American opinion, however, laid the chief blame for what had occurred on Dr. Dumba, who was henceforward regarded as a dangerous intriguer.
Mr. Lansing was a lawyer, not a politician, and looked at everything from the point of view of a lawyer and his position as the President"s sole legal adviser. He was, so to speak, Mr. Wilson"s legal conscience.
My personal relations with him were always extremely cordial.
Mr. Bryan"s point of view was in every sense that of a neutral.
The only really effective way of safeguarding American interests was, of course, to forbid the use of hostile pa.s.senger ships by citizens of the United States, who could perfectly well travel on their own vessels, or those of Holland or Scandinavia. However, the greater part of American public opinion did not accept this strict view of neutrality, and Mr. Wilson, therefore, adapted himself to the predominant opinion. It was useless for us to demand that the President should interpret his neutrality in the manner most convenient to us; we had to accept the fact that his ideas on this subject were neither ours nor Mr. Bryan"s, and, on this basis, endeavor to come to an understanding with Mr. Wilson, if we did not intend to bring the United States into the war. It must be remembered that, as I have already said, we had no means of bringing pressure to bear on America, whereas from her point of view war with Germany would be a comparatively simple affair, which would involve no vital risks for her, but would, on the contrary, greatly benefit her from an industrial point of view, besides gratifying the jingoes, by giving them an opportunity of making full use of their long-desired Army, Navy and commercial fleet. There could be considered, as factors tending to the preservation of peace, only the pacific sentiment of the majority of the people working in alliance with the dilatory policy of the President, who still nourished a hope that some favorable turn or other in events, or perhaps the advent of peace, would give him a chance to avoid breaking of relations with Germany.
The diplomatic incident, mentioned above, made such an impression on Mr. Gerard, as to induce him to make, on his own initiative in Berlin, at the time when the American Note of 10th June had to be answered, a proposal which met with a by no means cordial reception. His suggestion was that a certain number of pa.s.senger ships, detailed beforehand for the purpose, and rendered clearly recognizable, should be used for the transport of Americans to England; but though this scheme was embodied in the German Note of 8th July, it was at once rejected at Washington. Any a.s.sent to it would no doubt have involved a further departure from the principles laid down by the American Government--principles which it desired should be generally accepted, but which had already been in some measure compromised. The vessels which it was suggested should be employed in this service were to be marked in red, white and blue stripes, and as barbers" shops in the United States are decorated in this manner, they were called "Barber Ships."
On the 21st of July, the final American Note on the _Lusitania_ case was dispatched. The Washington Government modified their position to the extent that they recognized the legality of submarine warfare, provided that before the sinking of any merchant ship, the crew and pa.s.sengers were given a chance to leave in safety; in the main, however, the Note maintained the original American point of view.
It read as follows:
"If a belligerent cannot retaliate against an enemy without injuring the lives of neutrals as well as their property, humanity as well as justice and due regard for the dignity of neutral Powers should dictate that the practice be discontinued. If persisted in it would in such circ.u.mstances const.i.tute an unpardonable offence against the Sovereignty of the neutral nation affected ... the Government of the United States cannot believe that the Imperial Government will longer refrain from disavowing the wanton act of its naval commander in sinking the _Lusitania_ or offering reparation for the American lives lost, so far as reparation can be made for the needless destruction of human life by that illegal act.
"In the meanwhile the very value which this Government sets upon the long, unbroken friendship between the people and Government of the United States and the people and Government of the German nation, impels it to press most solemnly upon the Imperial German Government the necessity for the scrupulous observance of neutral rights. This is a critical matter. Friendship itself prompts it to say to the Imperial Government that repet.i.tion by the commanders of German naval vessels of acts in contravention of those rights must be regarded by the Government of the United States when they affect American citizens as deliberately unfriendly."
The first act of the German-American negotiations on the subject of submarine warfare thus closed with this open threat that war would follow any further action by Germany on the lines of the torpedoing of the _Lusitania_.
I think it well to reproduce here four of my reports, dated from Cedarhurst, a suburb of New York, where the Emba.s.sy usually had its headquarters during the hot summer months.
(1) CIPHER
"Cedarhurst, June 9th, 1915.
"The political outlook in America appears at present as calm as a summer"s day. The position abroad is perhaps reacting on internal affairs to some extent, as Mr. Wilson, as is usual in this country, considers foreign affairs primarily from the point of view of their influence on the prospects of next year"s presidential campaign.
"The tide of anti-German feeling aroused by the _Lusitania_ incident is still running pretty high, but it may now be regarded as certain, that neither the President nor the American people want a war with Germany. Mr. Wilson, then, will, I believe, have public opinion on his side, if he can find an honorable solution to his differences with us, and make use of this solution as the basis for a peace movement on a large scale. I am now even more convinced than I was a short time ago, at the time of my long interview with him, that the President"s ideas are developing in this direction, and that this is the cause of his suddenly taking up the Mexican question again, as he hopes to find in it a means of diverting public opinion. I am unwilling to give any grounds for exaggerated optimism, but my recent observations incline me to the belief that the President and his Cabinet are more neutral than is commonly supposed. England"s influence here is tremendous, permeating as it does through many channels, which we have no means of closing; but the Central Government, none the less, is really trying to maintain a neutral att.i.tude.
It is an astonishing thing, no doubt, but well established none the less, that all influential Americans who come from New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, the English headquarters in this country, to Washington, complain about the pro-German feeling there. I feel sure in my own mind that the Government hopes, by reviving the Mexican question, to diminish the export of arms and munitions to Europe. Public opinion, apart from the anti-German clique, would probably welcome such a move, as it is widely felt that the traffic in arms and munitions is hardly consistent with the continual appeals to humanity sent out all over the world from Washington. My general impression, as will be seen from the above, is that Mr. Wilson considers his best chance of re-election lies in bringing peace to Europe and restoring order in Mexico; for the latter purpose he will probably employ General Iturbide, who spent the whole of last winter in New York and Washington. He was at one time governor of the district of Mexico City, where he acquitted himself with courage and credit. He impressed me personally as a man of great ability. He should be able to find sufficient partisans in Mexico to enable him to raise an army, and the bankers of New York would be prepared to advance him the necessary sums. General Iturbide enjoys the full confidence of the present Administration, but only the future can show whether he will succeed in establishing a stable Government in Mexico, without the intervention of the United States."
(2) CIPHER
"Cedarhurst, 12th June, 1915.
"Since the publication of President Wilson"s second Note on the _Lusitania_ incident, the daily Press has been busy with conjectures as to the real reasons for Mr. Bryan"s resignation. It is generally agreed that the Note itself could hardly have been the occasion of the Cabinet crisis; as Bryan had concurred in the first Note, and there was no reason, therefore, why he should not have a.s.sented to the second one as well. On the other hand, no one can believe that the controversy with Germany was in reality simply an excuse for a personal trial of strength between Wilson and Bryan, after the manner of the earlier rivalry between Taft and Roosevelt.
"Bryan has now published in the _World_ a manifesto addressed to the German-American community defending his att.i.tude in this matter; but it is fortunately couched in terms which are unlikely to find favor in the eyes of those for whose benefit it was written. It would certainly be undesirable from our point of view that Bryan should be regarded as the champion of the German cause in this country; no useful result could follow from such advocacy. We must use all our efforts to come to an understanding with Mr. Wilson, if possible without compromising our present point of view; he is undoubtedly at the moment the most influential man in the country, and if he is antagonized we shall be powerless against him!"
(3) CIPHER
"Cedarhurst, July 2nd, 1915.
"In spite of the English interference with the American mails reported here to-day, I hope that the reports dispatched in the ordinary course of my duty have all reached your Excellency safely. In case they have not done so, I may report that since my audience with Mr. Wilson, the removal of the "agitator" Dernburg, the mission of Meyer Gerhardt, and the arrival of the Press telegrams from Berlin giving details of the last-named, things have been pretty quiet generally; the situation has reverted to the normal, and will remain normal if our next Note shows a conciliatory disposition.
I might even go further, and say that the _Lusitania_ incident, taking it all in all, despite the manner in which we dealt with it, has exercised and will exercise in the future a favorable influence on our mutual relations. Of course it has brought us into even greater odium with our avowed enemies; Anglophile "Society" in New York, Philadelphia and Boston is infuriated, and the Wall Street magnates are little better; but these two cliques have always been inveterate supporters of England. The Government has lost ground for the first time as a result of the _Lusitania_ incident, and it now fully realizes the importance of these questions of sea warfare; whereas when I first spoke in February, March and April to various exalted personages about the submarine campaign and kindred matters, no one would listen to me, and the full seriousness of the situation was quite unrealized. Now, however, "the freedom of the seas" has become the test question of American politics.
Every preparation has been made to take energetic measures with regard to England if our answer to the last American Note renders further negotiations possible. Even the New York Press has become more reasonable, and capable of discussing war questions impartially; and this was notably the case over the torpedoing of the _Armenian_.
In a word, at no time since the outbreak of war have the omens been so favorable for a rational policy on the part of America."
"Cedarhurst, July 22nd, 1915.
"If we ask what have-been the results of our eleven weeks" negotiations over the _Lusitania_ incident, and which involved the employment of all our available arts of persuasion, we may well reply that we have, despite our grave difficulties, averted the severance of diplomatic relations and the inevitable war that must have followed.
The former possibility, at all events, was at one time considerably more probable than most people in Germany are aware of.
"There could have been but one opinion among those I who saw and felt it as to the popular att.i.tude of mind during the first few weeks following the _Lusitania_ incident. In such circ.u.mstances we had only one possible resource left to us, to gain time, and hope for the restoration of a more friendly disposition in this country. The continuation of negotiations rendered this contingency possible; and so matters eventually turned out.
"We can hope for further results only if the American Government decides to inst.i.tute simultaneous negotiations with Berlin and London, with the object of bringing about a settlement. Our own views and those of America are radically divergent, and no mere one-sided discussion between us can bridge the gulf. The American Government went too far in its first Note to allow of its withdrawing now; although it admits our submarine campaign to have been a legitimate form of reprisal against the English hunger blockade, it still persists in holding us responsible for damage to American lives and limbs resulting from these reprisals. Put briefly the demands of the United States are therefore:
"1. A full apology in some form or other, and indemnification for the lives lost in the _Lusitania_.
"2. An undertaking that no pa.s.senger ships shall in future be sunk without preliminary warning.
"The latest Note from America, which is already on its way to Berlin, will in a sense bring the negotiations to a conclusion, as the Government want to have a definite basis of agreement which may form the foundation of their discussions with England. In my conversations with Mr. Lansing I have been given to understand that the Government wish to know verbally or in writing whether we are in a position to incline somewhat to the American point of view, and whether we can see our way to a.s.sist the present Government to secure by means of joint conversations with Germany and England the freedom of the seas, which has always been the main object of Mr. Wilson"s endeavors."
Dr. Dernburg returned to Germany in the middle of June, having been provided, by request of the American Government, with a safe conduct from the Entente. I went to New York to take leave of Dr.
Dernburg and invited a few friends to dinner in the roof-garden of the Ritz-Carlton Hotel on the eve of his departure. One incident of our gathering may be regarded as typical of the atmosphere of these _Lusitania_ days: a party of people for whom the next table to ours had been reserved refused to take it, as they declined to sit down in the neighborhood of Germans.
After Dr. Dernburg"s departure I deemed it advisable, in view of the popular hostility towards us, to redistribute the greater part of Dr. Dernburg"s duties. I did so, therefore, in agreement with the Foreign Office, and with the a.s.sistance of Dernburg"s former colleague, Councillor Albert took over, in addition to his former business with the Central Purchasing Company, all financial and economic affairs, and was attached to the Emba.s.sy as commercial adviser. Dr. Alexander Fuehr became Chief of the Press Bureau and Captain Hecker took over the duties connected with the German Red Cross. Unfortunately the generosity of many in America, and particularly those of German descent, has not been fully recognized or appreciated by the people of Germany. The total sum remitted to Germany for our Red Cross and other similar societies amounts to over 20,000,000 marks. The disillusion of our people at home when they realized the slight political influence exercised by the German-American element in the United States has led them to overlook their great achievements in the cause of charity, which were inspired by a heartfelt sympathy with the sufferings of the German nation.
CHAPTER VII
THE "ARABIC" INCIDENT
A few days after the dispatch of the last American Note concerning the _Lusitania_ incident, on July 21st, 1915, Mr. Lansing asked me to call on him. He then told me that the American Government had come to the end of its resources, and if any further cases occurred of loss of American lives by the torpedoing of merchant ships, war must inevitably result. The United States Government intended to write no more Notes, which had been proved useless, but would request me to undertake further negotiations in person.
My action in the _Lusitania_ incident had given proof of my earnest desire to avoid war, and the American Government were confident that I should succeed, even under such difficult conditions in finding some way out of the present _impa.s.se_.
From this time onwards, Mr. Lansing agreed with me that, as a regular thing, I should be permitted, whatever negotiations were going on, to send cipher dispatches to my Government through the channels of the State Department and the American Emba.s.sy in Berlin. It will be remembered that a similar privilege had been granted me at the time of the _Lusitania_ incident.
My sole ground of hope for success lay in one pa.s.sage of the American Note of July 21st, which read as follows:
"The Government of the United States and the Imperial German Government, contending for the same great object, long stood together in urging the very principles on which the Government of the United States now so solemnly insists. They are both contending for the freedom of the seas. The Government of the United States will continue to contend for that freedom from whatever quarter it is violated, without compromise and at any cost. It invites the practical co-operation of the Imperial German Government at this time, when co-operation may accomplish most, and this great common object can be most strikingly and effectively achieved. The Imperial German Government expresses the hope that this object may in some measure be accomplished even before the present war ends. It can be.
"The Government of the United States not only feels obliged to insist upon it, by whomsoever it is violated or ignored, in the protection of its own citizens, but it is also deeply interested in seeing it made practicable between the belligerents themselves.
It holds itself ready at any time to act as a common friend who may be privileged to suggest a way."
It seemed possible to reach some sort of agreement on the basis of the above request from America that we should co-operate in endeavoring to restore the freedom of the seas; but there remained the question of finding a formula which should serve as a basis for the settlement of the _Lusitania_ question and prevent any repet.i.tion of such incidents.
I was aware that there were two political counter-currents in Berlin: the one party desiring at all costs to prevent war with the United States, the other preferring to risk war for the sake of continuing the submarine campaign. I was clearly bound to co-operate with the first named, as I was convinced that America"s partic.i.p.ation in the war would certainly result in our eventual defeat; this view was, I knew, that Von Jagow, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whose opinion on this point was identical with mine. Up to January 31st, 1917, however, I could never ascertain which of these two views was the accepted one in Berlin, although, of course, I always hoped that the party of common sense would eventually prevail, nor was I able to discover what degree of success, if any, Meyer Gerhardt, who had been sent to represent my views to the authorities in Berlin, or Dr. Dernburg, who was working for the same end, had managed to achieve. As will be seen from my account of the subsequent course of events, my information on this point was very insufficient, and I was not even made acquainted with the views of the Berlin Government, on the conduct of the submarine campaign, or on the subsequent peace proposals put forward by the President. I was never informed beforehand as to the real intentions of Berlin, and I cannot understand, even to-day, why I was not told, until after the _Arabic_ incident, that the German submarine commanders had been instructed immediately after the torpedoing of the _Lusitania_ not to attack liners. A knowledge of this fact at the time would have a.s.sisted me greatly in my dealings with Washington. I do not intend to a.s.sert that in all this there was any deliberate neglect on the part of the Berlin Government but neither, on, the other hand, can I credit the commonly accepted explanation that the technical difficulties of transmitting reports were insuperable. It should have been possible to give me definite information on these matters by any one of the various channels of communication which were available between the Foreign Office and the Emba.s.sy at Washington. No other explanation is possible, except that which is to be found in the conflict of the two parties in Germany. The head of the Foreign Office was well aware that my policy in Washington was the same as his own in Berlin, but he was frequently unable to send me definite and early information because he, himself, could not tell whether his own views could be accepted and acted upon.
At this time I sent the following report to Berlin: