I was absent from home when I first saw in the newspapers an account of the infamous a.s.sault of the Terrys--husband and wife--upon you, and the prompt and courageous action of Deputy Marshal Neagle that happily frustrated the iniquitous plot against your life.
Accept, my dear friend, my fervent congratulations on your escape from the designs of this madman and of the shameless creature who was his wife and accomplice.
For the sake of our country and its reputation in the eyes of Christendom, I am indeed grateful that this vile stab at its judicial power, as vested in your personality, miscarried, and that by good fortune the insane malice of a disappointed suitor should have been thwarted.
Your dignified courage in this tragical episode is most impressive, and, while it endears you the more to those who love you, will wring even from your foes a tribute of respect and admiration.
Pa.s.sing over the arguments that may be wrought out of the verbiage of our dual const.i.tution of government, the robust and essential principle _must_ be recognized and proclaimed--that the _inherent powers_ of every government which are sufficient to authorize and enforce the judgments of its courts are equally and at all times and in all places sufficient to protect the individual judge who fearlessly and conscientiously, in the discharge of his duty, p.r.o.nounces those judgments.
The case, my dear friend, is not yours alone; it is equally mine and that of every other American. A principle so vital to society, to the body politic, was never more dangerously and wickedly a.s.sailed than by the a.s.sault of Terry and his wife upon you for your just and honorable performance of your duty as a magistrate.
I can well comprehend the shock to which this occurrence has subjected you, and I wish I could be by your side to give you a.s.surance orally (if any were needed) of that absolute sympathy and support to which you are so fully ent.i.tled. But these lines will perhaps suffice to make you feel the affectionate and steadfast regard I entertain for you, and which this terrible event has but increased.
I cannot forbear an expression of the hope that the arguments of jurisdictional and other points which must attend the litigation and settlement of this tragedy may not be abated or warped to meet any temporary local or partisan demand.
The voice of Justice can never speak in clearer or more divine accents than when heard in vindication and honor of her own faithful ministers.
Ever, my dear Judge Field, Sincerely yours, T.F. BAYARD.
The Hon. STEPHEN J. FIELD, _San Francisco, Cal_.
Letter from Hon. E.J. Phelps, former Minister to England:
BURLINGTON, VERMONT, _August 17, 1889_.
MY DEAR JUDGE FIELD:
Pray let me congratulate you most heartily on the Terry transaction. Nothing that has ever occurred in the administration of justice has given me more satisfaction than this prompt, righteous, and effectual vindication through an officer of the court of the sanct.i.ty of the judiciary when in the discharge of its duty. What your marshal did was exactly the right thing, at the right time, and in the right way. I shall be most happy to join in a suitable testimonial to him, if our profession will, as they ought, concur in presenting it. * * *
Your own coolness and carriage in confronting this danger in the discharge of your duty must be universally admired, and will shed an additional l.u.s.tre on a judicial career which was distinguished enough without it.
You have escaped a great peril--acquired a fresh distinction--and vindicated most properly the dignity of your high station.
I am glad to perceive that this is the general opinion.
Antic.i.p.ating the pleasure of seeing you in Washington next term,
I am always, dear sir, Most sincerely yours, E.J. PHELPS.
Letter from Hon. George F. h.o.a.r, Senator from Ma.s.sachusetts:
WORCESTER, _August 16, 1889_.
MY DEAR JUDGE FIELD:
I think I ought to tell you, at this time, how high you stand in the confidence and reverence of all good men here, how deeply they were shocked by this outrage attempted not so much on you as on the judicial office itself, and how entirely the prompt action of the officer is approved. I hope you may long be spared to the public service.
I am faithfully yours, GEO. F. h.o.a.r.
Letter from Hon. J. Proctor Knott, for many years a Member of Congress from Kentucky and Chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives, and afterwards Governor of Kentucky:
LEBANON, KENTUCKY, _September 5, 1889_.
MY DEAR JUDGE: * * *
I have had it in mind to write you from the moment I first heard of your fortunate escape from the fiendish a.s.sa.s.sination with which you were so imminently threatened, but I have, since the latter part of May, been suffering from a most distressing affection of the eyes which has rendered it extremely difficult, and frequently, for days together, quite impossible to do so. Even now, though much improved, I write in great pain, but I cannot get my consent to delay it longer on any account. You are to be congratulated, my dear friend, and you know that no one could possibly do so with more genuine, heartfelt sincerity than I do myself. * * *
I had been troubled, ever since I saw you had gone to your circuit, with apprehensions that you would be a.s.sa.s.sinated, or at least subjected to some gross outrage, and cannot express my admiration of the serene heroism with which you went to your post of duty, determined not to debase the dignity of your exalted position by wearing arms for your defense, notwithstanding you were fully conscious of the danger which menaced you. It didn"t surprise me, however; for I knew the stuff you were made of had been tested before. But I _was_ surprised and disgusted, too, that _you_ should have been charged or even suspected of anything wrong in the matter. The magistrate who issued the warrant for your arrest may possibly have thought it his duty to do so, without looking beyond the "railing accusation" of a baffled and infuriated murderess, which all the world instinctively knew to be false, yet I suppose there is not an intelligent man, woman, or child on the continent who does not consider it an infamous and unmitigated outrage, or who is not thoroughly satisfied that the brave fellow who defended you so opportunely was legally and morally justifiable in what he did. I have not been in a condition to _think_ very coherently, much less to read anything in relation to the question of jurisdiction raised by the State authorities in the _habeas corpus_ issued in your behalf by the U.S. Circuit Court, and it may be that, from the mere newspaper"s reports that have reached me, I have been unable to fully apprehend the objections which are made to the courts hearing all the facts on the trial of the writ; but it occurs to me as a plain principle of common sense that the federal government should not only have the power, but that it is necessary to its own preservation, to protect its officers from being wantonly or maliciously interfered with, hindered or obstructed in the lawful exercises of their official duties, not arbitrarily of course, but through its regularly const.i.tuted agencies, and according to the established principles of law; and where such obstruction consists in the forcible restraint of the officer"s liberty, I see no reason why the federal judiciary should not inquire into it on _habeas corpus_, when it is alleged to be not only illegal but contrived for the very purpose of hindering the officer in the discharge of his official duties, and impairing the efficiency of the public service. It is true that in such an investigation a real or apparent conflict between State and federal authority may be presented, which a due regard to the respective rights of the two governments would require to be considered with the utmost caution, such caution, at least, as it is fair to presume an intelligent court would always be careful to exercise, in view of the absolute importance of maintaining as far as possible the strictest harmony between the two jurisdictions. Yet those rights are determined and by fixed legal principles, which it would be impossible for a court to apply in any case without a competent knowledge of the _facts_ upon which their application in the particular case might depend. For instance, if your court should issue a writ of _habeas corpus_ for the relief of a federal officer upon the averments in his pet.i.tion that he was forcibly and illegally restrained of his liberty for the purpose of preventing him from performing his official duties, and it should appear in the return to the writ that the person detaining the prisoner was a ministerial officer of the State government authorized by its laws to execute its process, and that he held the pet.i.tioner in custody by virtue of a warrant of arrest in due form, issued by a competent magistrate, to answer for an offense against the State laws, I presume the court, in the absence of any further showing, would instantly remand the pet.i.tioner to the custody of the State authorities without regard to his official position or the nature of his public duties. But, on the other hand, suppose there should be a traverse of the return, averring that the warrant of the arrest, though apparently regular in all respects, was in truth but a fraudulent contrivance designed and employed for the sole purpose of hindering and obstructing the pet.i.tioner in the performance of his duties as an officer of the government of the United States; that the magistrate who issued it, knowingly and maliciously abused his authority for that purpose in pursuance of a conspiracy between himself and others, and not in good faith, and upon probable cause to bring the prisoner to justice for a crime against the State.
How then? Here is an apparent conflict--not a _real_ one--between the rights of the government of the United States and the government of the State. The one has a right to the service of its officer, and the right to prevent his being unlawfully interfered with or obstructed in the performance of his official duties; the other has the right to administer its laws for the punishment of crime through its own tribunals; but it must be observed that the former has no right to shield one of its officers from a valid prosecution for a violation of the laws of the latter not in conflict with the Const.i.tution and laws of the United States, nor can it be claimed that the latter has any right to suffer its laws to be prost.i.tuted, and its authority fraudulently abused, in aid of a conspiracy to defeat or obstruct the functions of the former. Such an abuse of authority is not, and cannot be in any sense, a _bona fide_ administration of State laws, but is itself a crime against them. What, then, would your court do?
You would probably say: If it is true that this man is held without probable cause under a fraudulent warrant, issued in pursuance of a conspiracy to which the magistrate who issued it was a party, to give legal color to a malicious interference with his functions as a federal official, he is the victim of a double crime--a crime against the United States and a crime against the State--and it is not only our duty to vindicate his right to the free exercise of his official duties, but the right of the federal government to his services, and its right to protect him in the legal performance of the same. But if, on the other hand, he has raised a mere "false clamor"--if he is held in good faith upon a valid warrant to answer for a crime committed against the State, it is equally as obligatory upon us to uphold its authority, and maintain its right to vindicate its own laws through its own machinery. To determine between these two hypotheses we must know the _facts_. * * * The same simple reasoning, it occurs to me, applies to Mr. Neagle"s case.
Whether he acted in the line of his duty under the laws of the United States, as an officer of that government, is clearly a question within the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary. If he _did_, he cannot be held responsible to the State authority; if he did _not_, he should answer, if required, before its tribunals of justice. I presume no court of ordinary intelligence, State or federal, would question these obvious principles; but how _any_ court could determine whether he did or did not act in the line of his official duty under the laws of his government without a judicial inquiry into the _facts_ connected with the transaction I am unable to imagine. * * *
I am, as always, Your faithful friend, J. PROCTOR KNOTT.
Hon. S.J. FIELD, _a.s.sociate Justice Supreme Court U.S._
Letter from Hon. William D. Shipman, formerly U.S. District Judge for the district of Connecticut:
NEW YORK, _October 20, 1889_.
DEAR JUDGE:
* * * * *
I have attentively read Judge Sawyer"s opinion in the Neagle _habeas corpus_ case, and I agree with his main conclusions.
It seems to me that the whole question of jurisdiction turns on the fact whether you were, at the time the a.s.sault was made on you, engaged in the performance of your official duty.
You had been to Los Angeles to hold court there and had finished that business. In going there you were performing an official duty as much as you were when you had held court there. It was then your official duty to go from Los Angeles to San Francisco and hold court there. You could not hold court at the latter place without going, and you were engaged in the line of your official duty in performing that journey for that purpose, as you were in holding the court after you got there. The idea that a judge is not performing official duty when he goes from court-house to court-house or from court-room to court-room in his own circuit seems to me to be absurd. The distance from one court-house or court-room to another is not material, and does not change or modify the act or duty of the judge.
Now, Neagle was an officer of your court, charged with the duty of protecting your person while you were engaged in the performance of your official duty. _His_ duty was to see to it that you were not unlawfully prevented from performing _your_ official duty--not hindered or obstructed therein. For the State authorities to indict him for repelling the a.s.sault on you in the only way which he could do so effectually seems to me to be as unwarranted by law as it would be for them to indict him for an a.s.sault on Terry when he a.s.sisted in disarming the latter in the court-room last year.
When, therefore, it was conceded on the argument that if the affair at Lathrop had taken place in the court-room during the sitting of the court, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court would be unquestionable, it is difficult for me to see why the whole question of federal jurisdiction was not embraced in that concession. a.s.sa.s.sinating a judge _on_ the bench would no more obstruct and defeat public justice than a.s.sa.s.sinating him on his way to the bench. In each case he is _proceeding in the line of official duty imposed on him by law and_ his official oath. The law requires him to go to court wherever the latter is held, and he is as much engaged in performing the duty thus imposed on him while he is proceeding to the place of his judicial labors as he is in performing the latter after he gets there.
It would, therefore, seem to go without saying that any acts done in defense and protection of the judge in the performance of the duties of his office must pertain to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of which he forms a part.
The fact that the a.s.sault on you was avowedly made in revenge for your judicial action in a case heard by you gives a darker tinge to the deed, but, perhaps, does not change the legal character of the a.s.sault itself.
That Neagle did his whole duty, and in no way exceeded it, is too plain for argument.
Yours faithfully, W.D. SHIPMAN
Mr. Justice FIELD.
Letter from James C. Welling, president of Columbian University, Washington: