Marvels? Yes, beyond our imagining, but marvels evolved by immutable laws. Revelation is incredible, not only because it fails to bring proof of its truth, but because the proofs abound of its falsehood; it claims to be Divine, and we reject it because we test it by what we know of His undoubted works, for men can write books of Him and call them His revelations, but the frame of nature can only be the work of that mighty Power which man calls G.o.d. Revelation depicts Him as changeable, nature as immutable; revelation tells us of perfection marred, nature of imperfection improving; revelation speaks of a Trinity, nature of one mighty central Force; revelation relates interferences, miracles, nature unbroken sequences, inviolable law. If we accept revelation we must believe in a G.o.d Who made man upright but could not keep him so; Who heard in his far-off heaven the wailing of His earth and came down to see if things were as bad as was reported; Who had a face which brought death, but Whose hinder parts were visible to man; Who commanded and accepted human sacrifice; Who was jealous, revengeful, capricious, vain; Who tempted one king and then punished him for yielding, hardened the heart of another and then punished him for not yielding, deceived a third and thereby drew him to his death. But nature does not so outrage our morality and trample on our hearts; only we learn of a power and wisdom unspeakable, "mightily and sweetly ordering all things," and our hearts tell of a Father and a Friend, infinitely loving, and trustworthy, and good. The G.o.d of Nature and the G.o.d of Revelation are as opposed as Ormuzd and Ahriman, as darkness and light; the Bible and the universe are not writ by the same hand.
II. Revelation then being so utterly untrustworthy, it is satisfactory to discover, secondly, that it is perfectly superfluous.
All man needs for his guidance in this world he can gain through the use of his natural faculties, and the right guidance of his conduct in this world must, in all reasonableness, be the best preparation for whatever lies beyond the grave. Revelationists a.s.sure us that without their books we should have no rules of morality, and that without the Bible man"s moral obligations would be unknown. Their theory is that only through revelation can man know right from wrong. Using the word "revelation"
in a different sense most Theists would agree with them, and would allow that man"s perception of duty is a ray which falls on him from the Righteousness of G.o.d, and that man"s morality is due to the illumination of the inspiring Father of Light. Personally, I believe that G.o.d does teach morality to man, and is, in very deed, the Inspirer of all gracious and n.o.ble thoughts and acts. I believe that the source of all morality in man is the Universal Spirit dwelling in the spirits He has formed, and moving them to righteousness, and, as they answer to His whispers by active well-doing--speaking ever in louder and clearer accents. I believe also that the most obedient followers of that inner voice gain clearer and loftier views of duty and of the Holiest, and thus become true prophets of G.o.d, revealers of His will to their fellows. And this is revelation in a very real sense; it is G.o.d revealing Himself by the natural working of moral laws, even as all science is a true revelation, and is G.o.d revealing Himself by the natural working of physical laws. For laws are modes of action, and modes of action reveal the nature and character of the actor, so that every law, physical and moral, which is discovered by truth-seekers and proclaimed to the world is a direct and trustworthy revelation of G.o.d Himself. But when Theists speak thus of "revelation" using the word as rightfully applicable to all discoveries and all n.o.bly written religious or scientific books, it is manifest that the word has entirely changed its signification, and is applied to "natural" and not "supernatural"
results. We believe in G.o.d working through natural faculties in a natural way, while the revelationists believe in some non-natural communication, made no one knows how, no one knows where, no one knows to whom.
Where opposing theories are concerned an ounce of fact outweighs pounds of a.s.sertion; and so against the statement of Christians, that morality is derived only from the Bible and is undiscoverable by "man"s natural faculties," I quote the morality of natural religion, una.s.sisted by what they claim as their special "revelation."
Buddha, as he lived 700 years before Christ, can hardly be said to have drawn his morality from that of Jesus or even to have derived any indirect benefit from Christian teaching, and yet I have been gravely told by a Church of England clergyman--who ought to have known better--that forgiveness of injuries and charity were purely Christian virtues. This heathen Buddha, lighted only by natural reason and a pure heart, teaches: "a man who foolishly does me wrong I will return to him the protection of my ungrudging love; the more evil comes from him the more good shall go from me;" among princ.i.p.al virtues are: "to repress l.u.s.t and banish desire; to be strong without being rash; to bear insult without anger; to move in the world without setting the heart on it; to investigate a matter to the very bottom; to save men by converting them; to be the same in heart and life." "Let a man overcome evil by good, anger by love, the greedy by liberality, the liar by truth. For hatred does not cease by hatred at any time; hatred ceases by love; this is an old rule." He inculcates purity, charity, self-sacrifice, courtesy, and earnestly recommends personal search after truth: "do not believe in guesses"--in a.s.suming something at hap-hazard as a starting-point--reckoning your two and your three and your four before you have fixed your number one. Do not believe in the truth of that to which you have become attached by habit, as every nation believes in the superiority of its own dress and ornaments and language. Do not believe merely because you have heard, but when of your own consciousness you know a thing to be evil abstain from it. Methinks these sayings of Buddha are unsurpa.s.sed by any revealed teaching, and contain quite as n.o.ble and lofty a morality as the Sermon on the Mount, "natural" as they are.
Plato, also, teaches a n.o.ble morality and soars into ideas about the Divine Nature as pure and elevated as any which are to be found in the Bible. The summary of his teaching, quoted by Mr. Lake in a pamphlet of Mr. Scott"s series, is a glorious testimony to the worth of natural religion. "It is better to die than to sin. It is better to suffer wrong than to do it. The true happiness of man consists in being united to G.o.d, and his only misery in being separated from Him. There is one G.o.d, and we ought to love and serve Him, and to endeavour to resemble Him in holiness and righteousness." Plato saw also the great truth that suffering is not the result of an evil power, but is a necessary training to good, and he antic.i.p.ates the very words of Paul--if indeed Paul does not quote from Plato--that "to the just man all things work together for good, whether in life or death." Plato lived 400 years before Christ, and yet in the face of such teaching as his and Buddha"s,--and they are only two out of many--Christians fling at us the taunt that we, rejectors of the Bible, draw all our morality from it, and that without this one revelation the world would lie in moral darkness, ignorant of truth and righteousness and G.o.d. But the light of G.o.d"s revealing shines still upon the world, even as the sunlight streams upon it steadfastly as of old; "it is not given to a few men in the infancy of mankind to monopolise inspiration and to bar G.o.d out of the soul.... Wherever a heart beats with love, where Faith and Reason utter their oracles, there also is G.o.d, as formerly in the heart of seers and prophets."*
* Theodore Tarker.
It is a favourite threat of the priesthood to any inquiring spirit: "If you give up Christianity you give up all certainty; rationalism speaks with no certain sound; no two rationalists think alike; the word rationalism covers everything outside Christianity, from Unitarianism to the blankest atheism;" and many a timid soul starts back, feeling that if this is true it is better to rest where it is, and inquire no more.
To such--and I meet many such--I would suggest one very simple thought: does "Christianity" give any more certainty than rationalism? Just try asking your mentor, "_whose_ Christianity am I to accept?" He will stammer out, "Oh, the teaching of the Bible, of course." But persevere: "As explained by whom? for all claim to found their Christianity on the Bible: am I to accept the defined logical Christianity of Pius IX., defiant of history, of science, of common sense, or shall I sit under Spurgeon, the denunciator, and flee from the scarlet woman and the cup of her fascinations: shall I believe the Christianity of Dean Stanley, instinct with his own gracious, kindly spirit, cultured and polished, pure and loving, or shall I fly from it as a sweet but insidious poison, as I am exhorted to do by Dr. Pusey, who rails at his "variegated language which destroys all definiteness of meaning." For pity"s sake, good father, label for me the various bottles of Christian medicine, that I may know which is healing to the soul, which may be touched with caution, as for external application, and which are rank poison."
All the priest will find to answer is, that "under sad diversities of opinion there are certain saving truths common to all forms of Christianity," but he will object to particularise what they are, and at this stage will wax angry and refuse to argue with anyone who shows a spirit so carping and so conceited. There is the same diversity in rationalism as in Christianity, because human nature is diverse, but there is also one bond between all freethinkers, one "great saving truth" of rationalism, one article of faith, and that is, that "free inquiry is the right of every human soul;" diverse in much, we all agree in this, and so strong is this bond that we readily welcome any thinker, however we disagree with his thoughts, provided only that he think them honestly and allow to all the liberty of holding their own opinions also. We are bound together in one common hatred of Dogmatism, one common love of liberty of thought and speech.
