III. SENSIBILIA
I shall give the name _sensibilia_ to those objects which have the same metaphysical and physical status as sense-data, without necessarily being data to any mind. Thus the relation of a _sensibile_ to a sense-datum is like that of a man to a husband: a man becomes a husband by entering into the relation of marriage, and similarly a _sensibile_ becomes a sense-datum by entering into the relation of acquaintance. It is important to have both terms; for we wish to discuss whether an object which is at one time a sense-datum can still exist at a time when it is not a sense-datum. We cannot ask "Can sense-data exist without being given?" for that is like asking "Can husbands exist without being married?" We must ask "Can _sensibilia_ exist without being given?" and also "Can a particular _sensibile_ be at one time a sense-datum, and at another not?" Unless we have the word _sensibile_ as well as the word "sense-datum," such questions are apt to entangle us in trivial logical puzzles.
It will be seen that all sense-data are _sensibilia_. It is a metaphysical question whether all _sensibilia_ are sense-data, and an epistemological question whether there exist means of inferring _sensibilia_ which are not data from those that are.
A few preliminary remarks, to be amplified as we proceed, will serve to elucidate the use which I propose to make of _sensibilia_.
I regard sense-data as not mental, and as being, in fact, part of the actual subject-matter of physics. There are arguments, shortly to be examined, for their subjectivity, but these arguments seem to me only to prove _physiological_ subjectivity, i.e. causal dependence on the sense-organs, nerves, and brain. The appearance which a thing presents to us is causally dependent upon these, in exactly the same way as it is dependent upon intervening fog or smoke or coloured gla.s.s. Both dependences are contained in the statement that the appearance which a piece of matter presents when viewed from a given place is a function not only of the piece of matter, but also of the intervening medium.
(The terms used in this statement--"matter," "view from a given place," "appearance," "intervening medium"--will all be defined in the course of the present paper.) We have not the means of ascertaining how things appear from places not surrounded by brain and nerves and sense-organs, because we cannot leave the body; but continuity makes it not unreasonable to suppose that they present _some_ appearance at such places. Any such appearance would be included among _sensibilia_.
If--_per impossibile_--there were a complete human body with no mind inside it, all those _sensibilia_ would exist, in relation to that body, which would be sense-data if there were a mind in the body. What the mind adds to _sensibilia_, in fact, is _merely_ awareness: everything else is physical or physiological.
IV. SENSE-DATA ARE PHYSICAL
Before discussing this question it will be well to define the sense in which the terms "mental" and "physical" are to be used. The word "physical," in all preliminary discussions, is to be understood as meaning "what is dealt with by physics." Physics, it is plain, tells us something about some of the const.i.tuents of the actual world; what these const.i.tuents are may be doubtful, but it is they that are to be called physical, whatever their nature may prove to be.
The definition of the term "mental" is more difficult, and can only be satisfactorily given after many difficult controversies have been discussed and decided. For present purposes therefore I must content myself with a.s.suming a dogmatic answer to these controversies. I shall call a particular "mental" when it is aware of something, and I shall call a fact "mental" when it contains a mental particular as a const.i.tuent.
It will be seen that the mental and the physical are not necessarily mutually exclusive, although I know of no reason to suppose that they overlap.
The doubt as to the correctness of our definition of the "mental" is of little importance in our present discussion. For what I am concerned to maintain is that sense-data are physical, and this being granted it is a matter of indifference in our present inquiry whether or not they are also mental. Although I do not hold, with Mach and James and the "new realists," that the difference between the mental and the physical is _merely_ one of arrangement, yet what I have to say in the present paper is compatible with their doctrine and might have been reached from their standpoint.
In discussions on sense-data, two questions are commonly confused, namely:
(1) Do sensible objects persist when we are not sensible of them? in other words, do _sensibilia_ which are data at a certain time sometimes continue to exist at times when they are not data? And (2) are sense-data mental or physical?
I propose to a.s.sert that sense-data are physical, while yet maintaining that they probably never persist unchanged after ceasing to be data. The view that they do not persist is often thought, quite erroneously in my opinion, to imply that they are mental; and this has, I believe, been a potent source of confusion in regard to our present problem. If there were, as some have held, a _logical impossibility_ in sense-data persisting after ceasing to be data, that certainly would tend to show that they were mental; but if, as I contend, their non-persistence is merely a probable inference from empirically ascertained causal laws, then it carries no such implication with it, and we are quite free to treat them as part of the subject-matter of physics.
Logically a sense-datum is an object, a particular of which the subject is aware. It does not contain the subject as a part, as for example beliefs and volitions do. The existence of the sense-datum is therefore not logically dependent upon that of the subject; for the only way, so far as I know, in which the existence of _A_ can be _logically_ dependent upon the existence of _B_ is when _B_ is part of _A_. There is therefore no _a priori_ reason why a particular which is a sense-datum should not persist after it has ceased to be a datum, nor why other similar particulars should not exist without ever being data. The view that sense-data are mental is derived, no doubt, in part from their physiological subjectivity, but in part also from a failure to distinguish between sense-data and "sensations." By a sensation I mean the fact consisting in the subject"s awareness of the sense-datum. Thus a sensation is a complex of which the subject is a const.i.tuent and which therefore is mental. The sense-datum, on the other hand, stands over against the subject as that external object of which in sensation the subject is aware. It is true that the sense-datum is in many cases in the subject"s body, but the subject"s body is as distinct from the subject as tables and chairs are, and is in fact merely a part of the material world. So soon, therefore, as sense-data are clearly distinguished from sensations, and as their subjectivity is recognised to be physiological not psychical, the chief obstacles in the way of regarding them as physical are removed.
V. "SENSIBILIA" AND "THINGS"
But if "sensibilia" are to be recognised as the ultimate const.i.tuents of the physical world, a long and difficult journey is to be performed before we can arrive either at the "thing" of common sense or at the "matter" of physics. The supposed impossibility of combining the different sense-data which are regarded as appearances of the same "thing" to different people has made it seem as though these "sensibilia" must be regarded as mere subjective phantasms. A given table will present to one man a rectangular appearance, while to another it appears to have two acute angles and two obtuse angles; to one man it appears brown, while to another, towards whom it reflects the light, it appears white and shiny. It is said, not wholly without plausibility, that these different shapes and different colours cannot co-exist simultaneously in the same place, and cannot therefore both be const.i.tuents of the physical world. This argument I must confess appeared to me until recently to be irrefutable. The contrary opinion has, however, been ably maintained by Dr. T.P. Nunn in an article ent.i.tled: "Are Secondary Qualities Independent of Perception?"[29] The supposed impossibility derives its apparent force from the phrase: "_in the same place_," and it is precisely in this phrase that its weakness lies. The conception of s.p.a.ce is too often treated in philosophy--even by those who on reflection would not defend such treatment--as though it were as given, simple, and unambiguous as Kant, in his psychological innocence, supposed. It is the unperceived ambiguity of the word "place" which, as we shall shortly see, has caused the difficulties to realists and given an undeserved advantage to their opponents. Two "places" of different kinds are involved in every sense-datum, namely the place _at_ which it appears and the place _from_ which it appears. These belong to different s.p.a.ces, although, as we shall see, it is possible, with certain limitations, to establish a correlation between them. What we call the different appearances of the same thing to different observers are each in a s.p.a.ce private to the observer concerned. No place in the private world of one observer is identical with a place in the private world of another observer. There is therefore no question of combining the different appearances in the one place; and the fact that they cannot all exist in one place affords accordingly no ground whatever for questioning their physical reality. The "thing" of common sense may in fact be identified with the whole cla.s.s of its appearances--where, however, we must include among appearances not only those which are actual sense-data, but also those "sensibilia," if any, which, on grounds of continuity and resemblance, are to be regarded as belonging to the same system of appearances, although there happen to be no observers to whom they are data.
An example may make this clearer. Suppose there are a number of people in a room, all seeing, as they say, the same tables and chairs, walls and pictures. No two of these people have exactly the same sense-data, yet there is sufficient similarity among their data to enable them to group together certain of these data as appearances of one "thing" to the several spectators, and others as appearances of another "thing."
