The casualties in the two days" fighting at Trevilian Station were very severe. The losses in killed and died from wounds received in the action aggregated in the brigade forty one, as follows:[28]
First Michigan 13 Fifth Michigan 8 Sixth Michigan 17 Seventh Michigan 3 --- Total 41
Of prisoners lost there were in all two hundred and forty-two, distributed as follows:
First Michigan 39 Fifth Michigan 102 Sixth Michigan 58 Seventh Michigan 43 --- Total 242
Of those who were captured and held as prisoners of war, eighty-eight died in southern prisons--most of them in Andersonville--as follows:[29]
First Michigan 12 Fifth Michigan 35 Sixth Michigan 26 Seventh Michigan 15 --- Total 88
The battle of Trevilian Station practically ended the fighting which was done by the Michigan brigade in the campaign from the Rapidan to the James. Sheridan"s retreat was skilfully conducted but was not especially eventful. A tabulated statement of the losses in the command, beginning in the Wilderness, May 6, and ending at Trevilian Station June 12, is appended hereto. By losses I mean killed in action or died of wounds received in action. It is not possible to give a reliable statement of the wounded, reports of regimental commanders being very deficient in that particular. The table is compiled from the official records in the office of the adjutant general of Michigan and is believed to be approximately correct:
First Fifth Sixth Seventh Michigan Michigan Michigan Michigan Total
Wilderness 2 3 4 -- 9 Todd"s Tavern 3 -- -- 1 4 Beaver Dam Station 1 -- -- -- 1 Yellow Tavern 14 7 3 9 33 Meadow Bridge -- -- 2 -- 2 Hanovertown -- -- 3 -- 3 Haw"s Shop 5 13 18 6 42 Old Church 2 -- -- 1 3 Cold Harbor 5 1 1 3 10 Trevilian Station 13 8 17 3 41 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- Total 45 32 48 23 148
Recapitulation--Killed and died of wounds, the Rapidan to the James:
First Michigan 45 Fifth Michigan 32 Sixth Michigan 48 Seventh Michigan 23 --- Total 148
In General Merritt"s official report[30] for the period May 26 to June 26, he makes the following statement:
"The losses in killed and wounded, (in the Reserve brigade,) are annexed in tabular statement. As they number more than the loss of the entire rest of the command they sufficiently attest the severe services of the brigade."
When General Merritt says "the entire rest of the command" we shall a.s.sume that he means "the entire rest" of the First division. We have no desire to make invidious comparisons, and have avoided doing so throughout these recollections. The Reserve brigade was a fine brigade and always fought well, and never better than at Trevilian Station and in the battles immediately preceding that engagement. To prove that his comparison was not warranted it is necessary only to refer to the official records. On page 810 of the same volume,[31] appended to the report of General Torbert, for the same period covered by General Merritt"s report, we find:
Reserve Brigade-- Officers killed 6 Officers wounded 17 ---- Officers killed and wounded 23
Reserve Brigade-- Men killed 57 Men wounded 275 ---- 332 ---- Total officers and men killed and wounded 355
Second Brigade-- Officers killed 2 Officers wounded 15 ---- Officers killed and wounded 17 Second Brigade-- Men killed 42 Men wounded 163 ---- Men killed and wounded 205 ---- Total officers and men killed and wounded 222
First Brigade-- Officers killed 3 Officers wounded 12 ---- Officers killed and wounded 15
First Brigade-- Men killed 62 Men wounded 192 ---- Men killed and wounded 254 ---- Total officers and men killed and wounded 269 Total killed and wounded First and Second Brigades 491 Total killed and wounded Reserve Brigade 355
The Reserve brigade comprised five regiments, two of volunteers and three of regulars. The Michigan brigade consisted of four regiments, of course, all volunteers. One third of the losses in killed and wounded at Trevilian Station in the Reserve brigade were in the single regiment, the First New York dragoons. My authority for this is still the official records. See page 186 of the volume already quoted and referred to in the footnote. Close a.n.a.lysis, therefore, shows that there are inconsistencies in the official records, and unguarded statements in the official reports.
