On the west flank of the Pacific Great Britain is established at Wei-hai-wei, Hong Kong, the Straits Settlements, Borneo, New Guinea, Australia, New Zealand, and various small islands. There are here possibilities of enormous strength and several points of grave danger.
At the outset let us consider the continental position of the British Empire on the west flank of the Pacific. The occupation of India gives to the British Power at once a great position and a great responsibility. Occupation of India, presuming the loyalty of the majority of the native inhabitants--a presumption which seems to become more and more reasonable with the pa.s.sage of time--gives great material resources and command of a vast population of good fighting men. It is admitted, however, that these native troops require a certain "stiffening" of White troops before taking the field. To provide that stiffening is the greatest single task of the British Regular army.
Strategically, the transfer from Great Britain to India of a large number of soldiers to leaven the native forces is not an ideal system.
The distance between the source of supply and the field of operations is so great that in peace it is necessary to have a larger force than would be necessary if that distance were reduced, and in war the repairing of wastage would be a matter of some difficulty. Further, the British soldier, coming from a very different climate, suffers a great deal from sickness in India. A more economical and effective system, if that were found to be politically possible, would be to strengthen the White garrison of India in part from Australia and New Zealand and South Africa in case of war.
The defence of India has to be considered in the light of--
(a) An attack from j.a.pan or China based on a Pan-Asiatic movement.
(b) Internal sedition.
(c) An attack from Russia through Persia.
(d) An attack from Germany allied with Turkey by way of the Persian Gulf.
The two former are the more immediate dangers. But on the whole, India is a far greater source of strength than of weakness. She makes the British Empire a great military power on the mainland of Asia, and she can contribute materially to the strength of the Pacific naval forces.
Pa.s.sing from India we find the British Empire in possession of several very important strategical positions on or near the coast of Asia, Wei-hai-wei and Hong Kong being the advance stations in the north, and Singapore (the favoured meeting-place of the Pacific squadron of the British Navy) being a well-situated central point. A British Pacific Fleet making Singapore its chief base would be in the best position to dominate the western littoral of the ocean. South of Singapore the large settlements (Australia and New Zealand) are friendly. From the north any possible enemy would be best watched, best met, from a Singapore base.
That base would be central for aid from India and South Africa; and it would also be the best point of departure for a Pacific Fleet finding it necessary to rendezvous on the American flank of the ocean.
This is a convenient point at which to call attention to one grave strategical weakness of the British Empire position in the Pacific--the lack of a fortified coaling station near to the centre of the ocean.
Between Hong Kong and Vancouver there is no fortified coaling station.
There are rumours, as I write, of the want being met by the fortification of Fanning Island, at present the landing-place of the Pacific cable between Vancouver and Norfolk Island. Fanning Island is not an ideal station either by position or natural advantages. But it would be better than nothing.
The strategical position of Australia and New Zealand comes next for consideration. Looking to the future, these British Dominions, which can be grouped under the one t.i.tle, Australasia, will probably form the most important national element in the South Pacific. Considered at present, Australia must be a source of the gravest anxiety strategically, for it has within its vast, and everywhere insufficiently populated, area one great tract, the Northern Territory, which is practically empty, and which contains to-day twice as many Asiatics as Whites. Embracing 335,000,000 acres, the Northern Territory possesses several splendid rivers, in the inland portion a great artesian water supply, and a wide diversity of land and of climate. On the uplands is a warm, dry, exhilarating area, not very rich in soil, but suitable for pastoral occupation, and giving great promise of mineral wealth. On the lowlands, with a climate which is sub-tropical to tropical, but, on account of the wide spread of the gum tree, is practically nowhere dangerously malarial, every agricultural industry is possible, from dairy-farming and maize-growing to the cultivation of coffee, sugar, sago, hemp, and spices. Almost every expert who has explored the Territory has been struck with its possibilities. Mr Dashwood, the former Government resident, considered the "area of land suitable for tropical agriculture enormous." Mr Sydney Kidman, the great cattle breeder, reported on the land about Herbert River as "ideal cattle country." A dozen other authorities acclaim the pastoral possibilities of the uplands. The probability of vast tin, copper and gold deposits is certified to by every geological explorer.
The Northern Territory thus offers a tempting prize for an Asiatic Power seeking new outlets for its population. Yet, with all its advantages the Territory remains empty. It is known that the Government of Great Britain is profoundly anxious for its settlement. It is an open gate through which an Asiatic invader may occupy Australia. It is an empty land which we do not "effectively occupy," and therefore is, according to the theories of international law, open to colonisation by some other Power.
Further, the Northern Territory is specially vulnerable, because an enemy landing there could find horses, oxen, pasturage, timber, some metals, a good soil, plenty of water, any number of easily defensible harbours--in short, all the raw material of war. And to prevent a landing there is nothing. The local White population is nil, practically; the fortifications are nil; the chances of an Australian force ever getting there to dislodge an enemy, nil.
An ingenious Australian romance (_The Commonwealth Crisis_, by C. H.
Kirness), recently published, imagines a "colonising invasion" of Australia by j.a.pan. A certain Thomas Burt and his friend, while on a hunting trip in the Northern Territory, observe the landing of bodies of j.a.panese troops at Junction Bay. They ride to the south-west to bring the news to Port Darwin, the small White settlement in the Territory.
For some years preceding j.a.pan had contemplated a secret "peaceful invasion" of the Northern Territory. The project was planned with great care. First a huge military colony was organised at Formosa, and the men trained in agriculture. Later, the men were supplied with wives. Three months were allowed to elapse, and the men were transported secretly to the Northern Territory. Quite 6000 "colonists" had been thus landed before "White Australia" was able to take any action. j.a.pan, when concealment is no longer possible, officially states through its Amba.s.sador in London that, quite without authority from the Mikado, a private colonising organisation had settled a body of j.a.panese in the Northern Territory. The Mikado regretted this, and was willing that these subjects should disavow their j.a.panese citizenship and swear devotion to the British Flag. A deputation from the j.a.panese colony in the Northern Territory then arrives at Port Darwin to offer its allegiance, and to ask that schools should be established in the new settlement.
From that point the story develops to the downfall of "White Australia"
so far as all the north of the Continent is concerned. That romance was, though in some of its details fantastic, in its main idea possible. It was one of many efforts in warning. Such warnings seem to be taking effect now, for the Commonwealth Government is moving at last to colonise the Northern Territory, and to build a railway which will bring it into touch with the more populous portions of the Continent. A scientific expedition was sent recently to investigate the conditions of the Territory as regards productiveness and health. The preliminary report of that expedition (presented to the Australian Parliament October 1911) was generally favourable. It enlarged on the great capacity of the Territory for production, and was optimistic about the climatic conditions:
"Bearing in mind that the country was visited at the time of year when the climate was most suitable for Europeans, the general health was remarkably good. The families of the second generation examined showed no signs of physical deterioration. There are none of the tropical diseases, such as malaria and dysentery, endemic in the settlements; and, as long as the necessary hygienic precautions are observed, there is no reason to antic.i.p.ate their appearance.
"There are, at present, men who have spent from three to four decades in the Territory, and every one of them compares favourably, both as regards physique and energy, with men of similar ages elsewhere.
"The healthiest and strongest are those, both men and women, who take regular open-air exercises both in the relatively cool and in the hot season.
"Life in the back country, provided the ordinary precautions necessary in tropical parts are taken, is decidedly healthy. The summer months are undoubtedly trying, but the winter months, when at night-time the temperature falls below 40 degrees F., afford recuperation from the excessive damp heat of the summer. In addition, the open-air life is in itself a great safeguard against enervation and physical deterioration."
That bears out the views of those who are in the best position to know the Northern Territory of Australia. Clearly, there are no obstacles to its White settlement except such as arise from the apathy and carelessness of the governments concerned. But with the strategical question of populating the Northern Territory is bound up the other idea of populating Australia itself. In 1904, the Government of New South Wales, one of the Australian states, alarmed by the fall of the birth-rate, appointed a Royal Commission to inquire into the cause. One thing made clear by the investigations of the Commission was "that a very large section of the population keeps down the birth-rate so far as it can, and that the limit of birth-suppression is defined by the limit of knowledge on the subject." That was practically the main conclusion in the Commissioners" report. It probably did not need a Commission of Inquiry to tell the social observer of Australia so much.
That the decreasing birth-rate in the Commonwealth was not primarily due to any physical degeneracy of the people, had long been the conviction of all who had had the opportunity and the desire to make the most cursory inquiry into the subject. Not lack of capacity, but lack of willingness to undertake parental responsibility, was the cause of the Australian movement towards sterility. Coming to a conclusion as to "why" was thus an easy task in investigating the dwindling birth-rate.
It was quite clear that the Australian cradle did not fill, mainly because the Australian parent preferred to have a very small family.
The evil--it is an evil, for there could be no better, no more welcome immigrants to any country than those coming on the wings of the stork--does not affect Australia alone, but is observable in almost every civilised country. It has successfully defied one of the strongest of natural sentiments. Every sane adult is by instinct desirous of being a parent. But instinct seems to weaken with civilisation and its accompanying artificiality of life. If, on an essentially vital point, it is to become so weak as to be ineffective, and is to be replaced by no ethical or other motive working towards the same end, then civilisation will involve extinction. That is the melancholy conclusion which some pessimists even now come to, pointing to the fact that the White races of the earth, as a whole, despite the still prolific Slav and German, show a tendency to dwindle.
Alarm at such a conclusion may yet prove in itself a remedy. Already there is a general agreement that for the community"s good it is well that there should be a higher birth-rate, but, so far, the general agreement lacks particular application. With a further recognition of the fate to which artificially-secured sterility points, there may be an acuter alarm, which will convert the individual not only to good belief, but to good practice. What is wanted is a generally accepted conviction that childlessness is either unfortunate or disgraceful, and that anything but a moderately large family is a condition calling for apology. In Australia that is particularly wanted. There are there--in a new country with plenty of room for many millions yet--none of the excuses which can be held to justify "small families" in more thickly populated lands. It is satisfactory to note that since the Birth-rate Commission aroused the public mind on the subject in Australia, there has been a distinct betterment of the birth-rate; and there has been an end to the old objection to immigration. "Empty Australia" is filling up somewhat more rapidly now; but the process is still far too slow, from the point of view of strategical safety.
With Australia, including the Northern Territory, populated and defended, the strategical position of the British Empire on the Asiatic flank of the Pacific Ocean could be organised on a sound basis. An Imperial Fleet, contributed to by the Mother Country, by Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, and the Crown Colonies, having a rallying point at Singapore, could hold the Indian Ocean (which is to the Pacific what the Mediterranean is to the Atlantic) as a "British lake," and this powerful naval force would straddle the centre of the western littoral of the ocean, keeping secure the British communities in the south from the Asiatic communities in the north, and ready to respond to a call from Canada. On the western, as on the eastern flank, there is present all the "raw material" for Fleets and armies--great supplies of coal, oil, timber, metals, fecund fishing grounds, and enormous areas of agricultural and pastoral territory.
When the strategical position of the United States in the Pacific comes to be examined, it is found to be for the moment one full of anxiety.
The Power which may, five years hence, have undisputed hegemony of the ocean, holds a difficult position there to-day. The map will show that if the United States had had no expansion ideas at all, in the Pacific or elsewhere, national safety demanded that she should stretch out her arm to take in the Hawaiian Islands. This group, if held by an enemy, would be as a sword pointed to the heart of the Pacific States of the Republic: but held by the United States it is a buckler against any enemy from south or west. A foe approaching the United States Pacific coast would inevitably seek to occupy first the Hawaiian Islands and use them as a base: and just as surely would not dare to pa.s.s those islands leaving there an American Fleet. With Honolulu Harbour strongly fortified and sheltering a Fleet of any real fighting strength, the Pacific coast of the United States is safe from invasion by sea (invasion by land from Canada hardly needs to be considered; nor from Mexico). At the present time Honolulu is in the process of being fortified rather than is fortified: and a powerful American Fleet awaits the completion of the Panama Ca.n.a.l before it can enter the Pacific without leaving the Atlantic coast of the Republic unduly exposed.
The Philippine Islands, too, are a source of anxiety rather than of strength at present. When the Panama Ca.n.a.l has been completed and Honolulu fortified, and the Philippines mark the terminal point of an American Fleet patrol, their strategical weight will count in the other scale, for they will then give the American Power a strong vedette post in the waters of a possible enemy. Any attack from the Pacific on the United States would in prudence have to be preceded by the reduction of the Philippines, or at least their close investment. Yet the temporary loss of the group would inflict no great disadvantage on the American plan of campaign. Thus the enemy could not afford to leave the Philippines alone, and yet would gain no decisive advantage from the sacrifices necessary to secure them. In the case of a war in which the United States was acting on the offensive against an Asiatic Power, the Philippines would be of great value as an advanced base.
The ultimate strategical position of the United States in the Pacific cannot be forecasted until there is a clearer indication of how far she proposes to carry a policy of overseas expansion. But in the near future it can be seen that she will keep on the high seas one great Fleet, its central rallying point being probably Cuba, with the Galapagos Islands, San Francisco, Honolulu and Manila as the Pacific bases. At present the Galapagos belong to Ecuador, and Ecuador does not seem disposed to "lease" them to the United States. But that difficulty will probably be overcome, since the United States must have an advance guard to protect the Panama Ca.n.a.l on the Pacific as well as on the Atlantic side. Viewed from a purely defensive standpoint, such a strategical position is sound and courageous. If offensive action is contemplated, on the Asiatic mainland for example, a military force far greater than that existing to-day in the United States must be created.
j.a.pan has consolidated a sound strategical position by the annexation of Corea, Russian naval power having ceased to exist in the Pacific. j.a.pan now holds the Sea of j.a.pan as her own Narrow Water. The possibility of a hostile China making a sea attack can be viewed without dread, for naturally and artificially the j.a.panese naval position is very strong.
Holding the Sea of j.a.pan as securely as she does, j.a.pan may also consider that her land frontier on the mainland is more accessible to her bases than to the bases of any possible enemy.
Russia has been harshly criticised for the conception of naval strategy which gave her one Fleet in the Baltic, another in the Black Sea, and a third in the Pacific. But she was forced by her geographical position into a "straggle" policy. It is extremely unlikely that she will now adopt the policy, recommended to her in some quarters, of concentrating naval strength in the Pacific: though, should the _Entente_ with Great Britain develop into an actual triple alliance between Great Britain, France and Russia, that concentration is just possible. It would have an important effect on the strategical position in the Pacific: but is too unlikely a contingency to call for any discussion. The same may be said in regard to any possibility of a great development of power in the Pacific by Germany or France.
The interest of the strategical position in the Pacific thus centres in the rivalry, or friendly emulation, between the United States and the British Empire. Without any very clear indications of a conscious purpose, the British Empire has blundered into a strategical position which is rich in possibilities of strength and has but two glaring weaknesses, the absence of a Mid-Pacific fortress and the emptiness of the Northern Territory of Australia. With a very clear idea of what she is about, the United States has prepared for a thoroughly scientific siege of the Pacific, but she has not the same wealth of natural material as has the British Empire.
CHAPTER XVIII
THE RIVALS
The essential superiority of a White Race over a Coloured Race may fairly be accepted as a "first principle" in any discussion of world politics. There are numberless facts to be gathered from 2500 years of history to justify that faith, and there is lacking as yet any great body of evidence to support the other idea, that modern conditions of warfare and of industry at last have so changed the factors in human greatness that mere numbers and imitative faculty can outweigh the superior intellectual capacity and originating genius characteristic of the European peoples. Nevertheless it must be admitted that the conditions, in warfare and in industry, of life to-day as compared with life in past centuries, have increased the value of numbers and of a faculty of blind obedience, and have proportionately decreased the relative value of individual character. An Asiatic army to-day is relatively better fitted to cope with a European army; an Asiatic factory is relatively more efficient.
It is necessary, therefore, to call to aid all the rea.s.suring records of history if one would keep a serene faith that the future of the Pacific, and with it the future of the world, is not destined to be dominated by the Asiatic rather than by the European. j.a.pan with her fertile people and sterile soil has done so much since she discovered that the test imposed on a people by Christian civilisation is based on their powers of destruction, that there is good reason for the alarm expressed by many thinkers (with the German Emperor as their leader) as to "the Yellow Peril." China, too, awaking now after the slumber of centuries and grasping at the full equipment of a modern nation, reinforces that alarm. It is conceivable that White civilisation may be for a while worsted and driven from some of its strongholds by the arms which it has taught the Coloured Races to use. "Asia for the Asiatics," may be a battle-cry raised in the future not without avail. But in time European superiority must again a.s.sert itself.
There are many pessimists who foretell the doom of the White Races coming from a sterility self-imposed for the sake of better ease. They see in every advance of comfort a cause of further weakness, and they picture luxury as rapidly corroding the supports of our society. But it is comforting to recall that every age has had the same gloomy critics, and the Golden Age has always been represented in the past by the pessimists of the present. For myself, I am daring enough to think that the White Races of to-day are neither enervated nor decadent: that in physique, in good health and in sense of public duty they are improving rather than deteriorating; and that the Europe of next century will be more happy, more vigorous and more sane than the Europe of to-day. There _was_ a time for the joy of pessimists, but it is a past time, that dismal past century when the industrial epoch rushed on man all unawares, when the clattering machine came to sweep away handicrafts, and the new economic idea of human beings as "hands" affected poisonously all social relations. It was as though a c.u.mbrous wain, well-built for its slow and sedate rumbling, had suddenly been hitched to a rushing steam engine. There were disturbances, clatterings, groanings, and creakings. The period of adjustment was a painful one.
But it is pa.s.sing. Meliorism is the justifiable faith of the future.
The future of the Pacific, I hold then, is with the White Races. At the best, the Asiatic can hope to hold his own continent in security. j.a.pan had the chance of securing a temporary dominance after the war with Russia, and at one time was said to have been on the verge of a struggle with the United States, as an a.s.sertion of that dominance. But the cloud pa.s.sed over. With the opening of the Panama Ca.n.a.l, now a matter only of months, the opportunity of j.a.pan will have finally pa.s.sed. With the gradual re-establishment of British naval power in the ocean, a re-establishment which will come through the agency of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, if not through the Home Country, and which will be "anti-Asiatic" in purpose, a further veto will be put on any aggressive ambitions on the part of an Asiatic Power. The statesmen of j.a.pan, indeed, seem to recognise that she has had her day of greatest power, and must be content for the future to be tolerated in her present position as one of the "Powers" forming the great council of the foremost nations. But in considering j.a.pan, allowance must always be made for the danger of the people getting out of the hands of the oligarchy which rules them. The j.a.panese people, fed fat on praise of their own prowess, may one day force a mad course on statesmen asked to choose between civil and foreign war. Such a war would be doomed to failure for financial if for no other reasons. But it might leave a deep stain of blood on the Pacific.
China--a Federal Republic, and rid of the Manchus if present appearances (1912) are not belied--will have no aggressive ambitions for some years to come. She may insist, and rightly insist, on more honourable treatment from foreign nations. But it is not likely that she will set Fleets ranging over the Pacific in search of conquests. By the time that China has come to a warlike mood--if she does ever come--the White Races will be fully equipped for any struggle. The greatest Asiatic peril, so far as warlike forces are concerned, is of a j.a.panese-Chinese alliance: and the chance of that is slight, for the two peoples are not sympathetic. It will be noted that the very first official paper of the nascent Chinese Republic is a letter of complaint to the j.a.panese Government.
If it is agreed that the Pacific will fall, as the Mediterranean did, as the Atlantic did, to the rule of the White Man, the next step is to consider, which people? There is, in addition to much evidence, the temptation of race-pride to suggest that of all the European peoples the Anglo-Celtic (controlling the British Empire and the United States) is inherently the best equipped for world dominance. But that is not nearly so sure as is the superiority of the White over the Coloured Races. The Latin peoples--Italians, Portuguese, Spaniards--have in their day won to lofty greatness. The French--in the main Latin, but with a large element of Celtic and some element of Teutonic blood--were supreme in the world for many generations, and are not exhausted to-day. There is not an incident of Anglo-Saxon history; either of fighting against tremendous odds and winning a victory which the stars in their courses seemed to forbid; or of making disaster glorious by a Spartan death; or of pushing out on some frail plank into an unknown sea--which cannot be matched by some incident equally n.o.ble from the records of the Latin peoples or the French people. The Teutons are only now making their bid for mastery: the Slavs may have a great future. The future dominance of Europe may be for any one of the European peoples.
But the position in the Pacific can be simplified for the present by the elimination of all the European Powers but two. Spain and Portugal have had their day there, and have pa.s.sed away. Neither France, Germany, Austria nor Italy can venture any great force from Europe. Nor is any one of them strongly established in the Pacific. Great Britain would be content with the Atlantic but that her overseas Empire gives her duties and advantages in the new ocean. The Pacific possessions of the British Empire were unsought. But they will be held. The other European Power in the Pacific is Russia, which has been checked but not destroyed there.
That the supremacy of Europe--at present held, so far as any enterprises beyond its seas are concerned, by Great Britain--may pa.s.s to other hands is not impossible; and that would affect, of course, the position in the Pacific. Speculation on that point, however, is outside the scope of this book, which has attempted to deal with the Pacific conditions of the present and immediate future.
On the facts there must be a further elimination of European Powers in the Pacific, since Russia has no naval forces there and no design of creating such forces. There is at present a natural bewilderment in the Russian mind as a consequence of the recent war with j.a.pan. That struggle destroyed her power in Europe as well as in Asia, and the European balance must be restored first. During the next five years--which will be the critical years--Russia will not count in the Pacific except as the useful ally of some powerful naval nation--either of j.a.pan, the United States or Great Britain.
Great Britain is thus left as the sole European Power capable of independent effort in the Pacific. Clearly the rivalry for the dominance of the ocean lies between her and the United States. To discuss that rivalry is to discuss the real problem of the Pacific. It may be done frankly, I trust, without raising suggestions of unfriendliness. A frank discussion of the problem, carried out on both sides of the Atlantic, would be of the greatest value to civilisation. For the position seems to be that both Powers are preparing to capture the Pacific; that neither Power can hold it against the other; and that a peaceful settlement can only be founded on complete mutual understanding.
It is true that if the United States decides "to play a lone hand," she may win through if all the circ.u.mstances are favourable, for she seems destined to control the resources of all America. It is likely that within this decade the United States Flag will fly (either as that of the actually governing or the suzerain Power) over all the territory south of the Canadian border to the southern bank of the Panama Ca.n.a.l.
Intervention has been threatened once already in Mexico. With any further disorder it may be carried into effect. The United States cannot afford to allow the chance of a disorderly force marching down to destroy 70,000,000 worth of United States property. Central America has been marked down for a process of peaceful absorption. The treaty with Honduras (a similar one exists with Nicaragua) shows the method of this absorption. It provides: