The second article repeats the important acknowledgment, that the Cherokee nation is under the protection of the United States of America, and of no other sovereign whosoever.
The meaning of this has been already explained. The Indian nations were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on some foreign potentate for the supply of their essential wants, and for their protection from lawless and injurious intrusions into their country.
That Power was naturally termed their protector. They had been arranged under the protection of Great Britain: but the extinguishment of the British power in their neighborhood, and the establishment of that of the United States, in its place, led naturally to the declaration, on the part of the Cherokees, that they were under the protection of the United States, and of no other Power. They a.s.sumed the relation with the United States which had before subsisted with Great Britain.
This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more powerful: not that of individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting as subjects to the laws of a master.
The third article contains a perfectly equal stipulation for the surrender of prisoners.
The fourth article declares, that "the boundary between the United States and the Cherokee nation shall be as follows: Beginning," &c. We hear no more of "allotments" or of "hunting grounds." A boundary is described, between nation and nation, by mutual consent. The national character of each, the ability of each to establish this boundary, is acknowledged by the other. To preclude forever all disputes, it is agreed that it shall be plainly marked by commissioners, to be appointed by each party; and, in order to extinguish forever, all claim of the Cherokees to the ceded lands, an additional consideration is to be paid by the United States. For this additional consideration the Cherokees release all right to the ceded land, forever.
By the fifth article, the Cherokees allow the United States a road through their country, and the navigation of the Tennessee river. The acceptance of these cessions is an acknowledgment of the right of the Cherokees to make or withhold them.
By the sixth article it is agreed, on the part of the Cherokees, that the United States shall have the sole and exclusive right of regulating their trade. No claim is made to the management of all their affairs.
This stipulation has already been explained. The observation may be repeated, that the stipulation is itself an admission of their right to make or refuse it.
By the seventh article the United States solemnly guaranty to the Cherokee nation all their lands not hereby ceded.
The eighth article relinquishes to the Cherokees any citizens of the United States who may settle on their lands; and the ninth forbids any citizen of the United States to hunt on their lands, or to enter their country without a pa.s.sport.
The remaining articles are equal, and contain stipulations which could be made only with a nation admitted to be capable of governing itself.
This treaty, thus explicitly recognizing the national character of the Cherokees, and their right of self government; thus guarantying their lands; a.s.suming the duty of protection, and of course pledging the faith of the United States for that protection; has been frequently renewed, and is now in full force.
To the general pledge of protection have been added several specific pledges, deemed valuable by the Indians. Some of these restrain the citizens of the United States from encroachments on the Cherokee country, and provide for the punishment of intruders.
From the commencement of our Government, Congress has pa.s.sed acts to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians, which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate. All these acts, and especially that of 1802, which is still in force, manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guarantied by the United States.
In 1819, Congress pa.s.sed an act for promoting these humane designs of civilizing the neighboring Indians, which had long been cherished by the Executive. It enacts, "that, for the purpose of providing against the further decline and filial extinction of the Indian tribes adjoining to the frontier settlements of the United States, and for introducing among them the habits and arts of civilization, the President of the United States shall be, and he is hereby, authorized, in every case where he shall judge improvement in the habits and condition of such Indians practicable, and that the means of instruction can be introduced, _with their own consent_, to employ capable persons, of good moral character, to instruct them in the mode of agriculture suited to their situation; and for teaching their children in reading, writing, and arithmetic; and for performing such other duties as may be enjoined, according to such instructions and rules as the President may give and prescribe for the regulation of their conduct in the discharge of their duties."
This act avowedly contemplates the preservation of the Indian nations as an object sought by the United States, and proposes to effect this object by civilizing and converting them from hunters into agriculturists. Though the Cherokees had already made considerable progress in this improvement, it cannot be doubted that the general words of the act comprehend them. Their advance in the "habits and arts of civilization." rather encouraged perseverance in the laudable exertions still farther to meliorate their condition. This act furnishes strong additional evidence of a settled purpose to fix the Indians in their country by giving them security at home.
The treaties and laws of the United States contemplate the Indian territory as completely separated from that of the States; and provide that all intercourse with them shall be carried on exclusively by the Government of the Union.
Is this the rightful exercise of power, or is it usurpation?
