"Washington, 11th October 1916.
"Wilson gave particular force to his remarks by pointing out that the leaders of the opposition Roosevelt, Lodge and Co., desired war with Germany, which he was quite unable to understand. His only desire was to remain neutral, and to help to bring the war to an end as a decision by force of arms seemed to him out of the question. He thought that neither of the belligerent parties would be able to gain a decisive victory. Therefore it was better to make peace to-day than to-morrow. But all prospect of ending the war would vanish if the United States were also drawn in.
"As Wilson always spoke as though he was holding himself in readiness, in case his services as mediator were required, I told him that in my opinion there was no prospect of any advances being made by the belligerent Powers.
"It was obvious that Wilson would have preferred to be directly encouraged to make peace before the election because in that case he would have been sure of being re-elected. If, however, he were re-elected without this, he would have to make up his mind to take the initiative himself. Result of the poll still very doubtful.
Wilson surprisingly strong, as Hughes has little success as a speaker and Roosevelt does more harm than good."
To this I received the following reply from the Chancellor:
CIPHER TELEGRAM
"Berlin, 14th October, 1916.
"Demand for unrestricted submarine campaign increasing here with prolongation of war and improbability of decisive military blow, without, however, shaking the Government"s att.i.tude.
"Direct request for Wilson"s mediation still impossible, in view of favor hitherto shown to Entente, and after last speeches of Asquith and Lloyd George. Spontaneous appeal for peace, towards which I again ask you to encourage him, would be gladly accepted by us. You should point out Wilson"s power, and consequently his duty, to put a stop to slaughter. If he cannot make up his mind to act alone he should get into communication with Pope, King of Spain and European neutrals. Such joint action, since it cannot be rejected by Entente, would insure him re-election and historical fame.
"BETHMANN-HOLLWEG."
The incident of the Emperor"s memorandum closed with the following telegram sent by me:
CIPHER TELEGRAM
"Washington, 20th October, 1916.
"I thought it better to give memorandum to Gerard for House, as in this way greater discretion is a.s.sured. Latter was incautious in his utterances to Press here. House will speak with Gerard.
Both gentlemen see Wilson shortly, and are accordingly in constant touch.
"It is still not to be expected that Wilson will make peace advances before the election. Nor that he will get into communication with Pope or King of Spain as. .h.i.therto every suggestion of joint action has met with immovable opposition, chiefly based on tradition.
Meanwhile prospect of Wilson"s re-election becomes obviously greater every day. Should this occur I believe that Wilson will very soon attempt mediation and with success, chiefly because the feeling against England has greatly increased, which England is seeking to hide. If peace is not concluded serious Anglo-American differences of opinion are to be expected. Until now every fresh dispute with Germany with regard to the submarine question has always been exploited by our enemies here to bridge the differences with England. Already the agitation in the German Press for unrestricted submarine warfare is persistently used for this purpose."
After a hard struggle Mr. Wilson was re-elected President. The pacifist tendency in the United States had won, for the battle was fought under the watchword that Mr. Wilson had preserved peace for the United States. "He kept us out of the war" had been the battle-cry of the Democrats. The few electioneering speeches made by the President breathed the spirit of neutrality and love of peace. It is particularly to be noticed that at that time, Mr.
Wilson, in an address, dealt in a thoroughly objective way with the question of guilt for the origin of the war, which was later to be the determining factor in his att.i.tude towards us. The way was now cleared for the opening of the peace movement. Public feeling had also become more favorable to us, inasmuch as the American war industry no longer attached so much importance to the prolongation of the war after the victorious Democratic party had drawn up an extensive armament programme and so indicated to the industry the prospect of great State contracts.
On the subject of my own att.i.tude with regard to the election, innumerable legends have been spread through Germany. The few German-Americans who shared the views of the so-called "German-American Chamber of Commerce" have reproached me with having brought about Mr. Wilson"s election by influencing the German-Americans.
Anti-German-American newspapers maintained, on the other hand, that I had used every lever to bring about the election of the Republican candidate, Mr. Hughes, so as to punish Mr. Wilson for his att.i.tude towards the submarine campaign. My position was an extraordinarily difficult one, as I could neither take part in the election nor give up the relations which naturally and in the course of my duty bound me to the German-Americans and pacifists.
In general I may say that the vast majority of German-Americans had absolute confidence in me throughout. A splendid testimony of this was given at the great German bazaar which was held in New York in aid of the Red Cross. This undertaking made the astounding net profit of 800,000 dollars. At the opening nearly 30,000 people were present, who gave me an indescribably enthusiastic ovation simply because they believed that I had prevented war between Germany and the United States.
I never for a moment denied that I personally should be glad to see Mr. Wilson re-elected, as I was convinced that he had the determination and the power to bring about peace. It was at that time impossible for me to foresee that our Government would change its att.i.tude to this question. All American pacifists belonged to the Democratic camp, all militarists belonged to the Republican party.
A change in our favor was, therefore, not to be expected from the election of Mr. Hughes. Apart from the usual relations with the pacifists and German-Americans already mentioned, which were in no way altered during the election, I held myself aloof as my position demanded. If it had been possible to accuse me of taking sides, the agents of the Entente would not have missed the opportunity of bringing me to book, as this they regarded as their object in life. I continually received letters from _agents provocateurs_, asking for my opinion on the elections. Of course I never replied to these. Neither were the false statements of anti-German newspapers any more successful which announced that on the day of the election I had openly shown my support of Mr. Hughes.
New York at night after the polling is one of the sights of America. All streets, squares, theatres and restaurants are filled to overflowing.
The election results are displayed everywhere by electric light and cinematograph. Particularly when the result is very uncertain, as in 1916, the crowd are tremendously excited. At 11 p.m. the election of Mr. Hughes seemed certain, as the Eastern States had voted for him almost to a man, and it was said that a Democratic candidate can only gain the victory if he wins over New York State. Next day the picture changed, after the results had come gradually from the West, where the Democratic party was everywhere triumphant.
The majority, however, was so slight that it was several days before Mr. Wilson"s election was secure.
The malcontents among the German-Americans already mentioned maintain that if Mr. Hughes had been elected, Congress would have used the four months between the election and the 4th March, during which Mr. Wilson was powerless and Mr. Hughes had not yet got the reins into his hands, to rush through the warning of American citizens against travelling on British pa.s.senger-ships. In that case, Mr.
Hughes, on a.s.suming office, would have found himself faced with a situation which would have prevented him from entering the war, in view of the national inclination towards peace. Therefore, the German-Americans ought to have supported Hughes. This had been clear to the Germans in the East. They maintained that Wilson"s re-election was due to the German votes in the Western States which had obeyed a more or less clear order from the German Emba.s.sy.
This line of argument is yet another proof that the Germans in question had no idea of the situation in America. They kept exclusively to themselves in the _Deutscher Verein_, and scarcely ever saw a real, true-bred American. To begin with, it is difficult to see why the Germans in the West should obey the alleged order from me if the Germans in the East did not do so. But the important thing is that Wilson had firmly made up his mind, in case Mr. Hughes was elected, to appoint him Secretary of State immediately and, after Hughes had informed himself on the political position in this office, to hand over the presidency and himself retire. Mr.
Wilson considered it impossible to leave the country without firm leadership at such a dangerous moment.
Immediately after the official announcement of his reelection, Mr. Wilson wrote a Peace-Note, but unfortunately kept it in his desk, because, unhappily, just at that time a new anti-German wave swept over the country on account of the Belgian deportations. Mr.
Wilson was at that time in the habit of typing the drafts of his Notes and speeches himself, and only submitting them to his advisers on points of law or other technicalities. Whether he still works in this way I do not know. If the unhappy measure of the Belgian deportations had not been adopted, and particularly just as we had informed the President that we did not want to annex Belgium, the history of the world would probably have taken a different course.
The American mediation would have antic.i.p.ated our peace offer and, therefore, would probably have succeeded, because we could not then have reopened the unrestricted submarine campaign without letting the mediation run its course.
In November several submarine incidents occurred in which there was a doubt as to whether the rules of cruiser warfare had been followed. The ships _Marina_ and _Arabia_ came under particular consideration. I will not go into these cases as they had no political importance. President Wilson caused the investigations to be carried on in a dilatory fashion because he did not want to see his peace move disturbed by controversies.
Of greater importance was the wish that was again cropping up in Berlin to open the so-called "intensified submarine campaign." I learned this in the following from Secretary of State von Jagow:
CIPHER TELEGRAM NO. 112.
"Berlin, 8th November, 1916.
"Navy wishes at least torpedo armed enemy cargo-vessels without warning. Does Your Excellency consider this dangerous, apart from probable mistakes, particularly in view of fact that now many Americans are lured to travel on such steamers!
"VON JAGOW."
As the "intensified submarine campaign" would have destroyed all prospect of American intervention, I advised strongly against it in the two following telegrams:
(1) CIPHER TELEGRAM NO. 152
"Washington, 17th November, 1916.
"It is urgently desirable not to reopen disputes about armed merchantmen, especially in view of Wilson"s peace plan."
(2) CIPHER TELEGRAM
"Washington, 20th November, 1916.
"In reply to telegram No. 112 which was delayed.
"Pursuant to Telegram No. 152.
"Urge no change in submarine war, until decided whether Wilson will open mediation. I consider this imminent."
At the same time I received the first news of the intended peace offer of the German Government. To begin with, the following telegram arrived from Secretary of State von Jagow:
CIPHER TELEGRAM