as blood has been drawn.
(e) A duel is fought for the purpose of settling a private quarrel. A hand-to-hand combat during battle between two soldiers of contending armies is not a duel in the proper sense of the word, since there is no private quarrel between them, but only the public quarrel of their countries.
1436. The Morality of Duelling.--(a) Generally, the duel is mortally sinful. Like ordinary fighting, it is against charity, and in addition it includes a will to kill or gravely injure another, to expose one"s own life or limb to chance, and to usurp the function of the State.
This applies to the challenged as well as to the challenger, for one can decline the combat to which one is dared.
(b) Exceptionally, a duel would not be sinful, if it took on the character of a war, or of self-defense against an unjust aggressor.
Thus, in order to shorten a war or to lessen the bloodshed, it might be lawful to make the whole issue depend on a single combat between the commanders or between champions chosen from opposing armies, as in the case of David and Goliath (I Kings, xvii); but in modern times such a practice has been abandoned. Again, if a person had to choose between certain death, if he refused a duel, and possible death, if he consented to a duel, it would seem that he is in the position of one attacked by an unjust aggressor; but it is not easy to picture such a case as happening in normal conditions.
1437. The Fallacy of the Arguments for Duelling.--(a) The amus.e.m.e.nt of the spectators was the purpose of the gladiatorial duels fought in ancient Rome. But today there is no one who would not grant that the butchering of human beings to make a holiday for the populace is savagery.
(b) The decision of doubtful cases before the courts was the purpose of the judicial duels fought among the Germans and Lombards in the early Middle Ages. But manifestly such duels are a temptation of G.o.d, since they rashly call on Him to disclose, through a duel between the litigants, what the evidence in court did not disclose. The outcome of the duel shows which party is stronger or more skilful, not which is in the right.
(c) Training in bravery and the termination of serious differences is the excuse offered for military and university duels. But to kill, cripple, or brutalize youth does not make the nation stronger, and the subst.i.tution of violence for law as a means of settling disputes is an encouragement to crime.
(d) Satisfaction for insults or other injury, or the avoidance of the reputation of being a coward, is the reason given for so-called affairs of honor. But is it not a superst.i.tion and a relic of barbarism to think that dishonor is wiped out by a dishonorable fight, or that a person shows himself brave because he lacks the moral bravery to act against the wrong opinions of the mult.i.tude?
1438. Penalties against Duelling.--(a) Church law deprives of ecclesiastical burial those who die as the result of a duel, if unrepentant (Canon 1240); it also declares excommunication reserved simply to the Holy See and infamy against duellists and their helpers (Canon 2351). (b) Civil law in English-speaking countries makes duelling a crime. If death results, it is regarded as murder, and the seconds are liable to punishment as accessories.
1439. What is the moral duty of rest.i.tution on account of injuries caused in a duel? (a) The challenger and his heirs have no right to rest.i.tution. (b) The challenged, if he accepted willingly, has no right to rest.i.tution, for his free acceptance of the fight implies the cession of such a right. (c) The challenged, if he accepted under grave compulsion, has the right to rest.i.tution. If he is wounded, the aggressor should pay the medical expense; if he is killed, the heirs should be compensated.
1440. Sedition.--Sedition is a discord between different factions of the same mult.i.tude so grave as to extend to physical conflict, and to the destruction of the unity of the State.
(a) It is a discord, that is, a disagreement of wills, and so it resembles schism, war and fighting. Difference of opinion in the political parties of a country is not sedition, since there is a unity of will and purpose in all of them with reference to the common good and the peace of the State (cfr. 1197, 1348). In fact, under a democratic system of government, the existence of some opposite parties has proved a useful, if not necessary means of stimulating the interest of citizens, and of expediting the business of legislation.
(b) Sedition is between different factions of the same mult.i.tude, that is, between different sections or groups of the same body politic.
Thus, it differs from war (which is between states), and from fighting (which is between individuals).
(c) Sedition extends to physical conflict, that is, it tends from its character to break out into violence and to array the opposite factions in fight against one another. If not accompanied by actual hostilities, it is simple sedition. But, if fighting has begun, it is insurrection or rebellion, when the people seek to overthrow the government; it is civil war, if one part of the nation seeks to secede from or overcome the other.
(d) It is prejudicial to the civil unity and peace of the people, that is, it tends to the violent dismemberment of the State, or at least to the disturbance of the common good. Thus, sedition is more serious than riots, tumults, gang-warfare, and like particular disturbances, which are not directed against the State itself, or against the harmony of the whole body of the people. Sedition differs also from the peaceful separation of parts of a state, and from the lawful self-defense of the people against a tyrannical government.
1441. From the definition given above, it is plain that sedition is a special distinct species of sin. (a) It differs from spiritual discord, for unlike schism it is opposed, not to the unity of the Church, but to the unity of the State. (b) It differs from other kinds of temporal discord, for unlike war and fighting it is opposed, not to peace between nations or individuals, but to peace between the members of the same civil body. War takes away peace with foreigners, sedition takes away peace with fellow-citizens; fighting attacks a private person or persons, sedition attacks the public welfare of the country.
1442. Sedition in the strict meaning given it above is always sinful.
(a) Thus, it is a mortal sin from its nature, since it is opposed to what is manifestly one of the greatest of temporal goods, namely, the unity of the State. (b) It is opposed to charity, as destroying the bond of peace; it is opposed to justice, as injuring a unity based on law and common utility, to which the nation has a strict right. (c) Sedition is graver in some persons than in others. Thus, the moral causes of sedition (i.e., those that sow discords or promote disaffection) are more responsible than those who are led and who carry out acts of violence. The gravity of the sin in each case depends on the amount of damage that is due to one"s influence or acts.
1443. Is one who resists a tyrannical government guilty of the sin of sedition? (a) When resistance is made by legal and pacific means, such as the rejection of a bad government at the polls, there is no sedition. (b) When legal and pacific means are impossible and armed aggression against a tyrant will benefit the common good, a rebel is not guilty of the sin of sedition. In this case, it is rather the bad ruler who causes discords and is seditious against the common good, whereas the people only defend themselves according to the laws. Thus, the rebellion of the Machabees against their Syrian oppressors was not seditious. (c) When legal means are impossible but armed aggression will not benefit the common good, a rebel is guilty of the sin of sedition.
Art. 9: THE SINS AGAINST BENEFICENCE
(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, q. 43.)
1444. Having discussed in the preceding paragraphs the sins opposed to the internal acts of charity (love, joy and peace), we come now to treat of scandal and coperation which are opposed to the external acts of charity--beneficence and brotherly correction.
1445. Scandal.--Scandal is derived from a Greek word signifying a snare or trap prepared for an enemy, or a stone or block laid in the road that he may stumble or trip over it. In use, it is applied in a wide or general sense, and in a strict or special sense. (a) In its wide sense, it refers to any kind of harm, especially of a spiritual or moral nature, that one brings on others. (b) In its strict sense, it refers to a fall into sin which one occasions for others by misconduct.
1446. The following are some examples of the word "scandal" as employed in its wide sense: (a) It is used to signify physical or natural injuries of various kinds. Thus, the servants of Pharaoh called the plagues brought on Egypt by Moses a scandal (Exod., x. 7), and the Psalmist says of the sinner that he laid a scandal (calamity) against his brother (Ps. xlix. 20). Those who spread defamatory gossip are called scandal-mongers, and "scandal" often signifies opprobrium or disgrace, as when Shakespeare speaks of the wrangling of n.o.bles as a scandal to the crown. (b) The word "scandal" is also used to signify moral injuries distinct from inducement to sin. Thus, the shock and offense given to virtuous persons by blasphemous language spoken in their hearing is described as a scandal, and one who would prevent another from following some more perfect course or practice to which there is no obligation (such as entering religion, saying grace at meals, etc.), is sometimes said to scandalize.
1447. Definition of Scandal.--In the strict sense, scandal is defined as "any conduct that has at least the appearance of evil and that offers to a neighbor an occasion of spiritual ruin."
(a) By conduct is understood external behavior or manner of acting in the presence of others. Thus, scandal differs from sin, for sin is committed, not only by external acts done before others, but also by internal thoughts and desires and external acts that are secret.
(b) Scandal is conduct which is evil at least in appearance, that is, sinful, or from the circ.u.mstances seemingly sinful. Thus, an act is not scandalous, if it is morally indifferent or a less good, and is perceivable as being such.
(c) Scandal tends to spiritual ruin, that is, to a fall into sin, great or small. Here scandal strictly understood differs from scandal in the wide senses given in the previous paragraph.
(d) Scandal is an occasion of a fall into sin, that is, it sets an example of sin before the attention, and thus suggests to the will that the will imitate the sin. Scandal is not, however, the cause of sin, for a person causes his own sin in yielding consent to the suggestion offered by scandal.
(e) Scandal is to another. A person may be said to scandalize himself in the sense that by his looks or acts he puts himself in an occasion of sin (Matt., v. 29, 30), or inasmuch as he maliciously makes the acts of a virtuous neighbor an occasion of sin; but scandal is more properly understood of an occasion of sin prepared for one"s neighbor.
1448. Causes of Scandal.--There are various divisions of scandal according to the kinds of external acts. (a) There is scandal in words, as profane language or calumnies spoken in a gathering of people. (b) There is scandal in acts, as when one is perceptibly drunk or fights in a city street. Scandal applies also to things, in so far as they are the result of acts or related to acts, such as disedifying books, pictures, dress. Thus, one gives scandal by having sinful objects on display, such as profane mottoes on one"s wall, obscene advertis.e.m.e.nts or announcements on one"s billboards. (c) There also may be scandal in omission, as when one is conspicuously absent from Ma.s.s on Sundays.
1449. The following kinds of sinful acts are not scandalous, for they are unknown to others, and hence cannot suggest sin: (a) internal acts, such as wicked thoughts, desires, emotions; (b) external acts concealed from others, such as inaudible profanity, intoxication not noticeable by others, omission of an obligatory penance about which others have no knowledge.
1450. There are, likewise, various divisions of scandal according to the internal purpose of the scandalizer. (a) Scandal is directly intentional, when the purpose of the scandalizer is to lead others to the guilt of sin (diabolical scandal). Example: t.i.tus blasphemes religion before Caius in order that the latter may become irreligious, and thus be more easily persuaded to follow a life of crime. (b) Scandal is indirectly intentional when the purpose of the scandalizer is to perform some action whose nature is such that it will lead others to the guilt of sin, and he is determined to perform that action, although not directly willing the neighbor"s guilt that will result.