ADDRESS OF REV. DR. ALFRED WHEELER.
Mr. President, it will be well for us, so far as we have progressed in this discussion, to see how near and how far we agree. It is admitted by the friends of the report, or by the committee, that this is a question of law, and to be decided exclusively upon principles of law. So far as those who are opposed to the report have spoken, they conceive, as I understand it, that the position taken by the committee is taken by those who are advocating its adoption. Then we are agreed that it is not a matter of sentiment, it is not a matter of chivalry. There is no place for knighthood, or any of its laws, or any other of the principles that dominated the contests of the knights of old. If it were a matter of knighthood there is not a man on this floor that would deem it necessary to bring a lance into this body. All would be peace and quiet.
There are none that would hail with more joy and gladness the women of the Church to a seat in this body than those of us who now, under the circ.u.mstances, oppose their coming in.
It is not either a matter of progressive legislation regarding the franchise of colored men, or of anybody else in the country. It is a question of law, Methodist law, and Methodist law alone.
Now, so far as the intention is concerned of those who made the law, I do not see how those who have kept themselves conversant with the history of lay delegation can for a moment claim that it was even the most remote intention of those who introduced lay delegation into the General Conference to bring in the women, and for us to transfer the field now toward women, in view of their magnificent work in the last ten or fifteen years, back to twenty years, is to commit an anachronism that would be fatal to all just interpretation of law.
I myself was in the very first meeting that was ever called to initiate the movement that at last brought in lay delegation. I voted for it; I wrote for it; I spoke for it in the General Conference and in the Annual Conferences. I was a member of the first lay committee, or Committee on Lay Delegation, that was appointed here by the General Conference in 1868. And during all these various processes of discussion, so far as I know, the thought was never suggested that under it women would come in to represent the laity, nor was it ever suggested that it was desirable that they should; so that the intention of the law-maker could never have embraced this design-the design of bringing women into the General Conference. I leave that.
Now, I claim that the General Conference has no legal authority to admit them here. We are not an omnipotent body. I know that the Supreme Court of the United States, in that contest between the Northern Church, or the Methodist Episcopal Church, and the Church South, decided that the General Conference was the Methodist Episcopal Church. I used that argument myself upon the Conference floor in 1868, that the General Conference could, without any other process, by mere legislation, introduce the laity into this body. I claimed there and then that, according to that decision, the Methodist Episcopal Church was in the General Conference. The General Conference refused to accept that endors.e.m.e.nt of that Court, or that proposition concerning the prerogatives of this body. And through all the processes that have been ordered concerning the introduction of lay delegation that interpretation of the const.i.tution of the Church has been repudiated. The Church herself rejected the interpretation that the Supreme Court placed upon her const.i.tution, and as a loyal son of the Church I accepted her interpretation of her own const.i.tution, so that now I claim that the General Conference has no authority whatever to change the personnel of the General Conference without the vote of the Annual Conferences. Before it can be done const.i.tutionally, you must obtain the consent of the brethren of the Annual Conferences, and I am in favor of that, and of receiving an affirmative vote on their part. But until this is done I do not see how they can come in only as we trample the organic law of our Church under our feet. And to do this, there is nothing but peril ahead of us.
A simple body may disregard law with comparative impunity, but an organic body that is complicated, complex in its nature, will find its own security in adhering earnestly, strictly, and everlastingly, to the law that that body pa.s.ses for the government of its own conduct.
Let us see, now, with regard to this Restrictive Rule. As I have said, it has been admitted all along that the action of the Annual Conferences must be secured. Here comes in the decision of the General Conference of 1872. I do not need to recite it. But let us bear in mind two facts. One is, that this General Conference is a legislative body, and that it is also a judicial body. As a judicial body, it interprets law; as a legislative body, it makes law. The General Conference of 1872 interpreted law, and the General Conference may reverse itself with just as much propriety as a court can reverse itself. And if it be the judgment of this General Conference that that interpretation was incorrect, it is perfectly competent for this Conference to say so, and have its action correspond with its own decision.
