The phenomena upon which Driesch lays considerable stress are those which occur upon a division of certain living embryos. An embryo, when cut in half, displays remarkable powers of self-adjustment and continued development. Each half can, as it were, regulate itself, and make a fresh start; a process which results in two self-contained organisms, though of smaller size than would have resulted from a single undivided organism. The cells which compose the organism seem able to adapt themselves to whatever demands are made upon them. Like workmen building a bridge, all of them _can_ do every single act--if need arise--and the result of their labours is a perfect bridge, even if some of the workmen fall sick or are killed or injured in an accident.

Driesch sums up the results of his researches by saying:

"There is something in the organism"s behaviour--in the widest sense of the word--which is opposed to an inorganic resolution of the same (i.e.

to its complete expression in terms of chemistry and physics), and which shows that the living organism is more than a sum or aggregate of its parts; that it is insufficient to call the organism "a typically combined body" (i.e., a machine), without further explanation."[73]

THE PROBLEM OF LIFE.--The problem is: What is it in an organism which causes it to behave in a fashion so impossible for any machine? To answer this question satisfactorily would be to have solved the mystery of life. Biologists do not answer the question; they do not say what this peculiar potency is, but they give it a name. Driesch calls it _entelechy_, i.e. "purposiveness," and he also speaks of _psychoids_, i.e. "primitive minds." Names do not carry us very far; but the mere fact that biologists have gone to the trouble of providing a name, is important. It const.i.tutes an admission on their part that there is something mysterious about the organism; for it has been a principle of modern science since the days of Galileo never to appeal to mysterious causes if known ones can be found. The _deus ex machina_ method seems to them fundamentally unsound, and so it is. If every difficulty were considered solved merely by the word "mystery," knowledge would never advance. Labelled ignorance is still ignorance. It is not names, but things that are important. But in this particular instance the application of the name _entelechy_ indicates that, in the opinion of such an authority as Driesch, at any rate, something exists which no merely physical or chemical term can completely describe. And Driesch is typical of the trend of much modern biology. It is only the very extreme optimists who now look for a final explanation of the living organism in terms of physics and chemistry.

RESULTS OF THE NEW BIOLOGY.--But if life resists all attempts to reduce it to matter and motion, we are confronted with the breakdown of the mechanical theory of the universe, which has been slowly but progressively elaborated since the days of Leonardo da Vinci, and applied impartially to the organic and the inorganic spheres. But this ultra-dogmatic theory now seems too cramped to contain the facts; even scientists resent the claims of materialist-mechanical orthodoxy. Some indeed adopt not merely a critical, but a provocative att.i.tude, and seek to discredit the prestige of mechanics. Professor J. S. Haldane not only vindicates the freedom, but prophesies the speedy advance of biology to a position of pre-eminence. Not only are biological phenomena irreducible to terms of mechanics, but it is mechanics that will have to be re-interpreted in terms of biology.

"It is at least evident that the extension of biological conceptions to the whole of nature may be much nearer than seemed conceivable even a few years ago. When the day of that extension comes, the physical and chemical world as we now conceive it--the world of atoms and energy--will be recognised as nothing but an appearance ... it will stand confessed as a world of abstractions like that of the pure mathematicians."[74]

THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY.--Not only physical and biological, but psychological science will contribute very largely to the reconstruction of view which is now taking place. Particular attention is due to those branches of psychology which deal experimentally with the subconscious, with instincts, with the phenomena of thought transference, psychotherapy, and of so-called "spiritualism." In none of these spheres can research yet be said to have proceeded far enough to justify the luxury of dogmatising over results. Considerable confusion of opinion may still exist, but it is now generally recognised that there is a wide sphere of research in psychical regions which is practically a _terra incognita_.

And those most competent to judge of results seem to be most cautious in their statements. We are in the position of not knowing what a day may bring forth; and an expectant agnosticism with regard to many problems is perhaps the right att.i.tude to adopt. The somewhat arrogant negations of the last generation are now out of place; they were never, in the strict sense, scientific, and they are now demodes. It is extremely difficult to imagine a return to the view which dismisses "mind"

from the universe as being an obscure by-product of matter, or a comparatively insignificant "epiphenomenon" accompanying certain obscure chemical or mechanical processes. The old theories, gratifying in their simplicity, will no longer cover the facts.

PSYCHICAL RESEARCH.--One particular branch of experimental psychology, which has attracted a large measure of public attention, calls for a few remarks. The attempt has been made to give experimental proof of the existence of "disembodied spirits," human or otherwise. The whole subject, exceptionally exposed as it is to the influence of prejudices of various kinds, requires to be treated with great caution, and it is inadvisable, in the present condition of the problem, to make dogmatic statements in any direction.

What appears to be certain is that the occurrence is well established of various _phenomena_ which it is extremely difficult to explain in accordance with our present knowledge of matter, of s.p.a.ce, or of mental action.

The occurrence of such phenomena is no longer disputed; but it is over the _explanation_ of them that controversy is active. And it seems quite certain that the very least in the way of concessions that these new facts will force from conservative scientists is _a radical revision of current notions of the range of human mental action_. The mind is evidently capable of producing certain effects--even upon matter--which would have seemed incredible a short while ago.

So much is the least that may be expected. But in the view of many competent and highly scientific observers, some far more radical revision of our notions may be necessary. Some scientists of good repute (e.g. Sir Oliver Lodge, in England, and Flammarion and others on the Continent) are convinced that the facts can only adequately be explained by reference to another world--interlocked, as it were, with this.[75]

And it has to be admitted that this, what may be called more "advanced"

explanation, is more in accordance than the other with a rather universal tradition or a.s.sumption of mankind in all ages.

It will be easily seen that the whole subject is one of the most extreme difficulty. There is a general hesitancy in accepting what is called the "spirit hypothesis," so long as any other can be found; a hesitancy justified in view of the extreme complexity of the world we live in (where so much is even yet unknown), and in view of the great difficulty which there seems to be in adducing _exact_ proofs of the "spirit theory."

A REASONABLE ATt.i.tUDE.--We shall, no doubt, be wise at present to refuse to cry "Proven," and whilst admitting that all things are possible--perhaps even probable--to await with patience the results of further investigation.

It has to be admitted that, while many people are superst.i.tious and easily attracted by picturesque theories, there are others who are as prejudiced, in their way, against new ideas, as were those astronomers who, being committed to Ptolemaic views, refused to look through Galileo"s telescope. It is not only theologians who have, in the history of thought, been guilty of obscurantism. In the early days of hypnotic experiments the scientific world in general "pooh-poohed" the idea of hypnotism; and it took a considerable time before it would allow itself to be convinced that such a thing was possible. Facts, in the end, were too strong even for prejudice. It is facts, eventually, that decide matters; and, no doubt, before a very long period has elapsed, sufficient facts will have acc.u.mulated to allow the scientific world to form more definite and better-grounded opinions than are possible to-day.

Meanwhile, the ordinary man will do well to remember that the universe is really a very wonderful place, and that the knowledge of the wisest of us about it can only be described as infinitesimal. The traditions of nineteenth-century materialism are still strong amongst us, even with those who are least conscious of them. But there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in that philosophy.

RESULTS.--These new conceptions of matter, of life, and of mind, which are the products of the new physics, the new biology, and the new psychology respectively, may be confidently left to themselves to work out their own salvation. They have the strength of youth. What is evident is that we have crossed the threshold of a new era in the history of science. The outlook of the future will be as different from that of the recent past as was the new science of Galileo, Descartes, and Newton from the dogmatic but fanciful notions which the Scholastic theologians had borrowed from Aristotle, and sought to impose as a permanent revelation.

The current of thought is never stayed. The future is obscure, but one thing is certain, that the coming generations will see catastrophic changes in the outlook of science; and the materialistic and mechanistic _weltanschauung_, which lately seemed so formidable, may soon become as superannuated as astrology. The theory which overshadowed the religious life of a century, and which had become more and more menacing as scientific knowledge increased in extent and popularity, has fallen into discredit. Its prestige will not revive.

CHAPTER XIII

SOME FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

VALUE OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.--It may perhaps be felt that our protracted excursion has not advanced us far beyond the position at which we stood in the opening chapter. Indeed, the history of philosophy may seem not to establish any very definite conclusions; and those who study the subject in the hope that it will supply them with material for dogmatising are likely to be disappointed. We have to reconcile ourselves to the fact that the riddle of the universe has as yet received no final solution at the hands of the metaphysicians. It is only too evident that, as the poet says:

"Our little systems have their day, They have their day, and cease to be."

And yet it would be an error to suppose that this lack of finality about philosophical opinion, or the want of unanimity among philosophers, indicates that no progress has been made. There are certain landmarks in the history of philosophy--such as Kant"s _Critique of Pure Reason_--which mark a point behind which we shall not again regress (a.s.suming that our culture and civilisation is preserved). Even if we have not grasped the whole truth about things yet, we are still justified in a.s.suming that we are gradually, if painfully, getting nearer to the goal.

But surely we are ent.i.tled to believe that it is not the crude appet.i.te for metaphysical dogma that attracts men to the history of philosophy.

Its fascination rather resembles that of the history of religion: both are, as it were, Odysseys of the human spirit; nor is there any activity of man that has not its appeal to the human heart: for _cor ad cor loquitur_.

And, again, we should reflect that those who ask for final conclusions, forget that the _search_ for truth may be, in and for itself, of the highest spiritual value. The best starting-point for the history of philosophy is a famous pa.s.sage from Lessing.

"Not the truth which is at the disposal of every man, but the honest pains he has taken to come at the truth make the worth of a man. For not through the possession, but through the pursuit of truth do his powers increase, and in this alone consists his ever-increasing perfection.

Possession makes us quiet, indolent, proud.... If G.o.d with all truth in His right hand, and in His left the single, unceasing striving after truth, even though coupled with the condition that I should ever and always err, came to me and said, "Choose!" I would in all humility clasp this left hand and say, "Father, give me this! Is not pure truth for Thee alone?""[76]

But there is another respect in which some knowledge of the history of thought may be an important advantage. It may not bestow upon us the liberty of dogmatising ourselves, but it does bestow upon us a certain imperturbability in the face of the dogmatisms of others. Airs of systematic omniscience, "the pride of a pretended knowledge," will leave us unimpressed and undismayed. The latest pretentious product of popular philosophy will, in the majority of cases, be recognised as an old heresy in a new garb; "new" thought will not impress (at least, by its novelty) those who know that it is old.

But it is against the crudities of materialistic naturalism that even a slight acquaintance with the history of ideas will form an antidote. The various exposures of it, from Hume and Kant to Bergson, will be to some extent familiar; and it will be a recognised fact that its chief popular attraction is at the same time its chief philosophic weakness; and this is that it is nothing more or less than a systematisation of the prejudices of common sense. "As a theory of first principles, the best that can be said of its pretensions is that they are ridiculous."[77]

SOME DEDUCTIONS FROM HISTORY.--But, it may be asked, what definite conclusions have the foregoing chapters to offer? Some, if we are not mistaken, of a genuinely positive character. It will be necessary to recall certain facts and reflections to the minds of our readers.

In the early chapters we noted the rise of an independent science, and the collapse of the medieval world view with which popular religious notions were a.s.sociated so closely, that many conservative thinkers expected to see both involved in a common ruin. Science seemed to threaten the existence of a religion bound up with conceptions of s.p.a.ce and of force which were being brought into discredit.

These misgivings turned out, however, to be ill-founded. Certain advantages, no doubt, of simplicity and definiteness, which had belonged to the old notions, had been irrecoverably lost; but thinkers like Giordano Bruno showed that the conception of an infinite universe was by no means hostile to religion; but that, on the contrary, it might be a conception of the highest spiritual value. Such are the sentiments expressed in some sonnets which precede Bruno"s dialogue "On the Infinite Universe."

"It seemed to Bruno as if he had never breathed freely until the limits of the universe had been extended to infinity, and the fixed spheres had disappeared. No longer now was there a limit to the flight of the spirit, no "so far and no further"; the narrow prison in which the old beliefs had confined men"s spirits had now to open its gates and let in the pure air of a new life."[78]

The scientific did not seem to him incompatible with a fundamentally religious conception of the world, at least for those who were not afraid "to take ship upon the seas of the infinite."

DANGERS OF THE "MECHANICAL VIEW."--Thus it was not _science_ that was hostile to religion. This was not the case until science began to be a.s.sociated with a certain fairly definite philosophy of a mechanistic, and later of a materialist, description. Religion could not have survived the final establishment of such a philosophy as this, for the indispensable element in a religious att.i.tude of life is the idea that _somehow there lies behind things a power or essence that has something in common with our own natures_--something that can, without an abuse of language, be called personal. Any philosophy that rules out this idea creates an atmosphere in which religion cannot breathe.

And it was just this atmosphere that the mechanistic view, unless amplified by considerations of another kind (as it was e.g. in the case of Spinoza) tended to create.

THE "MECHANICAL VIEW" NEVER UNCHALLENGED.--And with regard to this mechanistic philosophy, we have to observe that it never seems to have commended itself, as a final and complete solution, to the best minds.

In the seventeenth century, it will be remembered, the mechanical conception was transcended (though in entirely different ways) by Spinoza and by Leibniz, and the religious consciousness of the age, in the person of Pascal, protested against it.

And although, during the eighteenth century, this philosophy persisted, and was considerably reinforced (with the help of further discoveries in the realm of physics) by the school of Holbach and Diderot, yet it had still to face the radical criticism of Kant. This criticism, as we shall remember, indicated that the mechanical view is a way in which the human mind--owing to its const.i.tution--regards phenomena. If it is to understand them, the human mind cannot help viewing them in that fashion; it must subject things to the mould in which all its thought is cast. Mechanism is the _medium_ through which the mind understands phenomena. It belongs not to the things in themselves, but to our way of understanding them. And attached to this radical criticism of mechanical notions, was an idealistic philosophy of the most genuinely religious and spiritual character. Kantian idealism is one of those contributions to human thought behind which we shall not again regress. It is a phenomenon of incalculable value and importance.

The immediate results of Kant"s critical idealism was a luxuriant growth of a spiritual type of philosophy upon the ground he had cleared and prepared. Romanticism may be regarded as a revolt of those sides of human nature upon which the tyranny of mechanism pressed hardest--religion, speculation, poetry, music, art. "You may expel nature with a pitchfork, but she persists in returning." The Horatian remark is true also of the human mind; you may try to weed out religion and poetry, but your success will only be temporary; for nature herself is more persistent than the most earnest of materialists and (what is more) she outlives him.

And with regard to the materialist or mechanistic view, it is highly interesting to note that its greatest attraction has consisted in something which, strictly speaking, is not its own property. In the eighteenth century in France, and in the nineteenth century in Germany and England, the popularity of this view was derived from its altogether illegitimate a.s.sociation with a high moral and social idealism, which (it is only too evident) had been borrowed--without sufficient acknowledgment--from the Christian tradition. The rather self-conscious atheism (for instance) of Sh.e.l.ley or Byron--which they had presumably derived from Diderot and his contemporaries--was less a denial of G.o.d than an affirmation of the rights of humanity. This generous philosophy of revolt from contemporary tyranny and pharisaism is atheistic only in name. The callous and cynical powers, both political and ecclesiastical, that were the object of their bitter attacks were the embodiments of atheism, for "He alone is the true atheist to whom the predicates of the Divine Being, e.g. love, wisdom, justice, are nothing."[79]

THE PRESENT SITUATION.--During the nineteenth century the mechanical view received some accession of strength owing to the reduction of biology to what seemed like subjection. But, at the same time, an idealistic philosophy had taken a strong hold in England, and towards the end of the century critical students of scientific method cast doubt upon the _finality_ of the mechanical view. They regarded it as artificial, abstract, and symbolic only of reality. This critical movement may be a.s.sociated with the names of Mach, Boutroux, and (perhaps above all) of Bergson.

Moreover, towards the end of the century, a number of new facts in physics, biology, and psychology came to light and tended to discredit the mechanical view as a final explanation of reality. The indestructibility of matter, even the conservation of energy and of ma.s.s (corner stones of the mechanico-materialist view) began openly to be questioned, not by metaphysicians, but by men of science themselves. The foes of materialism were those of its own household.[80]

Thus a.s.sailed from without by the philosophers, and from within by the scientists themselves, the mechanical view, after a reign of three centuries (disturbed though these may have been by successive rebellions) seems destined to disappear. It may indeed subsist as an approximate and convenient way of regarding reality, of which it will no longer pretend to give an absolute and complete account. It will continue to reign as a const.i.tutional monarch, but the days of its tyranny are at an end. And it is not unlikely that future generations will look with surprise upon our respect for a theory which to them will wear something of the same aspect as medieval astrology now presents to ourselves.

SOME DEDUCTIONS.--If the history of thought showed no other results than the impaired prestige of naturalism, it would be worth attention and study. The facts undoubtedly compromise that prestige, for history indicates that at no period has naturalism been able to impose itself permanently. If there has been a movement in that direction, it has elicited a corresponding reaction. The human mind seems unable to remain satisfied with the negations which systematised common sense seeks to impose upon it. There is an instinctive appet.i.te in humanity for a spiritual view of things, and Sabatier was undoubtedly right in observing that mankind is "incurably religious." Neither Hobbes, nor Holbach, nor Buchner, with the best will in the world, can exorcise from the human heart that instinct which seeks for itself personal relations with the universe--which sees a mind behind phenomena. This is one of those instincts of which it is true that the more you repress them the more insurgent they become--they will have their way in the end.

Thus naturalism, blind to the mutilation of our nature of which it is guilty, is psychologically unsound. And yet, our nature is not so easily mutilated after all. Naturalistic dogmatism has it in its power to create an atmosphere which is unhealthy for religion, but that growth has its roots too deep for it to be easily destroyed. Springing as it does from the depths of our nature, it will prove as permanent as humanity itself.

This is not to deny that this type of dogmatism may do, as it actually has done, a great deal of harm. A plant may be strong and vigorous, but under unceasing bitter weather, it will tend to become discouraged.

Otherwise it would not be worth while to write criticisms of naturalism.

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