The rest of the month of June was consumed in the return march to the army. Owing to the necessity of caring for a large number of wounded and of guarding several hundred prisoners, to say nothing of an army of colored people of all ages and of both s.e.xes who joined the procession, it was necessary to take a tortuous course which traversed the Spottsylvania battle ground, touched at Bowling Green, followed the north bank of the Mattapony river, reaching King and Queen Courthouse June 18. From this place the sick, wounded and prisoners were sent to West Point. On the 19th we marched to Dunkirk, on the Mattapony river, which was crossed on a pontoon bridge and thence to the Pamunkey, opposite White House. June 21, the entire command crossed the Pamunkey at White House and marched the next day (June 22) to Jones"s bridge on the Chickahoming. June 25 reached the James river and on the 28th crossed that river to Windmill Point. From here the First and Second divisions were sent to Reams"s Station to the relief of the Third division under Wilson which had run into a situation similar to, if not more serious than that which Custer faced on the 11th at Trevilian.
Finding that officer safe, we returned to Lighthouse Point and settled down--after having fought and marched for fifty-six consecutive days--for a period of rest and recuperation. During the entire march from Trevilian to the James, Hampton hovered on the flank of Sheridan"s column, watching for a favorable opportunity to inflict a blow, but avoiding a general engagement. In crossing from the Pamunkey to the James, Sheridan was charged with the duty of escorting a train of 900 wagons from the White House to Douthat"s Landing on the James. General Gregg was entrusted with the responsibility of protecting the right flank, which placed him in the post of danger, and the brunt of the fighting as well as the greater part of the honors of the movement fell to his share. Indeed, General Sheridan in his official report, written in New Orleans a year after the war closed, gave Gregg credit for saving the train.
The time from July 2, when we returned to Lighthouse Point on the James river, to July 26 was quiet and uneventful. Many hundred convalescent wounded and sick men returned from hospital to duty; many also who had been dismounted by the exigencies of the campaign returned from dismounted camps. A fine lot of new horses were received. During the month the condition of the animals was very much improved, good care and a plentiful supply of forage contributing to the result. The duty performed was to picket the left flank of the army, the Michigan regiments connecting with Crawford"s division of the Fifth corps.
The story of the partic.i.p.ation of the cavalry with the Second corps in the movement to the north side of the James, which began on the forenoon of July 26, has been so fully and so well told by General Sheridan in his reports and in his memoirs that nothing is left to be added. In fact there is little, if anything, in the part taken by any portion of the force taken across by Sheridan and Hanc.o.c.k to differentiate it from that played by the whole. The object of the movement was to draw the enemy"s attention away from the lines around Petersburg preparatory for the explosion of the mine which was to take place on the 30th. In this it was successful. General Lee mistook the attack on his left for real instead of a feint, and detached enough troops to meet it to not only a.s.sure the success of the attack on Petersburg, if it had been made with determination, but to seriously menace the safety of the two corps engaged in the movement. General Sheridan truthfully says that, "The movement to the north side of the James for the accomplishment of our part of the plan connected with the mine explosion, was well executed, and every point made; but it was attended with such anxiety and sleeplessness as to prostrate almost every officer and man in the command."
This was the last incident of importance connected with the services of the First cavalry division with the army of the Potomac in the year 1864. August 1, Sheridan was ordered to the Shenandoah Valley and selected the First and Third cavalry divisions to go with him.
Since this is in some sort a personal narrative it may be of interest to mention that while at Lighthouse Point I received my commission as colonel and, July 9, was mustered out of the United States service as major--with which rank I had been commanding the regiment--and was mustered in in the new grade. The promotion, which was unsought, was due to a request made to the governor, signed by all the officers of the regiment serving in the field, and recommended by General Custer. On the original pet.i.tion, on file in the adjutant general"s office in Lansing, is an endors.e.m.e.nt in the general"s own handwriting.[32]
CHAPTER XXI
IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY
When Grant sent Sheridan to take charge of things in the Shenandoah Valley, and close that gateway to the north, he gave him one corps of infantry (Sixth) and two divisions of cavalry (First and Third) from the army of the Potomac. The Michigan cavalry brigade, still commanded by General George A. Custer, was a part of that force. It embarked on transports at City Point, Virginia, August 3, 1864, and proceeded to Washington, D.C., thence by the way of Poolesville, Maryland, to Halltown, Virginia, in front of Harper"s Ferry, arriving there August 10, in time to join in the advance of the new army of the Middle Military Division,[33] under its new commander.
Gregg with the Second division was left behind, under the immediate direction of General Meade, and thus, much to their regret, the Michigan men parted finally with that fine officer and his superb command, with whom they had been a.s.sociated so intimately and honorably at Gettysburg, Haw"s Shop, and in many other places. When they rejoined the army of the Potomac, in the spring of 1865, he had retired from the service.