It is probably a puzzle to good and unlearned Christians whence men, unenlightened by revelation, drew and still draw their morality. We answer, "from mere Nature, and that because Nature and not revelation is the true basis of all morality." We have seen the untrustworthiness of all so-called revelations; but when we fall back on Nature we are on firm ground. Theists start in their search after G.o.d from their well-known axiom: "If there be a G.o.d at all He must be at least as good as His highest creature;" and they argue that what is highest and n.o.blest and most lovable in man _must_ be below, but cannot be above, the height and the n.o.bleness and the loveableness of G.o.d. "Of all impossible thing, the most impossible must surely be that a man should dream something of the Good and the n.o.ble, and that it should prove at last that his Creator was less good and less n.o.ble than he had dreamed."* "The ground on which our belief in G.o.d rests is Man. Man, parent of Bibles and Churches, inspirer of all good thoughts and good deeds. Man, the master-piece of G.o.d"s work on earth. Man, the text-book of all spiritual knowledge. Neither miraculous or infallible, Man is nevertheless the only trustworthy record of the Divine mind in things pertaining to G.o.d. Man"s reason, conscience, and affections are the only true revelation of his Maker,"** And as we believe that we may glean some hints of the Glory and Beauty of our Creator from the glory and beauty of human excellence, so we believe that to each man, as he lives up to the highest he can perceive, will surely be unveiled fresh heights of righteousness, fresh possibilities of moral growth.
* Frances Power Cobbe.
** Rev. Charles Voysey.
To all men alike, good and evil, is laid open Nature"s revelation of morality, as exemplified in the highest human lives; and these n.o.ble lives receive ever the heavenly hall-mark by the instinctive response from every human breast that they "are very good." To those only who live up to the good they see, does G.o.d give the further inner revelation, which leads them higher and higher in morality, quickening their moral faculties, and making more sensitive and delicate their moral susceptibilities. We cannot, as revelationists do, chalk out all the whole range of moral perfection: we "walk by faith and not by sight:" step by step only is the path unveiled to us, and only as we surmount one peak do we gain sight of the peak beyond: the distant prospect is shrouded from our gaze, and we are too fully occupied in doing the work which is given us to do in this world, to be for ever peering into and brooding over the world beyond the grave. We have light enough to do our Father"s work here; when he calls us yonder it will be time enough to ask Him to unveil our new sphere of labour and to cause His sun to rise on it. Wayward children fret after some fancied happiness and miss the work and the pleasure lying at their feet, and so petulant men and women cry out that "man that is born of woman... is full of misery," and wail for a revelation to ensure some happier life: they seem to forget that if this world is full of misery _they_ are put here to mend it and not to cry over it, and that it is our shame and our condemnation that in G.o.d"s fair world so much sin and unhappiness are found. If men would try to read nature instead of revelation, if they would study natural laws and leave revealed laws, if they would follow human morality instead of ecclesiastical morality, then there might be some chance of real improvement for the race, and some hope that the Divine Voice in Nature might be heard above the babble of the Churches.
And Nature is enough for us, gives us all the light we want and all that we, as yet, are fitted to receive. Were it possible that G.o.d should now reveal Himself to us as He is, the Being of Whose Nature we can form no conception, I believe that we should remain as ignorant as we are at present, from the want of faculties to receive that revelation: the Divine language might sound in our ears, but it would be as unintelligible as the roar of the thunder-clap, or the moan of the earthquake, or the whisper of the wind to the leaves of the cedar-tree.
G.o.d is slowly revealing Himself by His works, by the course of events, by the progress of Humanity: if He has never spoken from Heaven in human language, He is daily speaking in the world around us to all who have ears to hear, and as Nature in its varied forms is His only revelation of Himself, so the mind and the heart alone can perceive His presence and catch the whispers ot His mysterious voice.
Never yet has been broken The silence eternal: Never yet has been spoken In accents supernal G.o.d"s Thought of Himself.
We are groping in blindness Who yearn to behold Him: But in wisdom and kindness In darkness He folds Him Till the soul learns to see.
So the veil is unriven That hides the All-Holy, And no token is given That satisfies wholly The cravings of man.
But, unhasting, advances The march of the ages, To truth-seekers" glances Unrolling the pages Of G.o.d"s revelation.
Impatience unheeding, Time, slowly revolving; Unresting, unspeeding, Is ever evolving Fresh truths about G.o.d.
Human speech has not broken The stillness supernal: Yet ever is spoken Through silence eternal, With growing distinctness G.o.d"s Thought of Himself.
ON THE NATURE AND THE EXISTENCE OF G.o.d.
IT is impossible for those who study the deeper religious; problems of our time to stave off much longer the question which lies at the root of them all, "What do you believe in regard to G.o.d?" We may controvert Christian doctrines, one after another; point by point we may be driven from the various beliefs of our churches; reason may force us to see contradictions where we had imagined harmony, and may open our eyes to flaws where we had dreamed of perfection; we resign all idea of a revelation; we seek for G.o.d in Nature only; we renounce for ever the hope (which glorified our former creed into such alluring beauty) that at some future time we should verily "see" G.o.d, that "our eyes should behold the King in his beauty" in that fairy "land which is very far off." But every step we take onwards towards a more reasonable faith and a surer light of Truth leads us nearer and nearer to the problem of problems, "What is That which men call G.o.d?" Not till theologians have thoroughly grappled with this question have they any just claim to be called religious guides; from each of those whom we honour as our leading thinkers we have a right to a distinct answer to this question, and the very object of the present paper is to provoke discussion on this point.
Men are apt to turn aside somewhat impatiently from an argument about the Nature and Existence of the Deity, because they consider that the question is a metaphysical one which leads nowhere; a problem the resolution of which is beyond our faculties, and the study of which is at once useless and dangerous; they forget that action is ruled by thought, and that our ideas about G.o.d are therefore of vast practical importance. On our answer to the question propounded above depends our whole conception of the nature and origin of evil, and of the sanctions of morality; on our idea of G.o.d turns our opinion on the much-disputed question of prayer, and, in fact, our whole att.i.tude of mind towards life, here and hereafter. Does morality consist in obedience to the will of a perfectly moral Being, and are we to aim at righteousness of life because in so doing we please G.o.d? Or are we to lead n.o.ble lives because n.o.bility of life is desirable for itself alone, and because it spreads happiness around us and satisfies the desires of our own nature? Is our mental att.i.tude to be that of kneeling or standing? Are our eyes to be fixed on heaven or on earth? Is prayer to G.o.d reasonable and helpful, the natural cry of a child for help from a Father in Heaven? Or is it, on the other hand, a useless appeal to an unknown and irresponsible force? Is the mainspring of our actions to be the idea of duty to G.o.d, or a sense of the necessity of bringing our being into harmony with the laws of the universe? It appears to me that these questions are of such grave and vital moment that no apology is needed for drawing attention to them; and because of their importance to mankind I challenge the leaders of the religious and non-religious world alike, the Christians, Theists, Pantheists, and those who take no specific name, duly to test the views they severally hold. In this battle the simple foot soldier may touch with his lance the shield of the knight, and the insignificance of the challenger does not exempt the general from the duty of lifting the gauntlet flung down at his feet. Little care I for personal defeat, if the issue of the conflict should enthrone more firmly the radiant figure of Truth. One fault, however, I am anxious to avoid, and that is the fault of ambiguity. The orthodox and the free-thinking alike do a good deal of useless fighting from sheer misunderstanding of each other"s standpoint in the controversy. It appears, then, to be indispensable in the prosecution of the following inquiry that the meaning of the terms used should be unmistakably distinct. I begin, therefore, by defining the technical forms of expression to be employed in my argument; the definitions may be good or bad, that is not material; all that is needed is that the sense in which the various terms are used should be clearly understood. When men fight only for the sake of discovering truth, definiteness of expression is specially inc.u.mbent on them; and, as has been eloquently said, "the strugglers being sincere, truth may give laurels to the victor and the vanquished: laurels to the victor in that he hath upheld the truth, laurels still welcome to the vanquished, whose defeat crowns him with a truth he knew not of before."
The definitions that appear to me to be absolutely necessary are as follows:--
_Matter_ is used to express that which is tangible. _Spirit (or spiritual_) is used to express those intangible forces whose existence we become aware of only through the effects they produce.
_Substance_ is used to express that which exists in itself and by itself, and the conception of which does not imply the conception of anything preceding it.
_G.o.d_ is used to represent exclusively that Being invested by the orthodox with certain physical, intellectual, and moral attributes.
Particular attention must be paid to this last definition, because the term "atheist" is often flung unjustly at any thinker who ventures to criticise _the popular and traditional idea_ of G.o.d; and different schools, Theistic and non-Theistic, with but too much facility, bandy about this vague epithet in mutual reproach.
As an instance of this uncharitable and unfair use of ugly names, all schools agree in calling the late Mr. Austin Holyoake an "atheist," and he accepted the name himself, although he distinctly stated (as we find in a printed report of a discussion held at the Victoria Inst.i.tute) that he did not deny the possibility of the existence of G.o.d, but only denied the possibility of the existence of that G.o.d in whom the orthodox exhorted him to believe. It is well thus to protest beforehand against this name being bandied about, because it carries with it, at present, so much popular prejudice, that it prevents all possibility of candid and free discussion. It is simply a convenient stone to fling at the head of an opponent whose arguments one cannot meet, a certain way of raising a tumult which will drown his voice; and, if it have any serious meaning at all, it might fairly be used, as I shall presently show, against the most orthodox pillar of the orthodox faith.
