The subjoined extracts from the log of my secretary will shew the periods at which the distribution took place:--
_Sept.10th._ Made distribution of prize money in silver.
_Sept.15th to 16th._ Went on board the _Maria de Gloria_, and paid prize money.
_Sept. 17th._ Paid Capt. Crosbie, 10,400 dollars in specie. Paid other officers 5750 dollars.
_Sept. 18th._ Paid Admiral 4750 dollars.
_Sept. 27th._ Paying prize money to the _Paragua.s.su_ and others.
_Sept. 28th._ Similarly employed.
_Sept. 30th._ Paying prize money.
_Oct. 1st to 5th._ Paying prize money.
The following were the amounts disbursed on these occasions, as far as they appear in my private memoranda--some doubtless having been lost:--
Dollars.
Disburs.e.m.e.nts at Rio de Janeiro 70,750 _(Paid Squadron as per account, made up Sept. 23, 1824.)_
To petty officers and seamen of flagship, in cla.s.ses numbered A to Y, as per pay books transmitted by _Piranha_ 18,289
Paid Captain Crosbie 10,400
" Captain-Lieutenants Carvalho, Grenfell, and Shepherd, 2250 dollars each 6,750
" Capt. Grenfell, on account of captures at Para 2,750
" Seven Lieutenants, at 1500 dollars each 10,500
" Two Lieutenants at 1000 dollars each 2,000
" Six Lieutenants at 750 dollars each 4,500
" Lieutenant Ross as prize master 500
" _Maria de Gloria_ 2,483
" _Nitherohy, Carolina,_ and _Paragua.s.su_, no account, say the same 7,500
" Brig _Bahia_ 274
" Officers and men of the _Piranga_ 7,053
" Mr. Dean, purser 600
" Lieutenant Ayre 480
" Florencia Jose da Costa 140
" Gratifications to artisans 419
" To Admiral 4,750 " Secretary, for distribution 5,000 " May and Lukin, prize agents, as per balance of account, July 15, 1824 5,324 ------ 160,462 Original amount 200,000 ------ Balance to be accounted for 39,538 ======
The above were not the whole amounts paid, but they are all that a search amongst my numerous papers at present furnish; and as the original accounts, as has been previously stated, were sent to Rio de Janeiro, a more precise balance cannot here be drawn; but even this is sufficient to carry conviction to any reasonable mind, that the sums above stated were disbursed in ordinary routine, and should make the Brazilian administration ashamed to say, that "the First Admiral never sent in his accounts of the 200,000 dollars entrusted to him," thus inducing an unworthy inference that they were not disbursed; though any man possessed of common understanding could never believe that a squadron, const.i.tuted as the Brazilian Marine was, would obey orders and cheerfully act in unison with me, knowing that their prize money was on board--of which I unwarrantably held possession!
These explanations are more humiliating to the Brazilian administration than to myself--though for so many years the subject of unmerited obloquy from their denial of accounts which must unquestionably have been in the possession of the Administration of 1825. But I must carry these explanations yet farther. With the exception of 4750 dollars for my own necessities, I took none as my share, though ent.i.tled to an eighth in all cases, and to a fourth in the absence of other ships whenever important services were performed by the flagship alone.
Neither had I received from the Imperial Government a single dollar of the customary emoluments due to me, though, had these been honestly paid according to the usages of nations and the stipulations of the Emperor"s decree of December 11, 1822, my share ought to have been more than double the whole amount entrusted to me to man the ships and satisfy the officers and men. Still I did not appropriate the 39,000 dollars which remained, after paying the men, but determined to withhold it till I saw what course the prize tribunal at Rio de Janeiro intended to pursue; and, if that course were not satisfactory, then to appropriate it as a right, although it was wholly inadequate to the services rendered, for which I had been loaded with Imperial honours and national thanks, without a shilling of emolument, notwithstanding the capture of a hundred and twenty _bona fide_ enemy"s ships--the expulsion of their fleet and army--and the annexation of more than one half the empire. But more of this in another place.
On my return to Pernambuco, I found General Lima in quiet possession of the city, and as the _Piranga_ had brought me instructions from His Imperial Majesty, that, as soon as order was restored, a force should proceed to Para, and depose the, General-at-Arms there nominated, I applied to General Lima for a small military detachment to effect that object; but he declined--on the ground, that in the present state of affairs in Pernambuco, it was not practicable to diminish his force.
It was not at Para only that irregularities prevailed: even at Maranham serious disturbances had broken out, with the avowed intention, on the part of the insurgents, of deposing the Governor acting under the authority of His Imperial Majesty--to whom this new attempt at revolution was as yet unknown. In short, the order to depose the General-at-Arms at Para had unexpectedly resolved itself into the necessity of tranquillizing the whole of the Northern provinces, which were only waiting the result of Carvalho"s measures at Pernambuco, openly to declare against the Imperial authority.
The dissatisfaction in the Northern provinces originated solely in the anti-Brazilian system of Government pursued at Rio de Janeiro, which in the estimation of all at a distance was Portuguese rather than Brazilian. As they were either ignorant, or did not believe, that the patriotic intentions of the Emperor were overruled or thwarted by the Portuguese faction in the administration, which, holding in reality the reins of power, left to His Majesty little more than nominal authority.
It was not, then, to be wondered at, that the inhabitants of these distant provinces, who, only a year before, had welcomed me as their liberator from Portuguese oppression, and as the representative of const.i.tutional authority, should now be dissatisfied with what they rightly considered an unnational system of government--preferring to submit to a bad government of their own choosing rather than to one thus arbitrarily imposed upon them.
To avert revolution required able presidents, well skilled in the management of public affairs; but, in place of these, men of an opposite character had, for the most part, been chosen by the administration.
It was no less essential that the Generals-at-Arms, or military commandants, should be temperate and unprejudiced; but those placed in this responsible position used their authority in the most obnoxious and arbitrary manner. It was, no doubt, difficult to find proper men; or, if they existed amongst the Brazilians, the jealousy of the Portuguese party in the administration prevented their elevation to power; the aim of that faction being disorder, as auxiliary to their anti-imperial views. This had been strikingly evinced by the instructions given to disembark General Lima"s force at Alagoas, instead of near the seat of disturbance; thus entailing loss of time and a difficult and tedious march, which might have ended in failure, had it not been for the distraction caused by the threatened bombardment of Pernambuco by water, and the demonstration made to shew how easily it would be effected, when means for a destructive attack were complete; the result was, that--knowing my return from Bahia, with everything in readiness for an attack in earnest, could not be delayed beyond a few days, no serious opposition was offered to the occupation of the city by the force under General Lima.
The reports of increased disaffection in the Northern provinces becoming daily more precise, it was necessary to take advantage of the panic which the recovery of Pernambuco had occasioned; the more so, as serious commotions had arisen, whilst a strong disposition to revolt was almost universally manifested. As General Lima had refused me a military detachment--and as the _Pedro Primeiro_ and _Piranga_ could render him no further a.s.sistance, I considered it more in conformity with His Majesty"s interests to visit the Northern ports with these ships; taking also the _Cacique_ and _Atalanta_, for the performance of services to which the larger vessels were not adapted. The mere presence of these off the disaffected ports would, I knew, suffice to restore order, by affording inferential demonstration that, if force were required, it was ready to be applied.
Accordingly, leaving at Pernambuco the remainder of the squadron, we sailed on the 10th of October for Rio Grande do Norte, where great confusion prevailed amongst the inhabitants, threatened by the insurgents in the adjacent province of Ceara, on account of their abandonment of revolutionary designs in consequence of events at Pernambuco.
Arriving off the Rio Grande on the 12th, I requested information from the President, relative to the state of the maritime towns and provinces between Rio Grande and Para, especially with regard to Ceara. The nature of the reply determined me at once to proceed to the latter place, though regretting the necessity of going farther to leeward, on account of the time which would be occupied in getting back to Rio de Janeiro; yet feeling a.s.sured that it would not be satisfactory to His Majesty, were we to return without ascertaining more particularly the condition of the North, and without contributing to the restoration of tranquillity.
Arriving off Ceara on the 18th, I sent a communication to the President, requiring him to make known my arrival for the purpose of restoring order, and promising that all disaffected persons who, within fourteen days, should return to their allegiance, would be permitted to retire quietly to their homes, and would not in any way be molested on account of their previous acts or opinions.
A deputation of the inhabitants came off to the flagship, asking me to land as large a force as I could spare, but as General Lima had declined to supply a military detachment, it was out of my power to comply; for the roadstead being unsafe, and the flagship nearly aground, I could not dispense with the English seamen, whilst the Portuguese portion of the crews was not to be trusted. Besides which, the foreign seamen were not adapted to garrisoning a town.
The application was, therefore, evaded; but with an a.s.surance to the President that, should the insurgents advance, we would render effectual a.s.sistance; reminding him, however, that the inhabitants ought to be induced to adopt amongst themselves, measures for their own protection and preservation of tranquillity, which results were perfectly within their power; and would render unnecessary the presence of military.
I however landed a small detachment for the purpose of ascertaining the means of defence, as well as in the hope of exciting the authorities on sh.o.r.e to some degree of activity in their own cause. In case of attack, I promised to disembark for their a.s.sistance the whole of the men who could be spared; at the same time giving permission to withdraw to the ships in case of sudden emergency, which might not admit of communication with me in time.
This offer produced the best effect in the city, giving confidence to the well-affected, whilst, as the discontented were ignorant of the extent of aid that could be afforded, they deemed it wisest to keep quiet. On the following day, the inhabitants returned to their allegiance, the officiating President hoisting the Imperial flag on the ramparts with his own hands, amidst every demonstration of general satisfaction.
I next caused despatches to be sent to all quarters of the province, announcing the return of the city to its allegiance, promising oblivion of the past to all who followed the example, and this was succeeded by a general acknowledgment of the Imperial authority. Confidential agents, entrusted with similar despatches, were likewise sent to the revolutionary forces headed by Bizarra, the rebel General-at-Arms, the whole of whose troops abandoned him; whilst, by similar agency, the _corps_, under the immediate command of the revolutionary president, Araripe, was reduced to a hundred men--even the Indians, without exception, abandoning his standard.
As one of the first steps towards the pacification of the province, I had published not only a general amnesty, but also a particular amnesty, offering to the insurgent leaders themselves especial pardon, from which, in ordinary general amnesty, they might otherwise imagine themselves excluded, I had, in my own mind, determined upon this as a general course to be pursued, as I could not but see that, in the outset of the revolt, both insurgents and leaders had good cause to be dissatisfied with the central Government at Rio de Janeiro. I had even addressed a letter personally to the revolutionary president, Araripe, remonstrating upon the folly of the course he was pursuing, and promising my protection to _himself_, as well as to the other revolutionary leaders, if they would return to their allegiance. He chose rather to withdraw into the interior, with the discontented who adhered to him, intending, no doubt, to wait till the naval force had retired. Foreseeing the danger of this, I issued a proclamation, offering a reward for his capture, sufficient to induce the Indians who had previously been his supporters to proceed in quest of him, the result being that he himself was killed, and the whole of his followers captured. The Indian chiefs, as well as their dependants, were of great service in the restoration of order, combining superior bodily strength and activity, with energy, docility, and unfailing power of endurance --forming, indeed, the best specimens of the native race I had seen in South America.
Previous to this I had succeeded, without much trouble, in restoring tranquillity to the province of Parahyba, which had also been disturbed by the mandates of Araripe; the inhabitants complying with his orders, from the immediate danger to which they were exposed by his violence, and being under the impression that Rio de Janeiro was too far distant to afford them succour. Their delight at finding a squadron at hand was, therefore, immediately followed by a repudiation of the insurgent chief, and a return to unqualified allegiance.