There is another point. The case that was before the General Conference of 1876 was a specific case. It was the case of the relation that local preachers sustain to the Church, a particular case. This is the principle of all decisions in law, that when a particular case is decided in general terms, the scope and comprehension of the decision must be limited to the particular case itself. And if a court in its decision embraces more than was involved in the particular case, it has no force whatever. And as this was a particular case submitted to the General Conference, and the decision was in general terms, it comprehends simply the case that was before it, and cannot be advanced to comprehend more. And the reason of this is very obvious; for if it was not the case, then cases might be brought before the court for its decision that had never occurred.
There is another point I wish to notice. The General Conference of 1880 did not see the effect that legislation would have by admitting women to certain offices. Certain affirmative legislation is also negative legislation. When saloons are permitted to sell in quant.i.ties of one gallon, it forbids to sell in quant.i.ties of less than one gallon; when it says you can sell in quant.i.ties of one barrel, it forbids them to sell in quant.i.ties of two. When the General Conference of 1880 decided that women should be eligible in the Quarterly Conferences as superintendents of Sunday-schools, cla.s.s-leaders, and as stewards, by that very affirmative conclusion, the subject was pa.s.sed upon about their taking any other position. That, I think, must be regarded as sound, and a just interpretation of the law.
But suppose it is not; the General Conference of 1880 certainly did not understand the matter as the General Conference of 1872 did. For if it had, there would have been no necessity for legislation at all, there would have been no need for putting in the law as it now stands, that the p.r.o.noun "he," wherever employed, shall not be considered as prohibiting women from holding the offices of Sunday-school Superintendent, Cla.s.s Leader, and Steward.
Now, for this reason, and for the further reason that it is a matter of immense importance that we guard against despotism, I oppose changing the personnel of the General Conference without my Annual Conference has a right to vote upon it, and it is voted upon. Despotism is a suitable term. A General Conference may become a despot, and just as soon as it goes outside of its legitimate province, then it usurps, and so far as it usurps, it becomes despotic, and is a despot; and you and I, so far as our Annual Conferences are concerned, do well to regard with a deep jealousy an infringement upon our organic rights. The only safety of the Church is the equipoise that is const.i.tuted by the relation the Annual Conferences sustain to the General Conference, and far safer is it for us to bring these women of the Church, elect, honorable women, into the General Conference of the Church by the same way that their husbands and brothers are here.
There is another thought that I wish to suggest. What are the possibilities with regard to lay delegation, supposing the design of those who wish to bring women in without further action is successful? You make lay delegation a farce in this body. The presiding elders and pastors of the Church may act in co-operation, and they can elect their own wives as delegates to this General Conference, and thus lay delegation comes to be a farce. Some of you may laugh at this suggestion, but it is an in posse, and it may easily be made an in esse. It is important to us that the laity should hold the place they have by the regulations we have, and they should be changed only to make them more perfect.
No body is safe without adherence to law. We may set lightly by law; we may regard it as a thing to be laid aside at the command of excitement or pa.s.sion, but the nation that does that is a doomed nation, and the Church that does that has its history already written. The only safe course for us to pursue is to pursue the wise, careful, judicious, and conservative-I mean every word-and conservative course we have heretofore pursued through all our history. When we boast of what Methodism has done, or what she is going to do, let us remember it is because of her firm adherence to law.
It is with her as it is with the German nation and the Anglo-Saxon race-everywhere our glory is in our adherence to wise laws, and if we pa.s.s unwise laws, in repealing them in the same wise.
ADDRESS OF GENERAL CLINTON B. FISK.
