May 5, 1823.
MOST ILl.u.s.tRIOUS SIR,
Availing myself of your permission to address you upon points of a particular nature, and referring you to my public despatches to the Minister of Marine, I beg leave to add that it was not only unfavourable winds which r.e.t.a.r.ded our progress, but the extreme bad sailing of the _Piranga_ and _Liberal_. Neither these ships nor the _Nitherohy_, which sails equally ill, are adapted to the purposes to be effected, as from their slowness, the enemy has an opportunity to force an action under any circ.u.mstances, however disadvantageous to this undisciplined squadron. The _Real_ is no better, and her total uselessness as a ship of war, has determined me to prepare her as a fireship, there appearing no probability of the others joining.
From the defective sailing and manning of the squadron it seems, indeed, to me, that the _Pedro Primiero_ is the only one that can a.s.sail an enemy"s ship of war, or act in the face of a superior force, so as not to compromise the interests of the empire and the character of the officers commanding. Even this ship--in common-with the rest--is so ill-equipped as to be much less efficient than she otherwise would be.
This letter, you will observe, is not intended to meet the public eye, but merely to put the Government in possession of facts necessary for its information.
Our cartridges are all unfit for service, and I have been obliged to cut up every flag and ensign that could be spared, to render them serviceable, so as to prevent the men"s arms being blown off whilst working the guns, and also to prevent the constant necessity of sponging, &c. which, from the time it consumes, diminishes the effective force of the ships fully one half.
The guns are without locks--which they ought to have had in order to their being efficient.
The sails of this ship are all rotten--the light and baffling airs on our way hither, having beaten one set to pieces, and the others are hourly giving way to the slightest breeze of wind.
The bed of the mortar which I received on board this ship was crushed on the first fire--being entirety rotten; the fuzes for the sh.e.l.ls are formed of such wretched composition that it will not take fire with the discharge of the mortar, and are consequently unfit for use on board a ship where it is extremely dangerous to kindle the fuze otherwise than by the explosion; even the powder with which this ship is supplied is so bad, that six pounds will not throw our sh.e.l.ls more than a thousand yards, instead of double that distance.
The marines neither understand gun exercise, the use of small arms, nor the sword, and yet have so high an opinion of themselves that they will not a.s.sist to wash the decks, or even to clean out their own berths, but sit and look on whilst these operations are being performed by seamen; being thus useless as marines, they are a hinderance to the seamen, who ought to be learning their duty in the tops, instead of being converted into sweepers and scavengers. I have not yet interfered in this injurious practice, because I think that reforms of the ancient practice of the service, ought to form the subject of instruction from the Government --and also, because at this moment, any alterations of mine might create dissatisfactions and dissensions even more prejudicial to the service in which we are engaged, than the evils in question.
With respect to the seamen, I would observe, that, in order to create an effective marine, young active lads of from fourteen to twenty should be selected. Almost the whole of those who const.i.tute the crews of these vessels--with the exception of the foreign seamen, are not only totally unpractised in naval profession, but are too old to learn.
I warned the Minister of Marine, that every native of Portugal put on board the squadron--with the exception of officers of known character--would prove prejudicial to the expedition, and yesterday we had a clear proof of the fact. The Portuguese stationed in the magazine, actually withheld the powder whilst this ship was in the midst of the enemy, and I have since learned that they did so from feelings of attachment to their own countrymen. I now inclose you two letters on this subject--one just received from the officer commanding the _Real_, whose crew were on the point of _carrying that vessel into the enemy"s squadron for the purpose of delivering her up!_ I have also reason to believe, that the conduct of the _Liberal_ yesterday in not bearing down upon the enemy and not complying with the signal which I had made to break the line--was owing to her being manned with Portuguese. The _Maria de Gloria_ has also a great number of Portuguese, which is the more to be regretted, as otherwise her superior sailing, with the zeal and activity of her captain, would render her an effective vessel. To disclose to you the truth, it appears to me that one half of the squadron is necessary to watch over the other half: and, a.s.suredly, this is a system which ought to be put an end to without delay.
A greater evil is, that this ship is one hundred and twenty seamen short of her complement and three hundred short of what I should consider an efficient crew, whilst the bad quality and ignorance of the landsmen, makes the task of managing her in action no easy matter, the incessant bawling going on rendering the voices of the officers inaudible. Had this ship yesterday been manned and equipped as she ought to have been, and free from the disadvantages stated, there is no doubt whatever in my mind, but, that singly, we could have dismantled half the ships of the enemy.
On the whole, Sir, you must perceive that I have not been supplied with any of those facilities which I requested to be placed in my hands. I am, however, aware of the difficulties under which a new Government labours, and am ready to do all in my power under any circ.u.mstances. What I have to request of you is, that you will do me the justice to feel that the predicament in which I am now placed, is somewhat a.n.a.logous to your own, and that if I cannot accomplish all I wish, the deficiency arises from causes beyond my control; but I entreat you to let me have--at least this ship-- _well manned_, and I will answer for her rendering more efficient service than the whole squadron besides--const.i.tuted as it now is.
You will perceive by my public despatch addressed to the Minister of Marine, that although we pa.s.sed through the enemy"s line, and, I may add, actually brushed the nearest vessel, which we cut off--yet nothing really useful was effected, notwithstanding that the vessel we touched ought to have been sunk, and those separated to have been dismantled or destroyed. I am quite vexed at the result--which was such, however, as might have been expected from the bad manning of the squadron.
I have determined to proceed forthwith to the Moro San Paulo, and to leave there the ill-sailing vessels. I intend to remove all the effective officers and seamen from the _Piranga_ and _Nitherohy_, into this ship, and with her alone, or attended only by the _Maria de Gloria_, to proceed to Bahia, to reconnoitre the situation of the enemy at their anchorage, and obtain the information requisite to enable me to enter on more effectual operations.
I have the honour, &c.
COCHRANE.
Ill. Exmo. Senor JOSe BONIFACIO D"ANDRADE Y SILVA, Ministro e Secretario d"Estado.
A rigorous blockade was nevertheless established, in spite of our deficiencies or the efforts made to raise or evade it--though the enemy were bold in reliance upon their numbers, and none the less so, perhaps, from considering our recent failure a defeat. They did not, however, venture to attack us, nor were we yet in a condition to meddle further with them.
The blockade of the port was not calculated to effect anything decisive, beyond paralysing the naval operations of the enemy"s squadron. Even this would not prevent the Portuguese from strengthening themselves in positions on sh.o.r.e, and thus, by intimidating all other districts within reach,--enable them to bar the progress of independence. I therefore determined, as a force in our condition was not safe to hazard in any combination requiring prompt and implicit obedience, to adopt the step of which I had apprised the Prime Minister, and took the squadron to Moro San Paulo, where, transferring from the bad sailing frigates to the flagship, the captains, officers, and best petty officers and seamen, the _Pedro Primiero_ was rendered more efficient than the whole together; and with her and the _Maria de Gloria_, I resolved to conduct further operations against the enemy--leaving the _Piranga_, and _Nitherohy_, together with all the other vessels, in charge of Captain Pio--the two senior captains having been transferred to the flagship, in charge of their officers and men.
There was, however, another reason for leaving the remainder of the squadron at Moro San Paulo. Before quitting Rio de Janeiro, I had urged on the Government the necessity of immediately forwarding fireships, as the most reliable means for destroying a superior force. These had not been supplied; but in their place a quant.i.ty of inflammable and explosive materials had been sent. As several prizes had been taken, I determined to convert them into fireships, as well as the _Real_ schooner--a useless vessel, the crew of which had shewn that they were not to be depended upon; so that the remaining ships of the squadron, though unreliable in other respects, were well employed in carrying these objects into execution.
In order to protect the ships and men thus engaged, I directed a body of marines to be landed, for the purpose of making a show by forming and manning batteries to repel any attack, though, had such been made, neither the batteries nor their defenders would have been of much service.
The flagship, together with the _Maria de Gloria_, now proceeded to cruize off Bahia, with such success that all supplies were cut off by sea, notwithstanding repeated attempts to introduce vessels from San Mattheos with farinha--a dozen of which fell into our hands, in spite of the enemy"s superiority.
As the _Carolina_ had now joined us, I directed her to take under convoy the captured transports with provisions, whilst the _Guarani_ was sent to scour the coast, with orders to avoid approaching the enemy"s fleet, and to bring me information as to the progress of the fireships, upon which I now saw that I must mainly rely.
On the 21st, I considered it expedient to address the following private letter to the Minister of Marine:--
Off Bahia, N.W. 12 miles, May 21, 1833.
Most Ill.u.s.trious Sir,
In addition to my official letters of the 3rd and 4th inst. I beg to acquaint you that, being convinced--not only from the conduct of the crew of this ship during the attack on the 4th, but from what I observed in regard to the other vessels--that nothing beneficial to His Imperial Majesty"s service could be effected by any attempts to combine the whole squadron in an attack against the enemy--but, on the contrary, from the imperfect and incongruous manner in which the vessels are manned-- consequences of the most serious nature would ensue from any further attempt of the kind. I have therefore determined to take the squadron to Moro San Paulo, for the adoption of other measures essential under such circ.u.mstances, viz. to take on board such officers and men from the bad sailing vessels as will render the _Pedro Primiero_ more effective than the whole squadron as now const.i.tuted.
In the first conversation I had with you, I gave you my opinion as to the superior benefit of equipping one or two vessels _well_-- rather than many imperfectly, and I again beg to press on your consideration the necessity of such efficient equipment of all vessels, whether many or few. I must also remind you of the great danger that arises from the employment of Portuguese of the inferior cla.s.s in active operations against their own countrymen, because they neither do nor can consider that the dispute between Brazil and the Portuguese Government, bears any similarity to warfare as ordinarily understood. I have had sufficient proof since leaving Rio de Janeiro, that there is no more trust to be placed in Portuguese, when employed to fight against their countrymen, than there was in the Spaniards, who, on the opposite side of this continent, betrayed the patriot Governments, by whom they were employed.
I shall press this point no further than to say, that so long as His Imperial Majesty"s ships are so manned, I shall consider them as not only wholly inefficient, but requiring to be vigilantly watched in order to prevent the most dangerous consequences.
Since making my arrangements at the Moro, where I left all the squadron except this ship and the _Maria de Gloria_, I have been constantly off the port of Bahia, but could see nothing of the enemy"s squadron, till the 20th, when I learned from an English vessel that they had been as far down as the Abrolhos shoals, for what purpose I know not. They consist of thirteen vessels, being the number which we encountered on the 4th. I am watching an opportunity to attack them in the night, in the hope not only of being able to damage them materially by the fire of this ship, but also in the expectation that, if they are not better disciplined than the crews of this squadron, they will occasion as much damage amongst themselves, as they would sustain if they had an equal force to contend with. In the meantime we are as effectually blockading Bahia, as if the enemy did not dare to remove from his anchorage--for both this ship and the _Maria de Gloria_ outsail them all. We have captured three Portuguese vessels, and from the letters found therein, many more are expected from Maranham and other ports to leeward, as well as from San Mattheos.
Should the enemy"s squadron return to port before I can obtain a favourable opportunity of a.s.sailing them at sea, I shall endeavour to attack them at their anchorage, and the Government may be a.s.sured that no exertion shall be wanting on my part, or on that of the officers now in this ship, to effect their destruction.
I may fairly ascribe the prepared state of the enemy, and the great force in which they appeared on the 4th, and still exhibit--to the information carried by the British ship of war Tartar, which was permitted to sail from Rio so early after our departure for Bahia, and thus served them as effectually as though she had been expressly hired for the purpose.
I have the honour, &c.
COCHRANE.
To the Minister of Marine.
On the 22nd we captured another vessel, and reconnoitred the port of Bahia, the Portuguese squadron being there at anchor. Finding this to be the case, I returned to the Moro to expedite the fireships--leaving the _Maria de Gloria_ to watch the enemy"s movements.
On the 26th the Portuguese Admiral again appeared in full force, and approached towards us at the Moro San Paulo, when we prepared for action, but the hostile squadron withdrew. The same demonstration was made for several days, the enemy not venturing on an attack, whilst, from the causes previously alleged, we were in no condition to take the initiative.
On the 26th I apprised the Minister of Marine that, when the enemy returned to port, I should make an attempt on them on the first dark night with the flagship alone, pending the equipment of the fireships.
At the same time I addressed the following letter to the Prime Minister, De Andrada:--
Moro San Paulo, 26th May, 1823.
MOST ILl.u.s.tRIOUS SIR,
With regard to the transactions of the squadron, I beg to refer you to my despatches to the Minister of Marine, but solicit your attention to a few particulars which appear to me of importance.
In the first place, you will observe from the enclosed Bahia newspaper, that the maritime force of the enemy is contrasted with that of the squadron under my command. I should be well content were the real disparity of the respective forces no greater than the statement has set forth, but unfortunately, the Brazilians, who have never before been at sea, are of little or no use, from their total want of discipline, and of any kind of nautical knowledge; whilst the Portuguese seamen in the squadron, are not only useless--but a great deal worse, for the reasons stated in my former letters.
The enemy in Bahia are in want of all kinds of fresh provisions --though they have been using every means to procure them. Some supplies they have lately had from Buenos Ayres, and even from the Cape de Verds; but the most surprising fact is that the Brazilian Governor of San Mattheos, near the Abrolhos, and the chiefs of other small Brazilian ports in that quarter have been loading vessels for the enemy"s use--under the simulated destination of Rio de Janeiro.
Permit me to suggest that an investigation into this matter is highly essential.
From all the information which I can collect, the enemy at Bahia are considerably distracted in their councils, which dissensions cannot fail to be increased by seeing their vessels taken in the very mouth of the harbour, and their look-out ships driven under the guns of the batteries by those of His Imperial Majesty, I may, indeed, say by two ships alone, because in the state of the other vessels and crews I have not deemed it prudent to trust them in the neighbourhood of a port occupied by the enemy.
I have no doubt of succeeding--by some means or other--in effecting our object, and that in as short a time as can reasonably be expected--for it is not to be supposed that I should all at once accomplish objects of such magnitude with a force so inferior, and in great part so inexperienced and heterogeneously composed. On this subject I beg to call your attention to the low opinion entertained of our squadron by the enemy, as expressed in the enclosed Bahia Gazette (No 65), which, on that point, is in conformity with my own opinion as previously expressed.
I have the honour, &c. COCHRANE.
To the Prime Minister.
The following proclamation from the _Bahia Gazette_ will shew the nature of these vapourings deliberately inserted by the Bahia authorities:--