If we move for a time within a fixed circle of phenomena which recur with unvarying uniformity, our thoughts gradually adapt themselves to our environment; our ideas reflect unconsciously our surroundings. The stone we hold in our hand, when dropped, not only falls to the ground in reality; it also falls in our thoughts. Iron-filings dart towards a magnet in imagination as well as in fact, and, when thrown into a fire, they grew hot in conception as well.
The impulse to complete mentally a phenomenon that has been only partially observed, has not its origin in the phenomenon itself; of this fact, we are fully sensible. And we well know that it does not lie within the sphere of our volition. It seems to confront us rather as a power and a law imposed from without and controlling both thought and facts.
The fact that we are able by the help of this law to prophesy and forecast, merely proves a sameness or uniformity of environment sufficient to effect a mental adaptation of this kind. A necessity of fulfilment, however, is not contained in this compulsory principle which controls our thoughts; nor is it in any way determined by the possibility of prediction. We are always obliged, in fact, to await the completion of what has been predicted. Errors and departures are constantly discernible, and are slight only in provinces of great rigid constancy, as in astronomy.
In cases where our thoughts follow the connexion of events with ease, and in instances where we positively forefeel the course of a phenomenon, it is natural to fancy that the latter is determined by and must conform to our thoughts. But the belief in that mysterious agency called causality, which holds thought and event in unison, is violently shaken when a person first enters a province of inquiry in which he has previously had no experience. Take for instance the strange interaction of electric currents and magnets, or the reciprocal action of currents, which seem to defy all the resources of mechanical science. Let him be confronted with such phenomena and he will immediately feel himself forsaken by his power of prediction; he will bring nothing with him into this strange field of events but the hope of soon being able to adapt his ideas to the new conditions there presented.
A person constructs from a bone the remaining anatomy of an animal; or from the visible part of a half-concealed wing of a b.u.t.terfly he infers and reconstructs the part concealed. He does so with a feeling of highest confidence in the accuracy of his results; and in these processes we find nothing preternatural or transcendent. But when physicists adapt their thoughts to conform to the dynamical course of events in time, we invariably surround their investigations with a metaphysical halo; yet these latter adaptations bear quite the same character as the former, and our only reason for investing them with a metaphysical garb, perhaps, is their high practical value.[76]
Let us consider for a moment what takes place when the field of observation to which our ideas have been adapted and now conform, becomes enlarged. We had, let us say, always seen heavy bodies sink when their support was taken away; we had also seen, perhaps, that the sinking of heavier bodies forced lighter bodies upwards. But now we see a lever in action, and we are suddenly struck with the fact that a lighter body is lifting another of much greater weight. Our customary train of thought demands its rights; the new and unwonted event likewise demands its rights. From this conflict between thought and fact the problem arises; out of this partial contrariety springs the question, "Why?" With the new adaptation to the enlarged field of observation, the problem disappears, or, in other words, is solved. In the instance cited, we must adopt the habit of always considering the mechanical work performed.
The child just awakening into consciousness of the world, knows no problem. The bright flower, the ringing bell, are all new to it; yet it is surprised at nothing. The out and out Philistine, whose only thoughts lie in the beaten path of his every-day pursuits, likewise has no problems. Everything goes its wonted course, and if perchance a thing go wrong at times, it is at most a mere object of curiosity and not worth serious consideration. In fact, the question "Why?" loses all warrant in relations where we are familiar with every aspect of events. But the capable and talented young man has his head full of problems; he has acquired, to a greater or less degree, certain habitudes of thought, and at the same time he is constantly observing what is new and unwonted, and in his case there is no end to the questions, "Why?"
Thus, the factor which most promotes scientific thought is the gradual widening of the field of experience. We scarcely notice events we are accustomed to; the latter do not really develop their intellectual significance until placed in contrast with something to which we are unaccustomed. Things that at home are pa.s.sed by unnoticed, delight us when abroad, though they may appear in only slightly different forms. The sun shines with heightened radiance, the flowers bloom in brighter colors, our fellow-men accost us with lighter and happier looks. And, returning home, we find even the old familiar scenes more inspiring and suggestive than before.
Every motive that prompts and stimulates us to modify and transform our thoughts, proceeds from what is new, uncommon, and not understood. Novelty excites wonder in persons whose fixed habits of thought are shaken and disarranged by what they see. But the element of wonder never lies in the phenomenon or event observed; its place is in the person observing. People of more vigorous mental type aim at once at an adaptation of thought that will conform to what they have observed. Thus does science eventually become the natural foe of the wonderful. The sources of the marvellous are unveiled, and surprise gives way to calm interpretation.
Let us consider such a mental transformative process in detail. The circ.u.mstance that heavy bodies fall to the earth appears perfectly natural and regular. But when a person observes that wood floats upon water, and that flames and smoke rise in the air, then the contrary of the first phenomenon is presented. An olden theory endeavors to explain these facts by imputing to substances the power of volition, as that attribute which is most familiar to man. It a.s.serted that every substance seeks its proper place, heavy bodies tending downwards and light ones upwards. It soon turned out, however, that even smoke had weight, that it, too, sought its place below, and that it was forced upwards only because of the downward tendency of the air, as wood is forced to the surface of water because the water exerts the greater downward pressure.
Again, we see a body thrown into the air. It ascends. How is it that it does not seek its proper place? Why does the velocity of its "violent" motion decrease as it rises, while that of its "natural" fall increases as it descends. If we mark closely the relation between these two facts, the problem will solve itself. We shall see, as Galileo did, that the decrease of velocity in rising and the increase of velocity in falling are one and the same phenomenon, viz., an increase of velocity towards the earth. Accordingly, it is not a place that is a.s.signed to the body, but an increase of velocity towards the earth.
By this idea the movements of heavy bodies are rendered perfectly familiar. Newton, now, firmly grasping this new way of thinking, sees the moon and the planets moving in their paths upon principles similar to those which determine the motion of a projectile thrown into the air. Yet the movements of the planets were marked by peculiarities which compelled him once more to modify slightly his customary mode of thought. The heavenly bodies, or rather the parts composing them, do not move with constant accelerations towards each other, but "attract each other," directly as the ma.s.s and inversely as the square of the distance.