While these States were colonies, this power, in its utmost extent, was admitted to reside in the crown. When our Revolutionary struggle commenced, Congress was composed of an a.s.semblage of deputies acting under specific powers granted by the Legislatures, or conventions of the several colonies. It was a great popular movement, not perfectly organized, nor were the respective powers of those who were entrusted with the management of affairs accurately defined. The necessities of our situation produced a general conviction that those measures which concerned all, must be transacted by a body in which the representatives of all were a.s.sembled, and which could command the confidence of all; Congress, therefore, was considered as invested with all the powers of war and peace, and Congress dissolved our connexion with the mother country, and declared these United Colonies to be independent States. Without any written definition of powers, they employed diplomatic agents to represent the United States at the several Courts of Europe; offered to negotiate treaties with them; and did actually negotiate treaties with France. From the same necessity, and on the same principles, Congress a.s.sumed the management of Indian affairs; first in the name of these United Colonies, and afterwards in the name of the United States. Early attempts were made at negotiation, and to regulate trade with them. These not proving successful, war was carried on under the direction, and with the forces of the United States, and the efforts to make peace, by treaty, were earnest and incessant. The Confederation found Congress in the exercise of the same powers of peace and war, in our relations with Indian nations, as with those of Europe. Such was the state of things when the Confederation was adopted. That instrument surrendered the powers of peace and war to Congress, and prohibited them to the States, respectively, unless a State be actually invaded, "or shall have received certain advice of a resolution being formed by some nation of Indians to invade such State, and the danger is so imminent as not to admit of delay till the United States, in Congress a.s.sembled, can be consulted." This instrument also gave the United States in Congress a.s.sembled the sole and exclusive right of "regulating the trade, and managing all the affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the States: _Provided_, That the legislative power of any State within its own limits be not infringed or violated."
The ambiguous phrases which follow the grant of power to the United States, were so construed by the States of North Carolina and Georgia as to annul the power itself. The discontents and confusion resulting from these conflicting claims, produced representations to Congress, which were referred to a committee, who made their report in 1787. The report does not a.s.sent to the construction of the two States, but recommends an accommodation, by liberal cessions of territory, or by an admission, on their part, of the powers claimed by Congress. The correct exposition of this article is rendered unnecessary by the adoption of our existing const.i.tution. That instrument confers on Congress the powers of war and peace; of making treaties, and of regulating commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and _with the Indian tribes_.
These powers comprehend all that is required for the regulation of our intercourse with the Indians. They are not limited by any restrictions on their free actions. The shackles imposed on this power, in the Confederation, are discarded.
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed: and this was a restriction which those European potentates imposed on themselves, as well as on the Indians. The very term, "nation," so generally applied to them, means "a People distinct from others." The const.i.tution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian nations, and, consequently, admits their rank among those Powers who are capable of making treaties. The words "treaty" and "nation" are words of our own language, selected in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and well understood meaning. We have applied them to Indians, as we have applied them to the other nations of the earth. They are applied to all in the same sense.
Georgia, herself, has furnished conclusive evidence that her former opinions on this subject concurred with those entertained by her sister States, and by the Government of the United States. Various acts of her Legislature have been cited in the argument, including the contract of cession made in the year 1802, all tending to prove her acquiescence in the universal conviction that the Indian nations possessed a full right to the lands they occupied, until that right should be extinguished by the United States, with their consent; that their territory was separated from that of any State within whose chartered limits they might reside, by a boundary line, established by treaties; that, within their boundary, they possessed rights with which no State could interfere; and that the whole power of regulating the intercourse with them, was vested in the United States. A review of these acts, on the part of Georgia, would occupy too much time, and is the less necessary, because they have been accurately detailed in the argument at the bar.
Her new series of laws, manifesting her abandonment of these opinions, appears to have commenced in December, 1828.
In opposition to this original right, possessed by the undisputed occupants of every country, to this recognition of that right, which is evidenced by our history in every change through which we have pa.s.sed, is placed the charters granted by the monarch of a distant and distinct region, parcelling out a territory in possession of others, whom he could not remove, and did not attempt to remove, and the cession made of his claims, by the treaty of peace.
The actual state of things at the time, and all history since, explain these charters; and the King of Great Britain, at the treaty of peace, could cede only what belonged to his crown. These newly a.s.serted t.i.tles can derive no aid from the articles so often repeated in Indian treaties, extending to them, first, the protection of Great Britain, and afterwards, that of the United States. These articles are a.s.sociated with others, recognizing their t.i.tle to self government. The very fact of repeated treaties with them recognizes it; and the settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that the weaker power does not surrender its independence--its right to self government--by a.s.sociating with a stronger, and taking its protection. A weak State, in order to provide for its safety, may place itself under the protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself of the right of government, and ceasing to be a State. Examples of this kind are not wanting in Europe. "Tributary and feudatory States," says Vattel, "do not thereby cease to be sovereign and independent States, so long as self government and sovereign and independent authority is left in the administration of the State." At the present day, more than one State may be considered as holding its right of self government under the guarantee and protection of one or more allies.
