Since the month of July, 1885, there has appeared on the other side of the Atlantic a set of military critics, of whom General Wolseley, Commander of the British Army, must be treated as the chief, who deny to General Grant the possession of superior military qualities, and who a.s.sert that General Lee was his superior in the contest which they carried on from February, 1864, to April, 1865. On this side of the Atlantic there is toleration, if not active and open support of General Wolseley"s opinion.
General Wolseley is ent.i.tled to an opinion and to the expression of his opinion; but his authority cannot be admitted. On the practical side of military affairs his experience is a limited experience only.
It is not known that General Wolseley ever, in any capacity, engaged in any battle that can be named in comparison with the battles of the Wilderness, with Spottsylvania, with Cold Harbor, or the battle of Five Forks; and it is certain that it was never his fortune to put one hundred thousand men, or even fifty thousand men, into the wage of battle and thus a.s.sume the responsibility of the contest.
It was never the necessity of the situation that General Lee should a.s.sume the offensive, and in the two instances where he did a.s.sume the offensive his campaigns were failures; and can any one doubt that if General Grant had been in command either at Antietam or Gettysburg, the war would than have come to an end of the left bank of the Potomac River by the capture of Lee"s army? If this be so, then Lee"s undertaking was a hazard for which there could have been no justifying reason, and his escape from destruction was due to the inadequacy of the men in command of the Northern armies. Following this remark I ought to say that General Meade was a brave and patriotic officer, but he lacked the qualities which enable a man to act promptly and wisely in great exigencies. While General Lee was acting on the defensive did he engage in and successfully execute any strategic movement that can be compared with Grant"s campaign of May, 1863, through Mississippi and to the rear of Vicksburg? Or can General Wolseley cite an instance of individual genius and power more conspicuous than the relief of our besieged army at Chattanooga, the capture of six thousand prisoners, forty pieces of artillery, seven thousand stands of small arms and large quant.i.ties of other material of war?
During the period of reconstruction Alexander H. Stephens was examined by the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives as to the condition and purposes of the South. When the examination was over I asked him when he came to the conclusion that the South was to be defeated. He said: "In the year 1862." I then said: "In that year you had your successes. What were the grounds of your conclusions?"
In reply he said: "It was then that I first realized that the North was putting its whole force into the contest, and I knew that in such a contest we were to be destroyed."
If I were to imagine a reason, or to suggest an excuse for General Lee"s two unsuccessful aggressive campaigns, I should a.s.sume that, simultaneously with Mr. Stephens, he had reached the conclusion that time was on the side of the North, and that the Fabian policy must fail in the end.
In an aggressive movement there was one chance of success. A victory and capture of Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington might lead to an arrangement by which the Confederacy would be recognized, or a restoration of the Union secured upon a basis acceptable to the South.
A desperate undertaking, no doubt, but it is difficult to suggest a more adequate reason for the conduct of General Lee.
I cannot, as a civilian, a.s.sume to give a judgment which shall be accepted by any one, upon the relative standing of military men; but I cannot accept, without question, the decision of a military man who never won a great victory in a great battle, upon a chieftain who fought many great battles and never lost one.
I end my observations upon General Grant as a soldier by the relation of an incident in my acquaintance with General Sherman, which was intimate during the four years that I was at the head of the Treasury Department.
It was my custom in those years to spend evenings at General Sherman"s, where we indulged ourselves in conversation and in the enjoyment of the game of billiards. Our conversations were chiefly upon the war. In those conversations General Grant"s name and doings were the topics often. General Sherman never inst.i.tuted a comparison between General Grant and any one else, nor did he ever express an opinion of General Grant as a military leader; but his conversation always a.s.sumed that General Grant was superior to every other officer, himself, General Sherman, included.
In concurrence with the opinion of General Sherman the friends of General Grant may call an array of witnesses who, both from numbers and character, are ent.i.tled to large confidence.
During the four years of the Civil War more than two million men served in the Northern Army. Many of them, more than a majority of them, probably, served for at least three years each. With an unanimity that was never disturbed by an audible voice of dissent, the two million veterans gave to General Grant supremacy over all the other officers under whom they had served. With like unanimity the chief officers of the army a.s.signed the first place to General Grant, and never in any other war of modern times has there been equal opportunity for the applications of a satisfactory test to leaders. In all the wars which England has been engaged since the fall of Napoleon, except, possibly, the Crimean War, the opposing forces have been composed of inferior races of men. The fields of contest have been in India, Egypt and South Africa. From such contests no satisfactory opinion can be formed as to the qualities of the leaders of the victorious forces.
In our Civil War the men and the officers were of the same race in the main, and the educated officers had been alike trained at West Point.
Except in numbers, the armies of the North and the South were upon an equality, and in all the great contests, the numbers engaged were equal substantially. The quality of the man and officers may be gauged and measured with accuracy from the fact that at Shiloh, in the Wilderness and at Gettysburg the same fields were contested for two and three continuous days. It has been said of Mr. Adams that when an English sympathizer with the South lauded the bravery of the Southern Army, Mr. Adams replied: "Yes, they are brave men; they are my country- men."