This latter notion, which includes the one applying to terrestrial bodies as a special case, is, as we see, quite different from the conception from which we started. How limited in scope was the original idea and to what a mult.i.tude of phenomena is not the present one applicable! Yet there is a trace, after all, of the "search for place" in the expression "attraction." And it would be folly, indeed, for us to avoid, with punctilious dread, this conception of "attraction" as bearing marks of its pedigree. It is the historical base of the Newtonian conception and it still continues to direct our thoughts in the paths so long familiar to us. Thus, the happiest ideas do not fall from heaven, but spring from notions already existing.
Similarly, a ray of light was first regarded as a continuous and h.o.m.ogeneous straight line. It then became the path of projection for minute missiles; then an aggregate of the paths of countless different kinds of missiles. It became periodic; it acquired various sides; and ultimately it even lost its motion in a straight line.
The electric current was conceived originally as the flow of a hypothetical fluid. To this conception was soon added the notion of a chemical current, the notion of an electric, magnetic, and anisotropic optical field, intimately connected with the path of the current. And the richer a conception becomes in following and keeping pace with facts, the better adapted it is to antic.i.p.ate them.
Adaptive processes of this kind have no a.s.signable beginning, inasmuch as every problem that incites to new adaptation, presupposes a fixed habitude of thought. Moreover, they have no visible end; in so far as experience never ceases. Science, accordingly, stands midway in the evolutionary process; and science may advantageously direct and promote this process, but it can never take its place. That science is inconceivable the principles of which would enable a person with no experience to construct the world of experience, without a knowledge of it. One might just as well expect to become a great musician, solely by the aid of theory, and without musical experience; or to become a painter by following the directions of a text-book.
In glancing over the history of an idea with which we have become perfectly familiar, we are no longer able to appreciate the full significance of its growth. The deep and vital changes that have been effected in the course of its evolution, are recognisable only from the astounding narrowness of view with which great contemporary scientists have occasionally opposed each other. Huygens"s wave-theory of light was incomprehensible to Newton, and Newton"s idea of universal gravity was unintelligible to Huygens. But a century afterwards both notions were reconcilable, even in ordinary minds.
On the other hand, the original creations of pioneer intellects, unconsciously formed, do not a.s.sume a foreign garb; their form is their own. In them, childlike simplicity is joined to the maturity of manhood, and they are not to be compared with processes of thought in the average mind. The latter are carried on as are the acts of persons in the state of mesmerism, where actions involuntarily follow the images which the words of other persons suggest to their minds.
The ideas that have become most familiar through long experience, are the very ones that intrude themselves into the conception of every new fact observed. In every instance, thus, they become involved in a struggle for self-preservation, and it is just they that are seized by the inevitable process of transformation.
Upon this process rests substantially the method of explaining by hypothesis new and uncomprehended phenomena. Thus, instead of forming entirely new notions to explain the movements of the heavenly bodies and the phenomena of the tides, we imagine the material particles composing the bodies of the universe to possess weight or gravity with respect to one another. Similarly, we imagine electrified bodies to be freighted with fluids that attract and repel, or we conceive the s.p.a.ce between them to be in a state of elastic tension. In so doing, we subst.i.tute for new ideas distinct and more familiar notions of old experience--notions which to a great extent run unimpeded in their courses, although they too must suffer partial transformation.
The animal cannot construct new members to perform every new function that circ.u.mstances and fate demand of it. On the contrary it is obliged to make use of those it already possesses. When a vertebrate animal chances into an environment where it must learn to fly or swim, an additional pair of extremities is not grown for the purpose. On the contrary, the animal must adapt and transform a pair that it already has.
The construction of hypotheses, therefore, is not the product of artificial scientific methods. This process is unconsciously carried on in the very infancy of science. Even later, hypotheses do not become detrimental and dangerous to progress except when more reliance is placed on them than on the facts themselves; when the contents of the former are more highly valued than the latter, and when, rigidly adhering to hypothetical notions, we overestimate the ideas we possess as compared with those we have to acquire.
The extension of our sphere of experience always involves a transformation of our ideas. It matters not whether the face of nature becomes actually altered, presenting new and strange phenomena, or whether these phenomena are brought to light by an intentional or accidental turn of observation. In fact, all the varied methods of scientific inquiry and of purposive mental adaptation enumerated by John Stuart Mill, those of observation as well as those of experiment, are ultimately recognisable as forms of one fundamental method, the method of change, or variation. It is through change of circ.u.mstances that the natural philosopher learns. This process, however, is by no means confined to the investigator of nature. The historian, the philosopher, the jurist, the mathematician, the artist, the Asthetician,[77] all illuminate and unfold their ideas by producing from the rich treasures of memory similar, but different, cases; thus, they observe and experiment in their thoughts. Even if all sense-experience should suddenly cease, the events of the days past would meet in different att.i.tudes in the mind and the process of adaptation would still continue--a process which, in contradistinction to the adaptation of thoughts to facts in practical spheres, would be strictly theoretical, being an adaptation of thoughts to thoughts.
The method of change or variation brings before us like cases of phenomena, having partly the same and partly different elements. It is only by comparing different cases of refracted light at changing angles of incidence that the common factor, the constancy of the refractive index, is disclosed. And only by comparing the refractions of light of different colors, does the difference, the inequality of the indices of refraction, arrest the attention. Comparison based upon change leads the mind simultaneously to the highest abstractions and to the finest distinctions.
Undoubtedly, the animal also is able to distinguish between the similar and dissimilar of two cases. Its consciousness is aroused by a noise or a rustling, and its motor centre is put in readiness. The sight of the creature causing the disturbance, will, according to its size, provoke flight or prompt pursuit; and in the latter case, the more exact distinctions will determine the mode of attack. But man alone attains to the faculty of voluntary and conscious comparison. Man alone can, by his power of abstraction, rise, in one moment, to the comprehension of principles like the conservation of ma.s.s or the conservation of energy, and in the next observe and mark the arrangement of the iron lines in the spectrum. In thus dealing with the objects of his conceptual life, his ideas unfold and expand, like his nervous system, into a widely ramified and organically articulated tree, on which he may follow every limb to its farthermost branches, and, when occasion demands, return to the trunk from which he started.
