EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, _March_ 17, 1873.
HON. GEO. S. BOUTWELL, _Dear Sir:_-- In accepting your resignation of the office of Secretary of the Treasury, an office which you have filled for four years with such satisfaction to the country, allow me to express the regret I feel at severing official relations which have been at all times so agreeable to me, and,--as I am a.s.sured by your letter of resignation,--to you also. Your administration of the important trust confided to you four years since, has been so admirably conducted as to give the greatest satisfaction to me because as I read public judgment and opinion it has been satisfactory to the country. The policy pursued in the office of Secretary of the Treasury by your successor I hope may be as successful as yours has been, and that no departure from it will be made except such as experience and change of circ.u.mstances may make necessary.
Among your new official a.s.sociates I trust you will find the same warm friends and co-workers that you leave in the Executive branch of the government.
You take with you my most sincere well wishes for your success as a legislator and as a citizen, and the a.s.surance of my desire to continue the warm personal relations that have existed between us during the whole of our official connection.
Very truly yours, U. S. GRANT.
x.x.xVIII GENERAL GRANT AS A STATESMAN*
General Grant"s father was a Whig and an admirer and supporter of Mr.
Clay. The public policy of Mr. Clay embraced three great measures: First, a national bank, or a fiscal agency as an aid to the Treasury in the collection and disburs.e.m.e.nt of the public revenues; secondly, a system of internal improvements to be created at the public expense and controlled by the National Government; and, thirdly, a tariff system which should protect the American laborer against the active compet.i.tion of the laborers of other countries who were compelled to work for smaller compensation.
From the year 1834 to the year 1836 the country was engaged in an active controversy over the policy of the Whig Party, of which Mr.
Clay was then the recognized head. Indeed, the controversy began as early as the year 1824, and it contributed, more than all other causes, to the new organization of parties under the leadership, respectively, of Mr. Clay and General Jackson.
General Grant was educated under these influences, and in the belief that the policy of the Whig Party would best promote the prosperity of the country. Those early impressions ripened into opinions, which he held and on which he acted during his public life. It happened by the force of circ.u.mstances that the Republican Party was compelled to adopt the policy of Mr. Clay--not in measures, but in the ideas on which his policy was based. It is not now necessary to inquire whether the weight of argument was with Mr. Clay or with his opponents.
The war made inevitable the adoption of a policy which Mr. Clay had advocated as expedient and wise.
The Pacific Railways were built by the aid of the Government and under the pressure of a general public opinion that the East must be brought into a more intimate connection with our possessions on the Pacific Ocean, for mutual support and for the common defence.
The national banking system was established for the purpose of securing the aid of the banks as purchasers and negotiators of the bonds of the Government, at a time when the public credit was so impaired that it seemed impossible to command the funds necessary for the prosecution of the war.
The same exigency compelled Congress to enact, and the country to accept, a tariff system more protective in its provisions than any scheme ever suggested by Mr. Clay. The necessities of the times compelled free-traders, even, to accept the revenue system with its protective features; but General Grant accepted it as a system in harmony alike with his early impressions and with his matured opinions.
It has happened, by the force of events, that the policy of the old Whig Party has been revived in the national banking system, while the Independent Treasury, the leading measure of the old Democratic Party, has been preserved in all its features as the guide of the Treasury Department in its financial operations.
When General Grant became President, these three measures had been incorporated into the policy of the Republican Party. Their full acceptance by him did not require any change of opinion on his part.
It was true that he had voted for Mr. Buchanan in 1856; but his vote was given in obedience to an impression that he had received touching the qualifications of General Fremont. The fact that he had voted for Mr. Buchanan excited suspicions in the minds of some Republicans, and it engendered hopes in the bosoms of some Democrats that he might act in harmony with the Democratic Party. The suspicions and the hopes were alike groundless.
As early as the month of August, 1863, in a letter to Mr. E. B.