The Southern Army was composed of brave men and its officers were qualified by training and experience to command any army and to contest for supremacy on any field.
My readers should not a.s.sume that I have avoided a discussion of the characteristics of General Grant in his personality and as a civil magistrate.
The voice of those who in 1872 denied his ability and questioned his integrity is no longer heard; but there are those at home and abroad who either teach or accept the notion that General Grant has become great historically by having been the favorite of fortune.
[* From the New York _Independent_.]
XL BLAINE AND CONKLING AND THE REPUBLICAN CONVENTION OF 1880
The controversy between Mr. Blaine and Mr. Conkling on the floor of the House of Representatives in the Thirty-ninth Congress was fraught with serious consequences to the contestants, and it may have changed the fortunes of the Republican Party.
Mr. Conkling was a member of the Thirty-seventh Congress, but he was defeated as a candidate for the Thirty-eighth. He was returned for the Thirty-ninth Congress. During the term of the Thirty-eighth Congress he was commissioned by the Department of War as judge-advocate, and a.s.signed for duty to the prosecution of Major Haddock and the trial of certain soldiers known as "bounty jumpers." That duty he performed.
When the army bill was before the House in April, 1866, Mr. Conkling moved to strike out the section which made an appropriation for the support of the provost-marshal general. General Grant, then in command of the army, had given an opinion, in a letter dated March 19, 1866, that that office in the War Department was an unnecessary office.
Mr. Conkling supported his motion in a speech in which he said: "My objection to this section is that is creates an unnecessary office for an undeserving public servant; it fastens, as an incubus upon the country, a hateful instrument of war, which deserves no place in a free government in a time of peace."
Thus Mr. Conkling not only a.s.sailed the office, he a.s.sailed the officer, and in a manner calculated to kindle resentment, especially in an officer of high rank. General James B. Fry was provost-marshal-general.
He was able to command the friendship of Mr. Blaine, and on the thirtieth day of April, Mr. Blaine read from his seat in the House a letter from General Fry addressed to himself. Thus Mr. Blaine endorsed the contents of the letter.
In that letter General Fry made three specific charges against Mr.
Conkling, but he made no answer to the arraignment that Mr. Conkling had made of him and his office. Thus he avoided the issue that Mr.
Conkling had raised. His charges were these:
1. That Mr. Conkling had received a fee for the prosecution of Major Haddock, and that the same had been received improperly, if not illegally.
2. That in the discharge of his duties he had not acted in good faith, and that he had been zealous in preventing the prosecution of deserters at Utica.
3. That he had notified the War Department that the Provost-Marshal in Western New York needed legal advice, and that thereupon he received an appointment.
The fourth charge was an inference, and it fell with the allegation.
Upon the reading of the letter a debate arose which fell below any recognized standard of Congressional controversy and which rendered a reconciliation impossible.
At that time my relations to Mr. Conkling were not intimate, and I am now puzzled when I ask myself the question: "Why did Mr. Conkling invite my opinion as to his further action in the matter?" That he did, however; and I advised him to ask for a committee. A committee of five was appointed, three Republicans and two Democrats. Mr. Sh.e.l.labarger was chairman, and Mr. Windom was a member.
The report was a unanimous report. The committee criticised the practice of reading letters in the House, which reflected upon the House, or upon the acts or speeches of any member.
At considerable length of statement and remarks, the committee exonerated Mr. Conkling from each and every one of the charges, and, with emphasis, the proceedings on the part of General Fry were condemned. The most important of the resolutions reported by the committee was in these words:
_Resolved,_ That all the statements contained in the letter of General James B. Fry to Hon. James G. Blaine, a member of this House, bearing date the 27th of April, A. D. 1866, and which was read in this House the 30th day of April, A. D. 1866, in so far as such statements impute to the Hon. Roscoe Conkling, a member of this House, any criminal, illegal, unpatriotic, or otherwise improper conduct, or motives, either as to the matter of his procuring himself to be employed by the Government of the United States in the prosecution of military offences in the State of New York, in the management of such prosecutions, in taking compensation therefor, or in any other charge, are wholly without foundation truth, and for their publication there were, in the judgment of the House, no facts connected with said prosecutions furnishing either a palliative or an excuse.
The controversy thus opened came to an end only with Mr. Conkling"s death. It is not known to me that Mr. Conkling and Mr. Blaine were unfriendly previous to the encounter of April, 1866. That they could have lived on terms of intimacy, or even of ordinary friendship, is not probable. Yet it may not be easy to a.s.sign a reason for such an estrangement unless it may be found in the word incompatibility. My relations with Mr. Blaine were friendly, reserved, and as to his aspirations for the Presidency, it was well understood by him that I could not be counted among his original supporters.
Only on one occasion was the subject ever mentioned. About two weeks before the Republican Convention of 1884, I met Mr. Blaine in Lafayette Square. He beckoned me to a seat on a bench. He opened the conversation by saying that he was glad to have some votes in the convention, but that he did not wish for the nomination. He expressed a wish to defeat the nomination of President Arthur, and he then said the ticket should be General Sherman and Robert Lincoln. Most a.s.suredly the nomination of that ticket would have been followed by an election. To me General Sherman had one answer to the suggestion: "I am not a statesman; my brother John is. If any Sherman is to be nominated, he is the man."
I did not then question, nor do I now question, the sincerity of the statement that Mr. Blaine then made. My acquaintance with Mr. Blaine began with our election to the Thirty-eighth Congress, and it continued on terms of reserved friendship to the end of his life. That reserve was not due to any defect in his character of which I had knowledge, nor to the statements concerning him that were made by others, but to an opinion that he was not a person whose candidacy I was willing to espouse in advance of his nomination. I ought to say that in my intercourse with Mr. Blaine he was frank and free from dissimulation.
I was on terms of intimacy with Mr. Conkling from the disastrous April, 1866, to the end of his life. Hence it was that I ventured upon an experiment which a less well-a.s.sured friend would have avoided. I a.s.sumed that Mr. Blaine would close the controversy at the first opportunity. It may be said of Mr. Blaine that, while he had great facility for getting into difficulties, he had also a strong desire to get out of difficulties, and great capacity for the accomplishment of his purposes in that direction.
On a time, and years previous to 1880, I put the matter before Mr.
Conkling, briefly, upon personal grounds, and upon public grounds in a party sense. He received the suggestion without any manifestation of feeling, and with great candor he said: "That attack was made without any provocation by me as against Mr. Blaine, and when I was suffering more from other causes than I ever suffered at any other time, and I shall never overlook it."
General Grant"s strength was so overmastering in 1868 and 1872 that the controversy between Blaine and Conkling was of no importance to the Republican Party. The disappearance of the political influence of General Grant in 1876 revived the controversy within the Republican Party, and made the nomination of either Blaine or Conkling an impossibility. Its evil influence extended to the election, and it put in jeopardy the success of General Hayes. At the end, Mr. Conkling did not accept the judgment of the Electoral Commission as a just judgment, and he declined to vote for its affirmation.
I urged Mr. Conkling to sustain the action of the commission, and upon the ground that we had taken full responsibility when we agreed to the reference and that there was then no alternative open to us. I did not attempt to solve the problem of the election of 1876 either upon ethical or political grounds. The evidence was more conclusive than satisfactory that there had been wrong-doing in New York, in Oregon, in New Orleans, and not unlikely in many other places. As a measure of peace, when ascertained justice had become an impossibility, I was ready to accept the report of the commission, whether it gave the Presidency to General Hayes or to Mr. Tilden. The circ.u.mstances were such that success before the commission did not promise any advantage to the successful party.
For the moment, I pa.s.s by the Convention of 1880 and the events of the following year. In the year 1884 Mr. Conkling was in the practice of his profession and enjoying therefrom larger emoluments, through a series of years, than ever were enjoyed by any other member of the American bar. He once said to me: "My father would denounce me if he knew what charges I am making." That conjecture may have been well founded, for the father would not have been the outcome of the period in which the son was living. The father was an austere county judge, largely dest.i.tute of the rich equipment for the profession for which the son was distinguished. After the year 1881, when Mr. Conkling gave himself wholly to the profession, Mr. Justice Miller made this remark to me: "For the discussion of the law and the facts of a case Mr. Conkling is the best lawyer who comes into our court."
If this estimate was trustworthy, then Mr. Conkling"s misgivings as to his charges may have been groundless. If a rich man, whose property is put in peril, whose liberty is a.s.sailed, or whose reputation is threatened, will seek the advice and aid of the leading advocate of the city, state, or country, shall not the compensation be commensurate with the stake that has been set up? Is it to be measured by the _per diem_ time pay of ordinary men?
Whatever may have been Mr. Conkling"s pecuniary interests or professional engagements in the year 1884, he found time to take a quiet part in the contest of that year, and to contribute to Mr. Blaine"s defeat.
In the month of November, and after the election, I had occasion to pa.s.s a Sunday in New York. It happened, and by accident, that I met Mr.
Conkling on Fifth Avenue. After the formalities, he invited me to call with him upon Mr. William K. Vanderbilt. Mr. Vanderbilt was absent when we called. Upon his return, the election was the topic of conversation. Mr. Vanderbilt said that he voted for Garfield in 1880, but that he had not voted for Blaine. Mr. Conkling expressed his regret that Mr. Blaine had come so near a success, and he attributed it to the fact that he had not antic.i.p.ated the support which had been given to Blaine by the Democratic Party.
On a time in the conversation Mr. Conkling said: "Mr. Vanderbilt, why did you sell Maud S.?"