They never saw him again but, from the eventful days of 1863 and 1864 to the present time, they have never ceased to respect him as a soldier and a man; and he always had their entire confidence as a commander of cavalry.
Sheridan wanted Early to cross into Maryland or to fight him in and around Winchester, but was in the dark as to his adversary"s intentions or movements, so at daylight, August 11, he started a reconnoissance in force. Custer led the way across the Opequon creek, toward Winchester, and soon ran into Early"s infantry. A sharp fight followed which showed that Early was retreating up the valley. Ransom"s regular battery, attached to the brigade, was charged by confederate infantry, which was met and repulsed by a countercharge of one battalion of the Sixth Michigan cavalry led by Captain James Mathers, who was killed. Sheridan had left the gateway via the fords of the Potomac river open, but Early was too foxy to take the lure. He was getting away as fast as he could to a place of safety.
The pursuit was instantly taken up and the next day (12th) found us up against infantry again at Fisher"s Hill, between Cedar Creek and Strasburg, a position impregnable against direct a.s.sault. For three days we remained face to face with Early"s infantry, constantly so close as to draw their fire and keep them in their intrenchments.
On the 16th we marched to Front Royal. Sheridan had information that a force of infantry and cavalry had been despatched from Richmond to reinforce Early and, incidentally, to strike Sheridan in flank or rear, if he could be caught napping. The force consisted of Kershaw"s division of infantry and Fitzhugh Lee"s division of cavalry, all commanded by General R. H. Anderson. The route by which they were supposed to be approaching was through Chester Gap and Front Royal. If they could have reached the Shenandoah river and effected a crossing undiscovered, a short march would have brought them to Newtown, directly in rear of our army.
Custer crossed and marched through Front Royal but no enemy was found.
He then recrossed and took position on commanding ground half a mile or so back from the river, and ordered the horses to be unsaddled and fed and the men to cook their dinner. Headquarters wagons were brought up, mess chests taken out, and we were just gathering around them to partake of a hastily prepared meal, when Fitzhugh Lee"s cavalry, which had stealthily approached the ford, charged across and made a dash at our pickets. Major H.H. Vinton, of the Sixth Michigan was in command of the picket line and promptly rallying on his reserves, he courageously met Lee"s attack and checked it. That dinner was never eaten. Custer"s bugler sounded "to horse." As if by magic, the men were in the saddle.
Custer dashed out with his staff and ordered the Fifth Michigan forward, to be followed by the other regiments, I supposed he would charge in the direction of the ford, where Fitzhugh Lee"s cavalry was still contending with the Sixth Michigan. He did nothing of the kind.
Moving diagonally to the left, he reached the crest overlooking the river just in time to surprise Kershaw in the act of crossing. The Fifth Michigan deployed into line in fine style and opened such a hot fire with their Spencers, that the head of Kershaw"s column was completely crushed. Every confederate who was across was either killed or captured.
Many of those who were in the water were drowned and those on the other side were kept there. Just then, Devin"s brigade came up, and helped to drive the cavalry across the river. The prisoners, all infantry, numbered from three to five hundred.
This rencounter at Front Royal was one of the most brilliant affairs of the war and it ill.u.s.trated well the marvelous intuition with which General Custer often grasped the situation, in an instant of time. He did not antic.i.p.ate Kershaw"s movement or he would not have given the order to unsaddle. It was a surprise but he was alert, and equal to the emergency. He was as bold to act as his perceptions were keen, and the incident recalls the intrepidity with which he met Rosser in the Wilderness under somewhat similar circ.u.mstances. Had he charged the cavalry, Anderson would have effected a crossing, and in a very short time might have had the Michigan brigade at such disadvantage that it would have required all of Custer"s boldness and skill to extricate it.
Custer divined that the dash of Lee"s advance was a mask for the infantry, and by a movement that would have done credit to Murat or Ney, caught Kershaw astride the river and trapped him completely. The behavior of the Fifth Michigan was never more "superb." I do not believe that a single regiment, on either side, at any time, during the entire war, performed a more brilliant deed. Major Vinton and his detachment also earned especial praise by interrupting without aid, the first onset of Fitzhugh Lee"s advance. The First and Seventh Michigan supported the Fifth in a most gallant manner. General Custer had a lock of hair shot away from his temple and Lieutenant Granger of his staff was killed.
