As the American ultimatum later formed the basis on which the American Government, immediately after the declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare, broke off diplomatic relations, I here give the vital contents of the American Note of the 18th April verbatim:
"Again and again the Imperial Government has given its solemn a.s.surances to the Government of the United States that at least pa.s.senger ships would not be dealt thus with, and yet it has repeatedly permitted its undersea commanders to disregard those a.s.surances with entire impunity. As recently as February last it gave notice that it would regard all armed merchantmen owned by its enemies as part of the armed naval forces of its adversaries, and deal with them as with men-of-war, thus, at least by implication, pledging itself to give warning to vessels which were not armed and to accord security of life to their pa.s.sengers and crews; but even this limitation their submarine commanders have recklessly ignored.
"The Government of the United States has been very patient. At every stage of this distressing experience of tragedy after tragedy it has sought to be governed by the most thoughtful consideration of the extraordinary circ.u.mstances of an unprecedented war, and to be guided by sentiments of very genuine friendship for the people and Government of Germany. It has accepted the successive explanations and a.s.surances of the Imperial Government as of course given in entire sincerity and good faith, and has hoped, even against hope, that it would prove to be possible for the Imperial Government so to order and control the acts of its naval commanders as to square its policy with the recognized principles of humanity as embodied in the law of nations. It has made every allowance for unprecedented conditions and has been willing to wait until the facts became unmistakable and were susceptible of only one interpretation.
"If it is still the purpose of the Imperial Government to prosecute an indiscriminate warfare against vessels of commerce by the use of submarines without regard to what the Government of the United States must consider the sacred and indisputable rules of international law and the universally recognized dictates of humanity, the Government of the United States is at last forced to the conclusion that there is but one course to pursue. Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against pa.s.senger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether.
This action the Government of the United States contemplates with the greatest reluctance, but feels constrained to take in behalf of humanity and the rights of neutral nations."
After this Note it is obvious that there was no longer any doubt in Berlin, that persistence in the point of view they had hitherto adopted would bring about a break with the United States, for I received instructions to make all preparations for German merchant ships lying in American ports to be rendered useless by the destruction of their engines.
I also received orders to arrange that Mr. Gerard, who had not been informed of the minimum demands of the American Government, should be instructed accordingly.
My reply was as follows:
CABLEGRAM IN CIPHER
"Washington, 1st May, 1916.
"House has informed me that at his request Gerard has already been informed of the minimum demands of the American Government. Wilson is strongly influenced by peace votes. Even the anti-German ring desires the end of the war, as otherwise they fear financial loss. My suggestions are based on the view that submarine warfare, according to international law, is valueless, and in any case, the opening of peace negotiations is more important. It would be advisable in the Note of reply to touch only on the princ.i.p.al points, to talk much of international law and humanity, and to leave details to be settled at a later date. I fear that the continuance of the submarine campaign, on the lines of cruiser warfare, only means the postponement of the rupture as fresh incidents are bound to occur."
On the 4th May followed the German reply, which averted the fourth serious crisis, by declaring that the submarine campaign would return to the recognized laws of cruiser-warfare. The Note began by opposing, in strong terms, the American view, and concluded with the following sentences:
"The German Government feel themselves justified in declaring that it would be impossible to answer to humanity and history, if, after twenty-one months of war the contention over the submarine war were allowed to develop into a serious menace to peace between the German and American peoples. Such a development the German Government will do everything in their power to prevent. They desire, at the same time, to make a final contribution towards confining--so long as the war lasts--the war to the present combatant Powers, an aim which includes the freedom of the seas, and in which the German Government believe themselves still to be in agreement with the Government of the United States.
"On this a.s.sumption the German Government beg to inform the Government of the United States that instructions have been issued to the German naval forces to observe the general principles of international law, with regard to the holding up, searching and destruction of merchant vessels, and not to sink any merchant vessel, even within the war zone, without warning and rescue of the pa.s.sengers and crew, unless they attempt to escape or offer resistance.
"The German Government hope and expect that these new instructions to the naval forces will also remove in the eyes of the United States Government every obstacle that might stand in the way of the realization of the offer of co-operation contained in the Note of the 23rd July, 1915, towards restoring the freedom of the seas during the war, and they do not doubt that the United States Government will now insist with all possible emphasis on the immediate observation by the British Government of those international rules which were universally accepted before the war, and which are specifically stated in the Notes of the American Government to the British Government of the 28th December, 1914, and the 5th November, 1915. Should it happen that the steps taken by the Government of the United States do not meet with the desired result of insuring recognition of the laws of humanity by all the combatant nations, the German Government would consider themselves faced by a new situation, for which they must reserve for themselves full freedom of decision."
The German Note reached the German Emba.s.sy piecemeal, and while the first part was being deciphered, its harsh tone produced in an increasing degree the impression: "Then it is war," which was not relieved until we came to the conclusion of the text.
The attempt made by the Imperial Government to reserve to themselves the right to resume the submarine campaign at a later date was not accepted by Mr. Wilson, and so the difference of opinion remained, which was bound to become a _casus belli_ if we reverted to unrestricted submarine warfare. This reservation led to a further Note from Washington, which I give here:
"The Note of the Imperial German Government under date of May 4th, 1916, has received careful consideration by the Government of the United States. It is especially noted, as indicating the purpose of the Imperial Government as to the future, and that it "is prepared to do its utmost to confine the operations of the war for the rest of its duration to the fighting forces of the belligerents," and that it is determined to impose on all its commanders at sea the limitations of the recognized rules of international law upon which the Government of the United States has insisted. Throughout the months which have elapsed since the Imperial Government announced on February 4th, 1915, its submarine policy, now happily abandoned, the Government of the United States has been constantly guided and restrained by motives of friendship in its patient efforts to bring to an amicable settlement the critical questions arising from that policy. Accepting the Imperial Government"s declaration of its abandonment of the policy which has so seriously menaced the good relations between the two countries, the Government of the United States will rely upon a scrupulous execution henceforth of the now altered policy of the Imperial Government, such as will remove the princ.i.p.al danger to an interruption of the good relations existing between the United States and Germany.
"The Government of the United States feels it necessary to state that it takes it for granted that the Imperial German Government does not intend to imply that the maintenance of its newly-announced policy is in any way contingent upon the course or result of diplomatic negotiations between the Government of the United States and any other belligerent Government, notwithstanding the fact that certain pa.s.sages in the Imperial Government"s Note of the 4th instant might appear to be susceptible of that construction. In order, however, to avoid any possible misunderstanding, the Government of the United States notifies the Imperial Government that it cannot for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States upon the high seas should in any way or in the slightest degree be made contingent upon the conduct of any other Government affecting the rights of neutrals and non-combatants. Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not relative."
This American Note, however, in no way affected the peaceful conclusion of the negotiations.
As a direct result of the _Suss.e.x_ incident, a step forward was taken in the question of American peace mediation. When I called on Colonel House, during the last days of the crisis, we had a long conversation on this question. As always, Colonel House had used his influence on the side of peace with regard to the _Suss.e.x_ incident. He took this opportunity to convey to me the pleasing news contained in a cablegram from Mr. Gerard, that the German Government were now ready to agree to American mediation.
This cablegram was the outcome of the following facts: Mr. Gerard, on account of his anti-German tendency, was not popular in Berlin. He regarded it as a personal slight that the most important negotiations should have been carried on partly in Washington, and partly by Colonel House in Berlin. The Amba.s.sador wanted therefore, to use the opportunity of the _Suss.e.x_ incident to a.s.sert himself, and expressed a desire to visit G.H.Q. and explain the American point of view in person to the Emperor. On the 1st May, Mr. Gerard was received by the Emperor, in the presence of the Imperial Chancellor, on which occasion he received the a.s.surance contained in his telegram.
Karl Helfferich"s account in _Weltkrieg_ gives the impression that the question of American mediation was mentioned for the first time on the 1st May. The two journeys of Colonel House, which were of far greater importance than Mr. Gerard"s visit to G.H.Q., are not mentioned in the Helfferich account. For the rest I have to rely for my information about events in Germany on this and other publications, in addition to the evidence given before the Commission of the National a.s.sembly. In any case, Colonel House regarded the telegram from Berlin as the sequel of his own negotiations there, which point was placed beyond all doubt by the text of the information he communicated to me. In order to inform myself on my side also as to the att.i.tude of our Government, I sent the following telegram to Berlin, to ascertain whether the information from the American Amba.s.sador was in accordance with the facts:
TELEGRAM IN CIPHER
"Washington, No. 26, 4th May.
"House informs me that Gerard has cabled that we would agree to the President"s mediation, and that a visit from House to Berlin, with this object, would be welcomed. Nothing known here about solution of _Lusitania_ question. Mediation naturally depends on this running smoothly, which would be most easily a.s.sured by cessation of submarine campaign during negotiations."
I received the following reply from the Imperial Chancellor:
TELEGRAM IN CIPHER
"Berlin, 6th May, 1916.
"Reply to telegram No. 26.
"For Your Excellency"s information.
"We hope that our Note and great concession finally removes cause of mistrust, and opens era of greater mutual confidence. Animosity of public opinion here against Wilson, as result of tone and contents of his Note and impression of _parti pris_ against us, however, so great that he must take open and unmistakable action with regard to England before he would be accepted as unbia.s.sed mediator by German people. To this extent Gerard"s telegram is premature. If Wilson neglects to take such action, there is danger that the animosity may become irremediable and possibility of mediation driven into distant future. Smoothing the way for peace, of course, always desired. Action against England, however, seems necessary to encourage conciliatory att.i.tude there, if a peace exclusively favorable to England is to be avoided.
"If it is found impossible to induce England to discuss peace with us, even though unofficially perhaps at first, we shall, as England refuses to return to the provisions of the Declaration of London, be placed in an absolutely free position with regard to our great concession amounting to abandonment of submarine campaign. A visit from House very welcome here at any time.
"BETHMANN-HOLLWEG."
Karl Helfferich"s account confirms the view I held at that time, that our concessions in respect of the submarine campaign were essentially prompted by the hope of mediation by Mr. Wilson. The following words of the Emperor make this plain:
"In politics it is necessary, before all things, to know the other party"s point of view; for politics are a question of give and take.
Gerard"s utterances had made it clear that Wilson was seeking a ladder for re-election. It was better, then, that we should offer him the ladder of peace than the ladder of war, which will eventually fall on our own heads."
Moreover, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg has declared before the Commission of the National a.s.sembly that he had expressed to Mr. Gerard the hope that the President would now take steps to bring about the restoration of peace.
When, at that time, Colonel House was discussing with me the German reservation in the Note of the 4th May, in connection with the questions of the "Freedom of the Seas" and peace, he said that the circ.u.mstances were then such that the President no longer possessed the power to compel England to observe international law. England would only give way before the menace of war. In view, however, of the state of natural feeling in the United States, and the development of trade relations between America and the Entente, war with England was out of the question. On the other hand, Mr.
Wilson possessed the power to bring about peace, because on this question he could rely on the support of the majority of the American nation. When the time was ripe, the President would take the desired steps, but a neutral act of this nature would be cried down by the very active Entente party in the United States as pro-German, and could only be carried through if the national feeling towards Germany took a more friendly turn. It was, therefore, necessary that there should be a period of lull, during which Germany should possibly not be discussed at all. The approaching hot season and the usual exodus of political personages from Washington to the country would offer a favorable opportunity to let all negotiations rest, especially as, after the settlement of the _Suss.e.x_ question, no new incidents were to be expected. Colonel House"s remarks accurately reflected the actual position in the United States at the time. I could not but express my agreement, and felt no doubt that the American mediation would begin in the late summer. After our giving way on the submarine question in order to avoid a break with the United States, I regarded it as certain that we would not directly bring about the rupture which had just been averted with such difficulty by reopening the unrestricted submarine campaign, for in view of the American ultimatum of the 18th April, 1916, there was no alternative.
I should like to take this opportunity of making clear that I always regarded American mediation as the only possible way out of the war. I had no faith in the submarine campaign as likely to save the situation, because the entry of the United States into the war would more than outweigh all the advantages that the submarines could bring us. On the other hand I was convinced that If the American Government established a peace conference, this would be sure to lead to peace itself. It could not be imagined that, in view of the nations" need of peace, such a conference could break up without having reached any result. Moreover, after the meeting of a conference, the United States would no longer be in a position to enter the war, because American public opinion would not have allowed it.
But without the help of the United States, the Entente could not win. It resolved itself, therefore, into a question of the skill of our negotiators to ensure a tolerable peace for us, as the result of the conference. Diplomatic negotiations have a way of ending owing to general weariness, in which case the party which holds the best cards secures the greatest advantages. If this happened, we should have the advantage of the position as our military gains would give us a strong lever in the negotiations.
Here I may touch on another question which was engaging my attention at that time. Since the _Lusitania_ catastrophe I had adopted the principle, and put it into practice as far as possible, of leaving the propaganda to our American friends, who were in a position to get an earlier hearing than we, and in any case understood the psychology of the Americans better than the Imperial German agents.
Indeed, the words "German propagandist" had already become a term of abuse in America. We were reproached there with being too indulgent, while in Germany the opposite criticism was levelled at us. In spite of the difficulty of the situation, however, there were Americans of German and other origin, who had the courage openly to champion our cause and to swim against the stream. Among others, a "Citizens"
Committee for Food Shipments" was formed, whose activities spread through the whole country, and were avowedly pro-German. A special function of the committee with Dr. von Mach as executive chief, was a month of propaganda throughout the country, with the object of obtaining the means to supply the children of Germany with milk. The English control of the post even led to the bold plan of building a submarine to run the milk through the English blockade. The propaganda was very vigorously attacked by the greater part of the American Press, but pursued its course unafraid, collected money, submitted protests to the State Department against the att.i.tude of the Entente, and so on.
Dr. von Mach succeeded in bringing the matter to the notice of the President who actively interested himself in it, and promised to see that the milk should pa.s.s the English blockade and reach Germany in safety. Accordingly, the State Department instructed the American Emba.s.sy in Berlin to issue a statement. Meanwhile, the well-known American journalist, McClure, returned from a tour of investigation in Germany, where he had been supported in every way by the German Government departments. He gave a very favorable account of the milk question, as of the feeding of infants in general, and this gave rise to the first disagreeable controversy. Mr. McClure took up an unyielding att.i.tude. Unfortunately, however, the State Department then published an equally favorable report, which, coming from the American Emba.s.sy and published with the approval of the Foreign Office in Berlin, caused the complete collapse of Dr. von Mach. This incident made a very painful impression in America, and led to a series of bitter attacks on Dr. von Mach and the whole movement, which was thus exposed in a most unfortunate light. The favorable report on the milk question was drawn up by a Dr. E. A.
Taylor, and definitely confirmed, and, indeed, inspired, by the German authorities.
I mention this incident to show that our propaganda was not by any means made easier by Germany, although our Press Bureau repeatedly brought up this very question in Berlin. This movement was particularly dear to us, because the Americans are most easily won over when an appeal is made to their humanity. Moreover, the favorable reports on the question of supplies in Germany did not coincide in any way with our defence of the submarine campaign as an act of reprisal.
This method of propaganda from home lost us our best argument.
Even to-day the majority of Americans certainly have no idea how many children have been murdered by the blockade.