(a) The virtue of religion has a n.o.bler object, since it regulates the worship owed to G.o.d, while justice regulates the things owed to man; and its obligation is stricter even than that of legal justice.
(b) The virtue of mercy, which is a rational inclination of the will to relieve the suffering or misfortune of others, is held to be greater than justice, because to relieve the distress of the community or of an individual indicates greater perfection than to pay merely what is due to another.
1718. Virtues may be compared, not only from the viewpoint of the objective excellence which they have from their own natures (whereby they are unequal and rank according to the greatness of their objects), but also from the viewpoint of the subjective partic.i.p.ation of them in the souls of their possessors.
(a) In a certain sense, all the virtues are equal in their possessor, since all of them alike are related to charity as their perfection (see 1118), and all of them increase or diminish in like proportions with the growth or decline of grace, which is their root (see 745).
(b) In a certain sense, too, the rank of the virtues may depart from the order of the dignity of their objects. For the facility and prompt.i.tude of exercise of an infused virtue does not depend formally on the infused virtue itself, but on subjective conditions, such as natural inclination or custom, or on a special gift of G.o.d (see 135, 136); and hence it may happen that a saint shows greater excellence and enjoys greater renown in an inferior than in a superior virtue. Thus, Abraham was singular in faith, Moses in meekness, Josue in bravery, David in fervor and devotion (Ecclus., xlv-xlviii), and St. Joseph is praised as "a just man" (Matt., i. 19).
1719. Injustice.--Just as the word "justice" is taken in a wide sense for holiness or the collection of all the virtues, and in a strict sense for a special cardinal virtue, so likewise the word "injustice"
is taken widely as a synonym for any transgression, iniquity, or sin ("He sendeth rain upon the just and the unjust," Matt., v. 45), but strictly for violation of the special virtue of justice ("Hear what the unjust judge saith," Luke, xviii. 6). It is of this latter injustice that we now speak.
1720. Species of Injustice.--Injustice is of two kinds. (a) Legal injustice is a special vice that moves one to despise the common good or to act against it intentionally. Thus, if one steals or overeats merely to gratify a pa.s.sion for money or for food, there is a certain condition of legal injustice, inasmuch as one violates a law; but if one does these things also or solely to injure the common good, there is a special sin of legal injustice, to be declared in confession. (b) Particular injustice is a special vice against the private good of others that moves one to seek for more than is one"s share, or to desire more of the benefits and less of the burdens than equality appoints. Examples: To sell above the just price or buy below the just price (commutative injustice); to show favoritism in the distribution of public offices or burdens, as when a person in authority showers public benefits on his unworthy relatives or friends, and overburdens with taxes those who are not his friends (distributive injustice).
1721. The Theological Species of Legal and Particular Injustice.--(a) From its nature injustice is a mortal sin, for it is an attack on a very great good, namely, the peace and security of society; the very foundations of orderly community life are shaken when injustice is done either to common or to private rights. Moreover, acts of injustice (unlike sins of mere pa.s.sion), if the matter is serious, offend against charity, the life of the soul; for charity "envieth not, dealeth not perversely" (I Cor., xiii. 4); while injustice injures the neighbor and leads to hatred, quarrels, and separations. Hence, the Apostle says of injustice: "Do not err: neither adulterers, nor thieves, nor covetous, nor extortioners, shall possess the kingdom of G.o.d" (I Cor., vi. 10); and Our Lord, speaking of justice, says: "If you would enter into life, keep the commandments" (Matt, xix. 18).
(b) From want of sufficient advertence in the subject (see 173 sqq.), or from smallness of matter in the object (see 172), a sin of injustice may be only venial. Thus, if one takes money that belongs to another on account of vincible ignorance due to slight negligence, or if one takes only a small amount that does no serious injury, the injustice is venial.
1722. Rule for Determining the Gravity of Sins of Injustice.--The rule for judging whether the matter of a sin of injustice is great or small, is the quant.i.ty of injury it inflicts, or the degree of reasonable unwillingness of the offended person to suffer the injustice; for sins against the neighbor are culpable precisely on account of and in proportion to the harm they do to others. Hence, since every injustice offends either the public or private good, or both, the following acts of injustice are gravely sinful:
(a) mortal sin is committed when injury is done to a private right in a matter of such great moment that the person offended is reasonably and gravely unwilling to sanction the injustice (e.g., cases of calumny, adultery, incendiarism). But if the injury itself is small and the party offended is nevertheless gravely unwilling to suffer it, only venial sin is committed against justice, but there may be a mortal sin done against charity, as when one steals a worthless trinket, knowing that the owner is so unreasonably attached to it that the loss will almost break his heart or will provoke in him violent anger, profanity, etc.;
(b) mortal sin is also committed when injury is done to a public right in a matter so important that the community is with good reason gravely averse to the commission of the injury. This happens when the common good is directly attacked, as when a citizen rebels against lawful government, or when the peace and security of the community is imperilled because of injury done to a private person, as when one steals a sum that is considerable from a wealthy person, even though the latter will not seriously feel the loss. Hence, an injury to a private person that does not seriously harm him may seriously harm the community, and be gravely sinful on account of the disastrous consequences to social order that would follow if such an injury were not gravely forbidden.
1723. Moral Species of Legal and of Particular Injustice.--These are distinguished according to the main cla.s.ses of objects or rights that are injured or offended (see 199). Hence, there are the following four kinds of injustice:
(a) injuries to spiritual rights or goods, whether natural or supernatural (e.g., superst.i.tion, idolatry, simony);
(b) injuries to internal goods of soul (e.g., lies) or of body (e.g., murder, mutilation);
(c) injuries to external goods, whether incorporeal (e.g., calumny) or corporeal (e.g., theft, fraud).
1724. Accidental Forms of Injustice.--There are also many accidental forms of injustice, that is, variations that do not of themselves change the moral species (see 200).
(a) Thus, as to its manner, injustice is done either positively, by action (e.g., by stealing from an employer), or negatively, by omission (e.g., by allowing another to steal from one"s employer). In both cases the same kind of injustice is committed; for example, he who permits theft is just as much a thief as if he had stolen himself.
(b) As to its consequences for the injured person, injustice is either merely injurious or injurious and damaging, according as a strict right is violated without loss (e.g., adultery from which no child is born), or with loss to the injured party (e.g., adultery from which a child is born). The character of the sin is the same in both cases, but in the latter case rest.i.tution is due (cfr. 1199, 1200). The loss (_d.a.m.num_) that results from violation of a strict right (_injuria_) may be in internal goods (such as salvation, life, health, sanity of mind) or in external goods (such as reputation, money, property).
(c) As to its consequences for the party who does the injury, injustice is either profitable to him (as in the case of unjust taking) or unprofitable (as in the case of unjust damage). The moral species is the same in either case, for the fact that the unjust person gains by his injustice does not make the injury greater, and the fact that he does not gain does not make the injury less.
1725. Injury is not suffered by one who knows and wills an act that is done contrary to his right (Rule 27 of the Decretals), for such a one cedes his right. Hence, if a man looks out with a smile while neighborhood boys take apples from his orchard and the latter take this as permission, no injustice, material or formal, is done. But the legal maxim needs interpretation, for the following two conditions are necessary in order that there be a surrender of right:
(a) the party who consents must be able to surrender his right, since, if he is not able to do so, his cession is invalid. Hence, one who kills a person asking for death is unjust to G.o.d and to the State; one who commits adultery with a woman whose husband gives permission is unjust to the marriage state and the lawful children; one who strikes a cleric who waived his privilege of canon (_privilegium canonis_) is unjust to the clerical state; one who takes property from a ward with the latter"s consent, is unjust to the estate, since the ward has no authority to alienate it. Many of the martyrs, it is true, wished to lose their lives at the hands of persecutors, but this meant only that they consented to the will of G.o.d, not that they consented to their own murder by the tyrants, for they had not the right to give the latter dominion over their lives;
(b) the party who consents must really will to yield his right, and hence, if there is error, fraud, fear or violence, the cession is of no effect. Thus, a buyer who through ignorance takes a defective article or pays an exorbitant price, a workman who through necessity accepts less than a living wage, or a man who yields his purse to a burglar at the point of the revolver, does not surrender his rights, since true consent is wanting. Similarly, when one follows the counsel of Christ not to resist spoliation (Matt., v. 40) or when a saintly person rejoices over injury done him (Heb., x. 34), the intention is not to surrender rights to the unjust, nor to approve their conduct, but to practise heroic virtue by patience, humility, forgiveness, etc.
1726. Internal Injustice.--Does internal injustice (i.e., the intention of injuring another) make an external action unjust?
(a) If the intention makes the external act to be a violation of a strict right, it also makes the external act unjust. Thus, to take a book from another"s room is of itself an indifferent action, for there may be, no violation of right (e.g., when the intention is to borrow), or there may be such violation (e.g., when the intention is to steal).
(b) If the intention does not make the external act a violation of strict right, even though that act be harmful to the other party, it does not make the external act unjust. Hence, if the other party has no strict right against the external act (e.g., t.i.tus sees the house of Balbus on fire, but he is not hired to take care of Balbus" property, and he gives no alarm in order that the house may burn down) or if the agent has a strict right to perform the external act (e.g., Claudius, a judge, condemns Semp.r.o.nius, according to law, but his chief intention is the harm he will inflict on the latter), the unjust intention does not make the external act unjust. But in these cases sin, and even grave sin, is committed against charity.
1727. Judgment.--Judgment, or the right determination of what is just and due to others, is the proper act of the virtue of justice, and hence Aristotle (_Ethics_, lib. V, cap. 7) declares that people take their disputes to a judge as to justice personified. Judgment is either public or private. (a) Public judgment is pa.s.sed by a judge who has the authority to compel disputing parties to abide by his decisions. (b) Private judgment is pa.s.sed by individuals without public authority concerning the morals or conduct of others.
1728. Since judgment is an act of virtue, it is lawful, and we find that both in the Old and the New Testament men have been appointed with authority to judge others. Thus, G.o.d ordered that judges be chosen in all the cities of Israel (Deut., xvi. 18); St. Paul declares that the judge is the minister of G.o.d (Rom., xiii. 4), and from Apostolic times tribunals have been set up in the Church. But certain conditions are required for moral goodness, both in those who ask for judgment and in those who pa.s.s judgment.
(a) Thus, those who seek judgment must be actuated by proper motives and must conduct themselves in a virtuous manner. Our Lord in Matt., v, teaches that it is better to suffer temporal loss rather than to contend in judgment from a motive of revenge to the prejudice of one"s spiritual good, and St. Paul condemns the Corinthians because they gave scandal by reason of their lawsuits before heathen tribunals and had recourse to frauds and injuries in their litigation (I Cor., vi. 1 sqq.).
(b) Those who pa.s.s judgment must have a good intention, must proceed according to law, and must decide according to prudence. If the first condition is wanting, judgment is unjust or otherwise sinful, according as the judge chooses against the right or is merely prompted by some human motive (such as hatred, anger, vainglory, avarice); if the second condition is lacking, judgment, if public, is usurped or illegal, if the third condition is not had, judgment is rash. But it should be noted that the Church has condemned the teaching of Wicliff that office and authority are forfeited by sinners (Denzinger, 595, 597).
1729. First Condition of Righteous Judgment.--The first condition of righteous judgment is that the purpose of the judge be just and sincere. But is it possible for judgment to be righteous if the judge is a bad man--that is, if he is in the state of mortal sin?
(a) If the sin of the judge is public, and judgment is given against a sin of the same character (e.g., if a notorious thief pa.s.ses sentence on another thief), serious scandal is given; for justice is discredited and an occasion offered for criticism of authority and for lawlessness.
But if the sin is not of the same character as the one condemned (e.g., if a notorious thief pa.s.ses sentence on a murderer), the scandal is not grave in so far as justice is concerned.
(b) If the sin is not public, it is clear that no scandal is given; and if the judge is moved by the duty of his office and by zeal for justice to condemn even the same kind of sin of which he himself is guilty, he commits no sin whatsoever in so doing (cfr. 1280). But he is guilty of hypocrisy if he uses the opportunity to pretend a personal righteousness which he does not possess. It is this that Our Lord reprobated in the Pharisees, who, although guilty of many and grave crimes, wished to put to death an adulteress in order that they themselves might thus shine as immaculate. The words, "Let him that is without sin among you cast the first stone" (John, viii. 7), condemn hypocrisy in judges, though they do not require that a judge be free from all sin. But though sinners may act against sin as lawmakers, prosecutors, judges, jurymen, police, etc., they should be admonished by their office to reform themselves according to the words of St.
Paul: "In judging another, thou condemnest thyself, for thou dost the same things which thou judgest" (Rom., ii. 1).
1730. Second Condition.-The second condition of righteous judgment is legality, if there is question of judgment in court.
(a) Thus, the judge must have public authority, for, just as laws cannot be made except by public authority, neither can they be interpreted except by the same authority (Rom., xiv. 4). Hence, proceedings that are not held in the proper place, at the proper time, or in the manner prescribed by law are void, and the same is true if a court has not jurisdiction over the parties or over the subject-matter in controversy.
(b) The judge must administer justice according to the law and the usual method observed in courts, since his office is to interpret, not to make law or custom (_jus dicere, non facere_). His opinions as precedents may affect the development and growth of law, and hence he is especially bound to be faithful to general principles that are binding on him. If a statute in its operation is found to impede the just disposition of controversies, judges perform a public service by indicating this to those who have authority to regulate procedure. If the application of a law would work injustice, no judge can in conscience p.r.o.nounce sentence according to that law; but there are many cases recognized in jurisprudence in which courts of equity afford relief to rights that cannot be defended or protected in courts of law, and in cases of this kind the judge should be guided by recognized principles of natural justice and the rules of his court.
1731. Third Condition.--The third condition of righteous judgment is that the sentence or decision be prudent or well-founded. Thus, in a judicial process the facts of a case must be examined and the rules of evidence be observed in judging the meaning of the facts. Since rash judgment is a sin committed, not only externally and in public, but also and especially internally and in private conclusions formed about the character or deeds of others, and since it is one of the commonest of sins, it will be well to explain its nature somewhat fully.
(a) It is an internal sin, and so it differs from external acts against the neighbor; but calumny, detraction, and unjust sentence are its outward expressions.
(b) Rash judgment is an internal sin of decision in which something is affirmed or denied mentally about a neighbor, and so it differs from a mere representation or thought. This distinction is important for scrupulous persons who think that mere suggestions against others that flash through their minds are rash judgments. These suggestions are a very common temptation, and, if repelled, are an occasion of merit; they become sinful only when entertained with pleasure.
(c) Rash judgment is a decision unfavorable to another in matters of character or honor. Thus, it differs from favorable decisions (as when without reason one holds that another is virtuous or has extraordinary merit), and from unfavorable decisions on matters other than character or honor (as when one concludes that a neighbor is mentally or physically deficient, and these defects are not connected with depravity nor considered as ignominious), and from unfavorable decisions that relate to sin but are not personal (as when one thinks that an expression used by an ignorant man is blasphemous, but pa.s.ses no judgment on the state of conscience of the man).
(d) Rash judgment is a decision that expresses conviction, and not mere supposition. Thus, it differs from the prudential att.i.tude by which one a.s.sumes for the sake of security that a stranger is to be distrusted, since he may be dishonest.
(e) Rash judgment is a certain conviction or judgment, that is, one which holds its own view as true and certain and does not consider the opposite of its view as worthy of consideration. Thus, it differs from doubt (that is, a state in which the mind is suspended between the unfavorable view and its opposite, and does not incline to one more than the other), from suspicion (that is, a state in which the mind inclines to the unfavorable view, but does not a.s.sent to it as being either probable or certain), and from opinion (that is, a state in which the mind a.s.sents to the unfavorable view as being probably true, but admits that it may be untrue). These various forms of mental reaction were treated in 654 sqq.
(f) Rash judgment is rash, that is, a belief based on insufficient authority, or an inference that is really groundless or not well drawn from premises. Thus, if one judges that one"s neighbor is a thief, because this was told one by an honest and well-informed person, the judgment is prudent; but, if one judges this on the word of a person who is unreliable or who has no knowledge of the facts, the judgment is imprudent. Again, if one judges that it is certain that one"s neighbor is a thief, because one has evidence that removes all doubt, the judgment is prudent; but if the evidence is merely probable, an opinion based on it is prudent, but a judgment based on it is imprudent. It is not rash to hold that the majority of mankind are lost, or that the present generation is not as good as the generation that preceded, if one has good reasons for such beliefs; but a sweeping and all-inclusive pessimism in such matters is unwarranted.
1732. The reasons for a judgment may be sufficient for something else, but insufficient for the judgment actually formed.
(a) Thus, they may be reasons sufficient for judging that one kind or degree of sin has been committed, but insufficient as regards another kind or degree of sin. For example, if one breaks the lock of another"s desk, there is an argument for willful trespa.s.s, but this alone does not prove larceny or the intent to steal.
(b) They may be sufficient for doubt and insufficient for suspicion, sufficient for suspicion and insufficient for opinion, or sufficient for opinion and insufficient for judgment.
1733. Rash Judgment.--Opinion, suspicion, and doubt are also rash, if there is no sufficient reason to warrant them.
(a) Thus, if there are no probable reasons for an unfavorable opinion, it is rash to form such an opinion. For example, the mere fact that two men have frequent and whispered conference together does not make it likely that they are plotting evil.
(b) If there are no sufficient reasons for inclining towards an unfavorable opinion or for suspending all a.s.sent, suspicion and doubt are rash. For example, the mere fact that a man enters a house when the owners are absent is no reason to suspect him of dishonest purposes, or even to have doubts, if he is of good reputation and enters the house in daylight and in a usual way.