"Repeated utterances of the leading statesmen of most of the great nations now engaged in the war have made it plain that their thought has come to this, that the principle of the public right must henceforth take precedence over the individual interests of particular nations, and that the nations of the world must in some way band themselves together to see that right prevails as against any sort of selfish aggression; that henceforth alliance must not be set up against alliance, understanding against understanding, but that there must be a common agreement for a common object, and that at the heart of that common object must lie the inviolable rights of peoples and mankind....
"This is undoubtedly the thought of America. This is what we ourselves will say when there comes a proper occasion to say it....
"We believe these fundamental things: First, that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live. Like other nations, we have ourselves no doubt once and again offended that principle when for a little while controlled by selfish pa.s.sion, as our franker historians have been honorable enough to admit; but it has become more and more our rule of life and action. Second, that the small States of the world have a right to enjoy the same respect for their sovereignty and for their territorial integrity that great and powerful nations expect and insist upon. And, third, that the world has a right to be free from every disturbance of its peace that has its origin in aggression and disregard of the rights of peoples and nations.
"So sincerely do we believe in these things that I am sure that I speak the mind and wish of the people of America when I say that the United States is willing to become a partner in any feasible a.s.sociation of nations formed in order to realize these objects and make them secure against violation....
"But I did not come here, let me repeat, to discuss a programme. I came only to avow a creed and give expression to the confidence I feel that the world is even now upon the eve of a great consummation, when some common force will be brought into existence which shall safeguard right as the first and most fundamental interests of all peoples and all governments, where coercion shall be summoned, not to the service of political ambition or selfish hostility, but to the service of a common order, a common justice, and a common peace. G.o.d grant that the dawn of that day of frank dealing and of settled peace, concord, and co-operation may be near at hand!"
This speech displayed all the characteristics of Mr. Wilson"s oratory: brilliant command of the English language, dazzling wealth of vocabulary and nebulous sentence construction which made the purpose clear only to the initiated. Nevertheless, the vital points of the speech could not be misunderstood. It prepared the world for American mediation by strong emphasis of the League of Nations idea.
The political lull of midsummer brought an important improvement in public feeling towards us. This change for the better was reflected with special clearness in the reception given to the merchant submarine _Deutschland_, as I have already described.
At the time of this speech of Mr. Wilson"s, I sent the following report:
REPORT IN CIPHER
"Washington, 28th May, 1916.
"The placation of American public opinion is progressing. Hardly any mention is now made in the Press of German-American relations.
Only two persons are still wavering. The American Government are delaying the publication of my letter on the subject of the _Lusitania_ settlement, because they think that it will not satisfy public opinion here. It may be a.s.sumed that its publication will take place at the beginning of June, during the Republican National Convention, so that it may pa.s.s as far as possible unnoticed in the general excitement about domestic politics. The American Government"s delay in this matter shows clearly how great the opposition has been. While we thought to have made important concessions, the American Government here consider that they have not attained the objective prescribed for them by public opinion.
"Further, the Igel incident is not yet settled. On this question there is a difference of opinion between the State and Law Departments.
The former confirming our standpoint that the seizure of the papers was illegitimate and that they must be returned. The Law Department, on the other hand, holds that Herr von Igel has been guilty of a legal offence and so has forfeited his diplomatic privileges.
Consequently I get no further, and the case is continually deferred.
It is to be hoped that the State Department will soon bestir itself to make a decision which will, however, in any case, necessitate the recall of Herr Igel.
"Mr. Wilson"s peace plans are becoming more and more tangible.
The only question is whether he possesses sufficient authority to force our enemies to agree to negotiations. Colonel House is convinced that Mr. Wilson will succeed. The President is considering the plan of calling together a conference at the Hague, in which the neutrals will only partic.i.p.ate so far as the "Freedom of the Seas" is concerned. If the project materializes, Colonel House is sure to take part in the conference, even though he may not be the official American representative. His influence, however, would be sure to be great, for no one else is so completely in touch with Mr. Wilson"s views. The latter is still of the opinion that the United States should under no circ.u.mstances take part in the actual settlement of the peace conditions. He and his _alter ego_ are meanwhile very much afraid that our enemies might remain obdurate, since they are under the impression, or are trying to spread the impression, that the President, in opening the peace negotiations, is acting for Germany. Certainly England continually drags this idea into the discussion. At one time it is said that Prince Bulow is coming here to submit the German peace conditions to Mr. Wilson; at another, that Germany is on the brink of starvation and must therefore sue for peace. We ought as far as possible to counteract this propaganda of our enemies. It is to be hoped that it will not do serious harm, because the peace vote in America continues to grow and Mr. Wilson can count with certainty on re-election if he establishes a peace conference. We shall therefore daily gain ground here so long as we appear to be ready to encourage the American peace movement, while our enemies adopt an unfavorable att.i.tude. The American people is now pacifically minded. It becomes clearer every day how difficult it is to arouse enthusiasm for war preparedness, etc. No one who has lived here for any length of time can help coming to the conclusion that peaceful money-making is the Americans" chief interest in life. Only when they think that their rights have been seriously infringed do they lash themselves into an hysterical war-fever. Why should war pa.s.sion smoulder in the hearts of a people whose boundaries are so secure that no enemy has ever been seen inside them, nor in all human probability ever will be?"
After the settlement of the _Suss.e.x_ incident the Imperial Government naturally hoped that Mr. Wilson would take steps to justify our concessions with regard to the submarine question. Accordingly I received the following general instructions:
"Berlin, 7th June, 1916.
"Order A. 56.
"_Confidential._
"More than a month has pa.s.sed since our last Note to the United States without President Wilson making up his mind to approach the English Government on the question of the blockade. True I do not expect that England would allow herself to be influenced by the United States to abandon her infringement of international law; nor do I imagine that a rejection of the American demands by England would lead to a serious disturbance of the relations between these two countries. The existing arbitration treaty, which makes it possible in extreme cases to delay the settlement of the points of contention indefinitely, rules this out. But the complete pa.s.sivity of Mr. Wilson, which could be understood so long as he wished to avoid giving the impression that he was acting under German coercion, but which cannot continue to be justified on these grounds, is bound to re-act very unfavorably on public opinion here and puts the Imperial Government in an extremely difficult position.
"From the information which has reached you, Your Excellency will already realize that our surrender to America on the submarine question has met with approval in wide and influential circles in Germany. If President Wilson persists in his pa.s.sive att.i.tude towards England, it is to be feared that the section of German public opinion whose att.i.tude has so far been favorable to the Government will ally themselves with the opponents of the Government policy, and that the whole of public opinion in Germany will clamor for the resumption of the submarine campaign on the old lines.
In that case, the Imperial Government would be all the less in a position to resist this demand for any length of time, as all the military authorities have always been unanimous in regarding and urging unrestricted submarine warfare as the only effective means to bring about the defeat of England. Moreover, as we have received secret information that the Entente have decided on a drastic tightening of the blockade, and at the same time have agreed in future to meet the protests of the neutrals, and particularly America, with the argument that only in this way can the end of the war, which is also in the interests of the neutral countries, be brought about. Your Excellency will therefore bring to the notice of President Wilson and Mr. House the serious dangers which his pa.s.sivity towards England involves.
"With regard to Mr. Wilson"s plans for mediation, they are meanwhile meeting with vigorous opposition in England. If they are rejected by England, the result cannot but be favorable to us, for we are naturally sceptical of mediation on the part of a statesman so partial to England, and at the same time so nave as President Wilson. This necessarily follows on the consideration that the President would primarily be concerned to construct peace on the basis of the _status quo ante_, and particularly in respect of Belgium. Although there is to-day little on which to form an estimate as to how far we shall be in a position to bring about a solution in conformity with our own interests to the Belgian question, which is the direct result of the war, so much is certain, that if the war continues in our favor, a peace on the basis of the absolute status quo ante would not be acceptable to us. So, as the President interprets his role as the chosen champion of all that, in his opinion, is right and just, it is to be feared that a refusal on our part to make peace on this basis might induce him to go over openly to the enemy"s camp. It is not, however, out of the question that public opinion in England may in time again turn to Mr. Wilson and his desire for mediation. As soon, therefore, as Mr. Wilson"s mediation plans threaten to a.s.sume a more concrete form and there is evidence of an inclination on the part of England to fall in with them, it will be Your Excellency"s duty to prevent President Wilson from approaching us with a positive proposal of mediation.
The choice of means for attaining this object without endangering our relations with the United States I think I may leave to Your Excellency"s diplomatic skill, as from here I am not in a position to get a clear insight into the position of affairs in America.
"VON JAGOW."
I have already mentioned that Mr. Wilson had for some time past subordinated the question of the "Freedom of the Seas," i.e., in this concrete instance the English blockade, to his desire for mediation. Regarded from his point of view, this new ordering of his plans was based on an entirely correct political train of thought.
The President gave first place to the attainable, with a view to taking up later what was for the time being unattainable. In view of the fact that we could bring no pressure to bear to change Mr.
Wilson"s point of view, it only remained for us to exploit his plans as far as possible in the interests of German policy.
As my instructions on the most important point--the question of mediation--did not appear to me sufficiently clear, I asked in the following report, dated from the summer quarters of the Emba.s.sy, for a more detailed explanation:
REPORT IN CIPHER
"In reply to Order A. 56, "Rye, 13th July, 1916.
"The inactivity of Mr. Wilson, who has only one thought, re-election, is due in the first place to the fact that no pressure is being put upon him by American public opinion to take action with regard to England. It is obvious that conditions here are not favorable to such action. Those American circles which are suffering financial losses as a result of the English blockade, have no weight in face of the tremendous stream of gold which our enemies have poured lavishly over this country, not haggling over details, and conniving at "graft." For the rest, Mr. Wilson"s train of thought with regard to action in respect of England practically coincides with that expressed by Your Excellency. He does not think at present that it is likely to meet with any success, as he has no means of bringing pressure to bear. No one would take him seriously if he threatened England with war.
"The position is quite different with the President"s well-known anxiety to bring about peace in Europe. In this matter he now has the whole of American public opinion behind him. He also believes that, after the expected failure of their present offensives, our enemies will be ready to open peace negotiations. If this a.s.sumption proves unfounded, and our enemies reject an American invitation on these lines, the main question dealt with in Your Excellency"s instructions to me will be settled. Meanwhile, he is sure to make an attempt to negotiate peace, if only for election purposes. I therefore venture to request Your Excellency to cable me further brief instructions as to how I am to interpret the words "more concrete form of mediation plans," and "positive proposal of mediation." I am a.s.suming that the main part of my respectful reports will only reach Your Excellency at the same time as this. Therefore, Mr.
Gerard, when Your Excellency spoke with him at the beginning of May, on the question of mediation, would not have received detailed instructions as to the President"s intentions. In any case, he was mistaken as to the att.i.tude Your Excellency should adopt with regard to an American peace-movement. On the strength of a telegram received at that time from Mr. Gerard, Mr. Wilson believed that the Imperial Government was ready to accept his mediation, and I accordingly contradicted this a.s.sumption as instructed. As far as I know, Mr. Wilson refuses definitely to take any part in the discussion of territorial questions, but confines his interest to "disarmament" and "Freedom of the Seas." His idea is that there should be a conference at the Hague, in which the United States and other neutral Powers would only take part in so far as these two questions are concerned. "Disarmament" may certainly be very undesirable for us, but, on the other hand, the "Freedom of the Seas," ought, without a doubt, to bring us on the side of the United States. If it once comes to peace negotiations between the combatants, I regard it as out of the question--even were they to fail--that the United States would enter the war against us. American public feeling in favor of peace is too strong for that. It required the hysterical excitement roused by the _Lusitania_ question, and the incidents connected with it, to produce a state of mind among Americans which at times made war seem inevitable. In the absence of similar incidents, such a state of public feeling could not be aroused. The admiration with which the cruise of the submarine _Deutschland_ was regarded showed plainly which way the wind blows now.
"I made the above mentioned request because I consider it out of the question to prevent Mr. Wilson from taking action with regard to peace. I am in doubt, however, whether by a "positive proposal of mediation" your Excellency means such a proposal as that made by Mr. Roosevelt after the Russo-j.a.panese War. On that occasion it is well known that the negotiations were carried on under direct American influence. This, as I have already said, is not what Mr.
Wilson wants. He only wants to play the part of peace-instigator; he would like to deserve the credit for having brought the combatants to negotiate one with the other. Such a success would, in view of the state of feeling here, probably a.s.sure his re-election.
"I am therefore convinced that within the next few weeks the President will inst.i.tute proceedings with regard to peace, provided that the enemy offensive continues to prove abortive. Mr. Wilson will then tell England that he has been obliged on the grounds of domestic politics to make a sharp protest against the blockade, provided that peace negotiations have not been opened. For me the question now arises whether I am to try to stand in the way of these proceedings.
Of course I could exert strong influence on Colonel House. Wilson, however, would immediately suspect that we were attempting to deal with his successor, and to give Mr. Hughes the honor of instigating peace proceedings.
"As far as I can judge from here, there seem to be three possibilities:
"1. That the Wilson peace movement should fail in consequence of the obduracy of our enemies. In that case, if we were to reopen the submarine campaign to bring England to her knees, the situation would at least be more favorable to us than before.
"2. That the peace movement should fail through us, and that we should resume the submarine war.
"3. That the peace movement should be accepted by both sides.
"In the first case, I consider war with the United States probable; in the second, certain. This is the reason for my request for more definite instructions as to whether I am to impede a peace movement, or only a positive proposal that would bind us in respect of territorial conditions."
To this report I received the following reply, containing quite clear instructions, emphatically to encourage Mr. Wilson in whatever course he might take:
TELEGRAM IN CIPHER
"Berlin, 18th August, 1916.
"In reply to report A. 350 of the 13th inst.
"Mediation by the President intended lead to the opening of peace negotiations between the combatants we are gladly ready to accept.
Please encourage emphatically the President"s efforts in this direction.
Naturally it must not be imagined that in accepting such mediation we bind ourselves to any concrete peace conditions. A general peace conference with partic.i.p.ation of neutrals only tolerable on the lines of previous successful peace-negotiations between combatants with regard to general and international questions of Freedom of the Seas and Disarmament.