The withdrawal of his tired-out soldiers did not {102} dishearten Albuquerque, and he resolved to call a council of his captains to obtain their consent to renewing the attack with the idea of permanently occupying the city, and building a fortress there; for he had experienced both at Ormuz and at Goa the great distaste entertained by the Portuguese captains for the work of building fortresses. The policy of Almeida, who preferred factories to fortresses, had always plenty of adherents who could not appreciate the imperial notions of Albuquerque.
A report is given of the speech which Albuquerque is said to have delivered to his captains, both in Correa and in the _Commentaries_.
It is not probable that he actually spoke these words, any more than the Roman generals in Livy made use of the very sentences attributed to them. But the language is thoroughly consonant with Albuquerque"s character, and exhibits the aims of his policy so clearly that the oration deserves quotation. The text here selected is that of the _Commentaries_, which is fuller than that given by Correa.
"Sirs," he is reported to have said, "you will have no difficulty in remembering that when we decided upon attacking this city, it was with the determination of building a fortress within it, for so it appeared to all to be necessary; and after having captured it, I was unwilling to let slip the possession of it, yet, because ye all advised me to do so, I left it and withdrew; but being now ready, as you see, to put my hands upon it again once more, I learned that you had already changed your opinion: now this cannot be because the Moors have destroyed the best part of us, but on account of {103} my sins, which merit the failure of accomplishing this undertaking in the way that I had desired. And, inasmuch as my will and determination is, so long as I am Governor of India, neither to fight nor to hazard men on land, except in those parts wherein I shall build a fortress to maintain them, as I have already told you before this, I desire you earnestly, of your goodness, although you all have already agreed upon what is to be done, to freely give me again your opinions in writing as to what I ought to do; for, inasmuch as I have to give an account of these matters, and a justification of my proceedings to the King Dom Manoel, our Lord, I am unwilling to be left alone to bear the blame of them; and although there be many reasons which I could allege in favour of our taking this city and building a fortress therein to maintain possession of it, two only will I mention to you on this occasion as tending to point out wherefore you ought not to turn back from what you have agreed upon.
"The first is the great service which we shall perform to Our Lord in casting the Moors out of this country, and quenching the fire of this sect of Muhammad so that it may never burst out again hereafter; and I am so sanguine as to hope for this from our undertaking, that if we can only achieve the task before us, it will result in the Moors resigning India altogether to our rule, for the greater part of them--or perhaps all of them--live upon the trade of this country, and are become great and rich, and lords of extensive treasures. It is, too, well worthy of belief that as the King of Malacca, who has already once been discomfited and had proof of our strength, with no hope of obtaining any succour from any other quarter--sixteen days having already elapsed since this took place--makes no endeavour to negotiate with us for the security of his estate, Our Lord is blinding his judgment and hardening his heart, and desires the completion {104} of this affair of Malacca: for when we were committing ourselves to the business of cruising in the Straits of the Red Sea, where the King of Portugal had often ordered me to go (for it was there that His Highness considered we could cut down the commerce which the Moors of Cairo, of Mecca, and of Jeddah carry on with these parts), Our Lord for His service thought right to lead us. .h.i.ther; for when Malacca is taken, the places on the Straits must be shut up, and they will never more be able to introduce their spices into those places.
"And the other reason is the additional service which we shall render to the King Dom Manoel in taking this city, because it is the headquarters of all the spices and drugs which the Moors carry every year hence to the Straits, without our being able to prevent them from so doing; but if we deprive them of this, their ancient market, there does not remain for them a single port nor a single situation so commodious in the whole of these parts, where they can carry on their trade in these things. For after we were in possession of the pepper of Malabar, never more did any reach Cairo, except that which the Moors carried thither from these parts, and the forty or fifty ships, which sail hence every year laden with all sorts of spices bound to Mecca, cannot be stopped without great expense and large fleets, which must necessarily cruise about continually in the offing of Cape Comorin; and the pepper of Malabar, of which they may hope to get some portion, because they have the King of Calicut on their side, is in our hands, under the eyes of the Governor of India, from whom the Moors cannot carry off so much with impunity as they hope to do; and I hold it as very certain that, if we take this trade of Malacca away out of their hands, Cairo and Mecca will be entirely ruined, and to Venice will no spices be conveyed, except what her merchants go and buy in Portugal.
{105} "But if you are of opinion that, because Malacca is a large city and very populous, it will give us much trouble to maintain our possession of it, no such doubts as these ought to arise, for, when once the city is gained, all the rest of the kingdom is of so little account, that the King has not a single place left where he can rally his forces; and if you dread lest by taking the city we be involved in great expenses, and on account of the season of the year there be no place where our men and our fleet can be recruited, I trust in G.o.d"s mercy that when Malacca is held in subjection to our dominion by a strong fortress, provided that the Kings of Portugal appoint thereto those who are well experienced as governors and managers of the revenues, the taxes of the land will pay all the expenses which may arise in the administration of the city; and if the merchants, who are wont to resort thither--accustomed as they are to live under the tyrannical yoke of the Malays--experience a taste of our just dealing, truthfulness, frankness and mildness, and come to know of the instructions of the King Dom Manoel, our Lord, wherein he commands that all his subjects in these parts be very well treated, I venture to affirm that they will all return and take up their abode in the city again, yea, and build the walls of their houses with gold; and all these matters which here I lay before you may be secured to us by this half-turn of the key, which is that we build a fortress in this city of Malacca and sustain it, and that this land be brought under the dominion of the Portuguese, and the King Dom Manoel be styled true King thereof, and therefore I desire you of your kindness to consider seriously the enterprise that we have in hand, and not to leave it to fall to the ground."[2]
[Footnote 2: Albuquerque"s _Commentaries_, vol. iii. pp. 115-119.]
After having made use of some such arguments as {106} these, Albuquerque ordered a second attack on the city of Malacca. His success was as complete as it had been on St. James" Day, but the Portuguese on this occasion, instead of evacuating the place, at once commenced to build a fortress. The Sultan was driven out of the city, and was pursued into the interior by an army of 400 Portuguese and 600 Javanese.
The contingent of Javanese soldiers was obtained by an alliance which Albuquerque made as soon as he was in occupation of Malacca. When the Sultan fled, the Portuguese General ordered his men to spare the warehouses and other property of Ninachatu, the Hindu merchant who has been mentioned as the kindly benefactor of Ruy de Araujo and his companions in captivity. This leniency caused other Hindus to ask Albuquerque for his protection. He willingly granted it, and appointed Ninachatu as superintendent or governor of all the Hindus in the city. Then an aged Javanese, who had turned Muhammadan and was possessed of great wealth and influence, named Utemuta Raja, also made his submission, and was appointed head of the Javanese community. He it was who supplied the Portuguese with the force of 600 Javanese soldiers.
Nor were these the only native trading communities which the Portuguese Governor favoured. He gave particular encouragement to the Chinese, the Burmese, who are generally called by the chroniclers Pegus, and the Loochewans; but he declared war to the death with the Malays, both as Muhammadans {107} and as the former rulers. In spite of the a.s.sistance which the old Javanese chieftain had rendered him, Albuquerque was soon placed on his guard against the ambitious projects of Utemuta Raja. Ruy de Araujo gave information that he was at the bottom of the plot formed in 1509 for the ma.s.sacre of the Portuguese, and that it was his son who had sworn to a.s.sa.s.sinate Sequeira with his own hand. He further declared that if Albuquerque sailed away and left Utemuta Raja in power, there would soon be an end of the Portuguese domination in Malacca.
Albuquerque gave heed to the warning, and when he found that the Javanese was taking advantage for his own profit of the power committed to him, he promptly had him and the princ.i.p.al members of his family arrested. They were tried before Pedro de Alpoem, the Ouvidor or Chief Magistrate of the Portuguese in the East, and condemned to death. The wife of Utemuta Raja, who was a native of Java, promised to give a large sum of money in gold towards the expense of building the fortress, if the Portuguese would let her husband and children go. Albuquerque replied that the Portuguese did not sell justice for money, but that he was willing to hand over the corpses of the victims to be buried with native rites. The sentence was carried out in the great square of Malacca, where the treacherous banquet to Sequeira and his officers was to have been held, and Utemuta Raja, his son, his son-in-law, and his grandson were all beheaded. The execution was {108} followed by an attempted riot of the Javanese, which was easily suppressed.
This execution struck terror into the inhabitants of Malacca, and firmly established the Portuguese authority. Albuquerque then devoted himself, while the fortress was being constructed, to opening up relations with the neighbouring powers. He knew that the possession of Malacca would be of no advantage if traders were not encouraged to come to the city. It has been seen therefore that, while striking hard at the Malays, he gave every encouragement to the merchants of other nationalities. The most important of the trading nations, which brought their commodities to the Malay port, were the Chinese.
Albuquerque had treated with great courtesy the crews of five Chinese junks, which were anch.o.r.ed in the harbour, at the time of the first a.s.sault on Malacca. After they had witnessed the valour of the Portuguese on that occasion, he allowed them to take in cargo and to depart in safety. These crews reported throughout China the bravery and civility of the Portuguese, which had a great effect upon the minds of the Chinese ministers; so much so, that when the expelled Sultan of Malacca appealed to China for help, and abused the Portuguese as robbers and pirates, he received the answer that the Portuguese seemed to be a very good people, and that the Chinese government would not a.s.sist him. Albuquerque did not at this time send an amba.s.sador to China, but it is worthy of notice that it was one of {109} his captains, Ferno Peres de Andrade, who, in 1517, was the first Portuguese to visit Canton.
With the kingdom of Siam Albuquerque himself opened up direct relations. When the five Chinese junks left Malacca, they took with them, at the Governor"s request, Duarte Fernandes, who had learnt the Malay language while a prisoner with Ruy de Araujo, as an emissary to the Siamese Court. He was received most favourably by the King of Siam, who had always considered the Sultan of Malacca as an intruder and had heard the news of his defeat with joy. Fernandes returned to Malacca laden with rich presents, and Albuquerque sent him back to Siam, accompanied by a Portuguese fidalgo or gentleman, Antonio de Miranda, as amba.s.sador. He also sent in different directions Duarte Coelho to visit Cochin China and Tongking, and Ruy da Cunha to the kingdom of Pegu. He entered into communications with the King of Java and with some of the chiefs of the island of Sumatra, who were all greatly impressed by the speedy conquest of Malacca.
Of equal importance was Albuquerque"s despatch of three ships, under the command of Antonio de Abreu, to explore the Moluccas and the Spice Islands. This squadron was ordered not to take prizes, but to devote itself entirely to the work of exploration. It touched at many places, and did much important work, but its chief interest to later generations is that Francisco Serro, who commanded one of the ships, carried with him a young Portuguese gentleman, {110} Ferno de Magalhes, who was afterwards to make the first voyage round the globe in the service of Spain, and who, as Magellan, has left his name upon the map of the world.
In January, 1512, Albuquerque, after having completed his fortress, sailed from Malacca. He left an efficient garrison of 400 Portuguese soldiers, and placed the settlement under the governorship of Ruy de Brito Patalim, as Captain of the fortress, with Ferno Peres de Andrade under him as Chief Captain of the sea. Ruy de Araujo was re-appointed Factor, and also judge of suits between merchants of different nationalities. For each nationality in itself he appointed separate governors, of whom one was the faithful Hindu, Ninachatu. On his way back to India the famous ship _Flor de la Mar_, on which Albuquerque sailed, and which had been commanded during the Ormuz campaign by Joo da Nova, ran ash.o.r.e on the coast of Sumatra, and since it was very old and rotten it broke up. Albuquerque and the crew were saved. But their dangers were not yet over, and the whole fleet would have perished from want of water and of supplies had they not met with and captured two Muhammadan ships.
When the Governor arrived at Cochin, there was great excitement, for, since no news had been received from Malacca, some of the officers had written to King Emmanuel that Albuquerque was lost with all his fleet. His first question, after returning thanks to Heaven in the princ.i.p.al church, was about the {111} situation of Goa, his favourite conquest, and he was informed that it had been besieged throughout the winter, and was almost at the point of surrender.
The facts were that as soon as Albuquerque, the terrible governor, was known to be out of India, all his enemies, both native princes and reluctant captains, breathed more freely. The minister of the young King of Bij.a.pur at once sent an army against Goa, under the command of Fulad Khan, whom the Portuguese called Pulateco. This general defeated the forces of Timoja and Malhar Rao, and then invaded the island of Goa, and established himself in the fortress of Benastarim. Timoja and Malhar Rao fled to the court of the Raja of Vijayanagar, where Timoja was poisoned, and Malhar Rao soon after made his way to Honawar, where he succeeded his brother as Raja. The Portuguese garrison of Goa, under the command of Rodrigo Rebello, the Captain, marched out to attack Fulad Khan. But they had underrated the strength of their opponents. They were defeated, and among the slain were Rebello himself and the young Manoel da Cunha, son of Tristo da Cunha, whom Albuquerque had knighted for his gallantry at the capture of Goa.
According to Albuquerque"s express commands, Francisco Pantoja should have succeeded to the governorship of Goa, but the captains resolved to pa.s.s him over, and elected instead Diogo Mendes de Vasconcellos.
The new governor at once ordered Manoel de Lacerda to abandon the blockade of {112} Calicut, on which he was engaged, and to come to the a.s.sistance of the besieged inhabitants of Goa. Diogo Mendes soon proved his unfitness for supreme command. The Court of Bij.a.pur sent its most famous general, Rasul Khan, with a strong army to the coast, but Fulad Khan refused to acknowledge his supremacy. Rasul Khan then appealed for the help of the Portuguese against the insubordinate officer, and Diogo Mendes was foolish enough to comply. With the help of the Portuguese themselves, Rasul Khan drove Fulad Khan out of Benastarim, and, once safely within the island of Goa, he demanded the surrender of the city.
This was too much even for Diogo Mendes, who now showed himself to be a brave commander. The city held out during the winter, but the inhabitants were much reduced by famine, and their power of defence was injured by the fall of part of the new wall, owing to the severity of the winter. Albuquerque, on hearing of the situation of affairs, sent a warrant for Manoel de Lacerda to be Captain of the city, and promised to arrive soon and destroy the besiegers. This news was received, in the words of the _Commentaries_, "with a great ringing of bells and firing of salutes, for every one looked upon himself as redeemed from death."[3]
[Footnote 3: Albuquerque"s _Commentaries_, vol. iii. p. 206.]
But eagerly as Albuquerque desired to bring help to Goa, he sadly felt how inadequate were the forces that remained to him. The conquest of Malacca, and {113} the necessity for leaving a garrison there, had much reduced his fighting strength, and he found that the officers he had left behind at Cochin were unwilling to lend him their aid. In fact, the agents or factors at Cochin, Quilon, and Cannanore looked with alarm at the establishment of the Portuguese in Goa. Their fears were shared by the native Rajas, who expected that the whole trade of the coast would be attracted from their ports to the new settlement. So strongly had this been felt, that the factors and their party, headed by Lourenco Moreno, the Factor at Cochin, had sent a despatch to King Emmanuel, during the period when they hoped the Governor had been lost in his expedition to Malacca, strongly advising the immediate abandonment of Goa.
An effort was made to dissuade Albuquerque by Diogo Correa, Captain of Cannanore, who reported that an Egyptian fleet had set sail from the Red Sea for India, and advised Albuquerque to go against it, and not to the relief of Goa. After pa.s.sing some weeks in a state of forced inactivity, Albuquerque, to his great joy, was reinforced by his nephew, Dom Garcia de Noronha, with six ships, on Aug. 20, 1512, and directly afterwards by a further squadron of eight more ships under Jorge de Mello Pereira. Both these captains brought with them a large number of soldiers. They also carried many young and gallant officers, who greatly distinguished themselves in the ensuing campaigns, among whom Dom Garcia de Noronha held the royal commission as Captain of the Indian {114} Seas. The arrival of this young n.o.bleman rejoiced the heart of Albuquerque, for it gave him a brave and faithful adherent, who almost replaced the loss he had suffered by the death of Dom Antonio de Noronha.
On September 10, 1512, Albuquerque set sail from Cochin with fourteen ships carrying 1700 Portuguese soldiers. He heard on his way that the report of the departure of an Egyptian fleet was unfounded; and he at once entered the harbour of Goa. He never doubted of victory, and instead of endeavouring to drive Rasul Khan out of Benastarim, he resolved to blockade him, with his 6000 Turkish and Persian soldiers, in the castle there. For this purpose he sent Ayres da Silva to cut off the communications of the castle with the mainland. That captain, with six small ships manned by picked sailors, forced his way up the river, and after pulling up the stakes which the Muhammadans had fixed in the stream for their defence, he bombarded the castle under the eye of Albuquerque himself.
This operation cut off the retreat of the Muhammadan garrison, and Albuquerque made his entry into Goa. It is mentioned as characteristic of his extreme piety that he ordered the canopy of brocade which the chief men of the city were carrying over his head, to be borne instead over the Cross, which the priests had brought from their church to greet him. He then organised his military forces, and hearing that Rasul Khan had marched out towards the city at the head {115} of 3000 men, he resolved on fighting a pitched battle. He divided his infantry into three divisions, commanded respectively by Pedro Mascarenhas, Dom Garcia de Noronha, and himself; and he placed his cavalry, amounting to about thirty troopers, under Manoel de Lacerda. Owing to the Portuguese general"s skilful dispositions the Musalmans were attacked simultaneously, in front by Mascarenhas and on the two flanks by the other divisions.
The battle was very fierce, and the Muhammadans were driven into the castle of Benastarim.
The Portuguese endeavoured to follow them, and some of their leaders climbed upon the walls. The first who got up was Pedro Mascarenhas, and the author of the _Commentaries_ states that,
"Affonso de Albuquerque after the rally embraced and kissed him on the face, whereat some were scandalised, although they had no need to be, for besides his actions that day like a brave cavalier, Albuquerque was under an obligation to him, for he had left the fortress of Cochin, of which he was Captain, and had come to serve the King in that war."[4]
[Footnote 4: Albuquerque"s _Commentaries_, vol. iii. pp. 226, 227.]
In spite of this gallantry it proved impossible to capture the castle by escalade, and Albuquerque ordered a retreat to Goa. Many officers and men were wounded in this engagement, and Albuquerque then determined to breach the fortress and carry it by storm. The trenches were pushed forward with much rapidity and an adequate breach was made, but on {116} the very morning for which Albuquerque had ordered the a.s.sault, Rasul Khan hung out the white flag. The terms which Albuquerque demanded were that the castle should be surrendered with all its artillery, ammunition and horses, and that the deserters in Rasul Khan"s camp should be given up to him. The Muhammadan general consented, but only on condition that the lives of the deserters should be spared. Benastarim was accordingly evacuated, and the island of Goa was once more left entirely in the hands of the Portuguese. The conquest had been made only just in time, for Rasul Khan, as he retired with his disarmed troops, met a strong reinforcement coming up from Bij.a.pur under the command of Yusaf-ul-Araj, whom the Portuguese called Icufularij.
This brilliant victory was marred by Albuquerque"s cruelty to the Portuguese deserters who fell into his hands. Some of these men had gone over to the Muhammadan camp when the Portuguese ships were blockaded in the harbour of Goa in 1510, and the others had left Goa during the recent siege. Having promised to spare their lives, Albuquerque kept his word, but he mutilated them horribly, cutting off their ears, noses, right hands, and the thumbs of their left hands, and plucking out all their hair. The most conspicuous renegade, a fidalgo named Ferno Lopes, was also put on board a ship bound for Portugal in custody. He escaped, while the ship was watering at the island of St. Helena, and led a Robinson Crusoe life there many years.
{117} The relief of Goa in 1512 completes the second period of Albuquerque"s governorship. His tenacity in maintaining the Portuguese position at Goa is not less noteworthy than the valour by which he conquered it.
{118}
CHAPTER V
THE RULE OF ALBUQUERQUE (_continued_)
_The Expedition to the Red Sea and the Conquest of Ormuz_.
The conquest of Goa is so distinctly the most important event of Albuquerque"s governorship, that it is expedient to make clear his aims and hopes with regard to the establishment of the Portuguese capital there. Fortunately a state paper is extant which defines the great Governor"s position in eloquent words. When Dom Garcia de Noronha arrived at Cochin, he delivered to his uncle a letter from King Emmanuel directing that a general council of all the captains and chief officers in India should be held to consider the advisability of retaining Goa. The abandonment of the place had been recommended by four civilians, of whom the chief was, as has been said, the Factor at Cochin, with arguments that show how deeply the rival policy of the first Viceroy, Almeida, had taken hold of the Portuguese officials in India. They advocated the claims of commerce, as against empire, in language which vividly recalls that {119} used by the English East India Company two centuries and a half later. The opinion of these opponents of Albuquerque was supported, at the Court of Lisbon, by Duarte de Lemos and Goncalo de Sequeira, who had declined to share in the perils of the conquest.
The King embodied the ideas of the opposition in certain articles, which he sent to Albuquerque to submit to the consideration of his general council. These articles were: (1) that Goa was very unhealthy and was the cause of unnecessary expense, being of no use except to give trouble to the soldiers; (2) that therein there must always be continual war, for the King of Bij.a.pur was so powerful, that he would be sure to try his utmost to recover it, because it was the chief port of his dominions; (3) that the revenues of the island, upon which Albuquerque laid great importance, could not be collected, except by maintaining a great number of people with heavy expenses for the collection of these revenues, since the King of Bij.a.pur himself could not collect them without the a.s.sistance of a large army; (4) that the King of Bij.a.pur would be glad to agree to any proposal, and to become tributary to His Highness the King of Portugal, provided that Goa was restored to him.
These articles were laid before the captains, who unanimously condemned them and stated--
"That they were amazed at His Highness desiring to surrender, in pursuance of the advice of men who had never donned a suit of armour for the sake of experiencing the trouble it would involve, a place so commodious and important {120} as Goa, which had been acquired at the cost of so much Portuguese blood."[1]
[Footnote 1: Albuquerque"s _Commentaries_, vol. iii. p. 264.]
It may be doubted whether the council would have come to this decision had Albuquerque laid the subject before it before the relief of Goa, but he carefully left the point undecided, until after his great victory over Rasul Khan and the capture of Benastarim.
Albuquerque"s despatch upon the retention of Goa reveals the whole of his policy, and it must be carefully studied by anyone who wishes to understand the greatness of his views.
"Sire," he wrote to the King, "I captured Goa, because Your Highness ordered me to do so, and the Marshal had orders to take it in his instructions; I took it also, because it was the headquarters of the league which was set on foot in order to cast us out of India; and if the fleet which the Turks had prepared in Goa river (with a large force of men, artillery, and arms specially a.s.sembled for this object) had pushed forward, and the fleet from Egypt had come at this juncture, as they had expected, without doubt I should have been utterly discomfited; yea, even if ever so great a fleet had come from Portugal they would not have allowed it to make good its arrival in this country. But when once Goa was conquered, everything else was at our command without any further trouble, and when Goa was taken, that one victory alone did more for the advancement of Your Highness"s prestige than all the fleets which have come to India during the last fifteen years. And if Your Highness, in deference to the opinions of those who have written this advice to you, thinks it possible to secure your dominions in {121} these parts by means of the fortresses of Cochin and Cannanore, it is impossible; for, if once Portugal should suffer a reverse at sea, your Indian possessions have not power to hold out a day longer than the kings of the land choose to suffer it; for, if one of our men takes anything by force from a native, immediately they raise the drawbridge and shut the gates of the fortress, and this causes Your Highness not to be Lord of the land, as of Goa, for in this territory the injury which is done to Moors or to Portuguese does not reach beyond the Captain of the fortress.
Justice is yours, and yours the arm, yours the sword, and in the hand of your Captain-General reposes the punishment, and before him lies the remedy for the complaint of everyone; and if to-day there be any improvement in regard to the obedience shown by the natives of the land, it is plainly to be referred to the fact that the taking of Goa keeps India in repose and quiet; and the fact that the island has so frequently been attacked by the Turks, as those who wrote to Your Highness a.s.sert, and so valiantly defended by the Portuguese, enhances the credit which the progress of affairs in these parts deserves. And I have so completely disheartened the members of the league against us, that the King of Gujarat, powerful prince as he is, lost no time in sending to me his amba.s.sadors and restoring to me all the cavaliers and fidalgos, who were shipwrecked with Dom Affonso de Noronha, my nephew, on their voyage from Socotra, without my sending to ask this of him, and even offered me permission to build a fortress in Diu, a matter of such immense importance that even now I can hardly believe it; and I am now importuned by the Zamorin of Calicut, who desires to grant me a site to build a fortress in his city, and is willing to pay a yearly tribute to the Crown. All this is the result of our holding Goa, without my waging war upon any of these princes.
"And I hold it to be free from doubt, that if fortresses be {122} built in Diu and Calicut (as I trust in Our Lord they will be), when once they have been well fortified, if a thousand of the Sultan"s ships were to make their way to India, not one of these places could be brought again under his dominion. But if those of your Council understood Indian affairs as I do, they would not fail to be aware that Your Highness cannot be Lord over so extensive a territory as India by placing all your power and strength in your navy only (a policy at once doubtful and full of serious inconveniences); for this, and not to build fortresses, is the very thing which the Moors of these lands wish you to do, for they know well that a dominion founded on a navy alone cannot last, and they desire to live on their estates and property, and to carry their spices to the ancient and customary markets which they maintain, but they are unwilling to be subject to Your Highness, neither will they trade or be on friendly terms with you. And if they will not have any of these things, how is it likely that they will be pleased to see us establishing ourselves in this city of Goa, and strengthening its defences, and Your Highness Lord of so important a port and bar as this is, and not labour with all their might to hinder us from accomplishing our intentions? And if it seems a hard matter to those who have written about this to Your Highness that the recovery of Goa should have been so many times attempted, how much harder must it have been to gain the country from so powerful a sovereign as the King of Bij.a.pur, Lord of so many armies, who is not likely to refrain from straining every nerve to recover the possession of it and striking a decisive blow at our prestige, if he could do so? And whenever any one of his captains shall come up against this city, are we to surrender it immediately without first of all measuring our forces against him? If this be so, Your Highness may as well leave India to the Moors, than seek to maintain your position therein with such extraordinary outlays and expenses {123} on the navy, in ships as rotten as cork, only kept afloat by four pumps in each of them.
"As for the extraordinary expenses connected with the maintenance of Goa, of which these idle fellows write to Your Highness, the mere dross of India is so great, that, if the Portuguese possessions be properly farmed by your officers, the revenue from them alone would suffice to repay a great part of these expenses to which we are put, and if they say that the reason why I desire to keep possession of Goa is because it was I who took it, Your Lordship may rest a.s.sured that if I were a Portuguese of such a character as they are, I would be the first, if you ordered me to destroy it, to put the pick axe into the walls, and to fire the barrel of gunpowder under the Castle, if only for the pleasure of seeing the cards of the game of India shuffled for a new deal; but as long as I live, and while it remains my duty to send an account to Your Highness of Indian affairs, Goa must not be dismantled, for I would not that my enemies should exult in the contemplation of any serious disaster to this estate; and I must sustain it at my own cost, until they get their wishes, and another governor be sent to rule over it.
"If this that I say does not agree with the ideas of some of those who are half-hearted about this matter of Goa, Your Highness may know for certain that as yet there is a man who is governing it; and old and weak as I am, I will accept the government of this conquered territory at Your Highness"s hands, if it may be permitted me to confer the lands of the Moors upon the cavaliers and fidalgos who have a.s.sisted me to gain them. But do not require of me every year an account of what I am doing as if I were a tax-gatherer, because four ill-mannered fellows, who sit at home like idols in their paG.o.das, have borne false witness against me; but honour me, and thank me, for I shall be happy to complete this enterprise, and spend what little I have upon it; and, {124} in conclusion, all that I have to say is, that, if Your Highness either now or at any other time surrenders Goa to the Turks, then plainly Our Lord desires that the Portuguese dominion in India should come to an end; and, as for me, Your Highness may be sure that, so long as I am Governor, although I be put to much trouble, I shall not at any rate send you painted pictures of fict.i.tious places, but rather kingdoms taken by force of arms from their masters and fortified by me in such a manner that they may give a good account of themselves to all time.
"This is my opinion concerning this question of Goa which Your Highness commanded me to discuss with my captains and officers."[2]