"Outfit allowance--30 on joining.
"Daily allowance of five shillings and sixpence (5s. 6d.) to cover cost of uniform and clothing, books, instruments, messing, washing and other expenses.
"No Cadet will be permitted to receive money, or any other supplies from his parents or guardians, or any person whomsoever, without the sanction of the Commandant. A most rigid observance of this order is urged upon all parents and guardians, as its violation would make distinctions between Cadets, which it is particularly desired to prevent.
"No Cadet, when within the Federal Territory, or when absent on duty from College, or when in uniform, shall drink any spirituous or intoxicating liquor, or bring or cause the same to be brought within the College, or have the same in his room, tent, or otherwise in his possession.
"Gambling, lotteries, and raffles are strictly prohibited. They are serious offences, which will be severely punished.
"Smoking may be permitted during certain hours and in authorised places.
The smoking of cigarettes is at all times prohibited. A Cadet found in possession of cigarettes is liable to punishment for disobedience of orders."
Canada has a militia force credited at present with a total strength of 55,000 men. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, who controlled the destinies of Canada for fifteen years up to 1911, was no military enthusiast and believed profoundly in a peaceful future for his country. In one respect, and in one respect only, Canada under his rule progressed in defence organisation: she had her own rifle factory turning out a rifle of Canadian design.
But a new spirit moves in Canada to-day in matters of Defence as in other things. I remember in 1909 speaking at Toronto in advocacy of a system of universal training for military service. Lieut.-Col. Wm.
Hamilton Merritt, a Canadian militia officer who had learned enthusiasm for the idea of a "citizen army" on a visit to Switzerland, invited me to come up to Toronto from New York to speak on the Australian campaign for the universal training of citizens. The meeting was friendly but not particularly enthusiastic. My strongest recollection of it is that one Canadian paper most unjustifiably and absurdly twisted some words of mine advocating Canadian self-reliance into advice that Canada should arm "to attack the United States." But the outcome of the meeting was that a "Canadian Patriotic League" was formed, and from it sprang the "Canadian Defence League, a non-political a.s.sociation to urge the importance to Canada of universal physical and naval or military training." For two years and more, in spite of the earnest efforts of Canadian enthusiasts, the movement languished. After the General Election of 1911, however, a quickening came to every department of Canadian life, and this particularly showed itself in matters of Defence. In November of that year, Colonel the Hon. S. Hughes, the Canadian Minister of Militia, called a conference of experts to consider the organisation of the militia. To that conference the Canadian Defence League was invited to send representatives, and their presence seemed to inspire the whole gathering with an enthusiasm for a universal service system. Summarising from a report sent to me by the Canadian Defence League: "Universal military training has at last become a live issue throughout the Dominion of Canada. It was the mainspring behind the whole machinery of the Militia Conference; almost every man present was in favour of it, but a few, if the question had come to vote, would have either refrained from voting or voted against it, because they were afraid of the possibility of being misunderstood by the public at large.
The cavalry section made no recommendation, and the infantry section discussed it, while the artillery, which is always in the front, was strongly in favour of it. Colonel Logie of Hamilton moved and Colonel Fotheringham of Toronto seconded a resolution recommending the adoption of the Australian system in Canada. This motion was with a view to placing the conference on record; but the Minister, in his wisdom, held the resolution in abeyance, and it did not come to a vote. But in the closing hours of the conference Senator Power of Nova Scotia positively and definitely advocated universal military training for the whole of Canada."
A universal service system in Canada would provide a citizen army of--probably--250,000 men of the finest type: and the effect of this force on Pacific issues would be equal to that of the combined armies of Australia and New Zealand.
The military strength of Latin America (the South American Republics and Mexico) it is difficult to estimate accurately. In almost all cases the const.i.tution of the Republics provides for "universal service" but fails to provide for universal training for service. Under modern conditions of warfare, it is useless to enact that men shall serve unless the necessary sacrifices of money and leisure are made to train them to serve. Raw levies could be made of some use almost immediately in a past epoch of warfare, when the soldier with his "Brown Bess" musket had the injunction from the drill sergeant to "wait until he could see the whites of the eyes" of his enemy and then to fire. That needed stolid nerves mainly, and but little training. In these days raw levies would be worse than useless, of no value in battles, a burden on the commissariat and hospital services between battles. The Latin-American armies must be judged in the light of that fact. Apart from that caution, the numbers are imposing enough.