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the a.s.sent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by our const.i.tution and laws, vested in the Government of the United States.
The act of the State of Georgia, under which the plaintiff in error was prosecuted, is consequently void, and the judgment a nullity. Can this Court revise and reverse it?
If the objection to the system of legislation, lately adopted by the Legislature of Georgia, in relation to the Cherokee nation, was confined to its extraterritorial operation, the objection, though complete, so far as respected mere right, would give this Court no power over the subject. But it goes much further. If the view which has been taken be correct, and we think it is, the acts of Georgia are repugnant to the const.i.tution, laws, and treaties, of the United States.
They interfere forcibly with the relations established between the United States and the Cherokee nation, the regulation of which, according to the settled principles of our const.i.tution, are committed exclusively to the Government of the Union.
They are in direct hostility with treaties, repeated in a succession of years, which mark out the boundary that separates the Cherokee country from Georgia; guaranty to them all the land within their boundary; solemnly pledge the faith of the United States to restrain their citizens from trespa.s.sing on it; and recognize the pre-existing power of the nation to govern itself.
They are in equal hostility with the acts of Congress for regulating this intercourse and giving effect to the treaties.
The forcible seizure and abduction of the plaintiff in error, who was residing in the nation, with its permission, and by authority of the President of the United States, is also a violation of the acts which authorize the Chief Magistrate to exercise this authority.
Will these powerful considerations avail the plaintiff in error? We think they will. He was seized, and forcibly carried away, while under guardianship of treaties guarantying the country in which he resided, and taking it under the protection of the United States. He was seized while performing, under the sanction of the Chief Magistrate of the Union, those duties which the humane policy adopted by Congress had recommended. He was apprehended, tried, and condemned, under color of a law which has been shown to be repugnant to the const.i.tution, laws, and treaties, of the United States. Had a judgment, liable to the same objections, been rendered for property, none would question the jurisdiction of this Court. It cannot be less clear when the judgment affects personal liberty, and inflicts disgraceful punishment, if punishment could disgrace when inflicted on innocence. The plaintiff in error is not less interested in the operation of this unconst.i.tutional law than if it affected his property. He is not less ent.i.tled to the protection of the const.i.tution, laws, and treaties, of his country.
It is the opinion of this Court that the judgment of the Superior Court for the county of Gwinnett, in the State of Georgia, condemning Samuel A. Worcester to hard labor, in the penitentiary of the State of Georgia, for four years, was p.r.o.nounced by that Court under color of a law which is void, as being repugnant to the const.i.tution, treaties, and laws of the United States, and ought, therefore, to be reversed and annulled.
MANDATE OF THE COURT.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, _January Term_, 1832.
SAMUEL A. WORCESTER, } _In Error to the Superior_ _Plaintiff in Error_, } _Court for the County of_ _vs._ } _Gwinnett, in the State of_ THE STATE OF GEORGIA. } _Georgia._
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Superior Court for the County of Gwinnett, in the State of Georgia, and was argued by counsel: on consideration whereof, it is the opinion of this Court, that the act of the Legislature of the State of Georgia, upon which the indictment in this case is founded, is contrary to the const.i.tution, treaties, and laws, of the United States; and, that the special plea, in bar, pleaded by the said Samuel A. Worcester, in manner aforesaid, and relying upon the const.i.tution, treaties, and laws, of the United States, aforesaid, is a good bar and defence to the said indictment, by the said Samuel A. Worcester; and, as such, ought to have been allowed and admitted by the said Superior Court for the County of Gwinnett, in the State of Georgia, before which the said indictment was pending and tried; and that there was error in the said Superior Court of the State of Georgia, in overruling the plea so pleaded, as aforesaid. It is, therefore, ordered and adjudged, that the judgment rendered in the premises, by the said Superior Court of Georgia, upon the verdict upon the plea of Not Guilty, afterwards pleaded by the said Samuel A. Worcester, whereby the said Samuel A.
Worcester is sentenced to hard labor in the penitentiary of the State of Georgia, ought to be reversed and annulled. And this Court, proceeding to render such judgment as the said Superior Court of the State of Georgia should have rendered, it is further ordered and adjudged, that the said judgment of the said Superior Court be, and hereby is, reversed and annulled; and that judgment be, and hereby is, awarded, that the special plea in bar, so as aforesaid pleaded, is a good and sufficient plea in bar, in law, to the indictment aforesaid, and that all proceedings on the said indictment do forever surcease, and that the said Samuel A. Worcester be, and hereby is, henceforth dismissed therefrom, and that he go thereof quit without day. And that a special mandate do go from this Court to the said Superior Court, to carry this judgment into execution.
MARCH 5, 1832.