The output obtainable from a given mine is obviously dependent not only on the size of the deposit, but also on the equipment provided,--in which equipment means the whole working appliances, surface and underground.
A rough and ready idea of output possibilities of inclined deposits can be secured by calculating the tonnage available per foot of depth from the horizontal cross-section of the ore-bodies exposed and a.s.suming an annual depth of exhaustion, or in horizontal deposits from an a.s.sumption of a given area of exhaustion. Few mines, at the time of initial equipment, are developed to an extent from which their possibilities in production are evident, for wise finance usually leads to the erection of some equipment and production before development has been advanced to a point that warrants a large or final installation. Moreover, even were the full possibilities of the mine known, the limitations of finance usually necessitate a less plant to start with than is finally contemplated. Therefore output and equipment are usually growing possibilities during the early life of a mine.
There is no better instance in mine engineering where pure theory must give way to practical necessities of finance than in the determination of the size of equipment and therefore output. Moreover, where finance even is no obstruction, there are other limitations of a very practical order which must dominate the question of the size of plant giving the greatest technical economy. It is, however, useful to state the theoretical considerations in determining the ultimate volume of output and therefore the size of equipments, for the theory will serve to illuminate the practical limitations.
The discussion will also again demonstrate that all engineering is a series of compromises with natural and economic forces.
OUTPUT GIVING LEAST PRODUCTION COST.--As one of the most important objectives is to work the ore at the least cost per ton, it is not difficult to demonstrate that the minimum working costs can be obtained only by the most intensive production. To prove this, it need only be remembered that the working expenses of a mine are of two sorts: one is a factor of the tonnage handled, such as stoping and ore-dressing; the other is wholly or partially dependent upon time. A large number of items are of this last order. Pumping and head-office expenses are almost entirely charges independent of the tonnage handled. Superintendence and staff salaries and the like are in a large proportion dependent upon time. Many other elements of expense, such as the number of engine-drivers, etc., do not increase proportionately to increase in tonnage. These charges, or the part of them dependent upon time apart from tonnage, may be termed the "fixed charges."
There is another fixed charge more obscure yet no less certain.
Ore standing in a mine is like money in a bank drawing no interest, and this item of interest may be considered a "fixed charge," for if the ore were realized earlier, this loss could be partially saved. This subject is further referred to under "Amortization."
If, therefore, the time required to exhaust the mine be prolonged by the failure to maintain the maximum output, the total cost of working it will be greater by the fixed charges over such an increased period. Conversely, by equipping on a larger scale, the mine will be exhausted more quickly, a saving in total cost can be made, and the ultimate profit can be increased by an amount corresponding to the time saved from the ravages of fixed charges. In fine, the working costs may be reduced by larger operations, and therefore the value of the mine increased.
The problem in practice usually takes the form of the relative superiority of more or of fewer units of plant, and it can be considered in more detail if the production be supposed to consist of units averaging say 100 tons per day each. The advantage of more units over less will be that the extra ones can be produced free of fixed charges, for these are an expense already involved in the lesser units. This extra production will also enjoy the interest which can be earned over the period of its earlier production. Moreover, operations on a larger scale result in various minor economies throughout the whole production, not entirely included in the type of expenditure mentioned as "fixed charges." We may call these various advantages the "saving of fixed charges" due to larger-scale operations. The saving of fixed charges amounts to very considerable sums. In general the items of working cost alone, mentioned above, which do not increase proportionately to the tonnage, aggregate from 10 to 25% of the total costs. Where much pumping is involved, the percentage will become even greater.
The question of the value of the mine as affected by the volume of output becomes very prominent in low-grade mines, where, if equipped for output on too small a scale, no profits at all could be earned, and a sufficient production is absolutely imperative for any gain. There are many mines in every country which with one-third of their present rate of production would lose money.
That is, the fixed charges, if spread over small output, would be so great per ton that the profit would be extinguished by them.
In the theoretical view, therefore, it would appear clear that the greatest ultimate profit from a mine can be secured only by ore extraction under the highest pressure. As a corollary to this it follows that development must proceed with the maximum speed.
Further, it follows that the present value of a mine is at least partially a factor of the volume of output contemplated.
FACTORS LIMITING THE OUTPUT.
Although the above argument can be academically defended, there are, as said at the start, practical limitations to the maximum intensity of production, arising out of many other considerations to which weight must be given. In the main, there are five princ.i.p.al limitations:--
1. Cost of equipment.
2. Life of the mine.
3. Mechanical inefficiency of patchwork plant.
4. Overproduction of base metal.
5. Security of investment.
COST OF EQUIPMENT.--The "saving of fixed charges" can only be obtained by larger equipment, which represents an investment. Mining works, shafts, machinery, treatment plants, and all the paraphernalia cost large sums of money. They become either worn out or practically valueless through the exhaustion of the mines. Even surface machinery when in good condition will seldom realize more than one-tenth of its expense if useless at its original site. All mines are ephemeral; therefore virtually the entire capital outlay of such works must be redeemed during the life of the mine, and the interest on it must also be recovered.
The certain life, with the exception of banket and a few other types of deposit, is that shown by the ore in sight, plus something for extension of the deposit beyond exposures. So, against the "savings" to be made, must be set the cost of obtaining them, for obviously it is of no use investing a dollar to save a total of ninety cents. The economies by increased production are, however, of such an important character that the cost of almost any number of added units (within the ability of the mine to supply them) can be redeemed from these savings in a few years. For instance, in a Californian gold mine where the working expenses are $3 and the fixed charges are at the low rate of 30 cents per ton, one unit of increased production would show a saving of over $10,000 per annum from the saving of fixed charges. In about three years this sum would repay the cost of the additional treatment equipment.
If further shaft capacity were required, the period would be much extended. On a Western copper mine, where the costs are $8 and the fixed charges are 80 cents per ton, one unit of increased production would effect a saving of the fixed charges equal to the cost of the extra unit in about three years. That is, the total sum would amount to $80,000, or enough to provide almost any type of mechanical equipment for such additional tonnage.
The first result of vigorous development is to increase the ore in sight,--the visible life of the mine. When such visible life has been so lengthened that the period in which the "saving of fixed charges" will equal the amount involved in expansion of equipment, then from the standpoint of this limitation only is the added installation justified. The equipment if expanded on this practice will grow upon the heels of rapid development until the maximum production from the mine is reached, and a kind of equilibrium establishes itself.
Conversely, this argument leads to the conclusion that, regardless of other considerations, an equipment, and therefore output, should not be expanded beyond the redemption by way of "saving from fixed charges" of the visible or certain life of the mine. In those mines, such as at the Wit.w.a.tersrand, where there is a fairly sound a.s.surance of definite life, it is possible to calculate at once the size of plant which by saving of "fixed charges" will be eventually the most economical, but even here the other limitations step in to vitiate such policy of management,--chiefly the limitation through security of investment.
LIFE OF THE MINE.--If carried to its logical extreme, the above program means a most rapid exhaustion of the mine. The maximum output will depend eventually upon the rapidity with which development work may be extended. As levels and other subsidiary development openings can be prepared in inclined deposits much more quickly than the shaft can be sunk, the critical point is the shaft-sinking.
As a shaft may by exertion be deepened at least 400 feet a year on a going mine, the provision of an equipment to eat up the ore-body at this rate of sinking means very early exhaustion indeed. In fact, had such a theory of production been put into practice by our forefathers, the mining profession might find difficulty in obtaining employment to-day. Such rapid exhaustion would mean a depletion of the mineral resources of the state at a pace which would be alarming.
MECHANICAL INEFFICIENCY OF PATCHWORK PLANT.--Mine equipments on speculative mines (the vast majority) are often enough patchwork, for they usually grow from small beginnings; but any scheme of expansion based upon the above doctrine would need to be modified to the extent that additions could be in units large in ratio to previous installations, or their patchwork character would be still further accentuated. It would be impossible to maintain mechanical efficiency under detail expansion.
OVERPRODUCTION OF BASE METAL.--Were this intensity of production of general application to base metal mines it would flood the markets, and, by an overproduction of metal depress prices to a point where the advantages of such large-scale operations would quickly vanish.
The theoretical solution in this situation would be, if metals fell below normal prices, let the output be reduced, or let the products be stored until the price recovers. From a practical point of view either alternative is a policy difficult to face.
In the first case, reduction of output means an increase of working expenses by the spread of fixed charges over less tonnage, and this in the face of reduced metal prices. It may be contended, however, that a falling metal market is usually the accompaniment of a drop in all commodities, wherefore working costs can be reduced somewhat in such times of depression, thereby partially compensating the other elements making for increased costs. Falls in commodities are also the accompaniment of hard times. Consideration of one"s workpeople and the wholesale slaughter of dividends to the then needy stockholders, resulting from a policy of reduced production, are usually sufficient deterrents to diminished output.
The second alternative, that of storing metal, means equally a loss of dividends by the investment of a large sum in unrealized products, and the interest on this sum. The detriment to the market of large amounts of unsold metal renders such a course not without further disadvantages.
SECURITY OF INVESTMENT.--Another point of view antagonistic to such wholesale intensity of production, and one worthy of careful consideration, is that of the investor in mines. The root-value of mining stocks is, or should be, the profit in sight. If the policy of greatest economy in production costs be followed as outlined above, the economic limit of ore-reserves gives an apparently very short life, for the ore in sight will never represent a life beyond the time required to justify more plant. Thus the "economic limit of ore in reserve" will be a store equivalencing a period during which additional equipment can be redeemed from the "saving of fixed charges," or three or four years, usually.
The investor has the right to say that he wants the guarantee of longer life to his investment,--he will in effect pay insurance for it by a loss of some ultimate profit. That this view, contradictory to the economics of the case, is not simply academic, can be observed by any one who studies what mines are in best repute on any stock exchange. All engineers must wish to have the industry under them in high repute. The writer knows of several mines paying 20% on their stocks which yet stand lower in price on account of short ore-reserves than mines paying less annual returns. The speculator, who is an element not to be wholly disregarded, wishes a rise in his mining stock, and if development proceeds at a pace in advance of production, he will gain a legitimate rise through the increase in ore-reserves.
The investor"s and speculator"s idea of the desirability of a proved long life readily supports the technical policy of high-pressure development work, but not of expansion of production, for they desire an increasing ore-reserve. Even the metal operator who is afraid of overproduction does not object to increased ore-reserves.
On the point of maximum intensity of development work in a mine all views coincide. The mining engineer, if he takes a Machiavellian view, must agree with the investor and the metal dealer, for the engineer is a "fixed charge" the continuance of which is important to his daily needs.
The net result of all these limitations is therefore an invariable compromise upon some output below the possible maximum. The initial output to be contemplated is obviously one upon which the working costs will be low enough to show a margin of profit. The medium between these two extremes is determinable by a consideration of the limitations set out,--and the cash available. When the volume of output is once determined, it must be considered as a factor in valuation, as discussed under "Amortization."
CHAPTER XVI.
Administration.
LABOR EFFICIENCY; SKILL; INTELLIGENCE; APPLICATION COORDINATION; CONTRACT WORK; LABOR UNIONS; REAL BASIS OF WAGES.
The realization from a mine of the profits estimated from the other factors in the case is in the end dependent upon the management.
Good mine management is based upon three elementals: first, sound engineering; second, proper coordination and efficiency of every human unit; third, economy in the purchase and consumption of supplies.
The previous chapters have been devoted to a more or less extended exposition of economic engineering. While the second and third requirements are equally important, they range in many ways out of the engineering and into the human field. For this latter reason no complete manual will ever be published upon "How to become a Good Mine Manager."
It is purposed, however, to a.n.a.lyze some features of these second and third fundamentals, especially in their interdependent phases, and next to consider the subject of mine statistics, for the latter are truly the microscopes through which the competence of the administration must be examined.
The human units in mine organization can be divided into officers and men. The choice of mine officers is the a.s.sembling of specialized brains. Their control, stimulation, and inspiration is the main work of the administrative head. Success in the selection and control of staff is the index of executive ability. There are no mathematical, mechanical, or chemical formulas for dealing with the human mind or human energies.
LABOR.--The whole question of handling labor can be reduced to the one term "efficiency." Not only does the actual labor outlay represent from 60 to 70% of the total underground expenses, but the capacity or incapacity of its units is responsible for wider fluctuations in production costs than the bare predominance in expenditure might indicate. The remaining expense is for supplies, such as dynamite, timber, steel, power, etc., and the economical application of these materials by the workman has the widest bearing upon their consumption.
Efficiency of the ma.s.s is the resultant of that of each individual under a direction which coordinates effectively all units. The lack of effectiveness in one individual diminishes the returns not simply from that man alone; it lowers the results from numbers of men a.s.sociated with the weak member through the delaying and clogging of their work, and of the machines operated by them.
Coordination of work is a necessary factor of final efficiency. This is a matter of organization and administration. The most zealous stoping-gang in the world if a.s.sociated with half the proper number of truckers must fail to get the desired result.
Efficiency in the single man is the product of three factors,--skill, intelligence, and application. A great proportion of underground work in a mine is of a type which can be performed after a fashion by absolutely unskilled and even unintelligent men, as witness the breaking-in of savages of low average mentality, like the South African Kaffirs. Although most duties can be performed by this crudest order of labor, skill and intelligence can be applied to it with such economic results as to compensate for the difference in wage. The reason for this is that the last fifty years have seen a subst.i.tution of labor-saving machines for muscle. Such machines displace hundreds of raw laborers. Not only do they initially cost large sums, but they require large expenditure for power and up-keep.
These fixed charges against the machine demand that it shall be worked at its maximum. For interest, power, and up-keep go on in any event, and the saving on crude labor displaced is not so great but that it quickly disappears if the machine is run under its capacity. To get its greatest efficiency, a high degree of skill and intelligence is required. Nor are skill and intelligence alone applicable to labor-saving devices themselves, because drilling and blasting rock and executing other works underground are matters in which experience and judgment in the individual workman count to the highest degree.
How far skill affects production costs has had a thorough demonstration in West Australia. For a time after the opening of those mines only a small proportion of experienced men were obtainable. During this period the rock broken per man employed underground did not exceed the rate of 300 tons a year. In the large mines it has now, after some eight years, attained 600 to 700 tons.
How far intelligence is a factor indispensable to skill can be well ill.u.s.trated by a comparison of the results obtained from working labor of a low mental order, such as Asiatics and negroes, with those achieved by American or Australian miners. In a general way, it may be stated with confidence that the white miners above mentioned can, under the same physical conditions, and with from five to ten times the wage, produce the same economic result,--that is, an equal or lower cost per unit of production. Much observation and experience in working Asiatics and negroes as well as Americans and Australians in mines, leads the writer to the conclusion that, averaging actual results, one white man equals from two to three of the colored races, even in the simplest forms of mine work such as shoveling or tramming. In the most highly skilled branches, such as mechanics, the average ratio is as one to seven, or in extreme cases even eleven. The question is not entirely a comparison of bare efficiency individually; it is one of the sum total of results. In mining work the lower races require a greatly increased amount of direction, and this excess of supervisors consists of men not in themselves directly productive. There is always, too, a waste of supplies, more accidents, and more ground to be kept open for accommodating increased staff, and the maintenance of these openings must be paid for. There is an added expense for handling larger numbers in and out of the mine, and the lower intelligence reacts in many ways in lack of coordination and inability to take initiative. Taking all divisions of labor together, the ratio of efficiency as measured in amount of output works out from four to five colored men as the equivalent of one white man of the cla.s.s stated. The ratio of costs, for reasons already mentioned, and in other than quant.i.ty relation, figures still more in favor of the higher intelligence.
The following comparisons, which like all mine statistics must necessarily be accepted with reservation because of some dissimilarity of economic surroundings, are yet on sufficiently common ground to demonstrate the main issue,--that is, the bearing of inherent intelligence in the workmen and their consequent skill. Four groups of gold mines have been taken, from India, West Australia, South Africa, and Western America. All of those chosen are of the same stoping width, 4 to 5 feet. All are working in depth and with every labor-saving device available. All dip at about the same angle and are therefore in much the same position as to handling rock. The other conditions are against the white-manned mines and in favor of the colored. That is, the Indian mines have water-generated electric power and South Africa has cheaper fuel than either the American or Australian examples. In both the white-manned groups, the stopes are supported, while in the others no support is required.
======================================================================= | Tons of | Average |Tons | | Material | Number of Men | per |Cost per Group of Mines | Excavated | Employed | Man | Ton of |over Period|---------------| per |Material |Compiled[5]|Colored| White |Annum| Broken ----------------------------|-----------|-------|-------|-----|-------- Four Kolar mines[1] | 963,950 | 13,611| 302 | 69.3| $3.85 Six Australian mines[2] | 1,027,718 | -- | 1,534 |669.9| 2.47 Three Wit.w.a.tersrand mines[3]| 2,962,640 | 13,560| 1,595 |195.5| 2.68 Five American mines[4] | 1,089,500 | -- | 1,524 |713.3| 1.92 =======================================================================
[Footnote 1: Indian wages average about 20 cents per day.]
[Footnote 2: White men"s wages average about $3 per day.]