Move three divisions of the 2d corps by the rear of the 5th and 6th corps, under cover of night, so as to join the 9th corps in a vigorous a.s.sault on the enemy at four o"clock A.M. to-morrow. will send one or two staff officers over to-night to stay with Burnside, and impress him with the importance of a prompt and vigorous attack. Warren and Wright should hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion caused by this attack, and to push in if any opportunity presents itself. There is but little doubt in my mind that the a.s.sault last evening would have proved entirely successful if it had commenced one hour earlier and had been heartily entered into by Mott"s division and the 9th corps.
U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.
HEADQUARTERS, ARMIES U. S., May 11, 1864.-4 P.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE, Commanding 9th Army Corps.
Major-General Hanc.o.c.k has been ordered to move his corps under cover of night to join you in a vigorous attack against the enemy at 4 o"clock A.M. to-morrow. You will move against the enemy with your entire force promptly and with all possible vigor at precisely 4 o"clock A.M. to-morrow the 12th inst. Let your preparations for this attack be conducted with the utmost secrecy and veiled entirely from the enemy.
I send two of my staff officers, Colonels Comstock and Babc.o.c.k, in whom I have great confidence and who are acquainted with the direction the attack is to be made from here, to remain with you and General Hanc.o.c.k with instructions to render you every a.s.sistance in their power. Generals Warren and Wright will hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion caused by yours and Hanc.o.c.k"s attack, and will push in their whole force if any opportunity presents itself.
U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.
The morning of the 12th opened foggy, delaying the start more than half an hour.
The ground over which Hanc.o.c.k had to pa.s.s to reach the enemy, was ascending and heavily wooded to within two or three hundred yards of the enemy"s intrenchments. In front of Birney there was also a marsh to cross. But, notwithstanding all these difficulties, the troops pushed on in quick time without firing a gun, and when within four or five hundred yards of the enemy"s line broke out in loud cheers, and with a rush went up to and over the breastworks. Barlow and Birney entered almost simultaneously. Here a desperate hand-to-hand conflict took place. The men of the two sides were too close together to fire, but used their guns as clubs. The hand conflict was soon over. Hanc.o.c.k"s corps captured some four thousand prisoners among them a division and a brigade commander twenty or more guns with their horses, caissons, and ammunition, several thousand stand of arms, and many colors. Hanc.o.c.k, as soon as the hand-to-hand conflict was over, turned the guns of the enemy against him and advanced inside the rebel lines. About six o"clock I ordered Warren"s corps to the support of Hanc.o.c.k"s. Burnside, on the left, had advanced up east of the salient to the very parapet of the enemy. Potter, commanding one of his divisions, got over but was not able to remain there. However, he inflicted a heavy loss upon the enemy; but not without loss in return.
This victory was important, and one that Lee could not afford to leave us in full possession of. He made the most strenuous efforts to regain the position he had lost. Troops were brought up from his left and attacked Hanc.o.c.k furiously. Hanc.o.c.k was forced to fall back: but he did so slowly, with his face to the enemy, inflicting on him heavy loss, until behind the breastworks he had captured. These he turned, facing them the other way, and continued to hold. Wright was ordered up to reinforce Hanc.o.c.k, and arrived by six o"clock. He was wounded soon after coming up but did not relinquish the command of his corps, although the fighting lasted until one o"clock the next morning. At eight o"clock Warren was ordered up again, but was so slow in making his dispositions that his orders were frequently repeated, and with emphasis. At eleven o"clock I gave Meade written orders to relieve Warren from his command if he failed to move promptly. Hanc.o.c.k placed batteries on high ground in his rear, which he used against the enemy, firing over the heads of his own troops.
Burnside accomplished but little on our left of a positive nature, but negatively a great deal. He kept Lee from reinforcing his centre from that quarter. If the 5th corps, or rather if Warren, had been as prompt as Wright was with the 6th corps, better results might have been obtained.
Lee ma.s.sed heavily from his left flank on the broken point of his line. Five times during the day he a.s.saulted furiously, but without dislodging our troops from their new position. His losses must have been fearful. Sometimes the belligerents would be separated by but a few feet. In one place a tree, eighteen inches in diameter, was cut entirely down by musket b.a.l.l.s. All the trees between the lines were very much cut to pieces by artillery and musketry. It was three o"clock next morning before the fighting ceased. Some of our troops had then been twenty hours under fire. In this engagement we did not lose a single organization, not even a company. The enemy lost one division with its commander, one brigade and one regiment, with heavy losses elsewhere. Our losses were heavy, but, as stated, no whole company was captured. At night Lee took a position in rear of his former one, and by the following morning he was strongly intrenched in it.
