The whole case is this: Certain depredations were committed by the French government and by the citizens of France, upon the citizens of the United States, previous to the beginning of the present century. The government of the United States did all it could to secure payment and compensation to its citizens for these depredations. The French government denied the validity of the claims, holding, on the other hand, that the government of the United States had violated the treaties made with it under circ.u.mstances of sacred obligation, that its citizens therefore were justified in doing what they had done in seizing upon American vessels, and taking from them goods called contraband of war, and in committing these depredations. It uniformly justified and maintained the action of its cruisers in doing these things. In other words, our claims were repudiated by France, their payment being refused, and, as we could not force their payment, we simply abandoned them. Recently they have been referred to the court of claims, without regard to the lapse of time, and large sums of money are now being paid by the United States for the depredations committed by the French nearly one hundred years ago, to descendants, three generations removed, of merchants and ship owners, who, with all their losses, enjoyed the most profitable commerce in the history of our mercantile marine. Their payment is, perhaps, the most striking evidence of the improvidence of Congress in dealing with antiquated claims against the government.
The first year of Buchanan"s administration, 1857, will always be noted as one of great political excitement, of sudden changes and unexpected results. At its beginning the Democratic party was in complete possession of all branches of the government. The House of Representatives, elected in the fall of 1856, had a strong Democratic majority. The Senate was composed of 37 Democrats, 20 Republicans and 4 Americans. The Supreme Court was composed of 5 Democrats from the slave states, and 2 Democrats and 2 Whigs from the free states. The cabinet of Buchanan had four members from the southern states and three from the northern. The south had full control of all departments of the government, with the President in hearty sympathy with the policy of that section. The condition of Kansas alone caused it trouble. The firm and impartial course of Governor Geary had imparted confidence and strength to the Free State citizens of that territory, who were now in an unquestioned majority through the large emigration from the north during the spring of 1857. The doctrine of popular sovereignty could not, therefore, be relied upon to establish slavery in Kansas, and it was abandoned. New theories had to be improvised and new agencies called into action.
I was present when the oath of office was administered to Mr.
Buchanan, on the 4th of March, 1857. With my strong sympathy for the Free State people of Kansas, I hoped and believed that he would give some a.s.surance that the pledges made for him in the canva.s.s would be carried out, but the statement in his inaugural address, that the difference of opinion in respect to the power of the people of a territory to decide the question of slavery for themselves would be speedily and finally settled, as a judicial question, by the Supreme Court of the United States, in a case then pending before it, naturally, excited suspicion and distrust. It was regarded as a change of position, a new device in the interest of slavery. In two days after the inauguration, Chief Justice Taney delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case, as to the status of negroes in the United States. He said:
"They had, for more than a century before, been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to a.s.sociate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect, and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit."
He said negroes "were not intended to be included in the word "citizens" in the const.i.tution, and therefore could claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to the citizens of the United States;" and announced as the opinion of the court that the Missouri Compromise act was not warranted by the const.i.tution and was therefore void.
These declarations were in no sense necessary to the decision of the case before the court, as it was held that Dred Scott was a resident of Missouri and subject as a slave to the laws of that state.
Justices McLean and Curtis dissented from the decision of the court, and in elaborate opinions refuted, as I think, every position of the Chief Justice.
Thus the Kansas question became a political question in the Supreme Court. At once the south rejected the doctrine of popular sovereignty, and demanded, as a const.i.tutional right, that slaves moved into a territory must be protected like other property, whether the people of the territory wish it or not. This was the first time in our history when this great tribunal entered into the political arena.
Its action encouraged the south, but produced a strong feeling of resentment in the north, and widened the breach between the two great sections of the country.
Mr. Buchanan, early in his administration, found it necessary to appoint a Governor of Kansas. He selected Robert J. Walker, of Mississippi, who had held high positions in the national government, having been Secretary of the Treasury and Senator of the United States. He appointed Fred. P. Stanton, of Tennessee, as secretary of the territory. Mr. Stanton had long been a Member of high standing of the House of Representatives. Both were southern men and both wished to see Kansas a slave state, but both were honorable men who would not seek to gain their ends by dishonest means.
After a careful estimate, made by them, it was believed that there were, in the territory, 9,000 Free State Democrats, 8,000 Republicans, 6,000 pro-slavery Democrats, and 500 pro-slavery Americans. A strong effort was made by Governor Walker to induce these elements to join in a movement for a convention to frame a const.i.tution, with a view to admit Kansas as a state in the Union. The Free State men, while anxious for such a result, were not willing to trust their adversaries with the conduct of such an election, without some safeguards against the repet.i.tion of the frauds and violence of the previous elections. The result was that only 2,200 persons took part in choosing delegates to what became the notorious Lecompton convention.
