Every trooper was alert and ready for whatever might come.
The field, of which mention has been made, was bisected by a ravine, nearly diagonally from left front to right rear, the ground sloping into it from front and rear. This ravine was to play a prominent part in the battle that ensued.
Suddenly, the signal came. A picket shot was heard, then another, and another. Thicker and faster the spattering tones were borne to our ears from the woods in front. Then, it was the "rebel yell;" at first faint, but swelling in volume as it approached. A brigade of cavalry, led by the intrepid Rosser, was charging full tilt toward our position. He did not stop to skirmish with the pickets but, charging headlong, drove them pell-mell into the reserves, closely following, with intent to stampede the whole command.
It was a bold and brilliant dash, but destined to fall short of complete success.
Rosser had met his match.
When the confederate charge was sounded, Custer was near his picket line and, scenting the first note of danger, turned his horse"s head toward the point where he had hidden his Wolverines in ambush and, bursting into view from the woods beyond the field, we saw him riding furiously in our direction. When he neared the edge of the woods, circling to the front and curbing the course of his charger as he rode, he bade the band to play and, with saber arm extended, shouted to the command, already in the saddle:
"Forward, by divisions!"
As the band struck up the inspiriting strains of "Yankee Doodle," the First Michigan broke by subdivisions from the right, the Sixth following in line, regimental front and the two regiments charged with a yell through the thick underbrush out into the open ground just as the confederate troopers emerged from the woods on the opposite side. Both commands kept on in full career, the First and Sixth inextricably intermingled, until they reached the edge of the ravine, when they stopped, the confederates surprised by the sudden appearance and audacity of the Michigan men and their gallant leader; Custer well content with checking Rosser"s vicious advance. Some of the foremost of either side kept on and crossed sabers in the middle of the ravine.
Among these was Lieutenant Cortez P. Pendill, of the Sixth Michigan, who was severely wounded among the very foremost. One squadron of the confederates, possibly a small regiment, charging in column of fours, went past our right flank, and then, like the French army that marched up a hill and then marched down again, turned and charged back, without attempting to turn their head of column towards the place where Custer was standing at bay, with his Michiganders cl.u.s.tered thick about him.
Pretty soon the confederates ran a battery into the field and opened on us with sh.e.l.l. Every attempt to break Custer"s line, however, ended in failure, the Spencer carbines proving too much of an obstacle to be overcome.
Meanwhile, the Fifth and Seventh had been doing excellent service on the left, forging to the front and threatening the right of the confederate position.
But it was evident that our own right was vulnerable, and Custer ordered Major Kidd to take the Sixth, move it by the rear to the woods on the right, dismount to fight on foot and, to use his own words: "Flank that battery."
The regiment had become much scattered in the charge, but the "rally"
was sounded, and as many men as could be quickly a.s.sembled on the colors, were withdrawn from the field and, obeying the order with as much alacrity as possible, in a few moments they were in position and moving forward briskly through the thick woods. But, they had not proceeded far, when a strong line of dismounted confederates was encountered. Both commanders seem to have ordered a simultaneous movement with a similar purpose, viz: To flank the other and attack his rear.
The two forces met very nearly on the prolongation of the line held by the mounted men of the First, Fifth and Seventh Michigan, east of the ravine. The confederate line extended beyond the right of the Sixth as far as we could see, and it was at once evident that we were greatly outnumbered, and liable to have the right flank turned at any moment.
The little force stood bravely up to their work, using the Spencers with deadly effect, and checking the advance of the confederates in their immediate front. Major Charles W. Deane who was helping to direct the movement, had his horse shot under him. Seeing that the left of the confederates were trying to pa.s.s around our right flank, the captain of the left troop was directed to hold on to his position and the right was "refused" to protect the rear. At the same time an officer was dispatched to General Custer with an appeal for reinforcements.
The entire of the Second brigade was now up and a battery which arrived on the field after the withdrawal of the Sixth, had been placed in position and opened upon the enemy. The battle was still raging in the field, but General Custer sent the Fifth Michigan, Colonel Russell A.
Alger commanding, and the Seventeenth Pennsylvania, Lieutenant Colonel J.Q. Anderson commanding, to the relief of the Sixth Michigan.
The reinforcements came none too soon. The confederates, confident in their superior numbers, were pressing hard and threatening to envelop us completely.
In a solid line of two ranks, with Spencer carbines full shotted, the two magnificent regiments deployed into line on our right. Then moving forward, by a left half wheel, turned the tables on the too exultant foe, and he was forced slowly but surely back. By virtue of his rank Colonel Alger was in command of the line and, in response to his clear-voiced order, "Steady men, forward," the three regiments, with a shout, swept on through the woods, driving everything before them. At the same time, the mounted men of the First and Seventh charged the force in their front. The enemy, thereupon, gave way in disorder, was routed and fled, leaving his dead and wounded in our hands. His repulse was complete and crushing and we saw no more of him that day. The Michigan men, with the aid of Devin"s New York and Pennsylvania troopers, had won a signal victory, momentous in its consequences, for it saved the union left from a disaster much dreaded, the fear of which neutralized one-half of Hanc.o.c.k"s corps during the entire day.
No one who witnessed it, can ever forget the superb conduct of Colonel Alger and his men when they swung into line on the right of the Sixth Michigan and turned a threatened reverse into a magnificent victory.
Among the wounded, besides Lieutenant Pendill, already mentioned, were Captain Benjamin F. Rockafellow, of the Sixth Michigan, and Lieutenant Alvin N. Sabin, of the Fifth Michigan. All of these officers were severely wounded and all behaved with the most conspicuous gallantry.
In the meantime, what was the infantry doing? After Rosser was driven from the field, it was found that there was a line of infantry not far to the right and rear. Indeed, the left of the infantry line overlapped the right of the cavalry. Attention was called to the fact when, after the fight, some of the cavalrymen began to straggle to the rear and returning, said that the Twenty-sixth Michigan infantry was only a little way off, and a good many of the men went over for a brief hand-shake with friends therein.
The Twenty-sixth Michigan was in Barlow"s division. They had been interested listeners to, if not actual witnesses of the cavalry fight.
The contest between the dismounted men of Rosser"s and Custer"s commands had been almost, if not quite, in their front and occasional shots had come their way.
Why did not Barlow, or indeed, Gibbon"s entire command, move up at the time when the Sixth Michigan cavalry was contending alone with a superior force directly in their front?
The answer to that question is in the sealed book which contains the reason of Grant"s failure in the "Wilderness."
Let us see!
Grant"s orders to the corps commanders--Sedgwick, Warren and Hanc.o.c.k--were to attack Lee"s army at five o"clock a.m., May 6.
Longstreet had not arrived but was expected up in the morning, and prisoners said he would attack the union left. Hanc.o.c.k was directed to look out for the left. Barlow"s division was posted for that purpose.
Hanc.o.c.k"s corps was divided into two wings, the right wing under Birney consisting of the three divisions of Birney, Mott and Getty; the left wing of Gibbon"s and Barlow"s divisions under Gibbon. Barlow, as has been seen, was to look out for the left. "The left" was well looked after by Sheridan"s cavalry for, aside from Custer"s two brigades which were directly in contact with Barlow"s left flank, Gregg"s division was posted at Todd"s Tavern, still farther to the left.
Sedgwick and Warren attacked Ewell at the hour, but were unsuccessful.
Hanc.o.c.k"s a.s.sault upon Hill was completely successful, although Longstreet arrived in the nick of time to save Hill. But Hanc.o.c.k"s attack was with his right wing under Birney, and Longstreet struck the left of Birney"s command. Where were the two divisions of Gibbon, posted for the very purpose of looking out for Longstreet?
In General A.A. Humphrey"s, "Virginia Campaigns," page 40, we read:
"At seven a.m., General Hanc.o.c.k sent a staff officer to General Gibbon, informing him of the success of his right wing, and directing him to attack the enemy"s right with Barlow"s division. This order was only partially obeyed. Had Barlow"s division advanced as directed, he (General Hanc.o.c.k) felt confident that the enemy"s force would have been defeated. The cause of his failure was probably owing to the expected approach of Longstreet on his (Barlow"s) left."
Again:
"At 8:30 a.m., Hanc.o.c.k began an attack with Birney"s wing and Gibbon"s division of the left wing."
General Grant, in his memoirs, (pp. 196-197):
"Hanc.o.c.k was ready to advance, but learning that Longstreet was threatening his left flank, sent a division of infantry, commanded by General Barlow, to cover the approaches by which Longstreet was expected."
General Sheridan, (memoirs, vol. I, pp. 362-363):
"On the sixth, General Meade became alarmed about his left flank and sent a dispatch, saying: "Hanc.o.c.k has been heavily pressed and his left turned. You had better draw in your cavalry to protect the trains.""
And again:
"On the morning of the sixth, Custer"s and Devin"s brigades had been severely engaged before I received the above note. They had been most successful in repulsing the enemy"s attacks, and I felt that the line could be held. But the despatch from General Hanc.o.c.k was alarming, so I drew all the cavalry close in around Chancellorsville."