HEADQUARTERS ARMIES U. S., May 12, 1864, 6.30 P.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Washington, D. C.
The eighth day of the battle closes, leaving between three and four thousand prisoners in our hands for the day"s work, including two general officers, and over thirty pieces of artillery. The enemy are obstinate, and seem to have found the last ditch. We have lost no organizations, not even that of a company, whilst we have destroyed and captured one division (Johnson"s), one brigade (Doles"), and one regiment entire from the enemy.
U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.
Warren"s corps was now temporarily broken up, Cutler"s division sent to Wright, and Griffin"s to Hanc.o.c.k. Meade ordered his chief of staff, General Humphreys, to remain with Warren and the remaining division, and authorized him to give it orders in his name.
During the day I was pa.s.sing along the line from wing to wing continuously. About the centre stood a house which proved to be occupied by an old lady and her daughter. She showed such unmistakable signs of being strongly Union that I stopped. She said she had not seen a Union flag for so long a time that it did her heart good to look upon it again. She said her husband and son, being, Union men, had had to leave early in the war, and were now somewhere in the Union army, if alive. She was without food or nearly so, so I ordered rations issued to her, and promised to find out if I could where the husband and son were.
There was no fighting on the 13th, further than a little skirmishing between Mott"s division and the enemy. I was afraid that Lee might be moving out, and I did not want him to go without my knowing it. The indications were that he was moving, but it was found that he was only taking his new position back from the salient that had been captured. Our dead were buried this day. Mott"s division was reduced to a brigade, and a.s.signed to Birney"s division.
During this day I wrote to Washington recommending Sherman and Meade for promotion to the grade of Major-General in the regular army; Hanc.o.c.k for Brigadier-General; Wright, Gibbon and Humphreys to be Major-Generals of Volunteers; and Upton and Carroll to be Brigadiers. Upton had already been named as such, but the appointment had to be confirmed by the Senate on the nomination of the President.
SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., May 13, 1864.
HON E. M. STANTON, SECRETARY OF WAR, Washington, D. C.
I beg leave to recommend the following promotions be made for gallant and distinguished services in the last eight days" battles, to wit: Brigadier-General H. G. Wright and Brigadier-General John Gibbon to be Major-Generals; Colonel S. S. Carroll, 8th Ohio Volunteers Colonel E. Upton, 121st New York Volunteers; Colonel William McCandless, 2d Pennsylvania Reserves, to be Brigadier-Generals. I would also recommend Major-General W. S. Hanc.o.c.k for Brigadier-General in the regular army. His services and qualifications are eminently deserving of this recognition. In making these recommendations I do not wish the claims of General G. M. Dodge for promotion forgotten, but recommend his name to be sent in at the same time. I would also ask to have General Wright a.s.signed to the command of the Sixth Army Corps. I would further ask the confirmation of General Humphreys to the rank of Major-General.
General Meade has more than met my most sanguine expectations. He and Sherman are the fittest officers for large commands I have come in contact with. If their services can be rewarded by promotion to the rank of Major-Generals in the regular army the honor would be worthily bestowed, and I would feel personally gratified. I would not like to see one of these promotions at this time without seeing both.
U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.
The night of the 13th Warren and Wright were moved by the rear to the left of Burnside. The night was very dark and it rained heavily, the roads were so bad that the troops had to cut trees and corduroy the road a part of the way, to get through. It was midnight before they got to the point where they were to halt, and daylight before the troops could be organized to advance to their position in line. They gained their position in line, however, without any fighting, except a little in Wright"s front. Here Upton had to contend for an elevation which we wanted and which the enemy was not disposed to yield. Upton first drove the enemy, and was then repulsed in turn. Ayres coming to his support with his brigade (of Griffin"s division, Warren"s corps), the position was secured and fortified. There was no more battle during the 14th. This brought our line east of the Court House and running north and south and facing west.
During the night of the 14th-15th Lee moved to cover this new front. This left Hanc.o.c.k without an enemy confronting him. He was brought to the rear of our new centre, ready to be moved in any direction he might be wanted.
On the 15th news came from Butler and Averill. The former reported the capture of the outer works at Drury"s Bluff, on the James River, and that his cavalry had cut the railroad and telegraph south of Richmond on the Danville road: and the latter, the destruction of a depot of supplies at Dublin, West Virginia, and the breaking of New River Bridge on the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. The next day news came from Sherman and Sheridan. Sherman had forced Johnston out of Dalton, Georgia, and was following him south. The report from Sheridan embraced his operations up to his pa.s.sing the outer defences of Richmond. The prospect must now have been dismal in Richmond. The road and telegraph were cut between the capital and Lee. The roads and wires were cut in every direction from the rebel capital. Temporarily that city was cut off from all communication with the outside except by courier. This condition of affairs, however, was of but short duration.
I wrote Halleck:
NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., May 16, 1864, 8 A.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Washington, D. C.: We have had five days almost constant rain without any prospect yet of it clearing up. The roads have now become so impa.s.sable that ambulances with wounded men can no longer run between here and Fredericksburg. All offensive operations necessarily cease until we can have twenty-four hours of dry weather. The army is in the best of spirits, and feel the greatest confidence of ultimate success.
You can a.s.sure the President and Secretary of War that the elements alone have suspended hostilities, and that it is in no manner due to weakness or exhaustion on our part.
U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.
The condition of the roads was such that nothing was done on the 17th. But that night Hanc.o.c.k and Wright were to make a night march back to their old positions, and to make an a.s.sault at four o"clock in the morning. Lee got troops back in time to protect his old line, so the a.s.sault was unsuccessful. On this day (18th) the news was almost as discouraging to us as it had been two days before in the rebel capital. As stated above, Hanc.o.c.k"s and Wright"s corps had made an unsuccessful a.s.sault. News came that Sigel had been defeated at New Market, badly, and was retreating down the valley. Not two hours before, I had sent the inquiry to Halleck whether Sigel could not get to Staunton to stop supplies coming from there to Lee. I asked at once that Sigel might be relieved, and some one else put in his place. Hunter"s name was suggested, and I heartily approved. Further news from Butler reported him driven from Drury"s Bluff, but still in possession of the Petersburg road. Banks had been defeated in Louisiana, relieved, and Canby put in his place. This change of commander was not on my suggestion. All this news was very discouraging. All of it must have been known by the enemy before it was by me. In fact, the good news (for the enemy) must have been known to him at the moment I thought he was in despair, and his anguish had been already relieved when we were enjoying his supposed discomfiture, But this was no time for repining. I immediately gave orders for a movement by the left flank, on towards Richmond, to commence on the night of the 19th. I also asked Halleck to secure the cooperation of the navy in changing our base of supplies from Fredericksburg to Port Royal, on the Rappahannock.
Up to this time I had received no reinforcements, except six thousand raw troops under Brigadier General Robert O. Tyler, just arrived. They had not yet joined their command, Hanc.o.c.k"s corps, but were on our right. This corps had been brought to the rear of the centre, ready to move in any direction. Lee, probably suspecting some move on my part, and seeing our right entirely abandoned, moved Ewell"s corps about five o"clock in the afternoon, with Early"s as a reserve, to attack us in that quarter. Tyler had come up from Fredericksburg, and had been halted on the road to the right of our line, near Kitching"s brigade of Warren"s corps. Tyler received the attack with his raw troops, and they maintained their position, until reinforced, in a manner worthy of veterans.
Hanc.o.c.k was in a position to reinforce speedily, and was the soldier to do it without waiting to make dispositions. Birney was thrown to Tyler"s right and Crawford to his left, with Gibbon as a reserve; and Ewell was whirled back speedily and with heavy loss.
Warren had been ordered to get on Ewell"s flank and in his rear, to cut him off from his intrenchments. But his efforts were so feeble that under the cover of night Ewell got back with only the loss of a few hundred prisoners, besides his killed and wounded. The army being engaged until after dark, I rescinded the order for the march by our left flank that night.
As soon as it was discovered that the enemy were coming out to attack, I naturally supposed they would detach a force to destroy our trains. The withdrawal of Hanc.o.c.k from the right uncovered one road from Spottsylvania to Fredericksburg over which trains drew our supplies. This was guarded by a division of colored troops, commanded by General Ferrero, belonging to Burnside"s corps. Ferrero was therefore promptly notified, and ordered to throw his cavalry pickets out to the south and be prepared to meet the enemy if he should come; if he had to retreat to do so towards Fredericksburg. The enemy did detach as expected, and captured twenty-five or thirty wagons which, however, were soon retaken.
In consequence of the disasters that had befallen us in the past few days, Lee could be reinforced largely, and I had no doubt he would be. Beauregard had come up from the south with troops to guard the Confederate capital when it was in danger. Butler being driven back, most of the troops could be sent to Lee. Hoke was no longer needed in North Carolina; and Sigel"s troops having gone back to Cedar Creek, whipped, many troops could be spared from the valley.
The Wilderness and Spottsylvania battles convinced me that we had more artillery than could ever be brought into action at any one time. It occupied much of the road in marching, and taxed the trains in bringing up forage. Artillery is very useful when it can be brought into action, but it is a very burdensome luxury where it cannot be used. Before leaving Spottsylvania, therefore, I sent back to the defences of Washington over one hundred pieces of artillery, with the horses and caissons. This relieved the roads over which we were to march of more than two hundred six-horse teams, and still left us more artillery than could be advantageously used. In fact, before reaching the James River I again reduced the artillery with the army largely.
I believed that, if one corps of the army was exposed on the road to Richmond, and at a distance from the main army, Lee would endeavor to attack the exposed corps before reinforcements could come up; in which case the main army could follow Lee up and attack him before he had time to intrench. So I issued the following orders: NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., VA., May 18, 1864.
MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.
Before daylight to-morrow morning I propose to draw Hanc.o.c.k and Burnside from the position they now hold, and put Burnside to the left of Wright. Wright and Burnside should then force their way up as close to the enemy as they can get without a general engagement, or with a general engagement if the enemy will come out of their works to fight, and intrench. Hanc.o.c.k should march and take up a position as if in support of the two left corps. To-morrow night, at twelve or one o"clock, he will be moved south-east with all his force and as much cavalry as can be given to him, to get as far towards Richmond on the line of the Fredericksburg Railroad as he can make, fighting the enemy in whatever force he can find him. If the enemy make a general move to meet this, they will be followed by the other three corps of the army, and attacked, if possible, before time is given to intrench.
Suitable directions will at once be given for all trains and surplus artillery to conform to this movement.
U. S. GRANT.
On the 20th, Lee showing no signs of coming out of his lines, orders were renewed for a left-flank movement, to commence after night.
CHAPTER LIV.
MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK-BATTLE OF NORTH ANNA-AN INCIDENT OF THE MARCH-MOVING ON RICHMOND-SOUTH OF THE PAMUNKEY-POSITION OF THE NATIONAL ARMY.
We were now to operate in a different country from any we had before seen in Virginia. The roads were wide and good, and the country well cultivated. No men were seen except those bearing arms, even the black man having been sent away. The country, however, was new to us, and we had neither guides nor maps to tell us where the roads were, or where they led to. Engineer and staff officers were put to the dangerous duty of supplying the place of both maps and guides. By reconnoitring they were enabled to locate the roads in the vicinity of each army corps. Our course was south, and we took all roads leading in that direction which would not separate the army too widely.
Hanc.o.c.k who had the lead had marched easterly to Guiney"s Station, on the Fredericksburg Railroad, thence southerly to Bowling Green and Milford. He was at Milford by the night of the 21st. Here he met a detachment of Pickett"s division coming from Richmond to reinforce Lee. They were speedily driven away, and several hundred captured. Warren followed on the morning of the 21st, and reached Guiney"s Station that night without molestation. Burnside and Wright were retained at Spottsylvania to keep up the appearance of an intended a.s.sault, and to hold Lee, if possible, while Hanc.o.c.k and Warren should get start enough to interpose between him and Richmond.
Lee had now a superb opportunity to take the initiative either by attacking Wright and Burnside alone, or by following by the Telegraph Road and striking Hanc.o.c.k"s and Warren"s corps, or even Hanc.o.c.k"s alone, before reinforcements could come up. But he did not avail himself of either opportunity. He seemed really to be misled as to my designs; but moved by his interior line-the Telegraph Road-to make sure of keeping between his capital and the Army of the Potomac. He never again had such an opportunity of dealing a heavy blow.
The evening of the 21st Burnside, 9th corps, moved out followed by Wright, 6th corps. Burnside was to take the Telegraph Road; but finding Stanard"s Ford, over the Po, fortified and guarded, he turned east to the road taken by Hanc.o.c.k and Warren without an attempt to dislodge the enemy. The night of the 21st I had my headquarters near the 6th corps, at Guiney"s Station, and the enemy"s cavalry was between us and Hanc.o.c.k. There was a slight attack on Burnside"s and Wright"s corps as they moved out of their lines; but it was easily repulsed. The object probably was only to make sure that we were not leaving a force to follow upon the rear of the Confederates.
By the morning of the 22d Burnside and Wright were at Guiney"s Station. Hanc.o.c.k"s corps had now been marching and fighting continuously for several days, not having had rest even at night much of the time. They were, therefore, permitted to rest during the 22d. But Warren was pushed to Harris"s Store, directly west of Milford, and connected with it by a good road, and Burnside was sent to New Bethel Church. Wright"s corps was still back at Guiney"s Station.
I issued the following order for the movement of the troops the next day: NEW BETHEL, VA., May 22, 1864 MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.
Direct corps commanders to hold their troops in readiness to march at five A.M. to-morrow. At that hour each command will send out cavalry and infantry on all roads to their front leading south, and ascertain, if possible, where the enemy is. If beyond the South Anna, the 5th and 6th corps will march to the forks of the road, where one branch leads to Beaver Dam Station, the other to Jericho Bridge, then south by roads reaching the Anna, as near to and east of Hawkins Creek as they can be found.
The 2d corps will move to Chesterfield Ford. The 9th corps will be directed to move at the same time to Jericho Bridge. The map only shows two roads for the four corps to march upon, but, no doubt, by the use of plantation roads, and pressing in guides, others can be found, to give one for each corps.
The troops will follow their respective reconnoitring parties. The trains will be moved at the same time to Milford Station.
Headquarters will follow the 9th corps.
U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.
Warren"s corps was moved from Harris"s Store to Jericho Ford, Wright"s following. Warren arrived at the ford early in the afternoon, and by five o"clock effected a crossing under the protection of sharpshooters. The men had to wade in water up to their waists. As soon as enough troops were over to guard the ford, pontoons were laid and the artillery and the rest of the troops crossed. The line formed was almost perpendicular to the course of the river-Crawford on the left, next to the river, Griffin in the centre, and Cutler on the right. Lee was found intrenched along the front of their line. The whole of Hill"s corps was sent against Warren"s right before it had got in position. A brigade of Cutler"s division was driven back, the enemy following, but a.s.sistance coming up the enemy was in turn driven back into his trenches with heavy loss in killed and wounded, with about five hundred prisoners left in our hands. By night Wright"s corps was up ready to reinforce Warren.
On the 23d Hanc.o.c.k"s corps was moved to the wooden bridge which spans the North Anna River just west of where the Fredericksburg Railroad crosses. It was near night when the troops arrived. They found the bridge guarded, with troops intrenched, on the north side. Hanc.o.c.k sent two brigades, Egan"s and Pierce"s, to the right and left, and when properly disposed they charged simultaneously. The bridge was carried quickly, the enemy retreating over it so hastily that many were shoved into the river, and some of them were drowned. Several hundred prisoners were captured. The hour was so late that Hanc.o.c.k did not cross until next morning.
Burnside"s corps was moved by a middle road running between those described above, and which strikes the North Anna at Ox Ford, midway between Telegraph Road and Jericho Ford. The hour of its arrival was too late to cross that night.
On the 24th Hanc.o.c.k"s corps crossed to the south side of the river without opposition, and formed line facing nearly west. The railroad in rear was taken possession of and destroyed as far as possible. Wright"s corps crossed at Jericho early the same day, and took position to the right of Warren"s corps, extending south of the Virginia Central Railroad. This road was torn up for a considerable distance to the rear (west), the ties burned, and the rails bent and twisted by heating them over the burning ties. It was found, however, that Burnside"s corps could not cross at Ox Ford. Lee had taken a position with his centre on the river at this point, with the two wings thrown back, his line making an acute angle where it overlooked the river.