Besides the appearances which a given thing in the room presents to the actual spectators, there are, we may suppose, other appearances which it would present to other possible spectators. If a man were to sit down between two others, the appearance which the room would present to him would be intermediate between the appearances which it presents to the two others: and although this appearance would not exist as it is without the sense organs, nerves and brain, of the newly arrived spectator, still it is not unnatural to suppose that, from the position which he now occupies, _some_ appearance of the room existed before his arrival. This supposition, however, need merely be noticed and not insisted upon.
Since the "thing" cannot, without indefensible partiality, be identified with any single one of its appearances, it came to be thought of as something distinct from all of them and underlying them.
But by the principle of Occam"s razor, if the cla.s.s of appearances will fulfil the purposes for the sake of which the thing was invented by the prehistoric metaphysicians to whom common sense is due, economy demands that we should identify the thing with the cla.s.s of its appearances. It is not necessary to _deny_ a substance or substratum underlying these appearances; it is merely expedient to abstain from a.s.serting this unnecessary ent.i.ty. Our procedure here is precisely a.n.a.logous to that which has swept away from the philosophy of mathematics the useless menagerie of metaphysical monsters with which it used to be infested.
VI. CONSTRUCTIONS VERSUS INFERENCES
Before proceeding to a.n.a.lyse and explain the ambiguities of the word "place," a few general remarks on method are desirable. The supreme maxim in scientific philosophising is this:
_Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be subst.i.tuted for inferred ent.i.ties._
Some examples of the subst.i.tution of construction for inference in the realm of mathematical philosophy may serve to elucidate the uses of this maxim. Take first the case of irrationals. In old days, irrationals were inferred as the supposed limits of series of rationals which had no rational limit; but the objection to this procedure was that it left the existence of irrationals merely optative, and for this reason the stricter methods of the present day no longer tolerate such a definition. We now define an irrational number as a certain cla.s.s of ratios, thus constructing it logically by means of ratios, instead of arriving at it by a doubtful inference from them. Take again the case of cardinal numbers. Two equally numerous collections appear to have something in common: this something is supposed to be their cardinal number. But so long as the cardinal number is inferred from the collections, not constructed in terms of them, its existence must remain in doubt, unless in virtue of a metaphysical postulate _ad hoc_. By defining the cardinal number of a given collection as the cla.s.s of all equally numerous collections, we avoid the necessity of this metaphysical postulate, and thereby remove a needless element of doubt from the philosophy of arithmetic.
A similar method, as I have shown elsewhere, can be applied to cla.s.ses themselves, which need not be supposed to have any metaphysical reality, but can be regarded as symbolically constructed fictions.
The method by which the construction proceeds is closely a.n.a.logous in these and all similar cases. Given a set of propositions nominally dealing with the supposed inferred ent.i.ties, we observe the properties which are required of the supposed ent.i.ties in order to make these propositions true. By dint of a little logical ingenuity, we then construct some logical function of less hypothetical ent.i.ties which has the requisite properties. This constructed function we subst.i.tute for the supposed inferred ent.i.ties, and thereby obtain a new and less doubtful interpretation of the body of propositions in question. This method, so fruitful in the philosophy of mathematics, will be found equally applicable in the philosophy of physics, where, I do not doubt, it would have been applied long ago but for the fact that all who have studied this subject hitherto have been completely ignorant of mathematical logic. I myself cannot claim originality in the application of this method to physics, since I owe the suggestion and the stimulus for its application entirely to my friend and collaborator Dr. Whitehead, who is engaged in applying it to the more mathematical portions of the region intermediate between sense-data and the points, instants and particles of physics.
A complete application of the method which subst.i.tutes constructions for inferences would exhibit matter wholly in terms of sense-data, and even, we may add, of the sense-data of a single person, since the sense-data of others cannot be known without some element of inference. This, however, must remain for the present an ideal, to be approached as nearly as possible, but to be reached, if at all, only after a long preliminary labour of which as yet we can only see the very beginning. The inferences which are unavoidable can, however, be subjected to certain guiding principles. In the first place they should always be made perfectly explicit, and should be formulated in the most general manner possible. In the second place the inferred ent.i.ties should, whenever this can be done, be similar to those whose existence is given, rather than, like the Kantian _Ding an sich_, something wholly remote from the data which nominally support the inference. The inferred ent.i.ties which I shall allow myself are of two kinds: (_a_) the sense-data of other people, in favour of which there is the evidence of testimony, resting ultimately upon the a.n.a.logical argument in favour of minds other than my own; (_b_) the "sensibilia"
which would appear from places where there happen to be no minds, and which I suppose to be real although they are no one"s data. Of these two cla.s.ses of inferred ent.i.ties, the first will probably be allowed to pa.s.s unchallenged. It would give me the greatest satisfaction to be able to dispense with it, and thus establish physics upon a solipsistic basis; but those--and I fear they are the majority--in whom the human affections are stronger than the desire for logical economy, will, no doubt, not share my desire to render solipsism scientifically satisfactory. The second cla.s.s of inferred ent.i.ties raises much more serious questions. It may be thought monstrous to maintain that a thing can present any appearance at all in a place where no sense organs and nervous structure exist through which it could appear. I do not myself feel the monstrosity; nevertheless I should regard these supposed appearances only in the light of a hypothetical scaffolding, to be used while the edifice of physics is being raised, though possibly capable of being removed as soon as the edifice is completed. These "sensibilia" which are not data to anyone are therefore to be taken rather as an ill.u.s.trative hypothesis and as an aid in preliminary statement than as a dogmatic part of the philosophy of physics in its final form.
VII. PRIVATE s.p.a.cE AND THE s.p.a.cE OF PERSPECTIVES
We have now to explain the ambiguity in the word "place," and how it comes that two places of different sorts are a.s.sociated with every sense-datum, namely the place _at_ which it is and the place _from_ which it is perceived. The theory to be advocated is closely a.n.a.logous to Leibniz"s monadology, from which it differs chiefly in being less smooth and tidy.
The first fact to notice is that, so far as can be discovered, no sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once. The things seen by two different people are often closely similar, so similar that the same _words_ can be used to denote them, without which communication with others concerning sensible objects would be impossible. But, in spite of this similarity, it would seem that some difference always arises from difference in the point of view. Thus each person, so far as his sense-data are concerned, lives in a private world. This private world contains its own s.p.a.ce, or rather s.p.a.ces, for it would seem that only experience teaches us to correlate the s.p.a.ce of sight with the s.p.a.ce of touch and with the various other s.p.a.ces of other senses. This multiplicity of private s.p.a.ces, however, though interesting to the psychologist, is of no great importance in regard to our present problem, since a merely solipsistic experience enables us to correlate them into the one private s.p.a.ce which embraces all our own sense-data. The place _at_ which a sense-datum is, is a place in private s.p.a.ce. This place therefore is different from any place in the private s.p.a.ce of another percipient. For if we a.s.sume, as logical economy demands, that all position is relative, a place is only definable by the things in or around it, and therefore the same place cannot occur in two private worlds which have no common const.i.tuent.
The question, therefore, of combining what we call different appearances of the same thing in the same place does not arise, and the fact that a given object appears to different spectators to have different shapes and colours affords no argument against the physical reality of all these shapes and colours.
In addition to the private s.p.a.ces belonging to the private worlds of different percipients, there is, however, another s.p.a.ce, in which one whole private world counts as a point, or at least as a spatial unit.
This might be described as the s.p.a.ce of points of view, since each private world may be regarded as the appearance which the universe presents from a certain point of view. I prefer, however, to speak of it as the s.p.a.ce of _perspectives_, in order to obviate the suggestion that a private world is only real when someone views it. And for the same reason, when I wish to speak of a private world without a.s.suming a percipient, I shall call it a "perspective."
We have now to explain how the different perspectives are ordered in one s.p.a.ce. This is effected by means of the correlated "sensibilia"
which are regarded as the appearances, in different perspectives, of one and the same thing. By moving, and by testimony, we discover that two different perspectives, though they cannot both contain the same "sensibilia," may nevertheless contain very similar ones; and the spatial order of a certain group of "sensibilia" in a private s.p.a.ce of one perspective is found to be identical with, or very similar to, the spatial order of the correlated "sensibilia" in the private s.p.a.ce of another perspective. In this way one "sensibile" in one perspective is correlated with one "sensibile" in another. Such correlated "sensibilia" will be called "appearances of one thing." In Leibniz"s monadology, since each monad mirrored the whole universe, there was in each perspective a "sensibile" which was an appearance of each thing.
In our system of perspectives, we make no such a.s.sumption of completeness. A given thing will have appearances in some perspectives, but presumably not in certain others. The "thing" being defined as the cla.s.s of its appearances, if ? is the cla.s.s of perspectives in which a certain thing ? appears, then ? is a member of the multiplicative cla.s.s of ?, ? being a cla.s.s of mutually exclusive cla.s.ses of "sensibilia." And similarly a perspective is a member of the multiplicative cla.s.s of the things which appear in it.
The arrangement of perspectives in a s.p.a.ce is effected by means of the differences between the appearances of a given thing in the various perspectives. Suppose, say, that a certain penny appears in a number of different perspectives; in some it looks larger and in some smaller, in some it looks circular, in others it presents the appearance of an ellipse of varying eccentricity. We may collect together all those perspectives in which the appearance of the penny is circular. These we will place on one straight line, ordering them in a series by the variations in the apparent size of the penny. Those perspectives in which the penny appears as a straight line of a certain thickness will similarly be placed upon a plane (though in this case there will be many different perspectives in which the penny is of the same size; when one arrangement is completed these will form a circle concentric with the penny), and ordered as before by the apparent size of the penny. By such means, all those perspectives in which the penny presents a visual appearance can be arranged in a three-dimensional spatial order. Experience shows that the same spatial order of perspectives would have resulted if, instead of the penny, we had chosen any other thing which appeared in all the perspectives in question, or any other method of utilising the differences between the appearances of the same things in different perspectives. It is this empirical fact which has made it possible to construct the one all-embracing s.p.a.ce of physics.
The s.p.a.ce whose construction has just been explained, and whose elements are whole perspectives, will be called "perspective-s.p.a.ce."
VIII. THE PLACING OF "THINGS" AND "SENSIBILIA" IN PERSPECTIVE s.p.a.cE
The world which we have so far constructed is a world of six dimensions, since it is a three-dimensional series of perspectives, each of which is itself three-dimensional. We have now to explain the correlation between the perspective s.p.a.ce and the various private s.p.a.ces contained within the various perspectives severally. It is by means of this correlation that the one three-dimensional s.p.a.ce of physics is constructed; and it is because of the unconscious performance of this correlation that the distinction between perspective s.p.a.ce and the percipient"s private s.p.a.ce has been blurred, with disastrous results for the philosophy of physics. Let us revert to our penny: the perspectives in which the penny appears larger are regarded as being nearer to the penny than those in which it appears smaller, but as far as experience goes the apparent size of the penny will not grow beyond a certain limit, namely, that where (as we say) the penny is so near the eye that if it were any nearer it could not be seen. By touch we may prolong the series until the penny touches the eye, but no further. If we have been travelling along a line of perspectives in the previously defined sense, we may, however, by imagining the penny removed, prolong the line of perspectives by means, say, of another penny; and the same may be done with any other line of perspectives defined by means of the penny. All these lines meet in a certain place, that is, in a certain perspective. This perspective will be defined as "the place where the penny is."
It is now evident in what sense two places in constructed physical s.p.a.ce are a.s.sociated with a given "sensibile." There is first the place which is the perspective of which the "sensibile" is a member.
This is the place _from_ which the "sensibile" appears. Secondly there is the place where the thing is of which the "sensibile" is a member, in other words an appearance; this is the place _at_ which the "sensibile" appears. The "sensibile" which is a member of one perspective is correlated with another perspective, namely, that which is the place where the thing is of which the "sensibile" is an appearance. To the psychologist the "place from which" is the more interesting, and the "sensibile" accordingly appears to him subjective and where the percipient is. To the physicist the "place at which" is the more interesting, and the "sensibile" accordingly appears to him physical and external. The causes, limits and partial justification of each of these two apparently incompatible views are evident from the above duplicity of places a.s.sociated with a given "sensibile."