The English philosopher Whewell has remarked that two things are requisite to the formation of science: facts and ideas. Ideas alone lead to empty speculation; mere facts can yield no organic knowledge. We see that all depends upon the capacity of adapting existing notions to fresh facts.
Over-readiness to yield to every new fact prevents fixed habits of thought from arising. Excessively rigid habits of thought impede freedom of observation. In the struggle, in the compromise between judgment and prejudgment (prejudice), if we may use the term, our understanding of things broadens.
Habitual judgment, applied to a new case without antecedent tests, we call prejudgment or prejudice. Who does not know its terrible power! But we think less often of the importance and utility of prejudice. Physically, no one could exist, if he had to guide and regulate the circulation, respiration, and digestion of his body by conscious and purposive acts. So, too, no one could exist intellectually if he had to form judgments on every pa.s.sing experience, instead of allowing himself to be controlled by the judgments he has already formed. Prejudice is a sort of reflex motion in the province of intelligence.
On prejudices, that is, on habitual judgments not tested in every case to which they are applied, reposes a goodly portion of the thought and work of the natural scientist. On prejudices reposes most of the conduct of society. With the sudden disappearance of prejudice society would hopelessly dissolve. That prince displayed a deep insight into the power of intellectual habit, who quelled the loud menaces and demands of his body-guard for arrears of pay and compelled them to turn about and march, by simply p.r.o.nouncing the regular word of command; he well knew that they would be unable to resist that.
Not until the discrepancy between habitual judgments and facts becomes great is the investigator implicated in appreciable illusion. Then tragic complications and catastrophes occur in the practical life of individuals and nations--crises where man, placing custom above life, instead of pressing it into the service of life, becomes the victim of his error. The very power which in intellectual life advances, fosters, and sustains us, may in other circ.u.mstances delude and destroy us.
Ideas are not all of life. They are only momentary efflorescences of light, designed to illuminate the paths of the will. But as delicate reagents on our organic evolution our ideas are of paramount importance. No theory can gainsay the vital transformation which we feel taking place within us through their agency. Nor is it necessary that we should have a proof of this process. We are immediately a.s.sured of it.
The transformation of ideas thus appears as a part of the general evolution of life, as a part of its adaptation to a constantly widening sphere of action. A granite boulder on a mountain-side tends towards the earth below. It must abide in its resting-place for thousands of years before its support gives way. The shrub that grows at its base is farther advanced; it accommodates itself to summer and winter. The fox which, overcoming the force of gravity, creeps to the summit where he has scented his prey, is freer in his movements than either. The arm of man reaches further still; and scarcely anything of note happens in Africa or Asia that does not leave an imprint upon his life. What an immense portion of the life of other men is reflected in ourselves; their joys, their affections, their happiness and misery! And this too, when we survey only our immediate surroundings, and confine our attention to modern literature. How much more do we experience when we travel through ancient Egypt with Herodotus, when we stroll through the streets of Pompeii, when we carry ourselves back to the gloomy period of the crusades or to the golden age of Italian art, now making the acquaintance of a physician of MoliAre, and now that of a Diderot or of a D"Alembert. What a great part of the life of others, of their character and their purpose, do we not absorb through poetry and music! And although they only gently touch the chords of our emotions, like the memory of youth softly breathing upon the spirit of an aged man, we have nevertheless lived them over again in part. How great and comprehensive does self become in this conception; and how insignificant the person! Egoistical systems both of optimism and pessimism perish with their narrow standard of the import of intellectual life. We feel that the real pearls of life lie in the ever changing contents of consciousness, and that the person is merely an indifferent symbolical thread on which they are strung.[78]
We are prepared, thus, to regard ourselves and every one of our ideas as a product and a subject of universal evolution; and in this way we shall advance st.u.r.dily and unimpeded along the paths which the future will throw open to us.[79]
FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 69: Inaugural Address, delivered on a.s.suming the Rectorate of the University of Prague, October 18, 1883.
The idea presented in this essay is neither new nor remote. I have touched upon it myself on several occasions (first in 1867), but have never made it the subject of a formal disquisition. Doubtless, others, too, have treated it; it lies, so to speak, in the air. However, as many of my ill.u.s.trations were well received, although known only in an imperfect form from the lecture itself and the newspapers, I have, contrary to my original intention, decided to publish it. It is not my intention to trespa.s.s here upon the domain of biology. My statements are to be taken merely as the expression of the fact that no one can escape the influence of a great and far-reaching idea.]
[Footnote 70: At first sight an apparent contradiction arises from the admission of both heredity and adaptation; and it is undoubtedly true that a strong disposition to heredity precludes great capability of adaptation. But imagine the organism to be a plastic ma.s.s which retains the form transmitted to it by former influences until new influences modify it; the one property of plasticity will then represent capability of adaptation as well as power of heredity. a.n.a.logous to this is the case of a bar of magnetised steel of high coercive force: the steel retains its magnetic properties until a new force displaces them. Take also a body in motion: the body retains the velocity acquired in (inherited from) the interval of time just preceding, except it be changed in the next moment by an accelerating force. In the case of the body in motion the change of velocity (AbAnderung) was looked upon as a matter of course, while the discovery of the principle of inertia (or persistence) created surprise; in Darwin"s case, on the contrary, heredity (or persistence) was taken for granted, while the principle of variation (AbAnderung) appeared novel.
Fully adequate views are, of course, to be reached only by a study of the original facts emphasised by Darwin, and not by these a.n.a.logies. The example referring to motion, if I am not mistaken, I first heard, in conversation, from my friend J. Popper, Esq., of Vienna.
Many inquirers look upon the stability of the species as something settled, and oppose to it the Darwinian theory. But the stability of the species is itself a "theory." The essential modifications which Darwin"s views also are undergoing will be seen from the works of Wallace [and Weismann], but more especially from a book of W. H. Rolph, Biologische Probleme, Leipsic, 1882. Unfortunately, this last talented investigator is no longer numbered among the living.]
[Footnote 71: Written in 1883.]
[Footnote 72: See Pfaundler, Pogg. Ann., Jubelband, p. 182.]