It is manifest to all who will take the trouble to think steadily, that there can be only one eternal and underived substance, and that matter and spirit must therefore only be varying manifestations of this one substance. The distinction made between matter and spirit is then simply made for the sake of convenience and clearness, just as we may distinguish perception from judgment, both of which, however, are alike processes of thought. Matter is, in its const.i.tuent elements, the same as spirit; existence is one, however manifold in its phenomena; life is one, however multiform in its evolution. As the heat of the coal differs from the coal itself, so do memory, perception, judgment, emotion, and will, differ from the brain which is the instrument of thought. But nevertheless they are all equally products of the one sole substance, varying only in their conditions. It may be taken for granted that against this preliminary point of the argument will be raised the party-cry of "rank materialism," because "materialism" is a doctrine of which the general public has an undefined horror. But I am bold to say that if by matter is meant that which is above defined as substance, then no reasoning person can help being a materialist. The orthodox are very fond of arguing back to what they call the Great First Cause. "G.o.d is a spirit," they say, "and from him is derived the spiritual part of man." Well and good; they have traced back a part of the universe to a point at which they conceive that only one universal essence is possible, that which they call G.o.d, and which is spirit only. But I then invite their consideration to the presence of something which they do not regard as spirit, _i e._, matter. I follow their own plan of argument step by step: I trace matter, as they traced spirit, back and back, till I reach a point beyond which I cannot go, one only existence, substance or essence; am I therefore to believe that G.o.d is matter only?
But we have already found it a.s.serted by Theists that he is spirit only, and we cannot believe two contradictories, however logical the road which led us to them; so we must acknowledge two substances, eternally existent side by side; if existence be dual, then, however absurd the hypothesis, there must be two First Causes. It is not I who am responsible for an idea so anomalous. The orthodox escape from this dilemma by an a.s.sumption, thus: "G.o.d, to whom is to be traced back all spirit, _created_ matter." Why, am I not equally justified in a.s.suming, if I please, that matter created spirit? Why should I be logical in one argument and illogical in another? If we come to a.s.sumptions, have not I as much right to my a.s.sumption as my neighbour has to his? Why may he predicate creation of one half of the universe, and I not predicate it of the other half? If the a.s.sumptions be taken into consideration at all, then I contend that mine is the more reasonable of the two, since it is possible to imagine matter as existing without mind, while it is utterly impossible to conceive of mind existing without matter. We all know how a stone looks, and we are in the habit of regarding that as lifeless matter; but who has any distinct idea of a mind _pur et simple?_ No clear conception of it is possible to human faculties; we can only conceive of mind as it is found in an organisation; intelligence has no appreciable existence except as-residing in the brain and as manifested in results. The lines of spirit and matter are not one, say the orthodox; they run backwards side by side; why then, in following the course of these two parallel lines, should I suddenly bend one into the other? and on what principle of selection shall I choose the one I am to curve? I must really decline to use logic just as far as it supports the orthodox idea of G.o.d, and arbitrarily throw it down the moment it conflicts with that idea. I find myself then compelled to believe that one only substance exists in all around me; that the universe is eternal, or at least eternal so far as our faculties are concerned, since we cannot, as some one has quaintly put it "get to the outside of everywhere;" that a Deity cannot be conceived of as apart from the universe, pre-existent to the universe, post-existent to the universe; that the Worker and the Work are inextricably interwoven, and in some sense eternally and indissolubly combined. Having got so far, we will proceed to examine into the possibility of proving the existence of that one essence popularly called by the name of _G.o.d_, under the conditions strictly defined by the orthodox. Having demonstrated, as I hope to do, that the orthodox idea of G.o.d is unreasonable and absurd, we will endeavour to discover whether _any_ idea of G.o.d, worthy to be called an idea, is attainable in the present state of our faculties.