We have seen that we can a.s.sign to a physical thing a place in the perspective s.p.a.ce. In this way different parts of our body acquire positions in perspective s.p.a.ce, and therefore there is a meaning (whether true or false need not much concern us) in saying that the perspective to which our sense-data belong is inside our head. Since our mind is correlated with the perspective to which our sense-data belong, we may regard this perspective as being the position of our mind in perspective s.p.a.ce. If, therefore, this perspective is, in the above defined sense, inside our head, there is a good meaning for the statement that the mind is in the head. We can now say of the various appearances of a given thing that some of them are nearer to the thing than others; those are nearer which belong to perspectives that are nearer to "the place where the thing is." We can thus find a meaning, true or false, for the statement that more is to be learnt about a thing by examining it close to than by viewing it from a distance. We can also find a meaning for the phrase "the things which intervene between the subject and a thing of which an appearance is a datum to him." One reason often alleged for the subjectivity of sense-data is that the appearance of a thing may change when we find it hard to suppose that the thing itself has changed--for example, when the change is due to our shutting our eyes, or to our s.c.r.e.w.i.n.g them up so as to make the thing look double. If the thing is defined as the cla.s.s of its appearances (which is the definition adopted above), there is of course necessarily _some_ change in the thing whenever any one of its appearances changes. Nevertheless there is a very important distinction between two different ways in which the appearances may change. If after looking at a thing I shut my eyes, the appearance of my eyes changes in every perspective in which there is such an appearance, whereas most of the appearances of the thing will remain unchanged. We may say, as a matter of definition, that a thing changes when, however near to the thing an appearance of it may be, there are changes in appearances as near as, or still nearer to, the thing. On the other hand we shall say that the change is in some other thing if all appearances of the thing which are at not more than a certain distance from the thing remain unchanged, while only comparatively distant appearances of the thing are altered. From this consideration we are naturally led to the consideration of _matter_, which must be our next topic.
IX. THE DEFINITION OF MATTER
We defined the "physical thing" as the cla.s.s of its appearances, but this can hardly be taken as a definition of matter. We want to be able to express the fact that the appearance of a thing in a given perspective is causally affected by the matter between the thing and the perspective. We have found a meaning for "between a thing and a perspective." But we want matter to be something other than the whole cla.s.s of appearances of a thing, in order to state the influence of matter on appearances.
We commonly a.s.sume that the information we get about a thing is more accurate when the thing is nearer. Far off, we see it is a man; then we see it is Jones; then we see he is smiling. Complete accuracy would only be attainable as a limit: if the appearances of Jones as we approach him tend towards a limit, that limit may be taken to be what Jones really is. It is obvious that from the point of view of physics the appearances of a thing close to "count" more than the appearances far off. We may therefore set up the following tentative definition:
The _matter_ of a given thing is the limit of its appearances as their distance from the thing diminishes.
It seems probable that there is something in this definition, but it is not quite satisfactory, because empirically there is no such limit to be obtained from sense-data. The definition will have to be eked out by constructions and definitions. But probably it suggests the right direction in which to look.
We are now in a position to understand in outline the reverse journey from matter to sense-data which is performed by physics. The appearance of a thing in a given perspective is a function of the matter composing the thing and of the intervening matter. The appearance of a thing is altered by intervening smoke or mist, by blue spectacles or by alterations in the sense-organs or nerves of the percipient (which also must be reckoned as part of the intervening medium). The nearer we approach to the thing, the less its appearance is affected by the intervening matter. As we travel further and further from the thing, its appearances diverge more and more from their initial character; and the causal laws of their divergence are to be stated in terms of the matter which lies between them and the thing. Since the appearances at very small distances are less affected by causes other than the thing itself, we come to think that the limit towards which these appearances tend as the distance diminishes is what the thing "really is," as opposed to what it merely seems to be.