Lieutenant Lucius Carver of the Seventh also lost his life in the engagement.
After this fight it was found that Sheridan had begun a retrograde movement down the valley to take a defensive position in front of Halltown. The brigade brought up the rear, the Sixth Michigan acting as rear guard.
From the 16th to the 25th of August, it was marching and countermarching, picketing, reconnoitering and skirmishing, continually.
Both armies were maneuvering for position and advantage. Anderson"s reinforcement had joined Early and, with the esprit of the Army of Northern Virginia, was constantly pushing close up to our lines and hara.s.sing us. The Michigan brigade was mostly engaged with infantry and did not once, I believe, come into contact with the confederate cavalry.
It was a lonesome day, indeed, when their mettle was not put to the proof in a skirmish with either Kershaw or Breckinridge. But one incident occurred to break the monotony. A part of the Fifth Michigan sent out to destroy some buildings supposed to contain supplies, was surprised by Mosby"s command and fifteen men were killed outright. They were caught in a field where escape was impossible and shot without mercy. The Sixth was sent out to reinforce the Fifth and we searched far and near for the dashing partisan but did not succeed in coming up with him. He departed as swiftly as he came and made his escape to the mountains.
Sheridan had, in his turn, been reinforced by Wilson"s division of cavalry (Third) and, on the 25th, Torbert[34] was sent out with Merritt"s and Wilson"s divisions, to hunt up Fitzhugh Lee, who was reported to have gone in the direction of the fords leading into Maryland. At or near Kearneysville, a small force of cavalry was encountered which was driven rapidly along the road toward Leetown.
Nearing the latter place, the inevitable infantry was found and it turned out to be Breckinridge"s corps, going north along the Smithfield and Shepherdstown pike. Shepherdstown is on the Potomac river, opposite Sharpsburg and the Antietam battle ground.
It never will be known what Breckinridge was intending to do, for he turned on Torbert and did not resume his journey. The collision was a complete surprise to both parties, but Early"s design, whatever it may have been, was disarranged, the movement was discovered and, though the cavalry had rather the worst of it, the information gained was worth all it cost. If Early had been contemplating an invasion of Maryland, he relinquished the design and did not revive it.
Torbert, finding that he had more than he could handle, fell back toward Halltown, leaving Custer with his brigade for a rear guard. Custer, coming to a piece of woods south of Shepherdstown, neither the enemy nor our own cavalry being in sight, halted and had his men dismount to rest, they having been in the saddle since early morning. We were all sitting or lying down with bridle reins in hand, taking our ease with more or less dignity, when a small body of confederate horse made its appearance in the direction of Shepherdstown. The brigade mounted and started in pursuit but had hardly been put in motion when a line of infantry suddenly appeared in the woods we were vacating and opened fire upon us.
The confederate hors.e.m.e.n were driven away by the First and Seventh and, when General Custer rallied his brigade to confront the new danger, he found that Breckinridge had intercepted his retreat in the direction the rest of the cavalry had gone, and was closing in with a line that threatened to envelop the brigade. In a few moments, the enemy"s right and left flanks began to swing in towards the river and he found himself face to face with two alternatives: To cut his way through, or fall back and take the risky chance of fording the river, with Breckinridge close at his heels. Of course there was no thought of surrender and Custer was not much given to showing his heels. Torbert left Custer to shift for himself. So far as I ever was able to learn, he made no effort to save his plucky subordinate and the report that the Michigan brigade had been captured was generally credited, in and around Harper"s Ferry.
Custer, with surprising coolness, put his brigade into line, the Sixth on the right, the First, Fifth and Seventh to the left of the Sixth, the battery in the center, with backs to the river and faces to the enemy, and presented so bold a front that the infantry did not charge, but moved up slowly, maneuvering to get around and obtain possession of the ford in rear. Custer had the men cheer and dared them to come on. With characteristic audacity, he actually unlimbered his pieces and gave them a charge or two right in their teeth; then limbering to the rear he took successive new positions and repeated the performance.
While holding one of these points, a squadron of the First New York dragoons, of Devin"s brigade, which also in some way had been separated from its command, was driven in from the right, and, riding up to where I was, the commanding officer, Captain Brittain, saluted and said:
"Colonel, I am cut off from my own regiment and wish to report to you for duty."