The orthodox believers in G.o.d are divided into two camps, one of which maintains that the existence of G.o.d is as demonstrable as any mathematical proposition, while the other a.s.serts that his existence is not demonstrable to the intellect. I select Dr. McCann, a man of considerable reputation, as the representative of the former of these two opposing schools of thought, and give the Doctor"s position in his own words:--"The purpose of the following paper is to prove the fallacy of all such a.s.sumptions" (i e., that the existence of G.o.d is an insoluble problem), "by showing that we are no more at liberty to deny His being, than we are to deny any demonstration of Euclid. He would be thought unworthy of refutation who should a.s.sert that any two angles of a triangle are together greater than two right angles. We would content ourselves by saying, "The man is mad"--mathematically, at least--and pa.s.s on. If it can be shown that we affirm the existence of Deity for the very same reasons as we affirm the truth of any geometric proposition; if it can be shown that the former is as capable of demonstration as the latter--then it necessarily follows that if we are justified in calling the man a fool who denies the latter, we are also justified in calling him a fool who says there is no G.o.d, and in refusing to answer him according to his folly." Which course is a very convenient one when you meet with an awkward opponent whom you cannot silence by sentiment and declamation. Again: "In conclusion, we believe it to be very important to be able to prove that if the mathematician be justified in a.s.serting that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, the Christian is equally justified in a.s.serting, not only that he is compelled to believe in G.o.d, but that he knows Him (sic). And that he who denies the existence of the Deity is as unworthy of serious refutation as is he who denies a mathematical demonstration."
("A Demonstration of the Existence of G.o.d," a lecture delivered at the Victoria Inst.i.tute, 1870, pp. I and II.) Dr. McCann proves his very startling thesis by laying down as axioms six statements, which, however luminous to the Christian traditionalist, are obscure to the sceptical intellect. He seems to be conscious of this defect in his so-called axioms, for he proceeds to prove each of them elaborately, forgetting that the simple statement of an axiom should carry direct conviction--that it needs only to be understood in order to be accepted.
However, let this pa.s.s: our teacher, having stated and "proved"
his axioms, proceeds to draw his conclusions from them; and as his foundations are unsound, it is scarcely to be wondered at that his superstructure should be insecure, I know of no way so effectual to defeat an adversary as to beg all the questions raised, a.s.sume every point in dispute, call a.s.sumptions axioms, and then proceed to reason from them. It is really not worth while to criticise Dr. McCann in detail, his lecture being nothing but a ma.s.s of fallacies and unproved a.s.sertions. Christian courtesy allows him to call those who dissent from his a.s.sumptions "fools;" and as these terms of abuse are not considered admissible by those whom he a.s.sails as unbelievers, there is a slight difficulty in "answering" Dr. McCann "according to his" deserts. I content myself with suggesting that they who wish to learn how pretended reasoning may pa.s.s for solid argument, how inconsequent statements may pa.s.s for logic, had better study this lecture. For my own part, I confess that my "folly" is not, as yet, of a sufficiently p.r.o.nounced type to enable me to accept Dr. McCann"s conclusions.
The best representation I can select of the second orthodox party, those who admit that the existence of G.o.d is not demonstrable, is the late Dean Mansel. In his "Limits of Religious Thought," the Bampton Lectures for 1867, he takes up a perfectly una.s.sailable position. The peculiarity of this position, however, is that he, the pillar of orthodoxy, the famed defender of the faith against German infidelity and all forms of rationalism, regards G.o.d from exactly the same point as does a well-known modern "atheist." I have almost hesitated sometimes which writer to quote from, so identical are they in thought. Probably neither Dean Mansel nor Mr. Bradlaugh would thank me for bracketing their names; but I am forced to confess that the arguments used by the one to prove the endless absurdities into which we fall when we try to comprehend the nature of G.o.d, are exactly the same arguments that are used by the other to prove that G.o.d, as believed in by the orthodox, cannot exist.
I quote, however, exclusively from the Dean, because it is at once novel and agreeable to find oneself sheltered by Mother Church at the exact moment when one is questioning her very foundations; and also because the Dean"s name carries with it so orthodox an odour that his authority will tell where the same words from any of those who are outside the pale of orthodoxy would be regarded with suspicion. Nevertheless, I wish to state plainly that a more "atheistical" book than these Bampton Lectures--at least, in the earlier part of it--I have never read; and had its t.i.tle-page borne the name of any well-known Free-thinker, it would have been received in the religious world with a storm of indignation.
The first definition laid down by the orthodox as a characteristic of G.o.d is that he is an Infinite Being. "There is but one living and true G.o.d... of _infinite_ power, &c." (Article of Religion, 1.) It has been said that _infinite_ only means _indefinite_, but I must protest against this weakening of a well-defined theological term. The term _Infinite_ has always been understood to mean far more than indefinite; it means literally _boundless_: the infinite has no limitations, no possible restrictions, no "circ.u.mference." People who do not think about the meaning of the words they use speak very freely and familiarly of the "infinitude" of G.o.d, as though the term implied no inconsistency. Deny that G.o.d is infinite and you are at once called an atheist, but press your opponent into a definition of the term and you will generally find that he does not know what he is talking about. Dean Mansel points out, with his accurate habit of mind, all that this attribute of G.o.d implies, and it would be well if those who "believe in an infinite G.o.d" would try and realise what they express. Half the battle of freethought will be won when people attach a definite meaning to the terms they use. The Infinite has no bounds; then the finite cannot exist. Why? Because in the very act of acknowledging any existence beside the Infinite One you limit the Infinite. By saying, "This is not G.o.d" you at once make him finite, because you set a bound to his nature; you distinguish between him and something else, and by the very act you limit him; that _which is not he_ is as a rock which checks the waves of the ocean; in that spot a limit is found, and in finding a limit the Infinite is destroyed.
The orthodox may retort, "this is only a matter of terms;" but it is well to force them into realising the dogmas which they thrust on our acceptance under such awful penalties for rejection. I know what "an infinite G.o.d" implies, and, as apart from the universe, I feel compelled to deny the possibility of his existence; surely it is fair that the orthodox should also know what the words they use mean on this head, and give up the term if they cling to a "personal" G.o.d, distinct from "creation."--Further--and here I quote Dean Mansel--the "Infinite"
must be conceived as containing within itself the sum, not only of all actual, but of all possible modes of being.... If any possible mode can be denied of it... it is capable of becoming more than it now is, and such a capability is a limitation. (The hiatus refers to the "absolute"
being of G.o.d, which it is better to consider separately.) "An unrealised possibility is necessarily (a relation and) a limit." Thus is orthodoxy crushed by the powerful logic of its own champion. G.o.d is infinite; then, in that case, everything that exists is G.o.d; all phenomena are modes of the Divine Being; there is literally nothing which is not G.o.d.
Will the orthodox accept this position? It lands them, it is true, in the most extreme Pantheism, but what of that? They believe in an "infinite G.o.d" and they are therefore necessarily Pantheists. If they object to this, they must give up the idea that their G.o.d is infinite at all; there is no half-way position open to them; he is infinite or finite, which?
Again, G.o.d is "before all things," he is the only Absolute Being, dependent on nothing outside himself; all that is not G.o.d is relative; that is to say, that G.o.d exists alone and is not necessarily related to anything else. The orthodox even believe that G.o.d did, at some former period (which is not a period, they say, because time then was not--however, at that hazy "time" he did), exist alone, _i e._, as what is called an _Absolute_ Being: this conception is necessary for all who, in any sense, believe in a _Creator_.
"Thou, in Thy far eternity, Didst live and love alone."
So sings a Christian minstrel; and one of the arguments put forward for a Trinity is that a plurality of persons is necessary in order that G.o.d may be able to love at the "time" when he was alone. Into this point, however, I do not now enter. But what does this Absolute imply? A simple impossibility of creation, just as does the Infinite; for creation implies that the relative is brought into existence, and thus the Absolute is destroyed. "Here again the Pantheistic hypothesis seems forced upon us. We can think of creation only as a change in the condition of that which already exists, and thus the creature is conceivable only as a phenomenal mode of the being of the Creator."
Thus once more looms up the dreaded spectre of Pantheism, "the dreary desolation of a Pantheistic wilderness;" and who is the Moses who has led us into this desert? It is a leader of orthodoxy, a dignitary of the Church; it is Dean Mansel who stretches out his hand to the universe and says, "This is thy G.o.d, O Israel."
The two highest attributes of G.o.d land us, then, in the most thorough Pantheism; further, before remarking on the other divine attributes, I would challenge the reader to pause and try to realise this infinite and absolute being. "That a man can be conscious of the infinite is, then, a supposition which, in the very terms in which it is expressed, annihilates itself.... The infinite, if it is to be conceived at all, must be conceived as potentially everything-and actually nothing; for if there is anything in general which it cannot become, it is thereby limited; and if there is anything in particular which it actually is, it is thereby excluded from being any other thing. But again, it must also be conceived as actually everything and potentially nothing; for an unrealised potentiality is likewise a limitation. If the infinite can be" (in the future) "that which it is not" (in the present) "it is by that very possibility marked out as incomplete and capable of a higher perfection. If it is actually everything, it possesses no characteristic feature by which it can be distinguished from anything else and discerned as an object of consciousness." I think, then, that we must be content, on the showing of Dr. Mansel, to allow that G.o.d is, in his own nature--from this point of view--quite beyond the grasp of our faculties; _as regards us he does not exist_, since he is indistinguishable and undiscernable. Well might the Church exclaim "Save me from my friends!" when a dean acknowledges that her G.o.d is a self-contradictory phantom; oddly enough, however, the Church likes it, and accepts this fatal championship. I might have put this argument wholly in my own words, for the subject is familiar to every one who has tried to gain a distinct idea of the Being who is called "G.o.d," but I have preferred to back my own opinions with the authority of so orthodox a man as Dean Mansel, trusting that by so doing the orthodox may be forced to see where logic carries them. All who are interested in this subject should study his lectures carefully; there is really no difficulty in following them, if the student will take the trouble of mastering once for all the terms he employs. The book was lent to me years ago by a clergyman, and did more than any other book I know to make me what is called an "infidel;" it proves to demonstration the impossibility of our having any logical, reasonable, and definite idea of G.o.d, and the utter hopelessness of trying to realise his existence.
It seems necessary here to make a short digression to explain, for the benefit of those who have not read the book from which I have been quoting, how Dean Mansel escaped becoming an "atheist." It is a curious fact that the last part of this book is as remarkable for its a.s.sumptions, as is the earlier portion its pitiless logic. When he ought in all reason to say, "we can know nothing and therefore can believe nothing," he says instead, "we can know nothing and therefore let us take Revelation for granted." An atheistic reasoner suddenly startles us by becoming a devout Christian; the apparent enemy of the faithful is "transformed into an angel of light." The existence of G.o.d "is inconceivable by the reason," and, therefore, "the only ground that can be taken for accepting one representation of it rather than another is, that one is revealed and the other not revealed." It is the acknowledgment of a previously formed _determination_ to believe at any cost; it is a wail of helplessness; the very apotheosis of despair. We cannot have history, so let us believe a fairy-tale; we can discover nothing, so let us a.s.sume anything; we cannot find truth, so let us take the first myth that comes to hand. Here I feel compelled to part company with the Dean, and to leave him to believe in, to adore, and to love that which he has himself designated as indistinguishable and undiscernable; it may be an act of faith but it is a crucifixion of intellect; it may be a satisfaction to the yearnings of the heart, but it dethrones reason and tramples it in the dust.
We proceed in our study of the attributes of G.o.d. He is represented as the Supreme Will, the Supreme Intelligence, the Supreme Love.
_As the Supreme Will_. What do we mean by "will?" Surely, in the usual sense of the word, a will implies the power and the act of choosing.
Two paths are open to us, and we will to walk in one rather than in the other. But can we think of power of choice in connection with G.o.d? Of two courses open to us one must needs be better than the other, else they would be indistinguishable and be only one; perfection implies that the higher course will always be taken; what then becomes of the power of choice? We choose because we are imperfect; we do not know everything which bears on the matter on which we are about to exercise our will; if we knew everything we should inevitably be driven in one direction, that which is the _best possible course_. The greater the knowledge, the more circ.u.mscribed the will; the n.o.bler the nature, the more impossible the lower course. Spinoza points out most clearly that the Divinity _could not_ have made things otherwise than they are made, because any change in his action would imply a change in his nature; G.o.d, above all, must be bound by necessity. If we believe in a G.o.d at all we must surely ascribe to him perfection of wisdom and perfection of goodness; we are then forced to conceive of him--however strange it may sound to those who believe, not only without seeing but also without thinking--as without will, because he must always necessarily pursue the course which is wisest and best.
_As the Supreme Intelligence_. Again, the first question is, what do we mean by intelligence? In the usual sense of the word intelligence implies the exercise of the various intellectual faculties, and gathers up into one word the ideas of perception, comparison, memory, judgment, and so on. The very enumeration of these faculties is sufficient to show how utterly inappropriate they are when thought of in connection with G.o.d. Does G.o.d perceive what he did not know before? Does he compare one fact with another? Does he draw conclusions from this correlation of perceptions, and thus judge what is best? Does he remember, as we remember, long past events? Perfect wisdom excludes from the idea of G.o.d all that is called intelligence in man; it involves unchangeableness, complete stillness; it implies a knowledge of all that is knowable; it includes an acquaintance with every fact, an acquaintance which has never been less in the past, and can never be more in the future. The reception at any time of a new thought or a new idea is impossible to perfection, for if it could ever be added to in the future it is necessarily something less than perfect in the past.
_As the Supreme Love_. We come here to the darkest problem of existence.