Washburne, he said: "It became patent to my mind early in the rebellion that the North and South could never live at peace with each other except as one nation, and that without slavery. As anxious as I am to see peace established, I would not, therefore, be willing to see any settlement until this question is forever settled."
Thus was General Grant, at an early moment, and upon his own judgment, brought into full accord with the Republican Party upon the two debatable and most earnestly debated questions during Mr. Lincoln"s administration--the prosecution of the war and the abolition of slavery.
And thus it is apparent that in 1868 he was in a condition, as to all matters of opinion, to accept a nomination at the hands of the Republican Party; and it is equally apparent that he was separated from the Democratic Party by a chasm wide, deep, and impa.s.sable. It is, however, true that General Grant"s feelings were not intense, and in the expression of his opinions his tone was mild and his manner gentle. It often happened, also, that he did not undertake to controvert opinions and expressions with which he had no sympathy.
This peculiarity may at times have led to a misunderstanding, or to a misinterpretation of his views. Upon this basis of his early impressions, and matured opinions his administrative policy was constructed.
When he became President, there was a body of American citizens, not inconsiderable in numbers, who doubted the ability of the Government to pay the war debt; there were others who advocated payment in greenbacks, or the subst.i.tution of a note not bearing interest for a bond that bore interest; and there were yet others who denied the validity of the existing obligations. All these cla.s.ses, whether they were dishonest or only misled, were alike rebuked in his inaugural address. These were his words: "A great debt has been contracted in securing to us and to our posterity the Union. The payment of this debt, princ.i.p.al and interest, as well as the return to a specie basis, as soon as it can be accomplished without material detriment to the debtor cla.s.s, or to the country at large, must be provided for. . . .
To protect the national honor, every dollar of Government indebtedness should be paid in gold, unless otherwise expressly stipulated in the contract. . . .
"Let it be understood that no repudiator of one farthing of our public debt will be trusted in public place, and it will go far toward strengthening a credit which ought to be the best in the world, and will ultimately enable us to replace the debt with bonds bearing less interest than we now pay."
In the same address he a.s.serted the ability of the country to pay the debt within the period of twenty-five years, and he also declared his purpose to secure a faithful collection of the public revenues. At the close of his administration of eight years one fifth part of the public debt had been paid, and if the system of taxation that existed in 1869 had been continued the debt would have been extinguished in less than a quarter of a century from the year 1869. In his administration, however, the crisis was pa.s.sed. The ability and the disposition of the country were made so conspicuous that all honest doubts were removed, and the repudiators were shamed into silence.
The redemption of the debt by the purchase of bonds in the open market strengthened the public credit, and laid a foundation for the resumption of specie payments.
General Grant"s inaugural address was followed by the pa.s.sage of the act of March 18, 1869, ent.i.tled "An act to strengthen the public credit." This act was a pledge to the world that the debts of the United States, unless there were in the obligations express stipulations to the contrary, would be paid in coin.
In accordance with the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, President Grant, in his annual message of December, 1869, recommended the pa.s.sage of an act authorizing the funding of the public debt at a lower rate of interest.
Following this recommendation, the bill for refunding the public debt, prepared by the Secretary of the Treasury, was enacted and approved July 14, 1870.
By this act the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to issue bonds to the amount of $200,000,000 bearing interest at the rate of 5 per cent, $300,000,000 bearing interest at the rate of 4 per cent, and $1,000,000,000 bearing interest at the rate of 4 per cent.
Under this act, and the amendments thereto, the debt has been refunded from time to time until the average rate of interest does not now exceed 3 per cent. Although these two important measures of administration were not prepared by General Grant, they were but the execution of his policy set forth in his inaugural address.
In respect to the rights of the negro race, General Grant must be ranked with the advanced portion of the Republican Party. Upon the capture of Fort Donelson, a number of slaves fell into the hands of the Union army. General Grant issued an order, dated Feb. 26, 1862, in which he authorized their employment for the benefit of the Government, and at the close he said that under no circ.u.mstances would he permit their return to their masters.
In his inaugural address he urged the States to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment, and its ratification was due, probably, to his advice. At that moment his influence was very great. It may well be doubted whether any other President ever enjoyed the confidence of the country in as high a degree. He gave to that measure the weight of his opinion and the official influence of his administration. The amendment was opposed by the Democratic Party generally, and a considerable body of Republicans questioned its wisdom. General Grant was responsible for the ratification of the amendment. Had he advised its rejection, or had he been indifferent to its fate, the amendment would have failed, and the country would have been left to a succession of bitter controversies arising from the application of the second section of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provided that the representation of a State should be based upon the number of male citizens over twenty-one years of age ent.i.tled to vote.
General Grant accepted the plan of Congress in regard to the reconstruction of the Union. There were three opinions that had obtained a lodgment in the public mind. President Johnson and his supporters claimed that the President held the power by virtue of his office to convene the people of the respective States, and that under his direction const.i.tutions might be framed, and that Senators and Representatives might be chosen who would be ent.i.tled to seats in Congress, as though they represented States that had not been engaged in secession and war. Others maintained that neither by the ordinances of secession nor by the war had the States of the Confederacy been disturbed in their legal relations to the Union.
It was the theory of the Republican Party in Congress that the eleven States by their own acts had destroyed their legal relations to the Union; that the jurisdiction of the National Government over the territory of the seceding States was full and complete; and that, as a result of the war, the National Government could hold them in a Territorial condition and subject to military rule. Upon this theory the re-appearance of a seceded State as a member of the Union was made to depend upon the a.s.sent of Congress, with the approval of the President, or upon an act of Congress by a two-thirds vote over a Presidential veto.
General Grant sustained the policy of Congress during the long and bitter contest with President Johnson, and when he became President he accepted that policy without reserve in the case of the restoration of the States of Virginia, Georgia, Texas, and Mississippi. Upon this statement it appears that General Grant was a Republican, and that he became a Republican by processes that preclude the suggestion that his nomination for the Presidency wrought any change in his position upon questions of principle or policy in the affairs of government. Indeed, his nomination in 1868 was distasteful to him, as he then preferred to remain at the head of the army. It was in the nature of things, however, that he should have wished for re-election. He was re- elected, and at the end of his second term he accepted a return to private life as a relief from the cares and duties of office. The support which he received for the nomination in 1880 was not due to any effort on his part. Not even to his warmest supporters did he express a wish, or dictate or advise an act. His only utterance was a message to four of his friends at the Chicago Convention, that whatever they might do in the premises would be acceptable to him.
His political career was marked by the same abstention from personal effort for personal advancement that distinguished him as an officer of the army. But he did not bring into civil affairs the habits of command that were the necessity of military life. Although by virtue of his position he was the recognized head of the Republican Party, he made no effort to control its action. Wherever he placed power, there he reposed trust.
There was not in General Grant"s nature any element of suspicion, and his confidence in his friends was free and full. Hence it happened that he had many occasions for regret.
On no man in public life in this generation were there more frequent charges and insinuations of wrong-doing, and in this generation there has been no man in public life who was freer from all occasion for such insinuations and charges.
When he heard that the Treasury Department was purchasing bullion of a company in which he was a stockholder, he sold his shares without delay, and without reference to the market price or to their real value.
General Grant had no disposition to usurp power. He had no policy to impose upon the country against the popular will. This was shown in the treatment of the Santo Domingo question. General Grant was not indisposed to see the territories of the Republic extended, but his love of justice and fair dealing was such that he would have used only honorable means in his intercourse with other nations. Santo Domingo was a free offering, and he thought that its possession would be advantageous to the country.
Yet he never made it an issue, even in his Cabinet, where, as he well knew, very serious doubts existed as to the expediency of the measure.
He was deeply pained by the unjust attacks and groundless criticism of which he was the subject, but he accepted the adverse judgment of the Senate as a const.i.tutional binding decision of the question, and of that decision he never complained.
In a message to the Senate of the 31st of May, 1870, he urged the annexation of Santo Domingo. He said, "I feel an unusual anxiety for the ratification of this treaty, because I believe it will redound greatly to the glory of the two countries interested, to civilization, and to the extirpation of the inst.i.tution of slavery." He claimed for the scheme great commercial advantages, that it was in harmony with the Monroe doctrine, and that the consummation of the measure would be notice to the states of Europe that no acquisitions of territory on this continent would be permitted. In his second inaugural address General Grant referred to the subject in these words: "In the first year of the past administration the proposition came up for the admission of Santo Domingo as a Territory of the Union. . . . I believe now, as I did then, that it was for the best interests of this country, for the people of Santo Domingo, and all concerned, that the proposition should be received favorably. It was, however, rejected const.i.tutionally, and therefore the subject was never brought up again by me." General Grant considered the failure of the treaty as a national misfortune, but he never criticised the action of its opponents.
General Grant"s firmness was shown in his veto of the Senate currency bill of 1874. It is known that unusual effort was made to convince him that the measure was wise in a financial view, and highly expedient upon political grounds. The President wrote a message in explanation of his act of approval, but upon its completion he was so much dissatisfied with his own argument that he resolved to veto the bill.
Hence the veto message of April 22, 1874.
In foreign policy, the princ.i.p.al measure of General Grant"s administration was the treaty with Great Britain of May, 1871. The specific and leading purpose of the negotiations was the adjustment of the claim made by the United States that Great Britain was liable in damages for the destruction of American vessels, and the consequent loss of commercial power and prestige, by the depredations of Confederate cruisers that were fitted out or had obtained supplies in British ports. Neither the treaty of peace of 1783, nor the subsequent treaties with Great Britain, made a full and final settlement of the fishery question or of our northern boundary-line at its junction with the Pacific Ocean. These outlying questions were considered in the negotiations, and they were adjusted by the terms of the treaty.
The jurisdiction of the island of San Juan on the Pacific coast, then in controversy, was referred to the Emperor of Germany as arbitrator, with full and final power in the premises. By his award the claim of the United States was sustained.
The fishery question was referred to arbitrators, but it was a misfortune that the award was not satisfactory to the United States, and the dispute is reopened with capacity to vex the two governments for an indefinite period of time.
The claims against Great Britain growing out of the operations of the Confederate cruisers, known as the Alabama claims, were referred to arbitrators, by whose award the Government of the United States received the sum of $15,500,000. But the value of the treaty of 1871 was not in the award made. The people of the United States were embittered against the Government of Great Britain, and had General Grant chosen to seek redress by arms he would have been sustained throughout the North with substantial unanimity. But General Grant was dest.i.tute of the war spirit, and he chose to exhaust all the powers of negotiation before he would advise a resort to force. A pa.s.sage in his inaugural address may have had an influence upon the policy of the British Government: "In regard to foreign policy, I would deal with nations as equitable law requires individuals to deal with each other. . . . I would respect the rights of all nations, demanding equal respect for our own. _If others depart from this rule in their dealings with us, we may be compelled to follow their precedent."_
The reference of the question at issue to the tribunal at Geneva was a conspicuous instance of the adjustment of a grave international dispute by peaceful methods.
By the sixth article of the treaty of 1871, three new rules were made for the government of neutral nations. These rules are binding upon the United States and Great Britain, and the contracting parties agreed to bring them to the knowledge of other maritime powers, and to invite such powers to accede to the rules.
In those rules it is stipulated that a neutral nation should not permit a belligerent to fit out, arm, or equip in its ports any vessel which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or carry on war against a power with which it is at peace. It was further agreed, as between the parties to the treaty, that neither would suffer a belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as a base of operations against the other. Finally, the parties agreed to use due diligence to prevent any infraction of the rules so established.