General Grant adopted the plan of moving by his left flank, with the purpose of compelling Lee to come out from behind his intrenchments along Mine Run and fight on equal terms. Grant knew well the character of country through which he would have to pa.s.s, but he was confident that the difficulties of operation in the thickly wooded region of the Wilderness would be counterbalanced by the facility with which his position would enable him to secure a new base; and by the fact that as he would thus cover Washington, there would be little or no necessity for the authorities there to detach from his force at some inopportune moment for the protection of that city.
In the move forward two divisions of my cavalry took the advance, Gregg crossing the Rapidan at Ely"s ford and Wilson at Germania ford.
Torbert"s division remained in the rear to cover the trains and reserve artillery, holding from Rapidan Station to Culpeper, and thence through Stevensburg to the Rappahannock River. Gregg crossed the Rapidan before daylight, in advance of the Second Corps, and when the latter reached Ely"s ford, he pushed on to Chancellorsville; Wilson preceded the Fifth Corps to Germania ford, and when it reached the river he made the crossing and moved rapidly by Wilderness Tavern, as far as Parker"s Store, from which point he sent a heavy reconnoissance toward Mine Run, the rest of his division bivouacking in a strong position. I myself proceeded to Chancellorsville and fixed my headquarters at that place, whereon the 5th I was joined by Torbert"s division.
Meanwhile, General Meade had crossed the Rapidan and established his headquarters not far from Germania ford. From that point he was in direct communication with Wilson, whose original instructions from me carried him only as far as Parker"s Store, but it being found, during the night of the 4th, that the enemy was apparently unacquainted with the occurrences of the day, Meade directed Wilson to advance in the direction of Craig"s Meeting House; leaving one regiment to hold Parker"s Store. Wilson with the second brigade encountered Rosser"s brigade of cavalry just beyond the Meeting House, and drove it back rapidly a distance of about two miles, holding it there till noon, while his first brigade was halted on the north side of Robinson"s Run near the junction of the Catharpen and Parker"s Store roads.
Up to this time Wilson had heard nothing of the approach of the Fifth Corps, and the situation becoming threatening, he withdrew the second brigade to the position occupied by the first, but scarcely had he done so when he learned that at an early hour in the forenoon the enemy"s infantry had appeared in his rear at Parker"s Store and cut off his communication with General Meade. Surprised at this, he determined to withdraw to Todd"s Tavern, but before his resolution could be put into execution the Confederates attacked him with a heavy force, and at the same time began pushing troops down the Catharpen road. Wilson was now in a perplexing situation, sandwiched between the Confederates who had cut him off in the rear at Parker"s store and those occupying the Catharpen road, but he extricated his command by pa.s.sing it around the latter force, and reached Todd"s Tavern by crossing the Po River at Corbin"s bridge. General Meade discovering that the enemy had interposed at Parker"s store between Wilson and the Fifth Corps, sent me word to go to Wilson"s relief, and this was the first intimation I received that Wilson had been pushed out so far, but, surmising that he would retire in the direction of Todd"s Tavern I immediately despatched Gregg"s division there to his relief. Just beyond Todd"s Tavern Gregg met Wilson, who was now being followed by the enemy"s cavalry. The pursuing force was soon checked, and then driven back to Shady Grove Church, while Wilson"s troops fell in behind Gregg"s line, somewhat the worse for their morning"s adventure.
When the Army of the Potomac commenced crossing the Rapidan on the 4th, General J. E. B. Stuart, commanding the Confederate cavalry, began concentrating his command on the right of Lee"s infantry, bringing it from Hamilton"s crossing and other points where it had been wintering. Stuart"s force at this date was a little more than eight thousand men, organized in two divisions, commanded by Generals Wade Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee. Hampton"s division was composed of three brigades, commanded by Generals Cordon, Young, and Rosser; Fitzhugh Lee"s division comprised three brigades also, Generals W. H.
F. Lee, Lomax, and Wickham commanding them.
Information of this concentration, and of the additional fact that the enemy"s cavalry about Hamilton"s crossing was all being drawn in, reached me on the 5th, which obviated all necessity for my moving on that point as I intended at the onset of the campaign. The responsibility for the safety of our trains and of the left flank of the army still continued, however, so I made such dispositions of my troops as to secure these objects by holding the line of the Brock road beyond the Furnaces, and thence around to Todd"s Tavern and Piney Branch Church. On the 6th, through some false information, General Meade became alarmed about his left flank, and sent me the following note:
"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "May 6, 1864.--1 o"clock P. M.
"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, "Commanding Cavalry Corps
"Your despatch of 11.45 a.m., received. General Hanc.o.c.k has been heavily pressed, and his left turned. The major-general commanding thinks that you had better draw in your cavalry, so as to secure the protection of the trains. The order requiring an escort for the wagons to-night has been rescinded.
"A. A. HUMPHREYS, "Major-General, Chief-of-Staff."
On the morning of the 6th Custer"s and Devin"s brigades had been severely engaged at the Furnaces before I received the above note.
They had been most successful in repulsing the enemy"s attacks, however, and I felt that the line taken up could be held; but the despatch from General Humphreys was alarming, so I drew all the cavalry close in toward Chancellorsville. It was found later that Hanc.o.c.k"s left had not been turned, and the points thus abandoned had to be regained at a heavy cost in killed and wounded, to both the cavalry and the infantry.
On the 7th of May, under directions from headquarters, Army of the Potomac, the trains were put in motion to go into park at Piney Branch Church, in antic.i.p.ation of the movement that was about to be made for the possession of Spottsylvania Court House. I felt confident that the order to move the trains there had been given without a full understanding of the situation, for Piney Branch Church was now held by the enemy, a condition which had resulted from the order withdrawing the cavalry on account of the supposed disaster to Hanc.o.c.k"s left the day before; but I thought the best way to remedy matters was to hold the trains in the vicinity of Aldrich"s till the ground on which it was intended to park them should be regained.
This led to the battle of Todd"s Tavern, a spirited fight for the possession of the crossroads at that point, partic.i.p.ated in by the enemy"s cavalry and Gregg"s division, and two brigades of Torbert"s division, the latter commanded by Merritt, as Torbert became very ill on the 6th, and had to be sent to the rear. To gain the objective point--the crossroads--I directed Gregg to a.s.sail the enemy on the Catharpen road with Irvin Gregg"s brigade and drive him over Corbin"s bridge, while Merritt attacked him with the Reserve brigade on the Spottsylvania road in conjunction with Davies"s brigade of Gregg"s division, which was to be put in on the Piney Branch Church road, and unite with Merritt"s left. Davies"s and Irvin Gregg"s brigades on my right and left flanks met with some resistance, yet not enough to deter them from, executing their orders. In front of Merritt the enemy held on more stubbornly, however, and there ensued an exceedingly severe and, at times, fluctuating fight. Finally the Confederates gave way, and we pursued them almost to Spottsylvania Court House; but deeming it prudent to recall the pursuers about dark, I encamped Gregg"s and Merritt"s divisions in the open fields to the east of Todd"s Tavern.
During the preceding three days the infantry corps of the army had been engaged in the various conflicts known as the battles of the Wilderness. The success of the Union troops in those battles had not been all that was desired, and General Grant now felt that it was necessary to throw himself on Lee"s communications if possible, while preserving his own intact by prolonging the movement to the left.
Therefore, on the evening of the 7th he determined to shift his whole army toward Spottsylvania Court House, and initiated the movement by a night march of the infantry to Todd"s Tavern. In view of what was contemplated, I gave orders to Gregg and Merritt to move at daylight on the morning of the 8th, for the purpose of gaining possession of Snell"s bridge over the Po River, the former by the crossing at Corbin"s bridge and the latter by the Block House. I also directed Wilson, who was at Alsop"s house, to take possession of Spottsylvania as early as possible on the morning of the 8th, and then move into position at Snell"s bridge conjointly with the other two divisions.
Wilson"s orders remained as I had issued them, so he moved accordingly and got possession of Spottsylvania, driving the enemy"s cavalry a mile beyond, as will be seen by the following despatch sent me at 9 A. M. of the 8th:
"HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION, CAVALRY CORPS, "ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
"SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE, May 8, 1864 9 A. M.
"LIEUTENANT-COLONEL FORSYTH, CHIEF-OF-STAFF, C. C.
"Have run the enemy"s cavalry a mile from Spottsylvania Court House; have charged them, and drove them through the village; am fighting now with a considerable force, supposed to be Lee"s division.
Everything all right.
"J. H. WILSON, "Brigadier-General Commanding.
During the night of the 7th General Meade arrived at Todd"s Tavern and modified the orders I had given Gregg and Merritt, directing Gregg simply to hold Corbin"s bridge, and Merritt to move out in front of the infantry column marching on the Spottsylvania road.
Merritt proceeded to obey, but in advancing, our cavalry and infantry became intermingled in the darkness, and much confusion and delay was the consequence. I had not been duly advised of these changes in Gregg"s and Merritt"s orders, and for a time I had fears for the safety of Wilson, but, while he was preparing to move on to form his junction with Gregg and Merritt at Snell"s bridge, the advance of Anderson (who was now commanding Longstreet"s corps) appeared on the scene and drove him from Spottsylvania.
Had Gregg and Merritt been permitted to proceed as they were originally instructed, it is doubtful whether the battles fought at Spottsylvania would have occurred, for these two divisions would have encountered the enemy at the Pa River, and so delayed his march as to enable our infantry to reach Spottsylvania first, and thus force Lee to take up a line behind the Po. I had directed Wilson to move from the left by "the Gate" through Spottsylvania to Snell"s bridge, while Gregg and Merritt were to advance to the same point by Shady Grove and the Block House. There was nothing to prevent at least a partial success of these operations; that is to say, the concentration of the three divisions in front of Snell"s bridge, even if we could not actually have gained it. But both that important point and the bridge on the Block House road were utterly ignored, and Lee"s approach to Spottsylvania left entirely un.o.bstructed, while three divisions of cavalry remained practically ineffective by reason of disjointed and irregular instructions.
On the morning of the 8th, when I found that such orders had been given, I made some strong remonstrances against the course that had been pursued, but it was then too late to carry out the combinations I had projected the night before, so I proceeded to join Merritt on the Spottsylvania road. On reaching Merritt I found General Warren making complaint that the cavalry were obstructing his infantry column, so I drew Merritt off the road, and the leading division of the Fifth Corps pushed up to the front. It got into line about 11 o"clock, and advanced to take the village, but it did not go very far before it struck Anderson"s corps, and was hurled back with heavy loss. This ended all endeavor to take Spottsylvania that day.
A little before noon General Meade sent for me, and when I reached his headquarters I found that his peppery temper had got the better of his good judgment, he showing a disposition to be unjust, laying blame here and there for the blunders that had been committed. He was particularly severe on the cavalry, saying, among other things, that it had impeded the march of the Fifth Corps by occupying the Spottsylvania road. I replied that if this were true, he himself had ordered it there without my knowledge. I also told him that he had broken up my combinations, exposed Wilson"s division to disaster, and kept Gregg unnecessarily idle, and further, repelled his insinuations by saying that such disjointed operations as he had been requiring of the cavalry for the last four days would render the corps inefficient and useless before long. Meade was very much irritated, and I was none the less so. One word brought on another, until, finally, I told him that I could whip Stuart if he (Meade) would only let me, but since he insisted on giving the cavalry directions without consulting or even notifying me, he could henceforth command the Cavalry Corps himself--that I would not give it another order.
The acrimonious interview ended with this remark, and after I left him he went to General Grant"s headquarters and repeated the conversation to him, mentioning that I had said that I could whip Stuart. At this General Grant remarked: "Did he say so? Then let him go out and do it." This intimation was immediately acted upon by General Meade, and a little later the following order came to me:
"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC "May 8th, 1864 1 P. M.
"GENERAL SHERIDAN, "Commanding Cavalry Corps.
"The major-general commanding directs you to immediately concentrate your available mounted force, and with your ammunition trains and such supply trains as are filled (exclusive of ambulances) proceed against the enemy"s cavalry, and when your supplies are exhausted, proceed via New Market and Green Bay to Haxall"s Landing on the James River, there communicating with General Butler, procuring supplies and return to this army. Your dismounted men will be left with the train here.
"A. A. HUMPHREYS, "Major-General, Chief-of-staff."
As soon as the above order was received I issued instructions for the concentration of the three divisions of cavalry at Aldrich"s to prepare for the contemplated expedition. Three days" rations for the men were distributed, and half rations of grain for one day were doled out for the horses. I sent for Gregg, Merritt, and Wilson and communicated the order to them, saying at the same time, "We are going out to fight Stuart"s cavalry in consequence of a suggestion from me; we will give him a fair, square fight; we are strong, and I know we can beat him, and in view of my recent representations to General Meade I shall expect nothing but success." I also indicated to my division commanders the line of march I should take--moving in one column around the right flank of Lee"s army to get in its rear --and stated at the same time that it was my intention to fight Stuart wherever he presented himself, and if possible go through to Haxall"s Landing; but that if Stuart should successfully interpose between us and that point we would swing back to the Army of the Potomac by pa.s.sing around the enemy"s left flank by way of Gordonsville. At first the proposition seemed to surprise the division commanders somewhat, for hitherto even the boldest, mounted expeditions had been confined to a hurried ride through the enemy"s country, without purpose of fighting more than enough to escape in case of molestation, and here and there to destroy a bridge. Our move would be a challenge to Stuart for a cavalry duel behind Lee"s lines, in his own country, but the advantages which it was reasonable to antic.i.p.ate from the plan being quickly perceived, each division commander entered into its support unhesitatingly, and at once set about preparing for the march next day.
CHAPTER XIX.
THE EXPEDITION STARTS--DESTROYING SUPPLIES--OPENING OF THE FIGHT AT YELLOW TAVERN--GENERAL CUSTER"S BRILLIANT CHARGE--DEATH OF GENERAL STUART--REMOVING TORPEDOES--EXCITEMENT IN RICHMOND--A NIGHT MARCH --ENTERPRISING NEWSBOYS--THE EFFECTS OF STUART"S DEFEAT AND DEATH --END OF THE FIRST EXPEDITION--ITS GREAT SUCCESS AND BENEFICIAL RESULTS.
The expedition which resulted in the battle of Yellow Tavern and the death of General Stuart started from the vicinity of Aldrich"s toward Fredericksburg early on the morning of May 9, 1864, marching on the plank-road, Merritt"s division leading. When the column reached Tabernacle Church it headed almost due east to the telegraph road, and thence down that highway to Thornburg, and from that point through Childsburg to Anderson"s crossing of the North Anna River, it being my desire to put my command south of that stream if possible, where it could procure forage before it should be compelled to fight.
The corps moved at a walk, three divisions on the same road, making a column nearly thirteen miles in length, and marched around the right flank of the enemy unsuspected until my rear guard had pa.s.sed Ma.s.saponax Church. Although the column was very long, I preferred to move it all on one road rather than to attempt combinations for carrying the divisions to any given point by different routes.
Unless the separate commands in an expedition of this nature are very prompt in movement, and each fully equal to overcoming at once any obstacle it may meet, combinations rarely work out as expected; besides, an engagement was at all times imminent, hence it was specially necessary to keep the whole force well together.
As soon as the Ny, Po, and Ta rivers were crossed, each of which streams would have afforded an excellent defensive line to the enemy, all anxiety as to our pa.s.sing around Lee"s army was removed, and our ability to cross the North Anna placed beyond doubt. Meanwhile General Stuart had discovered what we were about, and he set his cavalry in motion, sending General Fitzhugh Lee to follow and attack my rear on the Childsburg road, Stuart himself marching by way of Davenport"s bridge, on the North Anna, toward Beaver Dam Station, near which place his whole command was directed to unite the next day.
My column having pa.s.sed the Ta River, Stuart attacked its rear with considerable vigor, in the hope that he could delay my whole force long enough to permit him to get at least a part of his command in my front; but this scheme was frustrated by Davies"s brigade, which I directed to fight as a rear-guard, holding on at one position and then at another along the line of march just enough to deter the enemy from a too rapid advance. Davies performed this responsible and trying duty with tact and good judgment, following the main column steadily as it progressed to the south, and never once permitting Fitzhugh Lee"s advance to encroach far enough to compel a halt of my main body. About dark Merritt"s division crossed the North Anna at Anderson"s ford, while Gregg and Wilson encamped on the north side, having engaged the enemy, who still hung on my rear up to a late hour at night.
After Merritt"s division pa.s.sed the river, Custer"s brigade proceeded on to Beaver Dam Station to cut the Virginia Central railroad.
Before reaching the station he met a small force of the enemy, but this he speedily drove off, recapturing from it about four hundred Union prisoners, who had been taken recently in the Wilderness and were being conducted to Richmond. Custer also destroyed the station, two locomotives, three trains of cars, ninety wagons, from eight to ten miles of railroad and telegraph lines, some two hundred thousand pounds of bacon and other supplies, amounting in all to about a million and a half of rations, and nearly all they medical stores of General Lee"s army, which had been moved from Orange Court House either because Lee wished to have them directly in his rear or because he contemplated falling back to the North Anna.
On the morning of the 10th Gregg and Wilson, while crossing the North Anna, were again attacked, but were covered by the division on the south side of the stream; the pa.s.sage was effected without much loss, notwithstanding the approach of Stuart on the south bank from the direction of Davenport"s bridge. The possession of Beaver Dam gave us an important point, as it opened a way toward Richmond by the Negro-foot road. It also enabled us to obtain forage for our well-nigh famished animals, and to prepare for fighting the enemy, who, I felt sure, would endeavor to interpose between my column and Richmond.
Stuart had hardly united his troops near Beaver Dam when he realized that concentrating there was a mistake, so he began making dispositions for remedying his error, and while we leisurely took the Negro-foot toad toward Richmond, he changed his tactics and hauled off from my rear, urging his horses to the death in order to get in between Richmond and my column. This he effected about 10 o"clock on the morning of the 11th, concentrating at Yellow Tavern, six miles from the city, on the Brook turnpike. His change of tactics left my march on the 10th practically unmolested, and we quietly encamped that night on the south bank of the South Anna, near Ground Squirrel Bridge. Here we procured an abundance of forage, and as the distance traveled that day had been only fifteen to eighteen miles, men and horses were able to obtain a good rest during the night.
At 2 o"clock in the morning, May 11, Davies"s brigade of Gregg"s division marched for Ashland to cut the Fredericksburg railroad.
Arriving there before the head of the enemy"s column, which had to pa.s.s through this same place to reach Yellow Tavern, Davies drove out a small force occupying the town, burnt a train of cars and a locomotive, destroyed the railroad for some distance, and rejoined the main column at Allen"s Station on the Fredericksburg and Richmond railroad. From Allen"s Station the whole command moved on Yellow Tavern, Merritt in the lead, Wilson following, and Gregg in the rear.
The appearance of Davies"s brigade at Ashland in the morning had had the effect of further mystifying the enemy as to my intentions; and while he held it inc.u.mbent to place himself between me and Richmond, yet he was still so uncertain of my movements that he committed the same fault that he did the first day, when he divided his force and sent a part to follow me on the Childsburg road. He now divided his command again, sending a portion to hang upon my rear, while he proceeded with the rest to Yellow Tavern. This separation not only materially weakened the force which might have been thrown across my line of march, but it also enabled me to attack with almost my entire corps, while occupying the pursuers with a small rearguard.
By forced marches General Stuart succeeded in reaching Yellow Tavern ahead of me on May 11; and the presence of, his troops, on the Ashland and Richmond road becoming known to Merritt as he was approaching the Brook turnpike, this general pressed forward at once to the attack. Pushing his division to the front, he soon got possession of the turnpike and drove the enemy back several hundred yards to the east of it. This success had the effect of throwing the head of my column to the east of the pike, and I quickly brought up Wilson and one of Gregg"s brigades to take advantage of the situation by forming a line of battle on that side or the road. Meanwhile the enemy, desperate but still confident, poured in a heavy fire from his line and from a battery which enfiladed the Brook road, and made Yellow Tavern an uncomfortably hot place. Gibbs"s and Devin"s brigades, however, held fast there, while Custer, supported by Chapman"s brigade, attacked the enemy"s left and battery in a mounted charge.
Custer"s charge, with Chapman on his flank and the rest of Wilson"s division sustaining him, was brilliantly executed. Beginning at a walk, he increased his gait to a trot, and then at full speed rushed at the enemy. At the same moment the dismounted troops along my whole front moved forward, and as Custer went through the battery, capturing two of the guns with their cannoneers and breaking up the enemy"s left, Gibbs and Devin drove his centre and right from the field. Gregg meanwhile, with equal success, charged the force in his rear-Gordon"s brigadeand the engagement ended by giving us complete control of the road to Richmond. We captured a number of prisoners, and the casualties on both sides were quite severe, General Stuart himself falling mortally wounded, and General James B. Gordon, one of his brigade commanders, being killed.
After Custer"s charge, the Confederate cavalry was badly broken up, the main portion of it being driven in a rout toward Ashland and a small part in the direction of Richmond, which latter force finally rejoined Fitzhugh Lee near Mechanicsville. A reconnoitring party being now sent up the Brook turnpike toward the city, dashed across the South Fork of the Chickahominy, drove a small force from the enemy"s exterior intrenchments and went within them. I followed this party, and after a little exploration found between the two lines of works a country road that led across to the pike which runs from Mechanicsville to Richmond. I thought we could go around within the outer line of works by this country road across to the Mechanicsville pike on the south side of the Chickahominy, and encamp the next night at Fair Oaks; so I determined to make the movement after dark, being influenced in this to some extent by reports received during the afternoon from colored people, to the effect that General B. F.
Butler"s army had reached a small stream on the south side of the James, about four miles south of Richmond. If I could succeed in getting through by this road, not only would I have a shorter line of march to Haxall"s landing, but there was also a possibility that I could help Butler somewhat by joining him so near Richmond.
Therefore, after making the wounded as comfortable as possible, we commenced the march about 11 o"clock on the night of the 11th, and ma.s.sed the command on the plateau south of the Meadow bridge near daylight on the 12th.