""PAPEN.""
In view of the approaching session of Congress, the Government, on December 5th, published the fact that they had demanded the recall of the Attaches. This fact, with slight foundation for the American Government"s suspicions, made a bad impression in Berlin; I went therefore, to see Mr. Lansing on December 8th, and obtained from him this letter:
"As I have already stated, the demand for recall of the two Attaches of your Emba.s.sy was made as a result of the careful investigation of a number of facts and circ.u.mstances, which convinced this Government that they could no longer consider these two officers as _personoe gratoe_, and that their continued residence in the United States was, therefore, no longer compatible with diplomatic propriety.
This being the considered and deliberate view of this Government, it would seem that the mere fact of Captains von Papen and Boy-Ed being no longer acceptable, should have been sufficient justification for their immediate recall by the German Government without further discussion. The expectations of the United States Government, in this respect, were in accordance with all diplomatic precedent in cases where such requests have been made, and there seemed to be, therefore, no reason why this demand should have been kept a secret. It is regretted that the Imperial Government should have regarded the publication of the American request as an act of discourtesy towards itself. The United States Government does not share this view of its action, and, therefore, cannot be expected to express its regret for having acted as it has done.
"This Government is surprised that the Imperial Government should not have complied at once with its request for the recall of the two Attaches, who are no longer _personoe gratoe_ here. It seems to me obvious that whatever may have been the reasons for such request, it is for this Government, and not for the German Government, to say whether the charges alleged against the members of a German diplomatic mission appear sufficiently well-founded to justify action such as that now taken. In other words, the causes of the demand are legitimate and sufficient, as being based on suppositions or suspicions of undesirable activities on the part of these two officers.
"In any case, the fact remains, that Boy-Ed and von Papen are no longer acceptable to this Government.
"As I already apprised you by word of mouth, and in my letter of 4th of this month, the relations of the two Attaches with individuals who partic.i.p.ated in illegal and questionable activities, are established.
The names of von Wedell, Rintelen, Stegler, Burode, Archibald and Fay may be mentioned as some of those who have transgressed against our laws. I could also name other men and cite other examples of their activities, but as these are at present the object of an official inquiry, I, by this means, should only prevent the arrest of those who violated our laws and still continue to violate them.
"Although I have already said that this Government does not want to do anything further than to request the recall of Boy-Ed and von Papen, since they are no longer _personoe gratoe_, I, nevertheless, do not desire to go beyond the above declaration; so that your Government may be in a position to inst.i.tute an inquiry into the manner of dealing with your Attaches, should it wish to do so. If I should go into further details on this matter I might interfere with the inquiry which is now being taken up by this Government, dry up very valuable sources of information, and thus hinder the course of justice. On the other hand there might thus be raised other grounds for suspicion, serving rather to disturb than to improve the present friendly relations between the two countries. I need not tell your Excellency, that it is the sincere wish of this Government to avoid difficulties of this kind, so far as may be consistent with its dignity and its responsibilities."
Besides dispatching a copy of the above letter, I wired to Berlin on 8th December, as follows:
CIPHER
"Convinced that Rintelen is the main cause of the Attaches" recall.
Immediate categorical disavowal is absolutely necessary. Only possible connection with us is matter of 500,000 dollars, received from the Naval Attache and demanded for the exportation of goods."
Thereupon I received the following wireless message in English:
CIPHER
"You are empowered to disclaim connection with Rintelen, who had no orders to do anything whatsoever, which was an offence against the American law.
"JAGOW."
The peculiar relations of the Naval and Military Attaches with the Emba.s.sy had, even in times of peace, often led to diplomatic difficulties. For instance, it has often happened to us and to other countries to have to recall Military or Naval Attaches for spying. The diplomatic standing of the head of the Mission would not generally be affected thereby, but, in view of the pa.s.sions of wartime, and the general tension of nerves, I realized that I might be compromised by the demand for the recall of the Attaches. I questioned Lansing outright on this point, and added that I should immediately hand in to my Government my resignation, if I was considered to be myself "tarred with the same brush." The Secretary of State a.s.sured me that I was by no means involved, and that I should not on any account give up my post, since I had to carry on the momentous negotiations now in course, and the American Government had full confidence in me. Under the circ.u.mstances I saw no reason why the enforced recall of the Attaches should have any further results, and I was confirmed in this view a few days later when House repeated to me Lansing"s a.s.surance with even greater emphasis. His exact words were as follows:
"You must not dream of going home before peace is declared. You are the one tie that still binds us to Germany. If this tie should break, war would be inevitable."
