He says:
"The most conclusive proof that Terry had no intention, for the time being, of seriously hurting Field, but that his sole purpose was to tender him an insult, is found in the fact that he only used his open hand, and that, too, in a mild manner."
We often hear of the "mild-mannered men" who "scuttle ships" and "cut throats," but this is the very first one whose "very mild manner" of beating a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States with his hand was ever certified to by an attorney and counsellor of that court in the argument of a case before it.
It would be difficult to conceive of anything more puerile or absurd than this pretense that Terry had the slightest expectation of provoking a man of Justice Field"s age, official position, and physical condition, to fight a duel with him in vindication of the right of the court over which he presided to imprison a man for contempt for beating the marshal in the face with his fist, and afterwards pursuing him with a knife, in the presence of the court, for obeying an order of the court.
Mr. Montgomery appears to have been imported into the case mainly for the purpose of reviewing the facts and giving them the Terry stamp.
His ambition seems to have been to insult Justice Field and his a.s.sociates in the Circuit Court by charging them with misrepresenting the facts of the occurrence, thus repeating Terry"s reckless accusations to that effect. For Terry he had only words of eulogy and admiration, and said he was "straightforward, candid, and incapable of concealment or treachery himself, and therefore never suspected treachery, even in an enemy."
These n.o.ble qualities Terry had ill.u.s.trated by a.s.saulting Justice Field from behind while the latter was in a position which placed him entirely at the mercy of his a.s.sailant.
Montgomery thought that not only Neagle, but the President, Attorney-General, district attorney, and Marshal Franks should be arraigned for Terry"s murder.
Although Justice Field had expressly advised the marshal that it was unnecessary for anybody to accompany him to Los Angeles, and although Neagle went contrary to his wish, and only because the marshal considered himself instructed by the Attorney-General to send him, yet Mr. Montgomery especially demanded that he (Justice Field) should be tried for Terry"s homicide. This, too, in the face of the fact that under instructions from the attorney-general of the State of California, aroused to his duty by the Governor, the false, malicious, and infamous charge made against Justice Field by Sarah Althea Terry was dismissed by the magistrate who had entertained it, on the ground that it was manifestly dest.i.tute of the shadow of a foundation, and that any further proceedings against him would be "a burning disgrace to the State."
The decision of the Circuit Court discharging Neagle from the custody of the sheriff of San Joaquin county was affirmed by the Supreme court of the United States on the 14th of April, 1890. Justice Field did not sit at the hearing of the case, and took no part in its decision, nor did he remain in the conference room with his a.s.sociate justices at any time while it was being considered or on the bench when it was delivered. The opinion of the Court was delivered by Justice Miller.
Dissenting opinions were filed by Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Lamar. Justice Miller"s opinion concludes as follows:
"We have thus given, in this case, a most attentive consideration to all the questions of law and fact which we have thought to be properly involved in it. We have felt it to be our duty to examine into the facts with a completeness justified by the importance of the case, as well as from the duty imposed upon us by the statute, which we think requires of us to place ourselves, as far as possible, in the place of the Circuit Court and to examine the testimony and the arguments in it, and to dispose of the party as law and justice require.
"The result at which we have arrived upon this examination is, that in the protection of the person and the life of Mr.
Justice Field, while in the discharge of his official duties, Neagle was authorized to resist the attack of Terry upon him; that Neagle was correct in the belief that without prompt action on his part the a.s.sault of Terry upon the Judge would have ended in the death of the latter; that such being his well-founded belief, he was justified in taking the life of Terry, as the only means of preventing the death of the man who was intended to be his victim; that in taking the life of Terry, under the circ.u.mstances, he was acting under the authority of the law of the United States, and was justified in doing so; and that he is not liable to answer in the courts of California on account of his part in that transaction.
"We therefore affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court authorizing his discharge from the custody of the sheriff of San Joaquin county."
[1] NOTE.--Mr. Choate took great interest in the question involved--the right of the Government of the United States to protect its officers from violence whilst engaged in the discharge of their duties,--deeming its maintenance essential to the efficiency of the Government itself; and he declined to make any charge or take any fee for his professional services in the case. The privilege of supporting this great principle before the highest tribunal of the country, where his powers would be most effectively engaged in securing its recognition, was considered by him as sufficient reward. Certainly he has that reward in the full establishment of that principle--for which, also, both he and Attorney-General Miller will receive the thanks of all who love and revere our national government and trust that its existence may be perpetuated.
Mr. James C. Carter, the distinguished advocate of New York, also took a deep interest in the questions involved, and had several consultations with Mr. Choate upon them; and his professional services were given with the same generous and n.o.ble spirit that characterized the course of Mr. Choate.
CHAPTER XXI.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS.
Thus ends the history of a struggle between brutal violence and the judicial authority of the United States. Commencing in a mercenary raid upon a rich man"s estate, relying wholly for success on forgery, perjury, and the personal fear of judges, and progressing through more than six years of litigation in both the Federal and the State courts, it eventuated in a vindication by the Supreme Court of the United States of the const.i.tutional power of the Federal Government, through its Executive Department, to protect the judges of the United States courts from the revengeful and murderous a.s.saults of defeated litigants, without subjecting its appointed agents to malicious prosecutions for their fidelity to duty, by petty State officials, in league with the a.s.sailants.
The dignity and the courage of Justice Field, who made the stand against brute force, and who, refusing either to avoid a great personal danger or to carry a weapon for his defense, trusted his life to that great power which the Const.i.tution has placed behind the judicial department for its support, was above all praise.
The admirable conduct of the faithful deputy marshal, Neagle, in whose small frame the power of a nation dwelt at the moment when, like a modern David, he slew a new Goliath, ill.u.s.trated what one frail mortal can do, who scorns danger when it crosses the path of duty.
The prompt action of the Executive Department, through its Attorney-General, in directing the marshal to afford all necessary protection against threatened danger, undoubtedly saved a justice of the Supreme Court from a.s.sa.s.sination, and the Government from the disgrace of having pusillanimously looked on while the deed was done.
The skill and learning of the lawyers who presented the case of Neagle in the lower and in the appellate courts reflected honor on the legal profession.
The exhaustive and convincing opinion of Circuit Judge Sawyer, when ordering the release of Neagle, seemed to have made further argument unnecessary.
The grand opinion of Justice Miller, in announcing the decision of the Supreme Court affirming the order of the Circuit Court, was the fitting climax of all. Its statement of the facts is the most graphic and vivid of the many that have been written. Its vindication of the const.i.tutional right of the Federal Government to exist, and to preserve itself alive in all its powers, and on every foot of its territory, without leave of, or hindrance by, any other authority, makes it one of the most important of all the utterances of that great tribunal.
Its power is made the more apparent by the dissent, which rests rather upon the a.s.sertion that Congress had not legislated in exact terms for the case under consideration, than upon any denial of the power of the Federal Government to protect its courts from violence. The plausibility of this ground is dissipated by the citations in the majority opinion of the California statute concerning sheriffs, and of the federal statute concerning marshals, by which the latter are invested with all the powers of the sheriffs in the States wherein they reside, thus showing clearly that marshals possess the authority to protect officers of the United States which sheriffs possess to protect officers of the State against criminal a.s.saults of every kind and degree.
During the argument in the Neagle case, as well as in the public discussions of the subject, much stress was laid by the friends of Terry upon the power and duty of the State to afford full protection to all persons within its borders, including the judges of the courts of the United States. They could not see why it was necessary for the Attorney-General of the United States to extend the arm of the Federal Government. They held that the police powers of the State were sufficient for all purposes, and that they were the sole lawful refuge for all whose lives were in danger. But they did not explain why it was that the State never did afford protection to Judges Field and Sawyer, threatened as they notoriously were by two desperate persons.
The laws of the State made it the duty of every sheriff to preserve the peace of the State, but the Terrys were permitted, undisturbed and unchecked, to proclaim their intention to break the peace. If they had announced their intention, for nearly a year, to a.s.sa.s.sinate the judges of the Supreme Court of the State, would they have been permitted to take their lives, before being made to feel the power of the State? Would an organized banditti be permitted to unseat State judges by violence, and only feel the strong halter of the law after they had accomplished their purpose? Can no preventive measures be taken under the police powers of the State, when ruffians give notice that they are about to obstruct the administration of justice by the murder of high judicial officers? It was not so much to insure the punishment of Terry and his wife if they should murder Justice Field, as to prevent the murder, that the executive branch of the United States Government surrounded him with the necessary safeguards. How can justice be administered under the federal statutes if the federal judges must fight their way, while going from district to district, to overcome armed and vindictive litigants who differ with them concerning the judgments they have rendered?
But it was said Judge Terry could have been held to bail to keep the peace. The highest bail that can be required in such cases under the law of the State is five thousand dollars.
What restraint would that have been upon Terry, who was so filled with malice and so reckless of consequences that he finally braved the gallows by attempting the murder of the object of his hate? But even this weak protection never was afforded. Shall it be said that Justice Field ought to have gone to the nearest justice of the peace and obsequiously begged to have Terry placed under bonds? But this he could not have done until he reached the State, and he was in peril from the moment that he reached the State line. The dust had not been brushed from his clothing before some of the papers which announced his arrival eagerly inquired what Terry would do and when he would do it. Some of them seemed most anxious for the sensation that a murder would produce.
The State was active enough when Terry had been prevented from doing his b.l.o.o.d.y work upon Justice Field. The constable who had been telegraphed for before the train reached Lathrop on the fatal day, but who could not be found, and was not at the station to aid in preserving the peace, was quick enough to _arrest Neagle without a warrant, for an act not committed in his presence_, and therefore known only to him by hearsay. Against the remonstrances of a supreme justice of the United States, who had also been chief justice of California, and who might have been supposed to know the laws as well at least as a constable, the protection placed over him by the Executive branch of the Federal Government was unlawfully taken from him and the protector incarcerated in jail. The constable doubtless did only what he was told and what he believed to be his duty. Neagle declined to make any issue with him of a technical character and went with him uncomplainingly. If Neagle"s pistol had missed fire, or his aim had been false, he might have been arrested on the spot for his attempt to protect Justice Field, while Terry would have been left free at the same time to finish his murderous work then, or to have pursued Justice Field into the car and, free from all interference by Neagle, have despatched him there. The State officials were all activity to protect the would-be murderer, but seemed never to have been ruffled in the least degree over the probable a.s.sa.s.sination of a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. The Terrys were never thought to be in any danger. The general belief was that Judges Field and Sawyer were in great danger from them.
The death of Terry displeased three cla.s.ses: first, all who were willing to see Justice Field murdered; second, all who naturally sympathize with the tiger in his hunt for prey, and who thought it a pity that so good a fighter as Terry should lose his life in seeking that of another; and, third, all who preferred to see Sarah Althea enjoy the property of the Sharon estate in place of its lawful heirs.
It is plain from the foregoing review that the State authorities of California presented no obstruction to Terry and his wife as they moved towards the accomplishment of their deadly purpose against Justice Field. It was the Executive arm of the nation operating through the deputy United States marshal, under orders from the Department of Justice, that prevented the a.s.sa.s.sination of Justice Field by David S. Terry.
It only remains to state the result of the second trial of the case between Sarah Althea Hill, now Mrs. Terry, and the executor of William Sharon before the Superior Court of the city of San Francisco. It will be remembered that on the first trial in that court, presided over by Judge Sullivan, a judgment was entered declaring that Miss Hill and William Sharon had intermarried on the 25th of August, 1880, and had at the time executed a written contract of marriage under the laws of California, and had a.s.sumed marital relations and subsequently lived together as husband and wife. From the judgment rendered an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the State. A motion was also made for a new trial in that case, and from the order denying the new trial an appeal was also taken to the Supreme Court. The decision on the appeal from the judgment resulted in its affirmance. The result of the appeal from the order denying a new trial was its reversal, with a direction for a new trial. The effect of that reversal was to open the whole case. In the meantime William Sharon had died and Miss Hill had married David S. Terry. The executor of William Sharon, Frederick W. Sharon, appeared as his representative in the suit, and filed a supplemental answer. The case was tried in the Superior Court, before Judge Shafter, in July, 1890, and on the 4th of August following the Judge filed his findings and conclusions of law, which were, briefly, as follows:
That the plaintiff and William Sharon, deceased, did not, on the 25th of August, 1880, or at any other time, consent to intermarry or become, by mutual agreement or otherwise, husband and wife; nor did they, thereafter, or at any time, live or cohabit together as husband and wife, or mutually or otherwise a.s.sume marital duties, rights, or obligations; that they did not, on that day or at any other time, in the city and county of San Francisco, or elsewhere, jointly or otherwise, make or sign a declaration of marriage in writing or otherwise; and that the declaration of marriage mentioned in the complaint was false, counterfeited, fabricated, forged, and fraudulent, and, therefore, null and void. The conclusion of the court was that the plaintiff and William Sharon were not, on August 25, 1880, and never had been husband and wife, and that the plaintiff had no right or claim, legal or equitable, to any property or share in any property, real or personal, of which William Sharon was the owner or in possession, or which was then or might thereafter be held by the executor of his last will and testament the defendant, Frederick W. Sharon. Accordingly, judgment was entered for the defendant. An appeal was taken from that judgment to the Supreme Court of California, and on the 5th of August, 1892, Sarah Althea Terry having become insane pending the appeal, and P.P. Ashe, Esq., having been appointed and qualified as the general guardian of her person and estate, it was ordered that he be subst.i.tuted in the case, and that she subsequently appear by him as her guardian. In October following, the appeal was dismissed.
Thus ended the legal controversy initiated by this adventuress to obtain a part of the estate of the deceased millionaire.