Both before and after this so-called election Governor Walker promised that the const.i.tution, when adopted, should be submitted to a vote of the people, and he added his a.s.surance that the President of the United States would insist upon this condition.
On the 12th of July Mr. Buchanan wrote to Governor Walker:
"On the question of submitting the const.i.tution to the _bona fide_ resident settlers of Kansas, I am willing to stand or fall. In sustaining such a principle we cannot fail. It is the principle of the Kansas-Nebraska bill, the principle of popular sovereignty, and the principle at the foundation of all popular government.
The more it is discussed, the stronger it will become. Should the convention of Kansas adopt this principle, all will be settled harmoniously."
This promise was soon after violated, and the President declared in an open letter:
"At the time of the pa.s.sage of the Kansas-Nebraska act slavery existed, and still exists, in Kansas, under the const.i.tution of the United States. This point has at last been finally decided by the highest tribunal known to our laws. How it could ever have been seriously doubted is a mystery."
It was known that the delegates elected would adopt a pro-slavery const.i.tution and ask for admission to the Union. It was equally well known that no such const.i.tution would be adopted by the people of Kansas. Under these circ.u.mstances the President, pressed by his cabinet, yielded to the demands of the south, violated his pledges, and supported the convention in the extreme measures adopted by it.
In the meantime the Free State party in Kansas, composed of nearly equal proportions of Republicans and Democrats, was persuaded by Governor Walker to take part in the regular election for the territorial legislature. The result was, the Free State party elected nine of the thirteen councilmen, and twenty-four of the thirty-nine representatives. This should have settled the Kansas controversy, and it would have done so on the principle of popular sovereignty, but a broader const.i.tuency in the south demanded that the doctrine of the Dred Scott case should be applied to and enforced, not only in Kansas, but in all the states. Henceforth the Lecompton const.i.tution must be considered, not as a local question, but as a national one. The imperative issue, as pithily stated by Lincoln, was, all slave or all free states. The battle was to commence in Kansas, but was to become national in its scope.
The const.i.tutional convention met on the 19th of October, 1857, within two weeks after the election of the legislature, but in its action little interest was taken, a quorum being preserved with difficulty. It adopted a pro-slavery const.i.tution, which, it was well known, if submitted to the people, would be rejected by an overwhelming majority, and if not submitted would be resisted, if necessary, by open force. The President, Governor Walker, and all parties, had promised that the const.i.tution, when framed, would be submitted to a popular vote. How not to do it, and yet appear to do it, was a problem worthy of a gang of swindlers, and yet the feeling was so strong in administration circles, that the plan devised as below given was cordially approved by the cabinet and acquiesced in by the President.
The const.i.tution adopted by the convention provided: "The right of property is before and higher than any const.i.tutional sanction, and the right of the owner of a slave to such slave and its increase is the same and as inviolable as the right of the owner of any property whatever." Another provision of the const.i.tution was that it could not be amended until after the year 1864, and even then no alteration should "be made to affect the rights of property in the ownership of slaves."
The election was to be held on December 21, 1857. The people might vote for the "const.i.tution with slavery" or the "const.i.tution with no slavery." In either event, by the express terms of the const.i.tution, slavery was established for a time in Kansas and the doctrine of the Dred Scott case was to be embodied in our laws.
No opportunity was offered to the people to vote against the const.i.tution.
It is difficult to characterize in proper terms the infamy of these proceedings. The Free State party would take no part in the proposed election on December 21, and it resulted, for the const.i.tution with slavery, 6,226 votes, of which 2,720 were proven to be fraudulent; for the const.i.tution without slavery, 589. Governor Walker promptly denounced the outrage. He said: "I consider such a submission of the question a vile fraud, a base counterfeit, and a wretched device to prevent the people voting even on the slavery question." "I will not support it," he continued, "but I will denounce it, no matter whether the administration sustains it or not."
Mr. Buchanan supported the scheme after the const.i.tution had been adopted by the convention. The elections in the fall preceding were favorable to the Democrats, and Mr. Buchanan was naturally encouraged to hope that his party had regained popular ascendancy, but the Lecompton juggle created a profound impression in the north, and divided the Democratic party to a greater extent than did the Kansas-Nebraska bill, especially in the northwest and in Ohio, where the feeling of resentment was almost universal. Mr. Douglas, the great leader for the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, took immediate ground against the pro-slavery plan, and protested to the President against it. An open breach occurred between them.
When Congress a.s.sembled, the Lecompton scheme became the supreme subject for debate. Mr. Douglas a.s.sumed at once the leadership of the opposition to that measure. He said: "Up to the time of meeting of the convention, in October last, the pretense was kept up, the profession was openly made, and believed by me, and I thought believed by them, that the convention intended to submit a const.i.tution to the people, and not to attempt to put a government into operation without such a submission." But instead of that, "All men must vote for the const.i.tution, whether they like it or not, in order to be permitted to vote for or against slavery."
Again he said: "I have asked a very large number of the gentlemen who framed the const.i.tution, quite a number of delegates, and still a larger number of persons who are their friends, and I have received the same answer from every one of them. . . . They say if they allowed a negative vote the const.i.tution would have been voted down by an overwhelming majority, and hence the fellows should not be allowed to vote at all." He denounced it as "a trick, a fraud upon the rights of the people."
Governor Walker declared: "I state it as a fact, based on a long and intimate a.s.sociation with the people of Kansas, that an overwhelming majority of that people are opposed" to the Lecompton const.i.tution, "and my letters state that but one out of twenty of the press of Kansas sustains it. . . . Any attempt by Congress to force this const.i.tution upon the people of Kansas will be an effort to subst.i.tute the will of a small minority for that of an overwhelming majority of the people."
On the 28th of January, 1858, during the debate on the Lecompton const.i.tution, I made an elaborate speech, entering fully into the history of that const.i.tution and the events that preceded it, and closed as follows:
"In conclusion, allow me to impress the south with two important warnings she has received in her struggle for Kansas. One is, that though her able and disciplined leaders on this floor, aided by executive patronage, may give her the power to overthrow legislative compacts, yet, while the st.u.r.dy integrity of the northern ma.s.ses stands in her way, she can gain no practical advantage by her well- laid schemes. The other is, that while she may indulge with impunity the spirit of filibusterism, or lawless and violent adventure, upon a feeble and distracted people in Mexico and Central American, she must not come in contact with that cool, determined courage and resolution which forms the striking characteristic of the Anglo- Saxon race. In such a contest, her hasty and impetuous violence may succeed for a time, but the victory will be short-lived and transient, and leave nothing but bitterness behind. Let us not war with each other; but with the grasp of fellowship and friendship, regarding to the full each other"s rights, and kind to each other"s faults, let us go hand in hand in securing to every portion of our people their const.i.tutional rights."
I may as well here briefly follow the progress and end of the Kansas controversy. Mr. Stanton, the acting governor in the absence of Governor Walker, convened an extra session of the territorial legislature, in which the Free State men had a majority. The legislature provided for an election to be held January 4, 1858, at which a fair vote might be taken on the const.i.tution. At this election the vote stood: For the const.i.tution with slavery, 138; for the const.i.tution without slavery, 24; against the const.i.tution, 10,226.
Notwithstanding this decisive evidence of the opposition to the Lecompton const.i.tution by the people of Kansas, Mr. Buchanan sent a copy of it to Congress, and, recommending the admission of Kansas under that organic act, said:
"It has been solemnly adjudged, by the highest judicial tribunal known to our laws, that slavery exists in Kansas by virtue of the const.i.tution of the United States. Kansas is therefore at this moment as much a slave state as Georgia or South Carolina."
During the controversy Gen. Denver, a conservative Democrat, a native of Virginia, long a resident of Ohio and a representative from California in the 34th Congress, was appointed Governor of Kansas. His predecessors, four of his own party, Reeder, Shannon, Walker and Stanton, had been either removed or compelled to resign, every one refusing to execute the extreme pro-slavery policy of the President. His efforts to secure justice to the citizens of Kansas would in all probability have led to his removal, but the march of events withdrew the question involved from the people of Kansas to the halls of Congress. The policy of the administration was driving a wedge into the Democratic party. The bill for the admission of Kansas under the Lecompton const.i.tution pa.s.sed the Senate by a vote of 33 yeas to 25 nays, four northern Democrats and two southern Americans voting with the Republicans against it.
In the House of Representatives, composed of 128 Democrats, 92 Republicans and 14 Americans, the bill was defeated by the adoption of an amendment which provided that the Lecompton const.i.tution should be submitted to a vote of the people of Kansas, but this amendment was disagreed to by the Senate, and the disagreement was referred to a committee of conference. The result was the adoption of a subst.i.tute known as the English bill. This bill, though faulty, and partisan, provided for the admission of Kansas under the Lecompton const.i.tution, but provided also for a submission of the English bill to a vote of the people of Kansas. On the 2nd of August a vote was taken in Kansas, and 11,300, out of a total vote of 13,088, were cast against the English proposition. Thus the Lecompton const.i.tution and the English bill were defeated, the exclusion of slavery made absolute, and the State of Kansas admitted into the Union as a free state, under a const.i.tution approved by the people, but not until January 29, 1861.
This memorable result was the turning point of the slavery controversy.
The people of the south hastened preparations for a dissolution of the Union and a civil war. The Confederate congress, meeting four days later, on February 9, elected Jefferson Davis as its president, he having resigned as United States Senator, January 21, 1861, eight days before Kansas was admitted to the Union.
I have given much s.p.a.ce to this Kansas controversy, for I wish to impress upon the readers of this volume that the war was not caused by agitation for the abolition of slavery, but by aggressive measures for the extension of slavery over free territory. A large and influential cla.s.s of southern men were born politicians, and were mainly slaveholders. They had, from the beginning of the government, a large influence, and held more public offices of chief importance than their northern a.s.sociates. They were constantly complaining of opinions expressed by a comparatively few Abolitionists against slavery, while the great body of the north were either indifferent to or sympathized with them in their opposition to the Abolitionists.
CHAPTER VII.
RECOLLECTIONS OF THE FINANCIAL PANIC OF 1857.
Its Effect on the State Banks--My Maiden Speech in Congress on National Finances--Appointed a Member of the Committee on Naval Affairs--Investigation of the Navy Department and its Results--Trip to Europe with Mrs. Sherman--We Visit Bracklin"s Bridge, Made Famous by Sir Walter Scott--Ireland and the Irish--I Pay a Visit to Parliament and Obtain Ready Admission--Notable Places in Paris Viewed With Senator Sumner--The Battlefield of Magenta--Return Home.
In the summer of 1857 there occurred one of those periodical revulsions which seem to come after a term of apparent prosperity.
On the 24th of August the Ohio Life Insurance & Trust Company failed. That single event, in itself unimportant, indicated an unhealthy condition of trade, caused by reckless speculation, high prices, the construction of railroads in advance of their need, a great increase of imports, and the excessive development of cities and towns. All credits were expanded. The immediate results of the panic were the suspension of credits, the diminution of imports, the failure of banks, and the general or partial suspension or lessening of all industries. The revenues of the government were greatly diminished.
On the 1st of July, 1857, the balance in the treasury was $17,710,000.
On the 1st of July, 1858, the balance was reduced to $6,398,000, and during the year preceding, the United States borrowed $10,000,000.
On the 1st of July, 1859, the surplus was reduced to $4,320,000, and during the year preceding the United States borrowed $20,774,000.
This sudden change in the financial condition of the treasury was an indication of a like or greater change in the condition of every person engaged in productive industries.
The panic especially affected the state banks. These banks were authorized by the laws of several states to issue notes as money payable on demand, with no common system or methods of redemption, and varying in value according to the solvency of the banks issuing them. The banks in a few of the states maintained their notes at par, or at a small discount, but the great body of the notes could circulate only in the states where issued, and then only because their people could get no other money in exchange for their products.
The necessities created by the Civil War compelled the United States to borrow large sums, and to aid in this a national currency was provided, concerning which a statement of the measures adopted will be made hereafter. It is sufficient here to state that the national currency adopted proved one of the most beneficial results of the war.
The financial stringency of 1857 led to a careful scrutiny of appropriations for the support of the government.
On the 27th of May, 1858, I expressed my views in respect to the expenditures of the United States. This speech was the first effort I made in Congress to deal with the finances of the national government. In the previous Congresses I had devoted my time to the struggle in Kansas. At the meeting of the 35th Congress, I naturally turned to the condition of the finances, then the paramount subject of interest in the country, and, especially in Ohio, devoting most of my time to a careful study thereof. The speech referred to on national finances was the result of much labor, and I believe it will bear favorable scrutiny even at this late day. It certainly attracted the attention of my colleagues, and no doubt led to my transfer, at the next Congress, to the committee of ways and means.
In this speech I state fully the increase of expenditures and the diminution of the revenues, and the then condition of the treasury.
I quote as follows:
"And yet, sir, for this alarming condition of the public finances, the administration has no measures of relief except loan bills and paper money in the form of treasury notes. No provision is made for their payment; no measure of retrenchment and reform; but these acc.u.mulated difficulties are thrust upon the future, with the improvidence of a young spendthrift. While the secretary is waiting to foresee contingencies, we are prevented by a party majority from inst.i.tuting reform. If we indicate even the commencement of retrenchment, or point out abuses, on this side of the House, we are at once a.s.sailed by members of the committee of ways and means."
I cited the abuses and usurpations of the executive departments in diverting specific appropriations to purposes not authorized by law. I said: "The theory of our government is, that a specific sum shall be appropriated by a _law_ originating in this House, for a specific purpose, and within a given fiscal year. It is the duty of the executive to use that sum, and no more, especially for that purpose, and no other, and within the time fixed."
I pointed out cases where the departments a.s.sumed the power to transfer appropriations made for one purpose, to other purposes in the same department. Another abuse by the executive departments was the habit of making contracts in advance of appropriations, thus, without law, compelling Congress to sanction them or violate the public faith. All these evils have since been remedied by restrictive legislation. The habit of the Senate to load down appropriation bills with amendments already refused by the House of Representatives, and then insist that, if not agreed to, the bill would fail, was more frequent then than now, but under the practice now established an amendment finally disagreed to by either House is abandoned.