He wrote to Mr. Cameron, Secretary of War, from St. Louis, on May 8, 1861:
"I hold myself now, as always, prepared to serve my country in the capacity for which I was trained. I did not and will not volunteer for three months, because I cannot throw my family on the cold support of charity, but for the three years" call made by the President an officer could prepare his command and do good service.
I will not volunteer, because, rightfully or wrongfully, I feel myself unwilling to take a mere private"s place, and having for many years lived in California and Louisiana, the men are not well enough acquainted with me to elect me to my appropriate place.
Should my services be needed, the record or the war department will enable you to designate the station in which I can render best service."
When Mr. Lincoln was elected President, there was no general feeling among the northern people that war would result from his election.
It was not believed, although it had been threatened, that the southern states would take up arms to resist the accession of a President not of their choice. The love of Union and the orderly obedience to const.i.tuted authority had been so well established among our people that, while politicians might threaten, but few really believed that war, of which they knew nothing, was to come upon us. The result was that when the southern states, one by one, seceded, and Fort Sumter was fired upon, and the forts and a.r.s.enals of the south were captured, a new inspiration dawned upon the people of the north, a determination became general that, cost what it would, the Union should be preserved to our children and our children"s children. That feeling was not confined to party lines.
I am bound to say that the members of the Democratic party in the loyal States, in the main, evinced the same patriotic determination to maintain the cause of the Union, as those of the Republican party. Their sons and their kindred formed part of every regiment or force raised in the United States.
At this distance of time from the opening of the Civil War, I have endeavored to take an impartial retrospect of the causes that led the south to engage therein. Undoubtedly, the existence of negro slavery in the south was the governing excitement to war. The owners of slaves knew that the tenure of such property was feeble.
Besides the danger of escape, there was the growing hostility to slavery in a preponderance of the people of the United States, restrained only by its recognition by the const.i.tution. The slave owners believed that, by secession, they could establish a republic, founded on slavery, with an ample field in Mexico and Central America for conquest and expansion. They had cultivated a bitter sectional enmity, amounting to contempt, for the people of the north, growing partly out of the subserviency of large portions of the north to the dictation of the south, but chiefly out of the wordy violence and disregard of const.i.tutional obligation by the Abolitionists of the north. They believed in the doctrine of an irrepressible conflict long before it was announced by Seward.
South Carolina, far in advance of other southern states, led in promulgating the legal rights of secession, until they came to be acquiesced in by all these states. They committed themselves to it in the Charleston convention. Their speakers declared, during the canva.s.s, that if Lincoln was elected, their states would secede.
When elected, the first gun was fired on Fort Sumter, in South Carolina, where all the people were determined on war. The struggle once commenced, the natural sympathy of the southern states was with South Carolina. The States of Virginia, North Carolina and Tennessee, where a strong Union sentiment prevailed, hesitated and delayed, but the young and active spirits were with the south, and these carried the states named into the general conflict. Once in the war, there was no way but to fight it out. I have no sympathy with secession, but I can appreciate the action of those who were born and reared under the influence of such teachings. Who of the north can say, that in like conditions, he would not have been a rebel?
Looking back from my standpoint now, when all the states are re- united in a stronger Union, when Union and Confederate soldiers are acting together in both Houses of Congress in legislating for the common good, when, since 1861, our country has more than doubled its population and quadrupled its resources, when its inst.i.tutions have been harmonized by the abolition of slavery, when the seceding states are entering into a friendly and hopeful rivalry, in the development of their great resources, when they have doubled or trebled their production of cotton, when they are producing the greater part of their food, when they are developing their manufactures of iron and steel, and introducing the spindle and loom into the cities and villages, it seems to me that men of the south surely will appreciate, if they do not approve, what I said in the Senate early in the war:
"I would stake the last life, the last dollar, the last man, upon the prosecution of the war. Indeed, I cannot contemplate the condition of my country if it shall be dissevered and divided.
Take the loyal states as they now stand and look at the map of the United States, and regard two hostile confederacies stretching along for thousands of miles across the continent. Do you not know that the normal condition of such a state of affairs would be eternal, everlasting war? Two nations of the same blood, of the same lineage, of the same spirit, cannot occupy the same continent, much less standing side by side as rival nations, dividing rivers and mountains for their boundary. No, Mr. president, rather than allow this war to terminate except upon the restoration of the Union intact in all its breadth and length, I would sacrifice the last man and see the country itself submerged.
"Rather than yield to traitors or the intervention of foreign powers, rather than bequeath to the next generation a broken Union, and an interminable civil war, I would light the torch of fanaticism and destroy all that the labor of two generations has acc.u.mulated.
Better a desert and universal poverty than disunion; better the war of the French Revolution than an oligarchy founded upon the labor of slaves. But, sir, there is no need of this. The resources, wealth, and labor of twenty millions of freemen are amply sufficient to meet not only the physical, but financial, difficulties of the war. Thank G.o.d! the test to which all nations in the course of their history are subjected, is applied to us when we have a insignificant national debt; when our resources were never more manifest; when the loyal states are so throughly united; when our people are filled with a generous enthusiasm that will make the loss of life and burden of taxation easy to bear. If we conquer a peace by preserving the Union, the const.i.tution, our nationality, all our ample territories, the rebound of prosperity in this country will enable a single generation easily to pay the national debt, even if the war is protracted until desolation is written upon every rebel hearthstone."
This, I believe, expressed the spirit and determination of the loyal states of the north, at the beginning of the war. With opinions so widely divergent in the two sections, and with a fixed purpose of each to stand by them, there was no way that poor frail human nature could devise to decide the controversy except to fight.
From the graves of the dead, who fought on opposite sides for their country of their state, there has been a resurrection, honorable to both sections, a Union stronger, more united and glorious than the Union established by our fathers, and with a rebound of prosperity greater than we could conceive of in 1862. This war, though fearful in the sacrifice of property and life, has resulted in a better understanding among the people of both sections. Each has for the other a higher respect and regard. I sincerely hope and believe in the good time coming when sectional lines will not divide political parties, and common interests and a broader nationality will have destroyed sectional feeling and jealousy.
As the result of the war we command the respect of all foreign nations. The United States, as a great republic, has become an example already followed by European nations. It has at least secured the respect and forbearance of the ruling cla.s.s in Great Britain, who never forgot or forgave the rebellion of our ancestors against King George III and the parliament of Great Britain. It has stamped the language, the laws, and the boasted freedom of Englishmen, upon a population double that in the mother country, and they, in turn, are taking lessons from us in extending to their people equality of rights and privileges.
I remained in Washington a few days and then started for my home at Mansfield, to encourage enlistments, but found that no help was needed; that companies were enlisted in a day. One was recruited by William McLaughlin, a gallant soldier in the war in Mexico, a major general of the Ohio militia who had arrived at the age of sixty years. He dropped his law books and in twelve hours had a company of one hundred men ready to move at the command of the governor. A like patriotism was aroused in all parts of the state, so that in a very short time two full regiments, numbering 2,000 men, were organized under the command of Colonel A. McD. McCook, of the United States army, and were on the way to Washington, then blockaded by the roughs of Baltimore. I met them at Harrisburg and went with them to Philadelphia. They were camped at Fairmount Park, and were drilled with other regiments by Colonel Fitz John Porter, the entire force being under the command of General Patterson.
When the blockade was opened, by the skill and audacity of General Benjamin F. Butler, the two Ohio regiments were ordered to Washington and were there reviewed by President Lincoln, at which time a pleasant incident occurred which may be worthy of mention. I accompanied the President to the parade, and pa.s.sed with him down the line. He noticed a venerable man with long white hair and military bearing, standing in position at the head of his company with arms presented, and inquired his name. I said it was General McLaughlin and hurriedly told him his history, his politics and patriotism. The President, as he came opposite him, stopped, and leaving his party advanced to McLaughlin and extended his hand.
McLaughlin, surprised, had some difficulty in putting his sword under his left arm. They shook hands and Lincoln thanked him, saying when men of his age and standing came to the rescue of their country there could be no doubt of our success. McLaughlin highly appreciated this compliment. He afterwards enlisted for the war and died in the service of his country.
These two regiments were subsequently ordered to Harrisburg, to which place they went, accompanied by me, and there they formed a part of the command of General Patterson, which was to advance on Martinsburg and Winchester to aid in a movement of General McDowell against the enemy at Bull Run. I was serving on the staff of General Patterson as a volunteer aid without pay. While at Harrisburg it was suggested to me that ex-President Buchanan, then at his country home near that city, had expressed a wish to see me. As our personal relations had always been pleasant, though our political opinions were widely different, I called upon him, I think with Colonel Porter, and we were cordially received. I was surprised at the frankness and apparent sincerity of the opinions expressed by him in relation to the war. He said he had done all he could to prevent the war, but now that it was upon us it was the duty of all patriotic people to make it a success, that he approved all that had been done by Mr. Lincoln, of whom he spoke in high terms of praise. I believe he was sincere in the opinions he then expressed, and know of nothing said or done by him since that time that could create a doubt of his sincerity.
About the middle of June the command of General Patterson moved slowly to Chambersburg, where it remained several days under constant drill, then to Hagerstown and to the village of Williamsport on the Potomac. While at the latter place General Sherman, who had been at Washington and received his commission as colonel of the 13th United States infantry, then being recruited, came to visit me at my lodgings in a country tavern. He then met for the first time in many years his old cla.s.smate, Colonel, afterwards Major- General, George H. Thomas, who then commanded a regular regiment of the United States army in the force under the command of General Patterson. The conversation of these two officers, who were to be so intimately a.s.sociated in great events in the future, was very interesting. They got a big map of the United States, spread it on the floor, and on their hands and knees discussed the probable salient strategic places of the war. They singled out Richmond, Vicksburg, Nashville, Knoxville and Chattanooga. To me it has always appeared strange that they were able confidently and correctly to designate the lines of operations and strategic points of a war not yet commenced, and more strange still that they should be leading actors in great battles at the places designated by them at this country tavern.
The next day General Thomas crossed the river into Virginia, but the order was soon countermanded, it is said, by General Scott, and General Thomas returned to the north bank of the Potomac.
General Sherman returned to Washington to drill his raw troops for the battle of Bull Run. I soon after returned by stage to Frederick, Maryland, to take my seat in the Senate, Congress having been convened to meet in special session on the 4th of July.
CHAPTER XI.
SPECIAL SESSION OF CONGRESS TO PROVIDE FOR THE WAR.
Condition of the Treasury Immediately Preceding the War--Not Enough Money on Hand to Pay Members of Congress--Value of Fractional Silver of Earlier Coinage--Largely Increased Revenues an Urgent Necessity --Lincoln"s Message and Appeal to the People--Issue of New Treasury Notes and Bonds--Union Troops on the Potomac--Battle of Bull Run-- Organization of the "Sherman Brigade"--The President"s Timely Aid --Personnel of the Brigade.
To understand the measures to be submitted to Congress at its approaching session, it is necessary to have a clear conception of the condition of the treasury at that time, and of the established financial policy of the government immediately before the war.
On the meeting of Congress in December, 1860, the treasury was empty. There was not enough money even to pay Members of Congress.
The revenues were not sufficient to meet the demands for ordinary expenditures in time of peace. Since 1857 money had been borrowed by the sale of bonds and the issue of treasury notes bearing interest, to meet deficiencies. The public debt had increased during the administration of Mr. Buchanan about $70,000,000. The Secretary of the Treasury, Howell Cobb, resigned on the 10th of December, 1860, declaring that his duty to Georgia required such action. He had aided in every possible way to cripple the department while in charge of it.
On the 16th of the same month Congress authorized the issue of $10,000,000 treasury notes, to bear interest at the lowest rate bid.
On the 18th Secretary Philip F. Thomas, Mr. Cobb"s successor, invited bids for $5,000,000 of treasury notes, part of the $10,000,000 authorized, at the rate of interest offered by the lowest bidder.
Offers at 12 per cent. or less were made for $1,831,000 (the bulk of the offers being at 12 per cent.) which were accepted and additional offers were received at interest varying from 15 to 36 per cent., but were refused. Immediately after the decision of the department on these offers was announced, the a.s.sistant treasurer at New York advised the secretary that certain parties would take the residue of the $5,000,000 offered, through the Bank of Commerce, at 12 per cent. This proposition was accepted, on condition that the amount required to make up the five millions should be deposited without delay. The whole amount was applied to the payment of overdue treasury notes and other pressing demands on the treasury.
Secretary Thomas resigned on the 11th of January, 1861, and John A. Dix became Secretary of the Treasury. In answer to my inquiry Secretary Dix, in an official letter, dated January 18, 1861, stated the terms of the sale of treasury notes and that: "The amount required to meet the outstanding current and accruing dues before the close of the present fiscal year, besides any additional charges on the treasury created by legislation during the present session of Congress, is $44,077,524.63." He recommended a further issue of $25,000,000 of bonds, and suggested that the states which had received deposits under the act for the distribution of surplus revenue in General Jackson"s time might be called upon to return such deposits, and added: "If, instead of calling for these deposits, it should be deemed advisable to pledge them for the repayment of any money the government might find it necessary to borrow, a loan contracted on such a basis of security, superadding to the plighted faith of the United States that of the individual states, could hardly fail to be acceptable to capitalists."
In this connection I received the following note:
"Treasury Department, February 6, 1861.
"Hon. John Sherman.
"Dear Sir:--I send a preamble and resolution, and a letter to your governor. Will you read and send them at once? You, as a Member of Congress, can say what I cannot with propriety--that no states which guarantee bonds of the United States to the amount of the public moneys in its hands, will be likely to be called on to repay these moneys--at all events during the twenty years the bonds of the United States will run.
"I am truly yours, "John A. Dix.
"P. S.--I cannot put out my notice for a loan till your state acts, and the time is very short."
Subsequently I received the following letter:
"Treasury Department, February 11, 1861, 7 p. m.
"Dear Sir:--My plan for raising money to meet the outstanding liabilities of the government, and to enable the incoming administration to carry on its financial operations without embarra.s.sment till it shall have time to mature a plan for itself, has met with an obstacle quite unexpected to me. The committee of ways and means in the House has declined to report a bill to authorize me to accept the guaranties voluntarily tendered by the states. Mr. Spaulding, of New York, and Mr. Morrill, of Vermont, I learn, have objections.
Unless they withdraw their opposition the bill cannot be reported, and the plan must fail. In that case I shall not deem it proper to ask for a loan of more than two millions to meet the redemption of treasury notes, which fall due before the 4th of March. The state of the country is such that a larger amount thrown on the market would have a most disastrous influence on the public credit.
I do not think I can borrow two millions at more than 90 per cent.
With a guaranty such as the states have offered, I can get eight millions at par. The alternative is to authorize me to accept the guaranty, or leave the treasury with scarcely anything in it and with outstanding demands, some of them very pressing, of at least six millions of dollars, for you and your political friends to provide for. If anything is done it should be to-morrow, as I ought to publish the notice on Wednesday. Perhaps you can see the gentlemen referred to to-night and remove their objections. I am, very truly, your obedient servant,
"John A. Dix."
On the 8th of February, 1861, a bill became a law providing for the sale of $20,000,000 six per cent. bonds, and these were sold at the rate of $89.10 for $100, yielding $18,415,000.
Such was the humiliating financial condition of the government of the United States at the close of Mr. Buchanan"s administration.
The expenditures of the government for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1861, were $84,577,258.60, of which $42,064,082.95 was procured from loans and treasury notes, leaving a balance in the treasury, at the close of the fiscal year 1861, of $2,395,635.21. This condition still existed when Congress subsequently met in special session.
Under the sub-treasury laws then in force, the revenues of the government were received and held only in the treasury at Washington, and in sub-treasuries located in a few of the princ.i.p.al cities of the United States, and could be paid out only upon the draft of the treasurer of the United States, drawn agreeably to appropriations made by law. No money could be received into the treasury except gold and silver coin of the United States, and such treasury notes as were receivable for bonds. State bank notes were not received for government dues. This exclusion grew out of the general failure of banks after the War of 1812 and the panic of 1837, and had caused the outcry in 1840 of: "Gold for the office holders; rags for the people." But this policy of the government to receive only its own coin or notes was sustained by popular opinion.
Silver dollars were not in circulation in 1861. Their issue was provided for at the beginning of our government, but, as they were most of the time more valuable than gold coin of like face value, they were h.o.a.rded or exported. Their coinage was suspended by an order of President Jefferson in 1805, and after this order only 1,300 silver dollars were coined by the United States prior to 1836. From 1836 to 1861 silver dollars were coined in small quant.i.ties, the aggregate being less than one and one-half million, and they were generally exported. It is probable that when Mr.
Chase became Secretary of the Treasury, there was not in the United States one thousand silver dollars. In 1853, and prior to that year, fractional silver coins were worth for bullion more than their face value, and, therefore, did not circulate. Small change was scarce, and fractional notes, called "shinplasters," were issued in many parts of the United States. Mexican coin, debased and worn, was in circulation. To remedy this evil Congress, by the act of February 21, 1853, during Pierce"s administration, prescribed the weight of the silver half dollar as 192 grains instead of 206 grains, fixed by the coinage act of 1792, and the weight of the quarter, dime and half dime of silver was reduced in the same proportion. As these new coins were less valuable than gold at the rate coined, they were made a legal tender in payment of debts only for sums not exceeding five dollars. The silver bullion for these coins was purchased at market value, and the privilege theretofore granted to a depositor of silver bullion to have it coined for him was repealed. This law had the beneficial effect of driving out of circulation "shinplasters" and worn coins, and supplied in ample quant.i.ty new full weight silver coins of handsome device, the government receiving the profit of the difference between the market value of the silver and its coinage value.
Under this law the coinage of silver rapidly increased, so that, within two years after the pa.s.sage of the act of 1853, more silver was converted into fractional coins and was in active use among the people than was contained in all the silver dollars coined under "free coinage" from the beginning of the government to 1878.
While silver was thus made useful to the fullest extent possible, it was, from its weight and bulk, inadequate and inconvenient for the vast demands of the government during the war. Silver and gold together could not meet this demand. There was known to be in the country at that time, of specie in circulation, $250,000,000, of state bank notes, $180,000,000, in all $430,000,000. This amount, experience had shown, was necessary to meet exchanges in ordinary times of peace. The disturbance of a civil war would likely stimulate production for a time and require even more circulation for current business. This circulation, if drawn from its ordinary channels, would bring no end of confusion and distress to the people, and the government, to meet the demand occasioned by carrying on a war, must look elsewhere for a circulating medium with which to meet its enormous disburs.e.m.e.nts which must necessarily be made almost wholly in actual cash--checks being, from the character of payments, of little avail.
There was no escaping the issue of credit money in some form, and of whatever form adopted we knew that gold and silver would soon disappear under the shadow of war--that they would be h.o.a.rded or exported.
This is the universal result of great wars long protracted. It was our experience during our Revolution and the War of 1812, and of Great Britain and all European nations during the Napoleonic wars. What should take the place of gold and silver for currency?
The only answer was to subst.i.tute for the time the notes of the United States, with all the sanction and credit which the republic could confer, in the place of coin. We could not, with safety, accept bank notes issued by state corporations, varying in terms and credit according to the laws of twenty-three separate states.
To establish a credit of our bonds and notes these measures at least were necessary: First, to increase largely the revenues from customs duties to be paid in coin; second, impose all forms of internal taxes authorized by the const.i.tution; third, create a national currency redeemable in coin, with no fixed time for redemption, but made a legal tender for all debts, public and private, except customs duties; fourth, borrow any moneys needed on the most favorable terms possible.
On the 4th of July, 1861, the Senate convened in compliance with the proclamation of the President, from whom it received a message containing a clear statement of the events that followed his inaugural address. He described the attack upon Fort Sumter and said: