It is the purpose of every Socialist party to revolutionize the minds of the working cla.s.s in the same way as development of capitalism has revolutionized social relations. The work of propaganda and organization among the proletariat, however, has its own intrinsic inertia. The Socialist parties of Europe--in the first place the most powerful of them, the German Socialist party--have developed a conservatism of their own, which grows in proportion as Socialism embraces ever larger ma.s.ses and organization and discipline increase. Social-Democracy, personifying the political experience of the proletariat, can, therefore, at a certain juncture, become an immediate obstacle on the way of an open proletarian conflict with the bourgeois reaction. In other words, the propaganda-conservatism of a proletarian party can, at a certain moment, impede the direct struggle of the proletariat for power. The colossal influence of the Russian revolution manifests itself in killing party routine, in destroying Socialist conservatism, in making a clean contest of proletarian forces against capitalist reaction a question of the day.
The struggle for universal suffrage in Austria, Saxony and Prussia has become more determined under the direct influence of the October strike in Russia. An Eastern revolution imbues the Western proletariat with revolutionary idealism and stimulates its desire to speak "Russian" to its foes.
The Russian proletariat in power, even if this were only the result of a pa.s.sing combination of forces in the Russian bourgeois revolution, would meet organized opposition on the part of the world"s reaction, and readiness for organized support on the part of the world"s proletariat.
Left to its own resources, the Russian working cla.s.s must necessarily be crushed the moment it loses the aid of the peasants. Nothing remains for it but to link the fate of its political supremacy and the fate of the Russian revolution with the fate of a Socialist revolution in Europe.
All that momentous authority and political power which is given to the proletariat by a combination of forces in the Russian bourgeois revolution, it will thrust on the scale of cla.s.s struggle in the entire capitalistic world. Equipped with governmental power, having a counter-revolution behind his back, having the European reaction in front of him, the Russian workingman will issue to all his brothers the world over his old battle-cry which will now become the call for the last attack: _Proletarians of all the world, unite!_
EXPLANATORY NOTES
The first _Council of Workmen"s Deputies_ was formed in Petersburg, on October 13th, 1905, in the course of the great general October strike that compelled Nicholas Romanoff to promise a Const.i.tution.
It represented individual factories, labor unions, and included also delegates from the Socialist parties. It looked upon itself as the center of the revolution and a nucleus of a revolutionary labor government. Similar Councils sprung up in many other industrial centers. It was arrested on December 3d, having existed for fifty days. Its members were tried and sent to Siberia.
_Intelligentzia_ is a term applied in Russia to an indefinite, heterogeneous group of "intellectuals," who are not actively and directly involved in the industrial machinery of capitalism, and at the same time are not members of the working cla.s.s. It is customary to count among the _Intelligentzia_ students, teachers, writers, lawyers, physicians, college professors, etc. However, the term _Intelligentzia_ implies also a certain degree of idealism and radical aspirations.
_Witte_ was the first prime-minister under the quasi-const.i.tution granted on October 17th, 1905. _Stolypin_ was appointed prime minister after the dissolution of the first Duma in July, 1906.
Under the _minimum program_ the Social-Democrats understand all that range of reforms which can be obtained under the existing capitalist system of "private ownership of the means of production," such as an eight hour workday, social insurance, universal suffrage, a republican order. The _maximum program_ demands the abolition of private property and public management of industries, i.e., Socialism.
"_Some prejudices among the ma.s.ses_" referred to in this essay is the alleged love of the primitive ma.s.ses for their Tzar. This was an argument usually put forth by the liberals against republican aspirations.
_Lower-Middle-Cla.s.s_ is the only term half-way covering the Russian "Mieshchanstvo" used by Trotzky. "Mieshchanstvo" has a socio-economic meaning, and a flavor of moral disapproval. Socially and economically it means those numerous inhabitants of modern cities who are engaged in independent economic pursuits, as artisans (masters), shopkeepers, small manufacturers, petty merchants, etc., who have not capital enough to rank with the bourgeoisie. Morally "Mieshchanstvo" presupposes a limited horizon, lack of definite revolutionary or political ideas, and lack of political courage.
