A joint proclamation was therefore issued by Gen. San Martin and myself, my signature being added as a guarantee, whilst his bore the authority of Commander-in-Chief. The following extract will shew the nature of this proclamation:--
"On my entry into Lima, I will punctually pay to all foreign seamen who shall voluntarily enlist into the Chilian service, the whole arrears of their pay, to which, I will also add to each individual, according to his rank, one year"s pay over and above his arrears, as a premium or reward for his services, if he continue to fulfil his duty to the day of the surrender of that city, and its occupation by the liberating forces."
(Signed) JOSE DE SAN MARTIN.
"COCHRANE."
This proclamation had the desired effect, and the crews of the ships were immediately completed.
The Chilian force amounted to 4200 men, General San Martin, to the great disappointment of General Freire, being nominated Captain-General--the force under his command was designated the "liberating army" _(Exercito Libertador)_. Whilst the expedition was in process of formation, the Supreme Director had apprised the Peruvian people of its object, and lest they should entertain any jealousy of its presence uninvited, had declared his views in a general proclamation, from which the following is an extract:--
"Peruvians--Do not think we shall pretend to treat you as a conquered people? such a desire could have entered into the heads of none but those who are inimical to our common happiness. We only aspire to see you free and happy; _yourselves will frame your own government_, choosing that form which is most consistent with your customs, your situation, and your wishes. Consequently, _you will const.i.tute a nation as free and independent as ourselves_."
This, and subsequent proclamations, will require to be borne in mind, as the result by no means corresponded with the intentions of the Supreme Director, whose honesty of purpose was afterwards set at nought by those in whose estimation Peru was only a field for the furtherance of their own ambition. The Chileno officers, both native and foreign, certainly believed in the sincerity of their leaders, but were subsequently doomed to be miserably disappointed as regarded the chief of them.
On the 21st of August, 1820, the squadron sailed amidst the enthusiastic plaudits of the people, who felt proud that in so short a time the power of Spain had not only been humbled, but that they were enabled to despatch an army to liberate her princ.i.p.al remaining State.
On the 25th, the squadron hove to off Coquimbo, taking on board another battalion of troops. On the 26th we again sailed, when General San Martin made known to me his intention of proceeding with the main body of the army to Truxillo, a place four degrees to leeward of Lima, where the army could have gained no advantage, nor, indeed, have found anything to do, except to remain there safe from any attack by the Spaniards, who could not approach it by land, whilst the squadron could protect it by sea.
By representing to General San Martin that this course would cause great dissatisfaction amongst the Chileno officers and men, who expected to be landed and led at once against Lima, for the immediate conquest of which they were amply sufficient, he consented to give up his plan of proceeding to Truxillo, but firmly refused to disembark his men in the vicinity of Lima; for what reason I could not then divine. My own plan was to land the force at Chilca, the nearest point to Callao, and forthwith to obtain possession of the capital; an object by no means difficult of execution, and certain of success.
Finding all argument unavailing, we sailed for Pisco, where the expedition arrived on the 7th of September, and on the 8th, to my great chagrin, the troops were disembarked, and for fifty days remained in total inaction! with the exception of despatching Colonel Arenales into the interior with a detachment, which, after defeating a body of Spaniards, took up a position to the eastward of Lima.
Even on arriving at Pisco, General San Martin declined to enter the town, though the Spanish forces consisted of less than three hundred men. Landing the troops under Major-General Las Heras, he went down the coast in the schooner _Montezuma_ the inhabitants meanwhile retiring into the interior, taking with them their cattle, slaves, and even the furniture of their houses. This excess of caution excited great discontent in the army and the squadron, as contrasting strangely with the previous capture of the place, in the preceding year, by Lieut.-Colonel Charles and Major Miller, with their handful of men.
On the return of General San Martin, he professed to be greatly chagrined at the departure of the inhabitants, and the consequent loss of supplies. Instead of attributing this to his own tardy movements, he declared his disbelief in the accounts he had received from Peru as to the friendly disposition of the inhabitants, even throwing out doubts as to the success of the expedition in consequence. It was of the first importance to have taken the place immediately, and to have conciliated the inhabitants, as the ships were scantily provisioned, and all but dest.i.tute of other necessary supplies. A detailed account, however, of the capture of the place was transmitted to Santiago, where it was duly recorded in the official organ as the first feat of the great expedition.
During these fifty days the squadron was also necessarily kept in inaction, having achieved nothing beyond the capture of a few merchantmen along the coast, and a fruitless chase of two Spanish frigates, the _Prueba_ and _Venganza_, which I did not follow up, as involving risk to the transports during my absence.
