As it was clearly impossible that the Indian Government could put up with this insult, and that, moreover, England could not submit to see Russian envoys received by a country upon her border which refused to admit her own officers, preparations were at once made for war. It was decided to invade Afghanistan in three columns, one starting from Jumrood, at the north of the Khyber Pa.s.s, the second to advance through Tull by the Kuram Valley, and the third to move _via_ the Bolan Pa.s.s upon Candahar. The first of these was to be commanded by General Sir S.
Browne, the second by General Roberts, the third by General Biddulph.
The preparations for the concentration of these columns occupied considerable time, as India had been for some time in a state of profound peace, and the commissariat and transport service had to be entirely organised. The greatest efforts were, however, made, and the troops were rapidly got into place.
On the 26th of October a defiant reply to the Viceroy"s letter was received from the Ameer, and an ultimatum was in consequence sent to him, to the effect that unless the British demands were complied with, the troops would advance across the frontier. No reply having been received from him up to the night of the 20th November, orders were given to the troops to advance, and upon the following morning Generals Roberts and Browne advanced across the frontier with their respective columns.
The division of General Browne was divided into four brigades. The first, under General Macpherson, consisted of the fourth battalion of the Rifle Brigade, the 20th Bengal Infantry, and the 4th Ghurkas, with a mountain battery. These were to go round by a mountain road, to make a long circuit, and to come down into the pa.s.s at a village lying a mile or two beyond Ali-Musjid. The second brigade, under Colonel Tytler, consisting of the first battalion of the 17th Foot, the Infantry of the Guides, the 1st Sikhs, and a mountain battery, were to take a hill opposite to Ali-Musjid, and capture some batteries which the Afghans had erected there; while the third and fourth brigades were to advance direct up the valley. The former of these brigades consisted of the 81st, the 14th Sikhs, and the 24th Native Infantry. The fourth brigade was composed of the 51st Foot, the 6th Native Infantry, and the 45th Sikhs. With them was a mountain battery, and a battery of Horse Artillery.
The fort of Ali-Musjid is situated on a rock standing out in the valley, at a distance of some six miles from the frontier. It is a most commanding position, and, flanked as it was by batteries on the hillsides, was a most formidable place to capture. The advancing column marched forward until from a rise in the valley they could see Ali-Musjid at a distance of a mile and a half. The fort at once opened fire. The gunners there had been practising for some weeks, and had got the range with great accuracy. The column was therefore halted, and the men allowed to eat their dinners, as it was desired that the flanking columns should get into position before the front attack began. The guns of the battery answered those upon the fort, and a battery of 40-pounders coming up and opening fire, their effect upon the fort was at once visible.
The Sikhs were now thrown out upon the hillside, and these began a heavy musketry fire against the Afghans in the batteries there. Presently a general advance was ordered. The 81st and 24th Native Infantry advanced on the right-hand slopes of the valley, while the 51st and 6th Native Infantry and the Sikhs worked along on the left.
The scene is described as one of the most picturesque ever seen in warfare. From the fortress standing on the perpendicular rock in the centre of the valley, the flashes of the great guns came fast and steadily, while the edges of the rocks and forts were fringed with tiny puffs of musketry. On the British side the heavy 40-pounders and the batteries of Horse and Royal Artillery kept up a steady fire, while both sides of the steep hill-slopes were alive with British infantry, the quick flash of the rifles breaking from every rock and bush.
Gradually our skirmishers advanced until they were nearly abreast of the fort; but, so far, there was no sign that Macpherson"s brigade had accomplished its task and carried the hill, or that Tytler had worked round to the village in the rear. Some attacks, however, were made upon the Afghan intrenchments. These, however, were unsuccessful, and some valuable lives were lost. Major Birch and Lieutenant Fitzgerald, both of the 27th Native Infantry, were killed; Captain Maclean, of the 14th Sikhs, was wounded; and between thirty and forty rank and file killed and wounded.