The _Village community_ is a remnant of old times in Russia. Up to 1906 the members of the village were not allowed to divide the land of the community among the individual peasants on the basis of private property. The land legally belonged to the entire community which allotted it to its members. Since 1906 the compulsory character of communal land-ownership was abandoned, yet in very great areas of Russia it still remained the prevailing system of land-ownership.
Besides having a share in the community-land, the individual peasant could acquire a piece of land out of his private means (the seller being usually the landlord) and thus become a _small private owner_.
THE SOVIET AND THE REVOLUTION
(Fifty Days)
About two years after the arrest of the Soviet of 1905, a number of former leaders of that organization, among them Chrustalyov Nossar, the first chairman, and Trotzky, the second chairman, met abroad after having escaped from Siberian exile. They decided to sum up their Soviet experiences in a book which they called _The History of the Council of Workingmen"s Deputies_. The book appeared in 1908 in Petersburg, and was immediately suppressed. One of the essays of this book is here reprinted.
In his estimation of the role of the Soviet Trotzky undoubtedly exaggerates. Only by a flight of imagination can one see in the activities of the Soviet regarding the postal, telegraph and railroad strikers the beginnings of a Soviet control over post-office, telegraph and railroads. It is also a serious question whether the Soviet was really a leading body, or whether it was led by the current of revolutionary events which it was unable to control. What makes this essay interesting and significant is Trotzky"s a.s.sertion that "the first new wave of the revolution will lead to the creation of Soviets all over the country." This has actually happened. His predictions of the formation of an all-Russian Soviet, and of the program the Soviets would follow, have also been realized in the course of the present revolution.
1
The history of the Soviet is a history of fifty days. The Soviet was const.i.tuted on October 13th; its session was interrupted by a military detachment of the government on December 3rd. Between those two dates the Soviet lived and struggled.
What was the substance of this inst.i.tution? What enabled it in this short period to take an honorable place in the history of the Russian proletariat, in the history of the Russian Revolution?
The Soviet organized the ma.s.ses, conducted political strikes, led political demonstrations, tried to arm the workingmen. But other revolutionary organizations did the same things. The substance of the Soviet was its effort to become _an organ of public authority_. The proletariat on one hand, the reactionary press on the other, have called the Soviet "a labor government"; this only reflects the fact that the Soviet was in reality _an embryo of a revolutionary government_. In so far as the Soviet was in actual possession of authoritative power, it made use of it; in so far as the power was in the hands of the military and bureaucratic monarchy, the Soviet fought to obtain it. Prior to the Soviet, there had been revolutionary organizations among the industrial workingmen, mostly of a Social-Democratic nature. But those were organizations _among_ the proletariat; their immediate aim was to _influence the ma.s.ses_. The Soviet is an organization _of_ the proletariat; its aim is to fight for _revolutionary power_.
At the same time, the Soviet was _an organized expression of the will of the proletariat as a cla.s.s_. In its fight for power the Soviet applied such methods as were naturally determined by the character of the proletariat as a cla.s.s: its part in production; its numerical strength; its social h.o.m.ogeneity. In its fight for power the Soviet has combined the direction of all the social activities of the working cla.s.s, including decisions as to conflicts between individual representatives of capital and labor. This combination was by no means an artificial tactical attempt: it was a natural consequence of the situation of a cla.s.s which, consciously developing and broadening its fight for its immediate interests, had been compelled by the logic of events to a.s.sume a leading position in the revolutionary struggle for power.
The main weapon of the Soviet was a political strike of the ma.s.ses. The power of the strike lies in disorganizing the power of the government.
The greater the "anarchy" created by a strike, the nearer its victory.
This is true only where "anarchy" is not being created by anarchic actions. The cla.s.s that puts into motion, day in and day out, the industrial apparatus and the governmental apparatus; the cla.s.s that is able, by a sudden stoppage of work, to paralyze both industry and government, must be organized enough not to fall the first victim of the very "anarchy" it has created. The more effective the disorganization of government caused by a strike, the more the strike organization is compelled to a.s.sume governmental functions.
The Council of Workmen"s Delegates introduces a free press. It organizes street patrols to secure the safety of the citizens. It takes over, to a greater or less extent, the post office, the telegraph, and the railroads. It makes an effort to introduce the eight hour workday.
Paralyzing the autocratic government by a strike, it brings its own democratic order into the life of the working city population.
2
After January 9th the revolution had shown its power over the minds of the working ma.s.ses. On June 14th, through the revolt of the Potyomkin Tavritchesky it had shown that it was able to become a material force.
In the October strike it had shown that it could disorganize the enemy, paralyze his will and utterly humiliate him. By organizing Councils of Workmen"s Deputies all over the country, _it showed that it was able to create authoritative power_. Revolutionary authority can be based only on active revolutionary force. Whatever our view on the further development of the Russian revolution, it is a fact that so far no social cla.s.s besides the proletariat has manifested readiness to uphold a revolutionary authoritative power. The first act of the revolution was an encounter in the streets of the _proletariat_ with the monarchy; the first serious victory of the revolution was achieved through the _cla.s.s-weapon of the proletariat_, the political strike; the first nucleus of a revolutionary government was _a proletarian representation_. The Soviet is the first democratic power in modern Russian history. The Soviet is the organized power of the ma.s.ses themselves over their component parts. This is a true, unadulterated democracy, without a two-chamber system, without a professional bureaucracy, with the right of the voters to recall their deputy any moment and to subst.i.tute another for him. Through its members, through deputies elected by the workingmen, the Soviet directs all the social activities of the proletariat as a whole and of its various parts; it outlines the steps to be taken by the proletariat, it gives them a slogan and a banner. This art of directing the activities of the ma.s.ses on the basis of organized self-government, is here applied for the first time on Russian soil. Absolutism ruled the ma.s.ses, but it did not direct them. It put mechanical barriers against the living creative forces of the ma.s.ses, and within those barriers it kept the restless elements of the nation in an iron bond of oppression. The only ma.s.s absolutism ever directed was the army. But that was not directing, it was merely commanding. In recent years, even the directing of this atomized and hypnotized military ma.s.s has been slipping out of the hands of absolutism. Liberalism never had power enough to command the ma.s.ses, or initiative enough to direct them. Its att.i.tude towards ma.s.s-movements, even if they helped liberalism directly, was the same as towards awe-inspiring natural phenomena--earthquakes or volcanic eruptions. The proletariat appeared on the battlefield of the revolution as a self-reliant aggregate, totally independent from bourgeois liberalism.
The Soviet was a _cla.s.s-organization_, this was the source of its fighting power. It was crushed in the first period of its existence not by lack of confidence on the part of the ma.s.ses in the cities, but by the limitations of a purely urban revolution, by the relatively pa.s.sive att.i.tude of the village, by the backwardness of the peasant element of the army. The Soviet"s position among the city population was as strong as could be.
The Soviet was not an official representative of the entire half million of the working population in the capital; its organization embraced about two hundred thousand, chiefly industrial workers; and though its direct and indirect political influence was of a much wider range, there were thousands and thousands of proletarians (in the building trade, among domestic servants, day laborers, drivers) who were hardly, if at all, influenced by the Soviet. There is no doubt, however, that the Soviet represented the interests of _all_ these proletarian ma.s.ses.
There were but few adherents of the Black Hundred in the factories, and their number dwindled hour by hour. The proletarian ma.s.ses of Petersburg were solidly behind the Soviet. Among the numerous intellectuals of Petersburg the Soviet had more friends than enemies. Thousands of students recognized the political leadership of the Soviet and ardently supported it in its decisions. Professional Petersburg was entirely on the side of the Soviet. The support by the Soviet of the postal and telegraph strike won it the sympathy of the lower governmental officials. All the oppressed, all the unfortunate, all honest elements of the city, all those who were striving towards a better life, were instinctively or consciously on the side of the Soviet. The Soviet was actually or potentially a representative of an overwhelming majority of the population. Its enemies in the capital would not have been dangerous had they not been protected by absolutism, which based its power on the most backward elements of an army recruited from peasants. The weakness of the Soviet was not its own weakness, it was the weakness of a purely urban revolution.
The fifty day period was the period of the greatest power of the revolution. _The Soviet was its organ in the fight for public authority._ The cla.s.s character of the Soviet was determined by the cla.s.s differentiation of the city population and by the political antagonism between the proletariat and the capitalistic bourgeoisie.
This antagonism manifested itself even in the historically limited field of a struggle against absolutism. After the October strike, the capitalistic bourgeoisie consciously blocked the progress of the revolution, the petty middle cla.s.s turned out to be a nonent.i.ty, incapable of playing an independent role. The real leader of the urban revolution was the proletariat. Its cla.s.s-organization was the organ of the revolution in its struggle for power.
3
The struggle for power, for public authority--this is the central aim of the revolution. The fifty days of the Soviet"s life and its b.l.o.o.d.y finale have shown that urban Russia is too narrow a basis for such a struggle, and that even within the limits of the urban revolution, a local organization cannot be the central leading body. For a national task the proletariat required an organization on a national scale. The Petersburg Soviet was a local organization, yet the need of a central organization was so great that it had to a.s.sume leadership on a national scale. It did what it could, still it remained primarily the _Petersburg_ Council of Workmen"s Deputies. The urgency of an all-Russian labor congress which undoubtedly would have had authority to form a central leading organ, was emphasized even at the time of the first Soviet. The December collapse made its realization impossible. The idea remained, an inheritance of the Fifty Days.
The idea of a Soviet has become ingrained in the consciousness of the workingmen as the first prerequisite to revolutionary action of the ma.s.ses. Experience has shown that a Soviet is not possible or desirable under all circ.u.mstances. The objective meaning of the Soviet organization is to create conditions for disorganizing the government, for "anarchy," in other words for a revolutionary conflict. The present lull in the revolutionary movement, the mad triumph of reaction, make the existence of an open, elective, authoritative organization of the ma.s.ses impossible. There is no doubt, however, that _the first new wave of the revolution will lead to the creation of Soviets all over the country_. An All-Russian Soviet, organized by an All-Russian Labor Congress, will a.s.sume leadership of the local elective organizations of the proletariat. Names, of course, are of no importance; so are details of organization; the main thing is: a centralized democratic leadership in the struggle of the proletariat for a popular government. History does not repeat itself, and the new Soviet will not have again to go through the experience of the Fifty Days. These, however, will furnish it a complete program of action.
This program is perfectly clear.
To establish revolutionary cooperation with the army, the peasantry, and the plebeian lower strata of the urban bourgeoisie. To abolish absolutism. To destroy the material organization of absolutism by reconstructing and partly dismissing the army. To break up the entire bureaucratic apparatus. To introduce an eight hour workday. To arm the population, starting with the proletariat. To turn the Soviets into organs of revolutionary self-government in the cities. To create Councils of Peasants" Delegates (Peasants" Committees) as local organs of the agrarian revolution. To organize elections to the Const.i.tuent a.s.sembly and to conduct a preelection campaign for a definite program on the part of the representatives of the people.
It is easier to formulate such a program than to carry it through. If, however, the revolution will ever win, the proletariat cannot choose another. The proletariat will unfold revolutionary accomplishment such as the world has never seen. The history of Fifty Days will be only a poor page in the great book of the proletariat"s struggle and ultimate triumph.
PREFACE TO _MY ROUND TRIP_
Trotzky was never personal. The emotional side of life seldom appears in his writings. His is the realm of social activities, social and political struggles. His writings breathe logic, not sentiment, facts, not poetry. The following preface to his _Round Trip_ is, perhaps, the only exception. It speaks of the man Trotzky and his beliefs. Note his confession of faith: "History is a tremendous mechanism serving our ideals." ...
At the Stockholm Convention of the Social-Democratic Party, some curious statistical data was circulated, showing the conditions under which the party of the proletariat was working:
The Convention as a whole, in the person of its 140 members, had spent in prison one hundred and thirty-eight years and three and a half months.
The Convention had been in exile one hundred and forty-eight years and six and a half months.
Escaped from prison: Once, eighteen members of the Convention; twice, four members.