This delay was productive of the worst disasters which could have befallen the expedition. The people were eager to receive us, and not calculating on such tardiness on the part of General Martin--were everywhere declaring in our favour; but being unsupported, were fined, imprisoned, and subjected to corporal punishment by the Viceroy.
Rendered cautious by this, they naturally distrusted the force idling away its time at Pisco, manifesting reluctance to bring forward the requisite supplies, upon which they were treated, by order of General San Martin, with military rigour; being thus hara.s.sed, the Peruvians began to look upon the Chilenos as oppressors in common with the Spaniards, to the no small danger of losing every desire for national independence.
Nevertheless, on reaching Pisco, Gen. San Martin had promulgated a proclamation from the Supreme Director full of fervent appeals to G.o.d and man as regarded the good intentions of the Chilian Government: the following are extracts:--
"Peruvians, here are the engagements under which Chili--before the Supreme Being--and calling all nations to witness as avengers of any violation of the compact, engages to aid you--setting death and toil at defiance. You shall be free and independent.
You shall choose your own government and laws, by the spontaneous will of your representatives. No military or civil influence, direct or indirect, shall your brethren use to influence your social dispositions. You shall dismiss the armed force sent to your a.s.sistance the moment you judge proper, without regard to our opinion of your danger or security. Never shall any military division occupy the soil of a free people, unless called for by your lawful magistrate. Neither by ourselves, nor by our aid, shall party opinions which may have preceded your liberty be punished.
Ready to overthrow any armed force which may resist your rights, we beseech you to forget all grievances antecedent to the day of your glory, so as to reserve the most severe justice to obstinacy and oppression."
Such, were the inducements held out to the Peruvian people, and such was their first experience with regard to their liberators.
Yet even amidst inaction the fruits of demonstration early became manifest, a vessel arriving on the 4th of October, from Guayaquil, with the intelligence that on receiving news of the sailing of the expedition, that province had declared itself independent. Upon the arrival of this welcome news, I again begged of General San Martin to reimbark the troops and move on Lima, and at length succeeded in inducing him to make a move.
Previous to our departure, General San Martin issued the following proclamation, here given to shew how promises solemnly entered into could afterwards be broken.
"Peruvians! I have paid the tribute which, as a public man, I owe to the opinion of others, and have shewn what is my object and mission towards you. I come to fulfil the expectations of all those who wish to belong to the country which gave them birth, and who desire to be governed by their own laws. On the day when Peru shall freely p.r.o.nounce as to the form of her inst.i.tutions, be they whatever they may, _my functions shall cease_, and I shall have the glory of announcing to the Government of Chili, of which I am a subject, that their heroic efforts have at last received the consolation of giving liberty to Peru, and peace to the neighbouring states."
The troops being reimbarked--on the 28th we sailed from Pisco, and on the following day anch.o.r.ed before Callao. After having reconnoitred the fortifications, I again urged on General San Martin an immediate disembarcation of the force, but to this he once more strenuously objected, to the great disappointment of the whole expedition; insisting on going to Ancon, a place at some distance to the northward of Callao. Having no control over the disposition of the troops, I was obliged to submit; and on the 30th, detached the _San Martin, Galvarino,_ and _Araucano_, to convoy the transports to Ancon, retaining the _O"Higgins, Independencia_, and _Lautaro_, as if for the purpose of blockade.
The fact was, that--annoyed in common with the whole expedition--at this irresolution on the part of General San Martin, I determined that the means of Chili, furnished with great difficulty, should not be wholly wasted, without some attempt at accomplishing the objects of the expedition; and accordingly formed a plan of attack with the three ships which I had kept back--though being apprehensive that my design would be opposed by General San Martin, I had not even mentioned to him my intentions.
This design was to cut out the _Esmeralda_ frigate from under the fortifications, and also to get possession of another ship, on board of which we had learned that a million of dollars was embarked for flight, if it became necessary; my opinion being that if such display of power were manifested, the Spaniards would either surrender the capital or abandon it.
The enterprise was hazardous, for since my former visit the enemy"s position had been much strengthened, no less than 300 pieces of artillery being mounted on sh.o.r.e, whilst the _Esmeralda_ was crowded with the best sailors and marines that could be procured, these sleeping every night at quarters. She was, moreover, defended by a strong boom with chain moorings, and by armed blockships; the whole being surrounded by twenty-seven gun-boats; so that no ship could possibly get at her.
For three days we occupied ourselves in preparations, still keeping secret the purpose for which they were intended. On the evening of 5th of November, this was communicated to the ships by the following proclamation:--
"Marines and Seamen,"
"This night we are going to give the enemy a mortal blow. Tomorrow you will present yourselves proudly before Callao, and all your comrades will envy your good fortune. One hour of courage and resolution is all that is required of you to triumph. Remember, that you have conquered in Valdivia, and be not afraid of those who have hitherto fled from you."
"The value of all the vessels captured in Callao will be yours, and the same reward in money will be distributed amongst you as has been offered by the Spaniards in Lima to those who should capture any of the Chilian squadron. The moment of glory is approaching, and I hope that the Chilenos will fight as they have been accustomed to do, and that the English will act as they have ever done at home and abroad."
"COCHRANE."
On issuing this proclamation, it was stated that I should lead the attack in person, volunteers being requested to come forward, on which the whole of the marines and seamen on board the three ships offered to accompany me. As this could not be permitted, a hundred and sixty seamen and eighty marines were selected, and after dark were placed in fourteen boats alongside the flag-ship, each man armed with cutla.s.s and pistol, being, for distinction"s sake, dressed in white, with a blue band on the left arm. The Spaniards I expected would be off their guard, as, by way of _ruse_, the other ships had been sent out of the bay under the charge of Captain Foster, as though in pursuit of some vessels in the offing--so that the Spaniards would consider themselves safe from attack for that night.
At ten o"clock all was in readiness, the boats being formed in two divisions, the first commanded by my flag-captain Crosbie, and the second by Captain Guise,--my boat leading. The strictest silence, and the exclusive use of cutla.s.ses were enjoined; so that, as the oars were m.u.f.fled, and the night dark, the enemy had not the least suspicion of the impending attack.
It was just upon midnight when we neared the small opening left in the boom, our plan being well-nigh frustrated by the vigilance of a guard-boat, upon which my launch had luckily stumbled. The challenge was given, upon which, in an under-tone, I threatened the occupants of the boat with instant death if they made the least alarm. No reply was made to the threat, and in a few minutes our gallant fellows were alongside the frigate in line, boarding at several points simultaneously.
The Spaniards were completely taken by surprise--the whole, with the exception of the sentries, being asleep at their quarters--and great was the havoc made amongst them by the Chileno cutla.s.ses whilst they were recovering themselves. Retreating to the forecastle, they there made a gallant stand, and it was not until the third charge that the position was carried. The fight was for a short time renewed on the quarter-deck, where the Spanish marines fell to a man, the rest of the enemy leaping overboard and into the hold to escape slaughter.
On boarding the ship by the main chains, I was knocked back by the b.u.t.t end of the sentry"s musket, and falling on a thole pin of the boat, it entered my back near the spine, inflicting a severe injury, which caused me many years of subsequent suffering. Immediately regaining my footing, I reascended the side, and when on deck, was shot through the thigh, but binding a handkerchief tightly round the wound, managed, though with great difficulty, to direct the contest to its close.
The whole affair, from beginning to end, occupied only a quarter of an hour, our loss being eleven killed and thirty wounded, whilst that of the Spaniards was a hundred and sixty, many of whom fell under the cutla.s.ses of the Chilenos before they could stand to their arms. Greater bravery I never saw displayed than that of our gallant fellows. Before boarding, the duties of all had been appointed, and a party was told off to take possession of the tops. We had not been on deck a minute, when I hailed the foretop, and was instantly answered by our own men, an equally prompt answer being returned from the frigate"s maintop. No British man-of-war"s crew could have excelled this minute attention to orders.
The uproar speedily alarmed the garrison, who, hastening to their guns, opened fire on their own frigate, thus paying us the compliment of having taken it; though, even in this case, their own men must still have been on board, so that firing on them was a wanton proceeding, as several Spaniards were killed or wounded by the shot of the fortress, and amongst the wounded was Captain Coig, the commander of the _Esmeralda_--who, after he was made prisoner, received a severe contusion by a shot from his own party.
The fire from the fortress was, however, neutralised by a successful expedient. There were two foreign ships of war present during the contest--the United States frigate _Macedonian_, and the British frigate _Hyperion_; and these, as previously agreed on with the Spanish authorities in case of a night attack--hoisted peculiar lights as signals, to prevent being fired upon. This contingency being provided for by us--as soon as the fortress commenced its fire on the _Esmeralda_, we also ran up similar lights, so that the garrison became puzzled which vessel to fire at; the intended mischief thus involving the _Hyperion_ and _Macedonian_, which were several times struck, the _Esmeralda_ being comparatively untouched. Upon this the neutral frigates cut their cables and moved away; whilst Captain Guise, contrary to my orders, cut the _Esmeralda_ cables also, so that there was nothing to be done but to loose her top-sails and follow; the fortress then ceasing its fire.
My orders were not to cut the cables of the, _Esmeralda_; but after taking her to capture the _Maypu_, a brig of war previously taken from Chili--and then to attack and cut adrift every ship near, there being plenty of time before us; no doubt existing but that when the _Esmeralda_ was taken, the Spaniards would desert the other ships as fast as their boats would permit them, so that the whole might either have been captured or burned. To this end all my previous plans had been arranged; but on being placed _hors de combat_ by my wounds, Captain Guise, on whom the command of the prize devolved, chose to interpose his own judgment, and content himself with the _Esmeralda_ alone, cutting her cables without my orders; the reason a.s.signed being, that the English had broken into her spirit-room and were getting drunk, whilst the Chilenos were disorganized by plundering. It was a great mistake, for if we could capture the _Esmeralda_, with her picked and well-appointed crew, there would have been little or no difficulty in cutting the other ships adrift in succession. It would only have been the rout of Valdivia over again, chasing the enemy, without loss, from ship after ship, instead of from fort to fort.
The following extract, from the order issued preparatory to the attack, will clearly shew the plan frustrated by cutting the _Esmeralda_ adrift:--
"On securing the frigate, the Chilian seamen and marines are not to give the Chilian cheer, but to deceive the enemy, and give time for completing the work: they are to cheer "_Viva el Rey_.""
"The two brigs of war are to be fired on by the musketry _from the Esmeralda_, and are to be taken possession of by Lieutenants Esmonde and Morgell, in the boats they command; which, being done, they are to cut adrift, run out, and anchor in the offing as quickly as possible. The boats of the _Independencia_ are to turn adrift all the outward Spanish merchant ships; and the boats of the _O"Higgins_ and _Lautaro_, under Lieutenants Bell and Robertson, are to set fire to one or more of the headmost hulks; but these are not to be cut adrift, so as to fall down upon the rest."
(Signed) "COCHRANE."
By the cutting of the _Esmeralda"s_ cables, not one of these objects was effected. The captured frigate was ready for sea, with three months"
provisions on board, and with stores sufficient for two years. She was, no doubt, if opportunity offered, intended to convoy the treasure-ship, which, by the precipitancy of Captain Guise, we had missed; indeed the Spanish Admiral being on board at the time, with his flag flying, was a pretty clear proof that she was on the point of departure; instead of which, the Admiral, his officers, and 200 seamen were made prisoners, the remainder of the crew, originally 370 in number, being killed, wounded, or drowned.
An incident occurred during the contest which, at this distance of time, I shall not refrain from mentioning. His Britannic Majesty"s ship _Hyperion_ was so close to the _Esmeralda_, as to be a witness of the whole proceeding. A midshipman was standing at the gangway looking on, amongst others, when his truly English nature, unable to restrain itself as our gallant fellows cleared the forecastle of the enemy, gave vent to its expression by clapping his hands in approbation. It was afterwards reported that he was immediately ordered below by his commander, Captain Searle, who threatened to put him under arrest. Such was the feeling of an English commander towards me. I should not have condescended to notice this occurrence but for the bravado shown by the same officer on a previous occasion, by casting loose his guns, with their tompions out, when my flag-ship entered the roads; thereby either intimating that he considered me a pirate, or that he would so treat me, if he had an opportunity.
When approaching the _Esmeralda_, the British frigate also hailed each boat separately, with the evident intention of alarming the enemy; which would no doubt have been the case, had not the Spaniards been thrown off their guard by the before-mentioned ruse of sending the ships out of the bay.
Far different was the conduct of the commander of the United States frigate _Macedonian_--whose sentinels did not hail the boats--the officers in an under-tone wishing us success; and still more honourable was the subsequent testimony of that talented officer, Captain Basil Hall, who commanded His Britannic Majesty"s ship _Conway_, then in the Pacific. This testimony, though in some degree a recapitulation of the events already related, but slightly inaccurate as regards the number of men employed, I feel proud to adduce:--
"While the liberating army, under General San Martin, was removing to Ancon, Lord Cochrane, with part of his squadron, anch.o.r.ed in the outer roads of Callao. The inner harbour was guarded by an extensive system of batteries, admirably constructed, and bearing the general name of the "Castles of Callao." The merchant ships, as well as the men of war, consisting of the _Esmeralda_, a large 40-gun frigate, and two sloops of war, were moored under the guns of the castle, within a semicircle of fourteen gun-boats, and a boom made of spars chained together."