As the fort and its defences could not have been carried without vast loss of life, it was now determined to halt, in order to give the flanking columns time to get in their places. These, who had met with enormous obstacles on their march, arrived in the night at their respective destinations, and the defenders of Ali-Musjid, taken by alarm at the news that forces were advancing which would cut off their retreat, precipitately abandoned their posts and fled. A great number were taken prisoners, and in the morning the troops occupied Ali--Musjid without resistance. So completely taken by surprise were the Afghans at the easy capture of a fort which they believed to be absolutely impregnable, that they fled without further resistance; and the British, moving quietly up the valley, occupied place after place with scarcely a shot fired until they reached Jellalabad.
In the meantime, General Roberts was advancing up the Kuram Valley. The tribes here greeted our advance with pleasure, for they were tributary to Cabul, and viewed the Afghan rule with aversion. It was upon the Peiwar Khotal, a steep and extremely strong position, that the Afghans determined to take their stand.
On the 30th of November the forces approached this position. The Afghans remained silent, and preparations were made for encamping at the commencement of the pa.s.s. The enemy, however, were nearer and more active than had been supposed, and scarcely had the troops taken up their position, when a heavy fire was opened upon them from above, and the force had to retire hastily out of range. Some of the infantry were pushed forward, and for a time brisk firing took place. The troops then encamped for the night out of range of shot. The next day was pa.s.sed in endeavouring to feel the position of the enemy, who occupied the line upon the top of the crest, and it was not until the 2nd that an attack was delivered.
After thoroughly reconnoitring the ground, it was found that the position of the Afghans was too strong to be attacked in front, and it was determined to turn it by a long and very difficult night-march of nine miles, up a path leading to the extreme left of the enemy"s position. The 72nd Highlanders, the 5th Ghurkas, and the 29th Native Infantry were told off for the service, and started after nightfall. At daybreak they came upon the enemy"s pickets, and a fierce fight took place, the Afghans defending themselves desperately. Captain Kelso brought up his battery of mountain guns, and did good service in aiding the infantry, who were all fiercely engaged. He himself, however, was shot dead.
After three hours" hard fighting the enemy"s left wing was beaten, and the British, pressing forward, drove them in confusion upon the centre.
The 2nd Punjaub Infantry, the 23rd Pioneers, and four artillery guns on elephants now arrived on the scene. It was well that they did so, for the enemy were again found in a strong position in a thick wood, and an obstinate fight ensued. It was some hours before they were dislodged from this point, as they continually brought up fresh troops. So severe was their resistance that it was found impossible to force them back by a direct attack, and General Roberts now directed his men to advance in such a direction as to still further turn their position and threaten their line of retreat. This had the desired effect. The Afghans, as usual, lost heart as soon as it appeared that their retreat was menaced, and, leaving the strong positions on the Peiwar itself, fled hastily.
While this fight had been going on, the second battalion of the 8th Foot had advanced direct from the camp below. Hitherto they had made no great progress, but had succeeded in attracting the attention of the enemy and keeping a large body of men in their intrenchments, and so aided the main attack on the right. The moment the Afghans yielded, the 8th pushed forward and occupied the enemy"s position.
The total loss on our side was 2 officers killed, 2 wounded, and 90 rank and file (Europeans and natives) killed and wounded. The troops were too much fatigued with their hard marching and fighting to be able to pursue the enemy. But no ill effect was caused by this, as the Afghans had completely lost heart, and in their retreat threw away arms and abandoned baggage of all kinds, most of their guns being left behind, and one battery falling into the hands of the British when they advanced to the Shaturgurdan Pa.s.s. General Roberts with a small party went on to this point, which they found abandoned, and from whence they commanded a view across the heart of Afghanistan almost to Cabul. It was considered unnecessary to occupy this position, as the winter was now at hand, during which time the pa.s.s is absolutely closed by snow. There was, then, no fear of the Afghans taking the offensive from this quarter.
Thus in two engagements the military strength which Shere Ali had been building up for many years, and which he considered sufficient to defend his country against the attacks of the British, fell absolutely to pieces; and a few days later he himself left Cabul, and started, a fugitive, for the northern frontier with the intention of pa.s.sing into Russia. It was necessary, however, that letters should be sent asking permission for him to take this step, and during the delay which ensued the Ameer was seized by fever, and expired.
General Roberts determined to leave a force to garrison the Peiwar, and to take up his headquarters in the lower valley, there to winter. On the way down he followed a route hitherto unknown, leading through the defile of the Chappri. It turned out to be extremely wild and difficult, and the people of this part, a tribe called Mongols, attacked the baggage, which was proceeding under a small escort only, the troops having pa.s.sed through ahead. The attack was sudden and unexpected; but the men of the baggage guard stood their way well. Captain Goad, a.s.sistant-superintendent of transport, was shot through the legs, and fell while fighting bravely. The natives made a rush towards him, but four soldiers of the 72nd stood over him and gallantly defended him against a crowd of enemies until the 5th Ghurkas, under Major Fitzhugh, came up from the rear. Heavy as the fire was, singularly enough, only one of these gallant fellows was wounded.
The Mongols stood boldly, and, taking to the rocks, kept up a very rapid fire, while the Ghurkas repeatedly charged home with the bayonet, using their terrible knives with great effect, and finally putting them to flight, three of the 5th being killed and 13 wounded. Farther up the defile the Mongols made another rush upon the train, but were here more easily beaten back. The attack was made with the hope of plunder only, and from no political animosity.
The population in the valley, although not hostile to British rule, were eager to plunder British waggons, and constant outrages of this kind took place, many soldiers and camp followers being killed. The marauders were in some cases taken and executed upon the spot.
Early in January, General Roberts started with a force up the valley of the Khost. The General reached Khost without much opposition. The villages round sent in their submission, and all appeared likely to terminate quietly. But upon the day after their arrival at the fort, the natives from around mustered in great numbers, and advanced to an attack upon the camp, occupying a number of steep hills around it, and ma.s.sing in the villages themselves. A troop of the 5th Punjaub Cavalry advanced to attack them, with orders, if possible, to tempt them out on to the plain. This was well managed. The enemy, seeing the smallness of the force, poured out of the villages, when Major Bulkeley with the 10th Hussars swept down upon them, and the Afghans fled and took post on the hills.
They again advanced on all sides, and attacked the camp, and for four hours the 72nd, with two guns to a.s.sist them, could get but little advantage of them. Then, unable to withstand the fire of our breechloaders and the effect of our sh.e.l.l, they fell back to the hills.
Near the villages on the south side Major Stewart with thirty men of the 5th Punjaub Cavalry made a notable charge. A body fully a thousand strong of the enemy was making from the hills, when, with his handful of men, he dashed down upon them, scattering them in all directions, cutting down twenty, and wounding a large number.
When the enemy had retired to the hills, the villages were searched; and as the inhabitants of these had taken part in the fight, and large numbers of arms were found concealed there, these were burnt, the inhabitants being expelled, and those whom their wounds showed to have taken part in the fight--over 100 in number--brought as prisoners. The loss on our side was but two killed and eight wounded, showing that the Afghans, courageous as they are, are contemptible as marksmen.
This brought the fighting to a close. General Roberts, finding his force too small to hold the Kuram and Khost valleys, evacuated the latter, and the force went into winter quarters.
This step had already been taken in the Khyber. It had not been intended from the first to push the advance as far as Cabul before the winter came on, as the difficulties in the way of so doing would have been enormous, and the troops would have had great difficulty in maintaining their position, even should they capture Cabul before the snow set in. The flight of the Ameer, too, and the accession to power as his father"s representative of Yakoob Khan, his eldest son, who had for many years been kept by his father as a prisoner, naturally arrested the course of affairs. It was hoped that Yakoob would at once treat with us, and that our objects would be attained without further advance.
These antic.i.p.ations were to some extent verified. Negotiations were opened, and upon the 3rd of March Yakoob offered to negotiate terms of peace.
Nothing has been said as yet of the doings of the third column of invasion under General Stewart, who had taken the command originally a.s.signed to General Biddulph. The difficulties in the way of advance of this column were immense. First, a sandy desert almost dest.i.tute of water, extending between the Indus and the foot of the mountains, had to be crossed; then the ascent of the Bolan Pa.s.s had to be made, a work of the most tremendous difficulty. This pa.s.s, whose ascent occupies three days, is in fact the mere bed of a stream, full of boulders and stones of all sizes, in which the baggage and artillery horses sank fetlock deep. In making this pa.s.sage vast quant.i.ties of camels and other animals died, and a long delay took place in a.s.sembling the force at Quettah, a post occupied by us at the top of the pa.s.s. The arrangements were completed at last, and General Stewart advanced upon Candahar, which he captured on the 8th of January, having met with, a small amount of resistance only.
The negotiations with Yakoob, who had now succeeded to the dignity of Ameer, continued for some time; and upon the 8th of May he arrived at the British camp at Gundamuck, where he was received by General Sir S.
Browne and staff. Three or four days were spent in visits and negotiations, Yakoob a.s.senting to the British terms, and expressing the strongest hopes that a permanent friendship would be established between England and Afghanistan.
Previous to this a sad accident had occurred, which cast a gloom over the British camp. Upon the 1st of April a squadron of the 10th Hussars, following a squadron of the 11th Bengal Lancers, had, in crossing the river after nightfall, missed the ford, and had been carried off by the current. Lieutenant Harford and no less than fifty men were drowned.
This was an accident almost without precedent.
The treaty made at Gundamuck had for its chief object the representation of the British Government at the court of Yakoob Khan; and in accordance with the terms of the treaty, and of a direct invitation on the part of the Ameer, Sir Louis Cavaignari, accompanied by Mr William Jenkyns, of the Indian Civil Service, as secretary, and by 25 cavalry and 50 infantry of the Guides under Lieutenant Hamilton, went up to Cabul, where they arrived on the 24th of July. Doctor Kelly, surgeon of the Guides, accompanied the mission as medical officer. Some doubt had been entertained as to the prudence of sending this mission, but the Ameer"s promises of protection had been given with such solemnity, that it was deemed advisable to carry out the provisions of the treaty.
For some time all went well at Cabul. But the arrival of some regiments from Herat altered the complexion of affairs. From the date, August 5th, when these regiments arrived, turbulent outbreaks commenced in the town. These regiments had not, like those of Cabul, suffered defeat at our hands, and they taunted the Cabul people with cowardice. The position of the Emba.s.sy became full of danger. Sir Louis Cavaignari, a man of most extraordinary courage, was aware of the threatening danger, but determined to remain at his post and do his duty. When told by the native _rissaldar_ of one of our cavalry regiments, who was spending his furlough at a village near Cabul, that the Afghan soldiers would be likely to break into open mutiny, and that the danger was very real, he replied quietly, "They can only kill the three or four of us here, and our death will be avenged." It appears, however, that Cavaignari to the last believed that the Ameer"s authority would be sufficient to protect the little British force.
On the night of the 2nd of September the Heratee troops attacked the Emba.s.sy. The party were lodged in a wooden building in the Bala Hissar.
Although numbering but fifty fighting men, headed by four British officers, the little band for hours held out heroically against thousands of the enemy. These at last brought cannon to bear upon the place. Yakoob Khan, in his palace close by, heard the roar of the battle, but made no movement. Some of his councillors urged upon him to call out the loyal regiments at Bala Hissar, and to suppress and punish the mutiny. But the Ameer remained vacillating and sullen until the terrible night was over, and the last of the defenders, after performing prodigies of valour, and killing many more times than their own number of the enemy, succ.u.mbed to the attack, the British officers rushing out and dying sword in hand.
Twenty-four hours later, natives from Cabul brought the news over the Shaturgurdan Pa.s.s into the Kuram Valley. Thence it was telegraphed to Simla. The terrible news created a shock throughout all India. But no time was lost in taking measures to avenge the ma.s.sacre. On the 5th orders were sent to Brigadier-General Ma.s.sy, commanding at that time the Kuram field forces, to move the 23rd Pioneers, the 5th Ghurkas, and mountain train to the crest of the Shaturgurdan, and to intrench themselves there. The 72nd Highlanders and 5th Punjaub Infantry followed in a few days to secure the road between Ali Kheyl and the pa.s.s. On the 13th, General Baker took command of the troops at the Shaturgurdan, where the 23rd Pioneers and 5th Ghurkas had been strengthened by the arrival of the 72nd Highlanders.
General Roberts now set about the work of collecting transport. As usual, the moment the first campaign had terminated, the transport had been scattered, with the view of saving expense, and had now, at a great outlay, to be renewed. All the available animals in Peshawur and near the frontier were ordered to be sent up. But the drain had told heavily, and only 2000 mules, 700 camels, and 600 bullocks could be collected. The tribes in the valley, however, furnished many animals for local transport.
The Ameer at this time wrote to General Roberts, saying that he was trying to restore order and put down the mutineers, and to punish them for their conduct. But it was clear that he had lost all authority. On 26th September, General Roberts joined the troops at Ali Kheyl. On the way up from this point to the Shaturgurdan, two or three attacks were made upon baggage convoys by the natives; but these were all repulsed.
The advance now commenced. It consisted of the 12th and 14th Bengal Cavalry, two guns of the Royal Horse Artillery, two companies of the 72nd Highlanders, and the 5th Punjaub Native Infantry. These moved out as far as the Zerghun Shahr; and here the Ameer, with some of his princ.i.p.al n.o.bles, came into camp, declaring that they could not control the soldiery of Cabul, but that he had come to show his friendship to the English. The brigades of Generals Baker and Macpherson joined the advance at Zerghun; and on the 29th a _durbar_ was held. Yakoob, although received with all honour, was strongly suspected of treachery, and his conduct at the rising in Cabul had forfeited for him all claim upon our friendship. All matters were, however, deferred until after the arrival at Cabul. Before the force moved forward, a proclamation was issued and sent forward among the people, stating that all loyal subjects of the Ameer would be well treated, and that the object of the expedition was only to punish those concerned in the rising at Cabul.
Owing to the shortness of transport, some difficulty was experienced in moving forward, and the force was obliged to advance in two divisions.
On the 3rd of October Macpherson"s brigade, with the cavalry, reached Suffed Sang. There they halted, while the baggage animals went back to bring up Baker"s brigade. Upon this day an attack was made by the villagers upon the rearguard; but these were driven off, and several of them captured.
The next march was a short one to Charasia. Beyond this place the enemy had taken up their position. Here a ma.s.s of hills shuts in the wild valley, and this narrows to a mere defile. Upon both sides of this the enemy had placed guns in position, and lined the whole circle of the hills. In the afternoon a cavalry reconnaissance was made; but they did not succeed in getting the enemy to show themselves in force.
At daybreak on the 6th a working party was sent forward to improve the road through the defile. But they had scarcely started when the cavalry patrol announced that the enemy were in great strength on the hills, and had guns in position commanding the road.
Sir Frederick Roberts determined to attack at once without waiting for the division in the rear, as he feared that any inaction before the mutinous troops now facing them would lead to a general rising, and that in another twenty-four hours there might be not only the regulars, but the whole tribal force of the country to contend with.
The following were the troops who, under the command of Brigadier-General Baker, marched out at eleven o"clock to attack the position:--Four guns Number 2 mountain battery, two Gatling guns, the 7th company of Sappers and Miners, the 72nd Highlanders, six companies of the 5th Ghurkas, 200 men of the 5th Punjaub Infantry, and 450 of the 23rd Pioneers. On the right, the attack was to be made under the command of Major White of the 72nd Highlanders, who had three guns Royal Artillery, two squadrons of cavalry, a wing of the 72nd, and 100 men of the 23rd Pioneers. It was determined to attack the enemy by both flanks, as their power of resisting a front attack was considerable, and flank attacks are always found the most certain against foes of this kind. A reserve was left in Charasia, as the temper of the villagers around was very uncertain, and these would have been sure to rise and attack the baggage left there if the least reverse happened to the advancing force.
The attack was completely successful, both columns effecting their objects and driving the enemy before them. The Afghans, however, fought with great courage, for it was an hour and a half before any advantage was gained. The enemy were armed with Sniders and Enfields, and their fire was rapid and continuous. They were, however, bad shots, and our loss was extremely small. The 72nd were in advance, and these, after some hard fighting, carried the first position. The enemy rallied on some low hills about 600 yards to the rear. But the mountain guns and Gatlings opened upon them, the 72nd fired volleys into them, and a general advance being made, the enemy were driven back.
Major White, in the meantime, on the right had been doing excellent service with his column. It was but a weak one, and the operation had been intended as a feint rather than a real attack. However, they pushed forward, drove the enemy from their position, and captured 20 guns; and having done the work allotted to him, Major White was able to send a portion of his force to co-operate with General Baker"s brigade.
Unfortunately our cavalry were in the rear; the road through the pa.s.s was difficult; and before they could get through, the ma.s.ses of Afghans had fallen back into strong villages on the plain, and could not be attacked by cavalry. The enemy had altogether from 9000 to 10,000 on the ridges, including 13 regiments of regular troops. They left 300 dead on the field; but their losses in killed and wounded must have been much greater. Upon our side 20 were killed and 67 wounded. Among the latter were three officers.
This defeat, by a small portion only of the British force, of the whole of their troops placed in a position considered well-nigh impregnable, struck a complete panic into the Afghans, and no further resistance was offered. In the night a great portion of the Afghan troops scattered and fled. The cavalry under General Ma.s.sy swept round Cabul, and came upon the Sherpur intrenched camp, where 75 guns were captured.
Unfortunately considerable delay took place in the operations of our infantry; and in the face of the troops, who could easily have crushed them, the regiments which had taken the princ.i.p.al part in the ma.s.sacre of Major Cavaignari marched off unmolested. The villagers were to a man hostile, and seized every opportunity of firing upon bodies of our troops. It was necessary to show considerable severity, and all captured with arms in their hands in such cases were shot at once.
Cabul was now open to us; and upon the 11th October, Sir Frederick Roberts and his staff entered the Bala Hissar, and visited the ruins of the Emba.s.sy. The Bala Hissar is a large enclosure containing many important buildings, and situate on the hill above Cabul, which town its guns command. Even had the Afghans made a stand here, the place could not have resisted the British guns, as the walls were old and ruinous.
On the 12th of October formal possession was taken of Cabul, the troops occupying the Bala Hissar. Delay had taken place in this operation, as it was feared that the Afghans might explode large quant.i.ties of ammunition known to be stored there. A _durbar_ was held after we had entered the Bala Hissar. The whole of the sirdars and princ.i.p.al men of Cabul and its neighbourhood attended. Of these the leaders, who had been more than suspected of heading the plot against us, were at once seized and held as prisoners. A proclamation was issued by Sir Frederick Roberts, warning the people that any attempt against our authority would be severely punished; forbidding the carrying of weapons within the streets of Cabul, or within a distance of five miles from the city gates; and commanding that all arms issued to, or seized by, the Afghan troops should be given up, a small reward being given for the delivery of each. A reward also was offered for the surrender of any person, whether soldier or civilian, concerned in the attack on the British Emba.s.sy.
For some time things went quietly. The people were clearly intensely hostile to us. But except in the case of the women, no open insults were ventured upon. But it was unsafe in the extreme for small parties to ride about the country. On the 16th the camp was startled by a tremendous explosion at the Bala Hissar, where the 67th Foot were encamped, and where a body of Engineers, under Captain Shafto, were examining the various small buildings in which powder was stored. The southern wall of the a.r.s.enal was blown down, and great damage was done; but, singularly enough, no soldiers of the British regiment were killed, but of the Ghurkas, who were on guard at the a.r.s.enal at the time, twelve were killed and seven wounded. Captain Shafto was unfortunately killed.
No examination could for a time be made, as some of the buildings were on fire, and explosions continued frequent. In the afternoon another tremendous explosion occurred; four Afghans were killed and several soldiers hurt at a distance of 300 or 400 yards from the spot. Although it was never proved, it was believed that these explosions were caused by the Afghans; and as large quant.i.ties of powder still remained in the Bala Hissar, it was determined that, for the present, the place should remain unoccupied.