[Footnote 73: See the beautiful discussions of this point in Hering"s Memory as a General Function of Organised Matter (1870), Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1887. Compare also Dubois, Ueber die Uebung, Berlin, 1881.]
[Footnote 74: Spencer, The Principles of Psychology. London, 1872.]
[Footnote 75: See the article The Velocity of Light, page 63.]
[Footnote 76: I am well aware that the endeavor to confine oneself in natural research to facts is often censured as an exaggerated fear of metaphysical spooks. But I would observe, that, judged by the mischief which they have wrought, the metaphysical, of all spooks, are the least fabulous. It is not to be denied that many forms of thought were not originally acquired by the individual, but were antecedently formed, or rather prepared for, in the development of the species, in some such way as Spencer, Haeckel, Hering, and others have supposed, and as I myself have hinted on various occasions.]
[Footnote 77: Compare, for example, Schiller, Zerstreute Betrachtungen Aber verschiedene Asthetische GegenstAnde.]
[Footnote 78: We must not be deceived in imagining that the happiness of other people is not a very considerable and essential portion of our own. It is common capital, which cannot be created by the individual, and which does not perish with him. The formal and material limitation of the ego is necessary and sufficient only for the crudest practical objects, and cannot subsist in a broad conception. Humanity in its entirety may be likened to a polyp-plant. The material and organic bonds of individual union have, indeed, been severed; they would only have impeded freedom of movement and evolution. But the ultimate aim, the psychical connexion of the whole, has been attained in a much higher degree through the richer development thus made possible.]
[Footnote 79: C. E. von Baer, the subsequent opponent of Darwin and Haeckel, has discussed in two beautiful addresses (Das allgemeinste Gesetz der Natur in aller Entwickelung, and Welche Auffa.s.sung der lebenden Natur ist die richtige, und wie ist diese Auffa.s.sung auf die Entomologie anzuwenden?) the narrowness of the view which regards an animal in its existing state as finished and complete, instead of conceiving it as a phase in the series of evolutionary forms and regarding the species itself as a phase of the development of the animal world in general.]
ON THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPARISON IN PHYSICS.[80]
Twenty years ago when Kirchhoff defined the object of mechanics as the "description, in complete and very simple terms, of the motions occurring in nature," he produced by the statement a peculiar impression. Fourteen years subsequently, Boltzmann, in the life-like picture which he drew of the great inquirer, could still speak of the universal astonishment at this novel method of treating mechanics, and we meet with epistemological treatises to-day, which plainly show how difficult is the acceptance of this point of view. A modest and small band of inquirers there were, however, to whom Kirchhoff"s few words were tidings of a welcome and powerful ally in the epistemological field.
Now, how does it happen that we yield our a.s.sent so reluctantly to the philosophical opinion of an inquirer for whose scientific achievements we have only words of praise? One reason probably is that few inquirers can find time and leisure, amid the exacting employments demanded for the acquisition of new knowledge, to inquire closely into that tremendous psychical process by which science is formed. Further, it is inevitable that much should be put into Kirchhoff"s rigid words that they were not originally intended to convey, and that much should be found wanting in them that had always been regarded as an essential element of scientific knowledge. What can mere description accomplish? What has become of explanation, of our insight into the causal connexion of things?
Permit me, for a moment, to contemplate not the results of science, but the mode of its growth, in a frank and unbia.s.sed manner. We know of only one source of immediate revelation of scientific facts--our senses. Restricted to this source alone, thrown wholly upon his own resources, obliged to start always anew, what could the isolated individual accomplish? Of a stock of knowledge so acquired the science of a distant negro hamlet in darkest Africa could hardly give us a sufficiently humiliating conception. For there that veritable miracle of thought-transference has already begun its work, compared with which the miracles of the spiritualists are rank monstrosities--communication by language. Reflect, too, that by means of the magical characters which our libraries contain we can raise the spirits of the "the sovereign dead of old" from Faraday to Galileo and Archimedes, through ages of time--spirits who do not dismiss us with ambiguous and derisive oracles, but tell us the best they know; then shall we feel what a stupendous and indispensable factor in the formation of science communication is. Not the dim, half-conscious surmises of the acute observer of nature or critic of humanity belong to science, but only that which they possess clearly enough to communicate to others.
But how, now, do we go about this communication of a newly acquired experience, of a newly observed fact? As the different calls and battle-cries of gregarious animals are unconsciously formed signs for a common observation or action, irrespective of the causes which produce such action--a fact that already involves the germ of the concept; so also the words of human language, which is only more highly specialised, are names or signs for universally known facts, which all can observe or have observed. If the mental representation, accordingly, follows the new fact at once and pa.s.sively, then that new fact must, of itself, immediately be const.i.tuted and represented in thought by facts already universally known and commonly observed. Memory is always ready to put forward for comparison known facts which resemble the new event, or agree with it in certain features, and so renders possible that elementary internal judgment which the mature and definitively formulated judgment soon follows.
Comparison, as the fundamental condition of communication, is the most powerful inner vital element of science. The zoAlogist sees in the bones of the wing-membranes of bats, fingers; he compares the bones of the cranium with the vertebrA, the embryos of different organisms with one another, and the different stages of development of the same organism with one another. The geographer sees in Lake Garda a fjord, in the Sea of Aral a lake in process of drying up. The philologist compares different languages with one another, and the formations of the same language as well. If it is not customary to speak of comparative physics in the same sense that we speak of comparative anatomy, the reason is that in a science of such great experimental activity the attention is turned away too much from the contemplative element. But like all other sciences, physics lives and grows by comparison.
The manner in which the result of the comparison finds expression in the communication, varies of course very much. When we say that the colors of the spectrum are red, yellow, green, blue, and violet, the designations employed may possibly have been derived from the technology of tattooing, or they may subsequently have acquired the significance of standing for the colors of the rose, the lemon, the leaf, the corn-flower, and the violet. From the frequent repet.i.tion of such comparisons, however, made under the most manifold circ.u.mstances, the inconstant features, as compared with the permanent congruent features, get so obliterated that the latter acquire a fixed significance independent of every object and connexion, or take on as we say an abstract or conceptual import. No one thinks at the word "red" of any other agreement with the rose than that of color, or at the word "straight" of any other property of a stretched cord than the sameness of direction. Just so, too, numbers, originally the names of the fingers of the hands and feet, from being used as arrangement-signs for all kinds of objects, were lifted to the plane of abstract concepts. A verbal report (communication) of a fact that uses only these purely abstract implements, we call a direct description.
The direct description of a fact of any great extent is an irksome task, even where the requisite notions are already completely developed. What a simplification it involves if we can say, the fact A now considered comports itself, not in one, but in many or in all its features, like an old and well-known fact B. The moon comports itself as a heavy body does with respect to the earth; light like a wave-motion or an electric vibration; a magnet, as if it were laden with gravitating fluids, and so on. We call such a description, in which we appeal, as it were, to a description already and elsewhere formulated, or perhaps still to be precisely formulated, an indirect description. We are at liberty to supplement this description, gradually, by direct description, to correct it, or to replace it altogether. We see, thus, without difficulty, that what is called a theory or a theoretical idea, falls under the category of what is here termed indirect description.
What, now, is a theoretical idea? Whence do we get it? What does it accomplish for us? Why does it occupy a higher place in our judgment than the mere holding fast to a fact or an observation? Here, too, memory and comparison alone are in play. But instead of a single feature of resemblance culled from memory, in this case a great system of resemblances confronts us, a well-known physiognomy, by means of which the new fact is immediately transformed into an old acquaintance. Besides, it is in the power of the idea to offer us more than we actually see in the new fact, at the first moment; it can extend the fact, and enrich it with features which we are first induced to seek from such suggestions, and which are often actually found. It is this rapidity in extending knowledge that gives to theory a preference over simple observation. But that preference is wholly quant.i.tative. Qualitatively, and in real essential points, theory differs from observation neither in the mode of its origin nor in its last results.
The adoption of a theory, however, always involves a danger. For a theory puts in the place of a fact A in thought, always a different, but simpler and more familiar fact B, which in some relations can mentally represent A, but for the very reason that it is different, in other relations cannot represent it. If now, as may readily happen, sufficient care is not exercised, the most fruitful theory may, in special circ.u.mstances, become a downright obstacle to inquiry. Thus, the emission-theory of light, in accustoming the physicist to think of the projectile path of the "light-particles" as an undifferentiated straight-line, demonstrably impeded the discovery of the periodicity of light. By putting in the place of light the more familiar phenomena of sound, Huygens renders light in many of its features a familiar event, but with respect to polarisation, which lacks the longitudinal waves with which alone he was acquainted, it had for him a doubly strange aspect. He is unable thus to grasp in abstract thought the fact of polarisation, which is before his eyes, whilst Newton, merely by adapting to the observation his thoughts, and putting this question, "Annon radiorum luminis diversa sunt latera?" abstractly grasped polarisation, that is, directly described it, a century before Malus. On the other hand, if the agreement of the fact with the idea theoretically representing it, extends further than its inventor originally antic.i.p.ated, then we may be led by it to unexpected discoveries, of which conical refraction, circular polarisation by total reflexion, Hertz"s waves offer ready examples, in contrast to the ill.u.s.trations given above.
Our insight into the conditions indicated will be improved, perhaps, by contemplating the development of some theory or other more in detail. Let us consider a magnetised bar of steel by the side of a second unmagnetised bar, in all other respects the same. The second bar gives no indication of the presence of iron-filings; the first attracts them. Also, when the iron-filings are absent, we must think of the magnetised bar as in a different condition from that of the unmagnetised. For, that the mere presence of the iron-filings does not induce the phenomenon of attraction is proved by the second unmagnetised bar. The ingenuous man, who finds in his will, as his most familiar source of power, the best facilities for comparison, conceives a species of spirit in the magnet. The behavior of a warm body or of an electrified body suggests similar ideas. This is the point of view of the oldest theory, fetishism, which the inquirers of the early Middle Ages had not yet overcome, and which in its last vestiges, in the conception of forces, still flourishes in modern physics. We see, thus, the dramatic element need no more be absent in a scientific description, than in a thrilling novel.
If, on subsequent examination, it be observed that a cold body, in contact with a hot body, warms itself, so to speak, at the expense of the hot body; further, that when the substances are the same, the cold body, which, let us say, has twice the ma.s.s of the other, gains only half the number of degrees of temperature that the other loses, a wholly new impression arises. The demoniac character of the event vanishes, for the supposed spirit acts not by caprice, but according to fixed laws. In its place, however, instinctively the notion of a substance is subst.i.tuted, part of which flows over from the one body to the other, but the total amount of which, representable by the sum of the products of the ma.s.ses into the respective changes of temperature, remains constant. Black was the first to be powerfully struck with this resemblance of thermal processes to the motion of a substance, and under its guidance discovered the specific heat, the heat of fusion, and the heat of vaporisation of bodies. Gaining strength and fixity, however, from these successes, this notion of substance subsequently stood in the way of scientific advancement. It blinded the eyes of the successors of Black, and prevented them from seeing the manifest fact, which every savage knows, that heat is produced by friction. Fruitful as that notion was for Black, helpful as it still is to the learner to-day in Black"s special field, permanent and universal validity as a theory it could never maintain. But what is essential, conceptually, in it, viz., the constancy of the product-sum above mentioned, retains its value and may be regarded as a direct description of Black"s facts.
It stands to reason that those theories which push themselves forward unsought, instinctively, and wholly of their own accord, should have the greatest power, should carry our thoughts most with them, and exhibit the staunchest powers of self-preservation. On the other hand, it may also be observed that when critically scrutinised such theories are extremely apt to lose their cogency. We are constantly busied with "substance," its modes of action have stamped themselves indelibly upon our thoughts, our vividest and clearest reminiscences are a.s.sociated with it. It should cause us no surprise, therefore, that Robert Mayer and Joule, who gave the final blow to Black"s substantial conception of heat, should have re-introduced the same notion of substance in a more abstract and modified form, only applying to a much more extensive field.
Here, too, the psychological circ.u.mstances which impart to the new conception its power, lie clearly before us. By the unusual redness of the venous blood in tropical climates Mayer"s attention is directed to the lessened expenditure of internal heat and to the proportionately lessened consumption of material by the human body in those climates. But as every effort of the human organism, including its mechanical work, is connected with the consumption of material, and as work by friction can engender heat, therefore heat and work appear in kind equivalent, and between them a proportional relation must subsist. Not every quant.i.ty, but the appropriately calculated sum of the two, as connected with a proportionate consumption of material, appears substantial.
By exactly similar considerations, relative to the economy of the galvanic element, Joule arrived at his view; he found experimentally that the sum of the heat evolved in the circuit, of the heat consumed in the combustion of the gas developed, of the electro-magnetic work of the current, properly calculated,--in short, the sum of all the effects of the battery,--is connected with a proportionate consumption of zinc. Accordingly, this sum itself has a substantial character.
Mayer was so absorbed with the view attained, that the indestructibility of force, in our phraseology work, appeared to him a priori evident. "The creation or annihilation of a force," he says, "lies without the province of human thought and power." Joule expressed himself to a similar effect: "It is manifestly absurd to suppose that the powers with which G.o.d has endowed matter can be destroyed." Strange to say, on the basis of such utterances, not Joule, but Mayer, was stamped as a metaphysician. We may be sure, however, that both men were merely giving expression, and that half-unconsciously, to a powerful formal need of the new simple view, and that both would have been extremely surprised if it had been proposed to them that their principle should be submitted to a philosophical congress or ecclesiastical synod for a decision upon its validity. But with all agreements, the att.i.tude of these two men, in other respects, was totally different. Whilst Mayer represented this formal need with all the stupendous instinctive force of genius, we might say almost with the ardor of fanaticism, yet was withal not wanting in the conceptive ability to compute, prior to all other inquirers, the mechanical equivalent of heat from old physical constants long known and at the disposal of all, and so to set up for the new doctrine a programme embracing all physics and physiology; Joule, on the other hand, applied himself to the exact verification of the doctrine by beautifully conceived and masterfully executed experiments, extending over all departments of physics. Soon Helmholtz too attacked the problem, in a totally independent and characteristic manner. After the professional virtuosity with which this physicist grasped and disposed of all the points unsettled by Mayer"s programme and more besides, what especially strikes us is the consummate critical lucidity of this young man of twenty-six years. In his exposition is wanting that vehemence and impetuosity which marked Mayer"s. The principle of the conservation of energy is no self-evident or a priori proposition for him. What follows, on the a.s.sumption that that proposition obtains? In this hypothetical form, he subjugates his matter.
I must confess, I have always marvelled at the Asthetic and ethical taste of many of our contemporaries who have managed to fabricate out of this relation of things, odious national and personal questions, instead of praising the good fortune that made several such men work together and of rejoicing at the instructive diversity and idiosyncrasies of great minds fraught with such rich consequences for us.
We know that still another theoretical conception played a part in the development of the principle of energy, which Mayer held aloof from, namely, the conception that heat, as also the other physical processes, are due to motion. But once the principle of energy has been reached, these auxiliary and transitional theories discharge no essential function, and we may regard the principle, like that which Black gave, as a contribution to the direct description of a widely extended domain of facts.
It would appear from such considerations not only advisable, but even necessary, with all due recognition of the helpfulness of theoretic ideas in research, yet gradually, as the new facts grow familiar, to subst.i.tute for indirect description direct description, which contains nothing that is unessential and restricts itself absolutely to the abstract apprehension of facts. We might almost say, that the descriptive sciences, so called with a tincture of condescension, have, in respect of scientific character, outstripped the physical expositions lately in vogue. Of course, a virtue has been made of necessity here.
We must admit, that it is not in our power to describe directly every fact, on the moment. Indeed, we should succ.u.mb in utter despair if the whole wealth of facts which we come step by step to know, were presented to us all at once. Happily, only detached and unusual features first strike us, and such we bring nearer to ourselves by comparison with every-day events. Here the notions of the common speech are first developed. The comparisons then grow more manifold and numerous, the fields of facts compared more extensive, the concepts that make direct description possible, proportionately more general and more abstract.
First we become familiar with the motion of freely falling bodies. The concepts of force, ma.s.s, and work are then carried over, with appropriate modifications, to the phenomena of electricity and magnetism. A stream of water is said to have suggested to Fourier the first distinct picture of currents of heat. A special case of vibrations of strings investigated by Taylor, cleared up for him a special case of the conduction of heat. Much in the same way that Daniel Bernoulli and Euler constructed the most diverse forms of vibrations of strings from Taylor"s cases, so Fourier constructs out of simple cases of conduction the most multifarious motions of heat; and that method has extended itself over the whole of physics. Ohm forms his conception of the electric current in imitation of Fourier"s. The latter, also, adopts Fick"s theory of diffusion. In an a.n.a.logous manner a conception of the magnetic current is developed. All sorts of stationary currents are thus made to exhibit common features, and even the condition of complete equilibrium in an extended medium shares these features with the dynamical condition of equilibrium of a stationary current. Things as remote as the magnetic lines of force of an electric current and the stream-lines of a frictionless liquid vortex enter in this way into a peculiar relationship of similarity. The concept of potential, originally enunciated for a restricted province, acquires a wide-reaching applicability. Things as dissimilar as pressure, temperature, and electromotive force, now show points of agreement in relation to ideas derived by definite methods from that concept: viz., fall of pressure, fall of temperature, fall of potential, as also with the further notions of liquid, thermal, and electric strength of current. That relationship between systems of ideas in which the dissimilarity of every two h.o.m.ologous concepts as well as the agreement in logical relations of every two h.o.m.ologous pairs of concepts, is clearly brought to light, is called an a.n.a.logy. It is an effective means of mastering heterogeneous fields of facts in unitary comprehension. The path is plainly shown in which a universal physical phenomenology embracing all domains, will be developed.
In the process described we attain for the first time to what is indispensable in the direct description of broad fields of fact--the wide-reaching abstract concept. And now I must put a question smacking of the school-master, but unavoidable: What is a concept? Is it a hazy representation, admitting withal of mental visualisation? No. Mental visualisation accompanies it only in the simplest cases, and then merely as an adjunct. Think, for example, of the "coefficient of self-induction," and seek for its visualised mental image. Or is, perhaps, the concept a mere word? The adoption of this forlorn idea, which has been actually proposed of late by a reputed mathematician would only throw us back a thousand years into the deepest scholasticism. We must, therefore, reject it.
The solution is not far to seek. We must not think that sensation, or representation, is a purely pa.s.sive process. The lowest organisms respond to it with a simple reflex motion, by engulfing the prey which approaches them. In higher organisms the centripetal stimulus encounters in the nervous system obstacles and aids which modify the centrifugal process. In still higher organisms, where prey is pursued and examined, the process in question may go through extensive paths of circular motions before it comes to relative rest. Our own life, too, is enacted in such processes; all that we call science may be regarded as parts, or middle terms, of such activities.
It will not surprise us now if I say: the definition of a concept, and, when it is very familiar, even its name, is an impulse to some accurately determined, often complicated, critical, comparative, or constructive activity, the usually sense-perceptive result of which is a term or member of the concept"s scope. It matters not whether the concept draws the attention only to one certain sense (as sight) or to a phase of a sense (as color, form), or is the starting-point of a complicated action; nor whether the activity in question (chemical, anatomical, and mathematical operations) is muscular or technical, or performed wholly in the imagination, or only intimated. The concept is to the physicist what a musical note is to a piano-player. A trained physicist or mathematician reads a memoir like a musician reads a score. But just as the piano-player must first learn to move his fingers singly and collectively, before he can follow his notes without effort, so the physicist or mathematician must go through a long apprenticeship before he gains control, so to speak, of the manifold delicate innervations of his muscles and imagination. Think of how frequently the beginner in physics or mathematics performs more, or less, than is required, or of how frequently he conceives things differently from what they are! But if, after having had sufficient discipline, he lights upon the phrase "coefficient of self-induction," he knows immediately what that term requires of him. Long and thoroughly practised actions, which have their origin in the necessity of comparing and representing facts by other facts, are thus the very kernel of concepts. In fact, positive and philosophical philology both claim to have established that all roots represent concepts and stood originally for muscular activities alone. The slow a.s.sent of physicists to Kirchhoff"s dictum now becomes intelligible. They best could feel the vast amount of individual labor, theory, and skill required before the ideal of direct description could be realised.
Suppose, now, the ideal of a given province of facts is reached. Does description accomplish all that the inquirer can ask? In my opinion, it does. Description is a building up of facts in thought, and this building up is, in the experimental sciences, often the condition of actual execution. For the physicist, to take a special case, the metrical units are the building-stones, the concepts the directions for building, and the facts the result of the building. Our mental imagery is almost a complete subst.i.tute for the fact, and by means of it we can ascertain all the fact"s properties. We do not know that worst which we ourselves have made.
People require of science that it should prophesy, and Hertz uses that expression in his posthumous Mechanics. But, natural as it is, the expression is too narrow. The geologist and the palAontologist, at times the astronomer, and always the historian and the philologist, prophesy, so to speak, backwards. The descriptive sciences, like geometry and mathematics, prophesy neither forward or backwards, but seek from given conditions the conditioned. Let us say rather: Science completes in thought facts that are only partly given. This is rendered possible by description, for description presupposes the interdependence of the descriptive elements: otherwise nothing would be described.
It is said, description leaves the sense of causality unsatisfied. In fact, many imagine they understand motions better when they picture to themselves the pulling forces; and yet the accelerations, the facts, accomplish more, without superfluous additions. I hope that the science of the future will discard the idea of cause and effect, as being formally obscure; and in my feeling that these ideas contain a strong tincture of fetishism, I am certainly not alone. The more proper course is, to regard the abstract determinative elements of a fact as interdependent, in a purely logical way, as the mathematician or geometer does. True, by comparison with the will, forces are brought nearer to our feeling; but it may be that ultimately the will itself will be made clearer by comparison with the accelerations of ma.s.ses.
If we are asked, candidly, when is a fact clear to us, we must say "when we can reproduce it by very simple and very familiar intellectual operations, such as the construction of accelerations, or the geometrical summation of accelerations, and so forth." The requirement of simplicity is of course to the expert a different matter from what it is to the novice. For the first, description by a system of differential equations is sufficient; for the second, a gradual construction out of elementary laws is required. The first discerns at once the connexion of the two expositions. Of course, it is not disputed that the artistic value of materially equivalent descriptions may not be different.
Most difficult is it to persuade strangers that the grand universal laws of physics, such as apply indiscriminately to material, electrical, magnetic, and other systems, are not essentially different from descriptions. As compared with many sciences, physics occupies in this respect a position of vantage that is easily explained. Take, for example, anatomy. As the anatomist in his quest for agreements and differences in animals ascends to ever higher and higher cla.s.sifications, the individual facts that represent the ultimate terms of the system, are still so different that they must be singly noted. Think, for example, of the common marks of the Vertebrates, of the cla.s.s-characters of Mammals and Birds on the one hand and of Fishes on the other, of the double circulation of the blood on the one hand and of the single on the other. In the end, always isolated facts remain, which show only a slight likeness to one another.
A science still more closely allied to physics, chemistry, is often in the same strait. The abrupt change of the qualitative properties, in all likelihood conditioned by the slight stability of the intermediate states, the remote resemblance of the co-ordinated facts of chemistry render the treatment of its data difficult. Pairs of bodies of different qualitative properties unite in different ma.s.s-ratios; but no connexion between the first and the last is to be noted, at first.
Physics, on the other hand, reveals to us wide domains of qualitatively h.o.m.ogeneous facts, differing from one another only in the number of equal parts into which their characteristic marks are divisible, that is, differing only quant.i.tatively. Even where we have to deal with qualities (colors and sounds), quant.i.tative characters of those qualities are at our disposal. Here the cla.s.sification is so simple a task that it rarely impresses us as such, whilst in infinitely fine gradations, in a continuum of facts, our number-system is ready beforehand to follow as far as we wish. The co-ordinated facts are here extremely similar and very closely affined, as are also their descriptions which consist in the determination of the numerical measures of one given set of characters from those of a different set by means of familiar mathematical operations--methods of derivation. Thus, the common characteristics of all descriptions can be found here; and with them a succinct, comprehensive description, or a rule for the construction of all single descriptions, is a.s.signed,--and this we call law. Well-known examples are the formulA for freely falling bodies, for projectiles, for central motion, and so forth. If physics apparently accomplishes more by its methods than other sciences, we must remember that in a sense it has presented to it much simpler problems.
The remaining sciences, whose facts also present a physical side, need not be envious of physics for this superiority; for all its acquisitions ultimately redound to their benefit as well. But also in other ways this mutual help shall and must change. Chemistry has advanced very far in making the methods of physics her own. Apart from older attempts, the periodical series of Lothar Meyer and Mendelejeff are a brilliant and adequate means of producing an easily surveyed system of facts, which by gradually becoming complete, will take the place almost of a continuum of facts. Further, by the study of solutions, of dissociation, in fact generally of phenomena which present a continuum of cases, the methods of thermodynamics have found entrance into chemistry. Similarly we may hope that, at some future day, a mathematician, letting the fact-continuum of embryology play before his mind, which the palAontologists of the future will supposedly have enriched with more intermediate and derivative forms between Saurian and Bird than the isolated Pterodactyl, ArchAopteryx, Ichthyornis, and so forth, which we now have--that such a mathematician shall transform, by the variation of a few parameters, as in a dissolving view, one form into another, just as we transform one conic section into another.
Reverting now to Kirchhoff"s words, we can come to some agreement regarding their import. Nothing can be built without building-stones, mortar, scaffolding, and a builder"s skill. Yet a.s.suredly the wish is well founded, that will show to posterity the complete structure in its finished form, bereft of unsightly scaffolding. It is the pure logical and Asthetic sense of the mathematician that speaks out of Kirchhoff"s words. Modern expositions of physics aspire after his ideal; that, too, is intelligible. But it would be a poor didactic shift, for one whose business it was to train architects, to say: "Here is a splendid edifice; if thou wouldst really build, go thou and do likewise".
The barriers between the special sciences, which make division of work and concentration possible, but which appear to us after all as cold and conventional restrictions, will gradually disappear. Bridge upon bridge is thrown over the gaps. Contents and methods, even of the remotest branches, are compared. When the Congress of Natural Scientists shall meet a hundred years hence, we may expect that they will represent a unity in a higher sense than is possible to-day, not in sentiment and aim alone, but in method also. In the meantime, this great change will be helped by our keeping constantly before our minds the fact of the intrinsic relationship of all research, which Kirchhoff characterised with such cla.s.sical simplicity.
FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 80: An address delivered before the General Session of the German a.s.sociation of Naturalists and Physicians, at Vienna, Sept. 24, 1894.]
THE PART PLAYED BY ACCIDENT IN INVENTION AND DISCOVERY.[81]
It is characteristic of the naAve and sanguine beginnings of thought in youthful men and nations, that all problems are held to be soluble and fundamentally intelligible on the first appearance of success. The sage of Miletus, on seeing plants take their rise from moisture, believed he had comprehended the whole of nature, and he of Samos, on discovering that definite numbers corresponded to the lengths of harmonic strings, imagined he could exhaust the nature of the world by means of numbers. Philosophy and science in such periods are blended. Wider experience, however, speedily discloses the error of such a course, gives rise to criticism, and leads to the division and ramification of the sciences.
At the same time, the necessity of a broad and general view of the world remains; and to meet this need philosophy parts company with special inquiry. It is true, the two are often found united in gigantic personalities. But as a rule their ways diverge more and more widely from each other. And if the estrangement of philosophy from science can reach a point where data unworthy of the nursery are not deemed too scanty as foundations of the world, on the other hand the thorough-paced specialist may go to the extreme of rejecting point-blank the possibility of a broader view, or at least of deeming it superfluous, forgetful of Voltaire"s apophthegm, nowhere more applicable than here, Le superflu--chose trAs nAcessaire.
It is true, the history of philosophy, owing to the insufficiency of its constructive data, is and must be largely a history of error. But it would be the height of ingrat.i.tude on our part to forget that the seeds of thoughts which still fructify the soil of special research, such as the theory of irrationals, the conceptions of conservation, the doctrine of evolution, the idea of specific energies, and so forth, may be traced back in distant ages to philosophical sources. Furthermore, to have deferred or abandoned the attempt at a broad philosophical view of the world from a full knowledge of the insufficiency of our materials, is quite a different thing from never having undertaken it at all. The revenge of its neglect, moreover, is constantly visited upon the specialist by his committal of the very errors which philosophy long ago exposed. As a fact, in physics and physiology, particularly during the first half of this century, are to be met intellectual productions which for naAve simplicity are not a jot inferior to those of the Ionian school, or to the Platonic ideas, or to that much reviled ontological proof.
Latterly, there has been evidence of a gradual change in the situation. Recent philosophy has set itself more modest and more attainable ends; it is no longer inimical to special inquiry; in fact, it is zealously taking part in that inquiry. On the other hand, the special sciences, mathematics and physics, no less than philology, have become eminently philosophical. The material presented is no longer accepted uncritically. The glance of the inquirer is bent upon neighboring fields, whence that material has been derived. The different special departments are striving for closer union, and gradually the conviction is gaining ground that philosophy can consist only of mutual, complemental criticism, interpenetration, and union of the special sciences into a consolidated whole. As the blood in nourishing the body separates into countless capillaries, only to be collected again and to meet in the heart, so in the science of the future all the rills of knowledge will gather more and more into a common and undivided stream.
It is this view--not an unfamiliar one to the present generation--that I purpose to advocate. Entertain no hope, or rather fear, that I shall construct systems for you. I shall remain a natural inquirer. Nor expect that it is my intention to skirt all the fields of natural inquiry. I can attempt to be your guide only in that branch which is familiar to me, and even there I can a.s.sist in the furtherment of only a small portion of the allotted task. If I shall succeed in rendering plain to you the relations of physics, psychology, and the theory of knowledge, so that you may draw from each profit and light, redounding to the advantage of each, I shall regard my work as not having been in vain. Therefore, to ill.u.s.trate by an example how, consonantly with my powers and views, I conceive such inquiries should be conducted, I shall treat to-day, in the form of a brief sketch, of the following special and limited subject--of the part which accidental circ.u.mstances play in the development of inventions and discoveries.