At that time the contract system of labor had been introduced, and the contracts were regarded as binding both by whites and blacks.
General Thomas advised the admission of Tennessee into the Union as a State, and his advice was acted upon favorably by its admission in the summer of that year. His recommendations were based upon the facts that Tennessee had "repudiated the rebel debt, had abolished slavery, had adopted the Const.i.tutional amendment upon that subject, had pa.s.sed a franchise law prohibiting from voting every man who had been engaged in the rebellion" and had "pa.s.sed a law allowing negroes to testify."
His opinion of the four other States of his command was not as favorable. "I have received communications from various persons in the South that there was an understanding among the rebels and perhaps organizations formed or forming, for the purpose of gaining as many advantages for themselves as possible; and I have heard it also intimated that these men are very anxious and would do all in their power to involve the United States in a foreign war, so that if a favorable opportunity should occur, they might then again turn against the United States."
At the end of his first examination he gave this opinion as the result of his experience:
Question: "In what could those advantages consist in breaking up the government?"
Answer: "They would wish to be recognized as citizens of the United States, with the same rights they had before the war."
Question: "How can they do that? By wishing us in a war with England or France, in which they would take part against us?"
Answer: "In that event their desire is to establish the Southern Confederacy. They have not yet given up their desire for a separate government, and if they have an opportunity to strike for it again they will do so."
When asked what he knew of secret organizations he said that he had received several communications to that effect but the parties were unwilling to have their names made public. He added: "The persons communicating with me are reliable and truthful and I believe their statements are correct in the main.
"The nature and object of the organizations," he said, "are the embarra.s.sment of the Government of the United States in the proper administration of the affairs of the county, and if possible, to repudiate the national debt, or to gain such an ascendency in Congress as to make provision for the a.s.sumption by Congress of the debt incurred by the rebel government; also, in case the United States Government can be involved in a foreign war to watch their opportunity and take advantage of the first that comes to strike for the independence of the States lately in rebellion."
These extracts from the testimony of General Thomas are a fair exposition of the condition of public sentiment in the Confederate States with the exception in a degree of the border States. It is apparent also that General Thomas had not the degree of confidence in the good purposes of those who had been in the rebellion that was entertained by Northern officers including Grant, Sherman and Sheridan.
As the loyal men of the South were greater sufferers from the war, their hostility was more intense against those who were responsible for the war.
If we cannot say that Thomas was a great soldier in the large use of the phrase, it can be said that he was a good soldier and that without qualifying words. He should live in history as a true patriot and a man of the highest integrity.
SECRETARY STANTON
Of the men who occupied places in Mr. Lincoln"s Cabinet, no one was more free from just criticism affecting unfavorably the value of his public services than Secretary Stanton.
Of those who were nearest to him, no one ever received the impression from his acts or his conversation that he thought of the Presidency as a possibility under any circ.u.mstances. Seward, Chase and Bates had been candidates at Chicago in 1860, and whatever may have been the fact in regard to Seward and Bates, it is quite certain that ambition for the Presidency never lost its hold upon Mr. Chase, even when he became Chief Justice of the United States.
Coupled with the absence of ambition, or perhaps in a degree incident to the absence of ambition, Mr. Stanton was the possessor of courage for all the emergencies of the place that he occupied--a courage that was always available, whether in its exercise the wishes of individuals or the fortunes of the country were involved.
It was understood by those who frequented the War Office in the gloomy days of 1862 and "63 that a card signed "A. L." would not always command full respect from Secretary Stanton. He was a believer in the rigid principles of the army, and although he was a humane man he smothered or subdued his sympathy for heart-broken mothers whose sons had deserted the cause of the country, in his determination to save the country through the strictest enforcement of the rules and regulations of the army. Mr. Lincoln, in his abounding good nature, could not resist the appeals of disconsolate wives and heart-stricken mothers, and it was often Mr. Stanton"s fortune to resist such appeals even when supported by the President"s card in the form of a request which in ordinary times and upon ordinary men would be treated as an order.
Hence there may have been a foundation for the report that an unsuccessful user of one of the President"s cards returned to the President for a reinforcement of the order. The President insisted upon a full report of the Secretary"s answer. The applicant repeated the Secretary"s remark, which was not complimentary to the President"s good sense. The President hesitated, and then declined to renew the order, saying: "Stanton is generally right."
Mr. Stanton"s testimony was taken February 11, 1867, and on subsequent days. The record of the text and the accompanying doc.u.ments cover more than two hundred printed pages. The evidence was taken by the Committee on the Judiciary, and it had special reference to the charges that had been made against President Johnson. At that time, the separation between Mr. Stanton and the President had become irreconcilable, but there are no indications of hostility in the answers given by the Secretary. Indeed, he a.s.sumed, without reserve, full responsibility for acts that had been charged on the President by others.
During the war the railroads that fell within our lines were appropriated to the use of the United States, and heavy outlays had been made upon some of them for repairs and improvements. In many cases expenses had been incurred, that in the hands of the corporation would not have been chargeable to a construction account. In a majority of cases, if not in all, the roads had been surrendered without compensation, and the rolling stock had been transferred for very slight consideration.
Mr. Stanton a.s.sumed the responsibility of the policy, upon the ground that it was important to the South and to the country that the channels of commerce should be made available without delay and that the army could not be used wisely in commercial traffic. As the President was interested in one of the railroads that received a large benefit by the restoration of its property much improved, he was relieved of all responsibility for a policy that had been much condemned.
Through the testimony of Secretary Stanton the committee was enabled to find the origin and to trace with a degree of accuracy the history of President Johnson"s plan of reconstruction. At a time not many days prior to Mr. Lincoln"s death, Secretary Stanton prepared an order which contained a _projet_ for the government of the States that had been in rebellion. The paper was submitted to President Lincoln and it was considered by him in a cabinet meeting that was held during the day preceding the night of the a.s.sa.s.sination.
As this paper became the basis for the proclamations for the government of the States that had been in rebellion, its history, as given by Mr. Stanton, is worthy of exact report in his own words:
"On the last day of Mr. Lincoln"s life, there was a Cabinet meeting, at which General Grant, and all the members of the Cabinet, except Mr.
Seward, were present. General Grant at that time made a report of the condition of the country, as he conceived it to be, and as it would be on the surrender of Johnston"s army, which was regarded as absolutely certain. The subject of reconstruction was talked of at considerable length. Shortly previous to that time I had myself, with a view of putting into a practicable form the means of overcoming what seemed to be a difficulty in the mind of Mr. Lincoln, as to the mode of reconstruction, prepared a rough draft of a form or mode by which the authority and laws of the United States should be re-established, and governments reorganized in the rebel States under the Federal authority, without any necessity whatever for the intervention of rebel organizations or rebel aid.
In the course of that consultation Mr. Lincoln alluded to the paper, went into his room, brought it out, and asked me to read it, which I did, and explained my ideas in regard to it. There was one point which I had left open; that was as to who should const.i.tute the electors in the respective States . . . I left a blank upon that subject to be considered. There was at that time nothing adopted about it, and no opinions expressed; it was only a _projet_."
At the request of Mr. Lincoln and the Cabinet, the order was printed and a copy was given to each member, and a copy was given to Mr.
Johnson when he had become President.
The plan was further considered in Mr. Johnson"s Cabinet, and some alterations were made. The point of chief difference related to the elective franchise--whether it should be extended to the negro race.
Mr. Stanton said: "There was a difference of opinion upon that subject. The President expressed his views very clearly and distinctly. I expressed my views, and other members of the Cabinet expressed their views. The objection of the President to throwing the franchise open to the colored people appeared to be fixed, and I think every member of the Cabinet a.s.sented to the arrangement as it was specified in the proclamation relative to North Carolina. After that I do not remember that the subject was ever again discussed in the Cabinet."
Thus from Mr. Stanton"s testimony we gather the important facts as to the origin of a measure which became the subject of bitter controversy between President Johnson and the Republican Party. The framework of the North Carolina proclamation was furnished by Mr. Stanton. When alterations had been made the proclamation was agreed to by the Cabinet but without a declaration or even an understanding upon the point which, without much delay, became the vital point: was the policy of government that was announced in the proclamation a permanent policy or was it a temporary expedient, a subst.i.tute for military government, and subject to the approval or disapproval of Congress?
General Grant was of the opinion that the organizations which the President set up in the States were temporary and that they were subject to the action of Congress.
Mr. Stanton"s opinion is expressed carefully, in his own words: "My opinion is, that the whole subject of reconstruction and the relation of the State to the Federal Government is subject to the controlling power of Congress; and while I believe that the President and his Cabinet were not violating any law, but were faithfully performing their duty in endeavoring to organize provisional governments in those States, I supposed then, and still suppose, that the final validity of such organizations would rest with the law-making power of the government."
In an official letter, dated January 8, 1866, Secretary Stanton gave his reasons for the payment of the salaries of the provisional governors: "The payments were made from the appropriation of army contingencies because the duties performed by the parties were regarded of a temporary character ancillary to the withdrawal of military force, and to take the place of the armed forces in the respective States."
On the other hand the President chose to treat the governments that had been set up as permanent governments and beyond the control of Congress. On this point, the contest between President Johnson and the Republican Party was made up. It ended in an appeal to the people, who rendered a judgment against _the President_ by a two-thirds majority.
The testimony of Secretary Seward, and official papers that were issued by the Department of State in the year 1865, may warrant the conclusion that President Johnson was not then prepared to treat the new state organizations as final and binding upon Congress and the country.
Under date of July 8, 1865, Secretary Seward said, in an official letter to Governor Holden of North Carolina: "It is understood here that besides cotton which has been taken by the Secretary of the Treasury under Act of Congress there were quant.i.ties of resin, and other articles, as well as funds, lying about in different places in the State and not reduced into possession by United States officers as insurgent property. The President is of the opinion that you can appropriate these for the inevitable and indispensable expenses of the civil government of the State during the continuance of the provisional government."
On the 14th day of November, 1865, Mr. McCulloch authorized Mr. Worth, acting as treasurer in North Carolina, to use the fragments of rebel property that might be gathered to defray the expenses of the provisional government of the State.
In answer to a question put to Secretary Seward, he said: "I do not remember that any provisional governor held a military office, except Mr. Johnson."
In the further examination of Mr. Seward, May 16, 1867, he indicated his concurrence with President Johnson in this remark: "The object was to proceed with the work of the restoration of the Union as speedily and effectively and wisely as possible, having no reference as to whether Congress would be in session or not."
This question was put to Mr. Seward:
"Did not he (the President) urge these parties to be prepared to be at the doors of Congress by the time of its next meeting?"
The answer was: "Very likely he did. I do not know of the fact. I know that I was very anxious that these States should be represented in Congress, and that he was equally so, that they should be provided with representatives who could be admitted."
The policy of the administration, July 24, 1865, is set forth in a despatch from Secretary Seward to Governor Sharkey, of Mississippi (he is addressed as Provisional Governor): "The President sees no occasion to interfere with General Sloc.u.m"s proceedings. The government of the State will be provisional only until the civil authorities shall be restored with the approval of Congress."
Upon the united testimony of General Grant, Secretary Stanton and Secretary Seward, it may be claimed fairly that the governments that were set up under proclamations of the President were treated in the beginning as provisional governments and subject to the final judgment of Congress.
In 1866, when the rupture between Congress and the President had taken form, the President with the support of Mr. Seward announced the doctrine that the governments which had been set up were valid governments, and that claimants for seats in Congress from those who could prove their loyalty were ent.i.tled to admission.
Thus was a foundation laid for the impeachment of President Johnson by the House of Representatives, and his trial by the Senate.
x.x.xII IMPEACHMENT OF ANDREW JOHNSON
The nomination of Andrew Johnson to the Vice-Presidency in 1864, by the Republican Party, was a repet.i.tion of the error committed by the Whig Party in 1840, in the nomination of John Tyler for the same office.
In each case the nomination was due to an attempt to secure the support of a body of men who were not in accord in all essential particulars with the party making the nomination.