Both Attaches returned to Berlin under safe-conduct from the Entente at the end of December, 1915. Their offices were taken over by their representatives, but only for the purpose of settling up any outstanding matters.
At the beginning of 1916, there was in the United States no single German organization which merited the name of "propaganda." Thus no activities which could compromise us in any way ensued henceforward.
The political situation had become so serene that we had no need for propaganda. The pacifist elements in the United States did this work for us. The only question was as to whether we would remain really at one with them, or whether we meant to persist in submarine warfare, which must inevitably lead us into war.
President Wilson opened Congress on 7th December, 1915, with a message, in which he set forth the new programme for national defence.
"Preparedness" became the order of the day in the United States.
The message demanded that the Army and Navy should be increased, and added:
"The urgent question of our mercantile and pa.s.senger shipping is closely connected with the problem of national supply. The full development of our national industries, which is of such vital importance to the nation, pressingly calls for a large commercial fleet. It is high time to make good our deficiencies on this head and to restore the independence of our commerce on the high seas."
In this message may be recognized the second important point in the Presidential programme for the next election. "Peace and Preparedness" was to be the battle-cry of the Democratic Party. The Mexican imbroglio of 1913-14 had proved that the armed forces of the United States were unequal even to the demands of a comparatively small campaign; and the American Government, for lack of means, had been unable to impose its will on Mexico. Now the European War stirred all imaginations and offered a favorable occasion for overcoming the prejudices of the pacifist section against military armaments. It was not so long since the song "I didn"t raise my boy to be a soldier," was sung with fervor all the land over; but now events had too clearly proved the powerlessness of any but well-armed nations even to follow their own lines of policy; and the necessity of a mercantile marine of their own grew daily clearer to the people of the United States. Hitherto the Americans had always found enough of foreign vessels for the transport of their goods, had found it cheaper to make use of these facilities than to supply their own under the conditions existing in the States. Now, however, the shortage of merchant tonnage was acute, and American goods were piled roof high in all the warehouses of New York harbor.
It was clear that now or never was the time to seize the chance afforded by the war of persuading Congress to sanction the provision of a strong Army and Fleet.
The Presidential message also touched on the "conspiracies," but without any mention of the German Emba.s.sy"s supposed share in them.
The period of these so-called "conspiracies" thus closed with a sharp reprimand addressed by Mr. Wilson to the German-Americans, and with my official recommendation to the Germans in the United States to abstain from all forms of illegal action. The after-effects of this period, however, may be traced in the subsequent lengthy trials of the various offenders. I cannot be sure that since the beginning of 1916, not one single incident which could be comprised under the term "conspiracy" came to light; but these trials and Entente propaganda kept the recollection of such affairs alive, and the American war propaganda service had no difficulty subsequently in retelling the old tales which, but for the entry of the United States into the war, would have pa.s.sed into oblivion.
The paragraphs of the message dealing with this subject ran as follows:
"We are at peace with all the nations of the world, and there is reason to hope that no question in controversy between this and other Governments will lead to any serious breach of amicable relations, grave as some differences of att.i.tude and policy have been and may yet turn out to be. I am sorry to say that the gravest threats against our national peace and safety have been uttered within our own borders. There are citizens of the United States, I blush to admit, born under other flags, but welcomed by under our generous naturalization laws to the full freedom and opportunity of America, who have poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life; who have sought to bring the authority and good name of our Government into contempt, to destroy our industries wherever they thought it effective for their vindictive purposes to strike at them, and to debase our politics to the uses of foreign intrigue. Their number is not great as compared with the whole number of those st.u.r.dy hosts by which our nation has been enriched in recent generations out of virile foreign stocks; but it is great enough to have brought deep disgrace upon us and to have made it necessary that we should promptly make use of processes of law by which we may be purged of their corrupt distempers.
"But the ugly and incredible thing has actually come about and we are without adequate federal laws to deal with it. I urge you to enact such laws at the earliest possible moment, and feel that in doing so I am urging you to do nothing less than save the honor and self-respect of the nation. Such creatures of pa.s.sion, disloyalty and anarchy must be crushed out. They are not many, but they are infinitely malignant, and the hand of our power should close over them at once. They have formed plots to destroy property, they have entered into conspiracies against the neutrality of the Government, they have sought to pry into every confidential transaction of the Government in order to serve interests alien to our own. It is possible to deal with these things very effectually. I need not suggest the terms in which they may be dealt with."
The message, up to a point, maintained an impartial att.i.tude, for it not only blamed the German-Americans but continued in the following words, aimed solely at the many Americans in London and Paris who disapproved of Wilson"s policy of peace and neutrality:
"I wish that it could be said that only a few men, misled by mistaken sentiments of allegiance to the governments under which they were born, had been guilty of disturbing the self-possession and misrepresenting the temper and principles of the country during these days of terrible war, when it would seem that every man who was truly an American would instinctively make it his duty and his pride to keep the scales of judgment even and prove himself a partisan of no nation but his own. But it cannot. There are some men among us, and many resident abroad who, though born and bred in the United States and calling themselves Americans, have so forgotten themselves and their honor as citizens as to put their pa.s.sionate sympathy with one or the other side in the great European conflict above their regard for the peace and dignity of the United States.
They also preach and practise disloyalty. No laws, I suppose, can reach corruptions of the mind and heart; but I should not speak of others without also speaking of these and expressing the even deeper humiliation and scorn which every self-possessed and thoughtfully patriotic American must feel when he thinks of them and of the discredit they are daily bringing upon us."
About the turn of the year 1915-16, the severance of diplomatic relations between the American and Austro-Hungarian Governments had become imminent. The Italian liner _Ancona_ was torpedoed on November 7th in the Mediterranean Sea by an Austro-Hungarian submarine and went down before all the pa.s.sengers could succeed in escaping; many lives were lost, American citizens being among them. In consequence, the Washington Government dispatched to Vienna a Note couched in far stronger terms than any it had yet sent; demanding that the action should be admitted to be unlawful and inexcusable, that compensation should be made, and that the officer responsible should be punished for his deed, which would be branded by the whole world as inhuman and barbarous, and would incur the abhorrence of all civilized nations.
The Austro-Hungarian representative, Baron Zwiedeeneck von Suedenhorst, found himself in an extremely difficult position. Owing to the fact that he only ranked as charge d"affaires, and that his appointment only dated from Dr. Dumba"s departure, he was not empowered to enter into negotiations. He had always proved himself a very loyal colleague and acted in close co-operation with me, but in this instance, as the matter was one solely for Vienna"s decision, I could be of little service to him. I counselled him to telegraph frankly to his Government, that if the American demands were not conceded, a breach was to be expected. I was myself inclined to believe that, as in the case of our Naval and Military Attaches, Mr. Wilson"s real purpose was to give the lie to those accusations of weakness which the Entente party was constantly casting in his teeth, and this, I thought, accounted for the unwonted sternness of the American Note, which seemed absolutely to challenge a rupture.
It was not conceivable that the Austrian Government could swallow this bitter pill, while from the point of view of the American Government, the breaking-off of relations would be a real diplomatic victory; for on the one hand the political situation would remain unchanged so long as the German Emba.s.sy was in Washington, and on the other hand, Mr. Wilson would have achieved his object and shown the Berlin Government that his threats of war were seriously meant.
However, the Austro-Hungarian Government, after a short further exchange of Notes, complied under protest with the American demands.
I learned after my return home that in so doing, they acted under pressure from the German Foreign Office. Thus, this crisis also blew over, not, however, without a serious loss of prestige for the Central Powers, who had been compelled to yield to demands generally regarded as utterly unacceptable. Nothing could be more fatal to our position in the world than this alternation of defiance and submission, which served no diplomatic object and merely betrayed infirmity of purpose.
CHAPTER VIII
THE SECOND "LUSITANIA" CRISIS
In Germany, and particularly before the Committee of the National a.s.sembly, the American Government has been reproached with _mala fides_ for having unnecessarily reopened the _Lusitania_ question.
The line of argument is approximately as follows:
After the settlement of the _Arabic_ case one can suspect the obstinate harping on the _Lusitania_ affair, which had really died down, as a sign of _mala fides_. Did the Americans want to secure a fresh diplomatic success against us? They had already carried their principle with the settlement of the _Arabic_ case; was their object now to make a still greater splash? The continued possibility of a conflict with Germany--which was quite within practical politics if nothing intervened--made a very favorable background to make clear to American public opinion, in conjunction with a campaign on the same lines by Wilson himself, the following point: "We must get ourselves out of this situation pregnant with war by vindicating our right with both sides."
Apart from the fact that the negotiations on the _Lusitania_ question had been allowed to hang fire for about six weeks I believe that in this case we have again underestimated the significance of hostile public opinion in America. The best way of making clear the situation in the United States will probably be for me to reproduce here the telegrams and reports in which I informed Berlin of the reopening of the _Lusitania_ negotiations.