Mexico has an army organisation providing for 30,000 men on a peace footing and 84,000 men on a war footing. The Argentine army on a peace footing is about 18,000 strong; on a war footing about 120,000 strong, exclusive of the National Guard and Territorial troops (forming a second line). In the Republic of Bolivia the peace footing of the army is 2500: the probable war footing 30,000. The Republic of Brazil has a universal service system. The peace strength of the army is 29,000 (to which may be added a gendarmerie of 20,000). On the outbreak of war there could be mobilised, it is claimed, five divisions totalling, say, 60,000 men.
Chili has, on a peace footing, about 10,000 men; on a war footing 50,000, exclusive of the reserves (about 34,000). Colombia makes every man liable to service, but the training is not regular. Possibly 10,000 men could be mobilised in time of war. Ecuador maintains a permanent force of about 5000 men, and claims that it could mobilise 90,000 in case of war. Paraguay has a permanent force of 2500 men and a National Guard available for service in case of war.
The South American has proved himself, on occasions, a good and plucky fighter. But I doubt whether his military forces can be seriously considered as a factor in the fate of the Pacific, except in the matter of defending his own territory from invasion. The only armies that count greatly to-day in the Pacific are those of j.a.pan, Russia, and Great Britain, in that order, with China and the United States as potential rather than actual military forces.
CHAPTER XIV
TREATIES IN THE PACIFIC
There is one actual alliance between two Pacific Powers, Great Britain and j.a.pan: an _entente_ between Great Britain and Russia: and an instinct towards friendliness between Great Britain and the United States. There are several other possible combinations affecting the ocean in the future. But no Power of the Triple Alliance, nor yet France, can be considered a factor in the Pacific except in so far as it may help or hinder a Power already established there. Germany, for instance, might enter the Pacific as an ally of j.a.pan or the United States; but she could not without an alliance bring naval or military force there unless Great Britain had first been humbled in a European war.
To the alliance between Great Britain and j.a.pan not very much importance can be ascribed since its revision in 1911. It threatens to die now of inanition, as it becomes clear that British aims and j.a.panese aims in the Pacific do not move towards a common end. The first British-j.a.panese treaty, signed on January 30, 1902, had for its main provisions--
"The Governments of Great Britain and j.a.pan, actuated solely by a desire to maintain the _status quo_ and general peace in the extreme East, being moreover specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Corea, and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations, hereby agree as follows:--
"The High Contracting Parties, having mutually recognised the independence of China and of Corea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country. Having in view, however, their special interests, of which those of Great Britain relate princ.i.p.ally to China, while j.a.pan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree politically, as well as commercially and industrially, in Corea, the High Contracting Parties recognise that it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other Power, or by disturbances arising in China or Corea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the High Contracting Parties for the protection of the lives and property of its subjects.
"If either Great Britain or j.a.pan, in the defence of their respective interests as above described, should become involved in war with another Power, the other High Contracting Party will maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities against its ally.
"If in the above event any other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against that ally, the other High Contracting Party will come to its a.s.sistance and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.
"The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the interests above described.
"Whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or j.a.pan, the above-mentioned interests are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly."
A letter covering the treaty, addressed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to the British Minister at Tokio, Sir C. Macdonald, explained the fact that there was to be no disturbance of Chinese or Corean territory: "We have each of us desired that the integrity and independence of the Chinese Empire should be preserved, that there should be no disturbance of the territorial _status quo_ either in China or in the adjoining regions, that all nations should, within those regions, as well as within the limits of the Chinese Empire, be afforded equal opportunities for the development of their commerce and industry, and that peace should not only be restored, but should, for the future, be maintained. We have thought it desirable to record in the preamble of that instrument the main objects of our common policy in the Far East to which I have already referred, and in the first Article we join in entirely disclaiming any aggressive tendencies either in China or Corea."
But that stipulation did nothing to safeguard Corea"s independence, which was soon sacrificed to j.a.panese ambition. There was a widespread feeling of uneasiness in the British Dominions in the Pacific when this treaty was announced. At the time Canada was having serious trouble on her Pacific Coast with j.a.panese immigrants, and the Canadian Pacific provinces were anxious to prohibit absolutely the entry of more j.a.panese to their territory.[8] Australia in 1901 had made the first great deed of her new national organisation a law practically prohibiting all coloured immigration, and making the entry of j.a.panese colonists impossible. The Act certainly veiled its hostility to the Asiatic races by a subterfuge. It was not stated in so many words that black skin, brown skin, and yellow skin were prohibited from entry, but an educational standard was set up which might be applied to any immigrant, but needed to be applied to none. In practice it is never applied to the decent White but always to the coloured man: and its application is such that the coloured man can never be sure that his standard of education will be sufficiently high to satisfy the fastidious sense of culture of an Australian Customs officer. He may be a learned Baboo, B.A. of Oxford, and Barrister of the Inner Temple, and yet fail to pa.s.s the Australian Education Test, for the ordeal is to take dictation in any European language, not necessarily English, but perhaps Russian or modern Greek. New Zealand, without going so far by her legislation, shows an equal repugnance to any form of Asiatic immigration.
The "official" view of the British Alliance with j.a.pan, advocated with some energy, was that it was a benefit to the White Dominions in the Pacific, for it made them secure against the one aggressive Asiatic Power. But nevertheless the policy of making the wolf a guardian of the sheep-fold was questioned in many quarters. The question was asked: "Presuming a Pacific war in which the United States was the enemy of j.a.pan?" The answer in the minds of many, in Australia at any rate, and probably also in Canada and New Zealand, was that in such event the sympathy, if not the active support, of the British Dominions in the Pacific would be with the United States, whether Great Britain kept to her Treaty or not. It was recognised, however, as almost unthinkable that Great Britain would go to war by the side of j.a.pan against the American Republic.
Great Britain is very sensitive to the opinions of her Dominions in these days of the industrious promulgation of Imperialist sentiment in Great Britain: and a Canadian or an Australian voter--though he has no vote for the House of Commons--has far more influence on the destinies of the Empire than his British compeer. The overseas objection to the Treaty with j.a.pan had its full effect in the British Cabinet, and that effect was seen in subsequent modifications of the Treaty.
On August 12, 1905, the British-j.a.panese Treaty was renewed, and the chief articles of the new treaty were:--
"The Governments of Great Britain and j.a.pan, being desirous of replacing the agreement concluded between them on the 30th January, 1902, by fresh stipulations, have agreed upon the following articles, which have for their object--
"(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India;
"(b) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China;
"(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defence of their special interests in the said regions:--
"It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or j.a.pan, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or interests.
"If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any other Power or Powers, either Contracting Party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other Contracting Party will at once come to the a.s.sistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.
"j.a.pan possessing paramount political, military, and economic interests in Corea, Great Britain recognises the right of j.a.pan to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Corea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests, provided always that such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations.
"Great Britain having a special interest in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier, j.a.pan recognises her right to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions.
"The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement.
"The conditions under which armed a.s.sistance shall be afforded by either Power to the other in the circ.u.mstances mentioned in the present Agreement, and the means by which such a.s.sistance is to be made available, will be arranged by the naval and military authorities of the Contracting Parties, who will from time to time consult one another fully and freely upon all questions of mutual interest.
"The present Agreement shall, subject to the provisions of Article VI., come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date."
It will be noted that there is, as regards the general responsibility under the Treaty, some watering down. One Power is bound to come to the help of the other Power only by reason of "unprovoked attack or aggressive action" on the part of another Power. The fiction of preserving the independence of Corea is abandoned.
On April 3, 1911, a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was entered into between Great Britain and j.a.pan. The j.a.panese Government had revised its tariff in such a way as to prejudice seriously foreign trade. It was announced in j.a.pan that certain nations would have the benefit of "most-favoured nation" rates under the new tariff, but that Great Britain would not have that benefit, since, being a Free Trade country, she was able to give no concessions in return. Then the diplomatic Treaty of 1905 was used by the British Government as an argument for securing more favoured treatment for British merchants. If the Trade Treaty of 1911 is closely studied, it will be found that the trade advantages given to j.a.pan by Great Britain, in return for some real concessions on the part of j.a.pan to Great Britain, are wholly illusory.
It is difficult to see how they could have been otherwise, since a Free Trade country can give nothing better than Free Trade to another country. But Great Britain, a good deal out of conceit at this time with the diplomatic value of the Treaty of 1905, did not hesitate to use it as a means of securing some trade benefits. The effect on j.a.panese public opinion was not favourable. But the diplomatic position had so changed that that was not considered a serious circ.u.mstance in Great Britain.
Two articles of the British-j.a.panese Trade Treaty of 1911 should be quoted to show the mutual acceptance by the two Powers of the independent right of the British overseas Dominions to restrict or prohibit j.a.panese immigration:
"The subjects of each of the High Contracting Parties shall have full liberty to enter, travel and reside in the territories of the other, and, conforming themselves to the laws of the country,
"They shall in all that relates to travel and residence be placed in all respects on the same footing as native subjects.
"They shall have the right, equally with native subjects, to carry on their commerce and manufacture, and to trade in all kinds of merchandise of lawful commerce, either in person or by agents, singly or in partnerships with foreigners or native subjects.
"They shall in all that relates to the pursuit of their industries, callings, professions, and educational studies be placed in all respects on the same footing as the subjects or citizens of the most favoured nation."
But Article 26 makes this reservation: