They will not.
If then the other is never in the same, there is nothing in which the other is during any s.p.a.ce of time; for during that s.p.a.ce of time, however small, the other would be in the same. Is not that true?
Yes.
And since the other is never in the same, it can never be in anything that is.
True.
Then the other will never be either in the not-one, or in the one?
Certainly not.
Then not by reason of otherness is the one other than the not-one, or the not-one other than the one.
No.
Nor by reason of themselves will they be other than one another, if not partaking of the other.
How can they be?
But if they are not other, either by reason of themselves or of the other, will they not altogether escape being other than one another?
They will.
Again, the not-one cannot partake of the one; otherwise it would not have been not-one, but would have been in some way one.
True.
Nor can the not-one be number; for having number, it would not have been not-one at all.
It would not.
Again, is the not-one part of the one; or rather, would it not in that case partake of the one?
It would.
If then, in every point of view, the one and the not-one are distinct, then neither is the one part or whole of the not-one, nor is the not-one part or whole of the one?
No.
But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one another, nor other than one another, will be the same with one another:--so we said?
Yes.
Then shall we say that the one, being in this relation to the not-one, is the same with it?
Let us say so.
Then it is the same with itself and the others, and also other than itself and the others.
That appears to be the inference.
And it will also be like and unlike itself and the others?
Perhaps.
Since the one was shown to be other than the others, the others will also be other than the one.
Yes.
And the one is other than the others in the same degree that the others are other than it, and neither more nor less?
True.
And if neither more nor less, then in a like degree?
Yes.
In virtue of the affection by which the one is other than others and others in like manner other than it, the one will be affected like the others and the others like the one.
How do you mean?
I may take as an ill.u.s.tration the case of names: You give a name to a thing?
Yes.
And you may say the name once or oftener?
Yes.
And when you say it once, you mention that of which it is the name? and when more than once, is it something else which you mention? or must it always be the same thing of which you speak, whether you utter the name once or more than once?
Of course it is the same.
And is not "other" a name given to a thing?
Certainly.
Whenever, then, you use the word "other," whether once or oftener, you name that of which it is the name, and to no other do you give the name?
True.
Then when we say that the others are other than the one, and the one other than the others, in repeating the word "other" we speak of that nature to which the name is applied, and of no other?
Quite true.
Then the one which is other than others, and the other which is other than the one, in that the word "other" is applied to both, will be in the same condition; and that which is in the same condition is like?