Grant"s memoirs, once more:
"The firing was hardly begun when Hanc.o.c.k was informed that the left wing was seriously threatened so as to fully occupy Barlow. The enemy"s dismounted cavalry opened on him (sic.) with artillery and pressed forward his skirmish line. The rapid firing of Sheridan"s attack helped to confirm the impression that this was a serious flank attack by the enemy. These repeated reports prevented Hanc.o.c.k from throwing his full strength into the attack along the plank road."
"The rapid firing of Sheridan"s attack" is good. Sheridan is ent.i.tled to the credit of placing Custer where he was. But that is all. Sheridan was not on the ground to direct the attack in any way; nor was the division commander on the ground. It was Custer"s attack and it was Custer"s victory. The only dismounted cavalry that attacked Barlow was Rosser"s cavalry, and Custer"s cavalry was between Rosser and Barlow. The only artillery with which the dismounted cavalry opened on Barlow was Rosser"s battery and Custer and his men were between Barlow and that battery. Had Barlow taken the trouble to ascertain what was really going on in his front, an easy matter, he would have found that, so far from this dismounted cavalry endangering his flank, they had been driven off the field in headlong flight, leaving their dead and wounded. There was never a moment during the entire day (May 6, 1864,) when Barlow was in the slightest danger of being flanked. His failure to advance, enabled Longstreet to swing across his front and attack Birney"s left, thus neutralizing Hanc.o.c.k"s victory over Hill. If Barlow and Gibbon had advanced as they were ordered to do, they would have struck Longstreet"s flank and, probably, crushed it.
All of which seems to demonstrate that, in battle, as in the ordinary affairs of life, imaginary dangers often trouble us more than those which are real.
The fear of being flanked was an ever present terror to the army of the Potomac, and the apparition which appeared to McDowell at Mana.s.sas, to Pope at the Second Bull Run, to Hooker at Chancellorsville, flitted over the Wilderness also, and was the princ.i.p.al cause why that campaign was not successful.
And then again, General Meade placed too low an estimate upon the value of cavalry as a factor in battle and failed utterly to appreciate the importance of the presence of Sheridan"s troopers upon his left. Had Meade and Hanc.o.c.k known Sheridan then, as they knew him a year later, when he intercepted the flight of the army of Northern Virginia at Five Forks and Sailor"s Creek, there would have been in their minds no nervous apprehension that Longstreet might reenact in the Wilderness the part played at Chancellorsville by Stonewall Jackson. As it was, Grant"s strategy and Hanc.o.c.k"s heroism were paralyzed by these false rumors about Longstreet"s menacing the safety of the Potomac army by moving against its left and rear. If such a thing was seriously intended, it was met and thwarted by Custer and Gregg who, alone and unaided as at Gettysburg, successfully resisted every effort on the part of Stuart"s cavalry to break through the union lines. The noise of the successful battle which the union cavalry was waging, instead of rea.s.suring the federal commanders as it should have done, served only to increase the alarm which extended to General Hanc.o.c.k and to army headquarters, as well. If a proper rating had been placed upon the services of the cavalry all apprehension would have been quieted. Barlow and Gibbon would have moved promptly to the front as directed, and Hill and Ewell might have been crushed before Longstreet was in position to save them.
General Sheridan"s report gives a very meager and inadequate account of the cavalry fight in the Wilderness. In his book he dismisses it with a paragraph. Major McClellan, Stuart"s adjutant general, in his "Campaigns of Stuart"s Cavalry," makes no mention of it at all, though he devotes much s.p.a.ce to Rosser"s victory over Wilson, on the fifth. That is not strange, perhaps, in the case of the confederate chronicler, who set out in his book to write eulogiums upon his own hero, and not upon Sheridan or Custer. He has a keen eye for confederate victories and, if he has knowledge of any other, does not confess to it. As for Sheridan, his corps was scattered over a wide area, its duty to guard the left flank and all the trains, and he was not present in person when Custer put an abrupt stop to Rosser"s impetuous advance. It is now known that he was so hampered by interference from army headquarters that his plans miscarried, and the relations between himself and his immediate superior became so strained that the doughty little warrior declared that he would never give the cavalry corps another order. By General Grant"s intervention, however, these difficulties were so far reconciled that Sheridan was soon off on his memorable campaign which resulted in the b.l.o.o.d.y battle of Yellow Tavern and the death of the foremost confederate cavalier, General J.E.B. Stuart.
CHAPTER XVII
THE YELLOW TAVERN CAMPAIGN