Mr. President and Brethren, to an onlooker of this remarkable scene, this great debate now in the third day of its progress must be suggestive of some of the marvellous plays, woven into song, which have made the hearts of the thronging mult.i.tudes who have crowded this place of meeting in the past throb alternately with emotions of hope and fear as to the outcome of the parties involved in plot and counterplot. The visitors to this General Conference, seated in their boxes and in the family circle, Will say surely these honored men of G.o.d who have been called as Superintendents of the affairs of our great conquering Church, these chosen ministers of reconciliation and peace, these male laymen called by their brethren to their high places in this General Conference, whose names at home are the synonym of chivalrous goodness-surely all these of rank and talent and authority, whose able and eloquent words have been ringing through the arches and dome of this temple of music on the wrong side of the question, are but simply acting the parts a.s.signed them. In the final scene they will join hands around the eligible women elect, who, in obedience to the call of the laity in their several Conferences, are in their seats with us, and say, "Whom G.o.d hath joined, let not male put asunder." My brothers, let us briefly restate the case. Five n.o.ble women of the laymen of the Methodist Episcopal Church have been chosen as delegates to this General Conference under the Const.i.tution and by the forms prescribed by the laws of the Church. As they enter, or attempt to enter, the portals of this great a.s.semblage they hear a voice from the platform, in words not to be misunderstood, "Thou shalt not," and voices from all parts of the house take up the prohibitory words, and supplement the voices of the Bishops, "Thou shalt not." And one would think, from the vehement oratory of the resisting delegates of this General Conference, that the foundations of the Church were in imminent peril by the presence of these "elect ladies" among us.
Let us turn back a moment, and review the history of the rise, progress, and triumph of the cause of lay representation. I claim to know a little something about it, as I was on the skirmish line in the conflict, and in all its battles fought until the day of victory.
In 1861, to the male members of the Church, was submitted the question of lay representation. It failed of securing a majority vote. Had it carried, there would have been plausibility in the argument this day made against the eligibility of women to seats in this General Conference. The evolution of the succeeding eight years lifted woman to a higher appreciation of her position in the Methodist Church, and her rights and privileges became the theme of discussion throughout the bounds of the Church. Among the champions for woman was that magnificent man, that grand old man, Dr. Daniel D. Whedon, who, in discussing this question, said: "If it is rights they talk of, every competent member of the Church of Christ, of either s.e.x and of every shade of complexion, has equal original rights. Those rights, they may be a.s.sured, when that question comes fairly up, will be firmly a.s.serted and maintained."
And in answer to the expected fling, "But you are a woman"s rights man," he replied: "We are a human rights man. And our mother was a human being. And our wives, sisters, and daughters are all human beings. And that these human beings are liable as any other human beings to be oppressed by the stronger s.e.x, and as truly need in self-defence a check upon oppression, the history of all past governments and legislation does most terribly demonstrate. What is best in the State is not indeed with us the question; but never, with our consent, shall the Church of the living G.o.d disfranchise her who gave to the world its divine Redeemer. When that disfranchis.e.m.e.nt comes to the debate, may the G.o.d of eternal righteousness give us strength equal to our will to cleave it to the ground!"
The General Conference of 1868, after full discussion, submitted the question of Lay Representation to a vote of all the members of the Church, male and female, thus recognizing the women as laymen, as belonging to the great body of the laity, and as vitally interested in the government of the Church, and having rights under that government. During the debate on the report of the Committee on the plan for submitting the question as in 1861, to the male members, Dr. Sherman moved to strike out the word "male." While that motion was under consideration, Dr. Slicer, of Baltimore, said, "If it were the last moment I should spend, and the last articulate sound I should utter, I should speak for the wives, mothers, and daughters of the Methodist Episcopal Church.... I am for women"s rights, sir, wherever church privileges are concerned."
Dr. Sherman"s motion was carried by a vote of 142 to 70, and the question of lay representation was submitted to all the members of the Church over twenty-one years of age. The General Conference did not ask women to vote on a proposition that only male members of the Church should be represented in the General Conference, and it did not then enter the thought of any clear-headed man that women were to be deprived of their rights to a seat in the General Conference. There were a few noisy, disorderly brethren who cried out from their seats, "No, no," but they were silenced by the presiding Bishop and the indignation of the right thinking, orderly delegates.
What does the Rev. Dr. David Sherman, the mover of the motion to strike out the word "male," now say of the prevailing sentiment on that day of great debate? I have his freshly written words in response to an inquiry made a few weeks ago. On March 21st he made this statement: "Some of us believed that women were laymen, that the term "men" in the Discipline, as elsewhere, often designated not s.e.x, but genus; and that those who const.i.tuted a main part of many of our churches should have a voice in determining under what government they would live. We believed in the rightful equality of the s.e.xes before the law, and hence that women should have the same right as men to vote and hold office. The Conference of 1868 was a reform body, and it seemed possible to take these views on a stage; hence the amendment was offered, and carried with a rush and heartiness even beyond my expectations....The latter interpretation of the Conference making all not members of Conferences laymen, fully carried out these views, as they were understood at the moment by the majority party. Some, to be sure, cried out against it, but their voices were not heard amid the roar of victory. Who can go back of the interpretation of the supreme court of the Church?"
It is amazing that brethren will stand here to-day and utterly ignore the decision of our Supreme Court in defining who are laymen. Could the utterances of any Court be more definite and clear than those of the General Conference when it said, "The General Conference holds that in all matters connected with the election of lay delegates the word "laymen" must be understood to include all the members of the Church who are not members of the Annual Conferences"? This decision must include women among the laity of the Church. I know it is said that this means the cla.s.sification of local preachers. We respond that that only appears from the debate. The General Conference was settling a great principle in which the personal rights and privileges of two thirds of the membership of our Church were involved. Surely, our Supreme Court would have made a strange decision had they, in defining laymen, excepted women. Let us see how it would look in cold type had they said, "The General Conference holds that in all matters connected with the election of lay delegates the word laymen must be understood to include all the members of the Annual Conferences, and who are not women." We would have become the laughing-stock of Christendom had we made such an utterance. The Church universal in all ages has always divided its membership into two great cla.s.ses, and two only, the clergy and the laymen, using the terms laity and laymen synonymously and interchangeably. See Bingham"s "Antiquities," Blackstone"s "Commentaries," Schaffs "History," and kindred authorities. It is sheer trifling for sensible males to talk about a distinction between laymen and laywomen.
Women were made cla.s.s-leaders, stewards, and Sunday-school superintendents, and employed in these several capacities long before the specific interpretations of the p.r.o.nouns were made. They were so appointed and employed in Saint Paul"s Church in this city during the pastorate of that sainted man, John M"Clintock, in 1860, and could the voice of that great leader and lover of the Church reach us to day from the skies it would be in protest against the views presented in this debate by the supporters of the committee"s report and its amendment.
It is a well-established and incontrovertible principle of law that any elector is eligible to the office for which said elector votes, unless there be a specific enactment discriminating against the elector. Our law says that a lay delegate shall be twenty-five years of age, and five years a member of the Methodist Episcopal Church. It does not say that a delegate must not be a woman, or must be a man.
Women are eligible to membership in this General Conference. Women have been chosen delegates as provided by law. They are here in their seats ready for any duty on committees, or otherwise, as they may be invited. We cannot turn them out and slam the door on their exit. It would be revolutionary so to do by a simple vote of this body. It would be a violation of the guarantees of personal liberty, a holding of the just rights of the laity of the Church. We cannot exclude them from membership in the General Conference, except by directing the Annual Conferences to vote on the question of their exclusion. Are we ready to send that question in that form down to the Annual Conferences for their action? I trust that a large majority of this General Conference will say with emphasis we are not ready for any such action. The women of our Methodism have a place in the heart of the Church from which they cannot be dislodged. They are our chief working members. They are at the very front of every great movement of the Church at home or abroad. In the spirit of rejoicing consecration our matrons and maids uphold the banner of our Lord in every conflict with the enemy of virtue and righteousness. Looking down upon us from these galleries, tier upon tier, are the magnificent leaders of the Woman"s Foreign and the Woman"s Home Missionary Societies. Our women are at the front of the battle now waging against the liquor traffic in our fair land, and they will not cease their warfare until this nation shall be redeemed from the curse of the saloon. G.o.d bless all these women of our great conquering Church of the Redeemer.
Twenty years ago Bishop Hurst accompanied me on a leisurely tour of continental Europe. In the old city of Nuremberg we wandered among the old churches and market-places, where may be seen the marvellous productions of that evangel of art, Albert Durer. In an old schloss in that city may be found the diary of Albert Durer, almost four centuries old. In it you may read as follows: "Master Gebhart, of Antwerp, has a daughter seventeen years old, and she has illuminated the head of a Saviour for which I gave a florin. It is a marvel that a woman could do so much." Three and a half centuries later Rosa Bonheur hangs her master-piece in the chief places of the galleries of the world, and Harriet Hosmer"s studio contributes many of the best marbles that adorn the parlors of Europe and America, and no one wonders that a woman can do so much. From that day when Martin Luther, the protesting monk, and Catherine Von Bora, the ex-nun, stood together at the altar and the twain became one, woman has by her own heroism, by her faith in her s.e.x and in G.o.d, who made her, fought a good fight against the organized selfishness of those who would withhold from her any right or privilege to which she is ent.i.tled, and has lifted herself from slavery and barbarism to a place by the side of man, where G.o.d placed her in paradise, his equal in tact and talent, moving upon the world with her unseen influences, and making our Christian civilization what it is to-day. Let not our Methodism in this her chiefest council say or do ought that shall lead the world to conclude that we are retreating from our advanced position of justice to the laity of the Church. Let us rather strengthen our guarantee of loving protection of every right and privilege of every member of our Church, without distinction of race, color, or s.e.x. Amen and Amen.
ADDRESS OF JUDGE Z. P. TAYLOR.
Mr. President and Gentlemen, when elected a delegate I had no opinion on the const.i.tutional question here involved. But I had then, and I have now, a sympathy for the women, and a profound admiration of their work. No man on this floor stands more ready and more willing to a.s.sist them by all lawful and const.i.tutional means to every right and and to every privilege enjoyed by men.
But, sir, notwithstanding this admiration and sympathy, I cannot lose sight of the vital question before the General Conference now and here.
That question is this: Under the Const.i.tution and Restrictive Rules of the Methodist Episcopal Church are women eligible as lay delegates in this General Conference? If they are, then this subst.i.tute offered by Dr. Moore does them an injustice, because it puts a cloud upon their right and t.i.tle to seats upon this floor. If they are not, then this body would be in part an unconst.i.tutional body if they are admitted.
It follows that whoever supports this subst.i.tute either wrongs the elect ladies or violates the Const.i.tution. If they are const.i.tutionally a part of this body, seat them; if they are not, vote down this subst.i.tute, and adopt the report of the committee, with the amendment of Dr. Neely, and then let them in four years hence in the const.i.tutional way. After the most careful study of the vital question in the light of history, ecclesiastical, common, and const.i.tutional law, it is my solemn and deliberate judgment that women are not eligible as lay delegates in this body.
Facts, records, and testimonials conclusively prove that in 1868, when the General Conference submitted the matter of lay delegation to the entire membership of the Church, the idea of women being eligible was not the intent. The intent was to bring into the General Conference a large number of men of business experience, who could render service by their knowledge and experience touching the temporal affairs of the Church. When the principle of admitting lay delegates was voted upon by the laity, this idea, and no other, was intended. When the Annual Conferences voted for the principle and the plan, this and this only was their intent.
When the General Conference, by the const.i.tutional majority, acted in favor of admitting the lay delegates provisionally elected, this idea, and none other, actuated them. It was not the intent then to admit women, but to admit men only, and the intent must govern in construing a Const.i.tution.
Dr. Fisk said Judge Cooley is a high authority on const.i.tutional law. I admit it, and am happy to say that I was a student of his over a quarter of a century ago, and ever since then have studied and practised const.i.tutional law, and I am not here to stultify my judgment by allowing sentiment and impulse to influence my decision.
Those opposing the report of the committee, with few exceptions, admit that it was not the intent and purpose, when the Const.i.tution and Restrictive Rules were amended, to admit women as lay delegates. They claim, however, that times have changed, and now propose to force a construction upon the language not intended by the laity, the Annual Conferences, or the General Conference at the time of the amendment. Can this be done without an utter violation of law? I answer, No.
In the able address read by Bishop Merrill, containing the views of the Board of Bishops, he says: "For the first time in our history several "elect ladies" appear, regularly certified from Electoral Conferences, as lay delegates to this body. In taking the action which necessitates the consideration of the question of their eligibility, the Electoral Conferences did not consult the Bishops as to the law in the case, nor do we understand it to be our duty to define the law for these Conferences; neither does it appear that any one is authorized to decide questions of law in them. The Electoral Conferences simply a.s.sumed the lawfulness of this action, being guided, as we are informed, by a declarative resolution of the General Conference of 1872, defining the scope of the word "laymen," in answer to a question touching the cla.s.sification and rights of ordained local and located ministers. Of course, the language of that resolution is carried beyond its original design when applied to a subject not before the body when it was adopted, and not necessarily involved in the language itself. This also should be understood, that no definition of the word "laymen" settles the question of eligibility as to any cla.s.s of persons, for many are cla.s.sed as laymen for the purposes of lay representation, and have to do with it officially as laymen, who are themselves not eligible as delegates. Even laymen who are confessedly ineligible, who are not old enough to be delegates, or have not been members long enough, may be stewards, cla.s.s-leaders, trustees, local preachers and exhorters, and, as such, be members of the Quarterly Conference, and vote for delegates to the Electoral Conference without themselves being eligible.
"The const.i.tutional qualifications for eligibility cannot be modified by a resolution of the General Conference, however sweeping, nor can the original meaning of the language be enlarged. If women were included in the original const.i.tutional provision for lay delegates, they are here by const.i.tutional right. If they were not so included, it is beyond the power of this body to give them membership lawfully, except by the formal amendment of the Const.i.tution, which cannot be effected without the consent of the Annual Conferences. In extending to women the highest spiritual privileges, in recognizing their gifts, and in providing for them spheres of Christian activity, as well as in advancing them to positions of official responsibility, ours has been a leader of the Churches, and gratefully do we acknowledge the good results shown in their enlarged usefulness, and in the wonderful developments of their power to work for G.o.d, which we take as evidences of the divine approval of the high ground taken. In all reformatory and benevolent enterprises, especially in the Temperance, Missionary, and Sunday-school departments of Church-work, their success is marvellous, and challenges our highest admiration. Happily no question of competency or worthiness is involved in the question of their eligibility as delegates. Hitherto the a.s.sumption underlying the legislation of the Church has been that they were ineligible to official positions, except by special provision of law. In harmony with this a.s.sumption, they have been made eligible, by special enactment, of the offices of steward, cla.s.s-leader, and Sunday-school superintendent, and naturally the question arises as to whether the necessity for special legislation, in order to their eligibility to those specified offices, does not indicate similar necessity for special provision in order to their eligibility as delegates, and if so it is further to be considered that the offices of steward, cla.s.s-leader, and Sunday-school superintendent may be created and filled by simple enactments of the General Conference itself; but to enter the General Conference, and form part of the law-making body of the Church, requires special provision in the Const.i.tution, and, therefore, such provision as the General Conference alone cannot make."
Now, sir, this language moves forward with a grasp of logic akin to that used by Chief Justice Marshall, or that eminent jurist, Cooley, from whom I beg leave to quote. Cooley, in his great work on "Const.i.tutional Limitations," says: "A Const.i.tution is not made to mean one thing at one time, and another at some subsequent time, when the circ.u.mstances may have changed as perhaps to make a different rule in the case seem desirable. A princ.i.p.al share of the benefit expected from written Const.i.tutions would be lost, if the rules they establish were so flexible as to bend to circ.u.mstances, or be modified by public opinion.
"The meaning of the Const.i.tution is fixed when it is adopted, and is not different at any subsequent time."
This same great author says: "Intent governs. The object of construction applied to a written const.i.tution is to give effect to the intent of the people in adopting it. In the case of written laws it is the intent of the lawgiver that is to be enforced.
"But it must not be forgotten in construing our const.i.tutions that in many particulars they are but the legitimate successors of the great charters of English liberty whose provisions declaratory of the rights of the subject have acquired a well understood meaning which the people must be supposed to have had in view in adopting them. We cannot understand these unless we understand their history.
"It is also a very reasonable rule that a State Const.i.tution shall be understood and construed in the light, and by the a.s.sistance of the common law, and with the fact in view that its rules are still in force.
"It is a maxim with the Courts that statutes in derogation of the common law shall be construed strictly."
Here, sir, we have the language of Judge Cooley himself. It is as clear as the noonday"s sun, and he utterly repudiates the pernicious doctrine that the Const.i.tution can grow and develop so as to mean one thing when it is adopted, and something else at another time. You can never inject anything into a Const.i.tution by construction which was not in it when adopted. And you are bound, according to all rules of construction, to give it the construction which was intended when adopted. No man of common honesty and common sense dares to a.s.sert on this floor that it was the intent when the Const.i.tution was amended to admit women as lay delegates. It follows inevitably that they are not const.i.tutionally eligible, and to admit them is to violate the Const.i.tution of the Church, which, as a Court, we are in honor bound not to do.
It has been a.s.serted with gravity that the right to vote for a person for office carries with it the right to be voted for unless prohibited by positive enactment. This proposition is not true, and never has been. We have seen, when the Const.i.tution and Restrictive Rules were amended, the intent was to admit men only as lay delegates. No General Conference can, by resolution or decision, change the Const.i.tution and Restrictive Rules. Grant, if you please, that the General Conference, by its action in 1880, had power to make women eligible in the Quarterly Conference as stewards and cla.s.s-leaders, this could not qualify her to become a lay delegate in the law-making body of the Church. The qualifications of lay delegates to this body must inhere in the Const.i.tution and Restrictive Rules, according to their intent and meaning when adopted. It is fundamental law that where general disabilities exist, not simply by statute, but by common law, the removal of lesser disabilities does not carry with it the removal of the greater ones.
Legislation qualifying women to vote in Wyoming and elsewhere had to be coupled also with positive enactments qualifying her to be voted for, otherwise she would have been ineligible to office. This is so, and I defy any lawyer to show the contrary.
--3, Article I, Const.i.tution of the United States, reads: "The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof for six years. No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the age of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of the State for which he shall be chosen."
These and no other qualifications are worded or found in the Const.i.tution of the United States touching the qualification of Senators. Is there a layman on this floor who will dare a.s.sert that under the Const.i.tution of the United States women are eligible as Representatives or Senators? Words of common gender are exclusively used as applied to the qualification of Senators. The words persons and citizens include women the same as they include men. Nevertheless, in the light of the past, I am bold to a.s.sert, that any man who would dare stand in the Senate of the United States, and contend that women are eligible to the office of United States Senators, would be regarded by the civilized world as a person of gush and void of judgment.
Article 14, United States Const.i.tution, --1: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
(Tax case and what was decided.) (Mrs. Minor vs. Judges of Election. 53 Mo. 68.) The first case indicates that the word citizen when affecting property rights includes corporations.
The second, that the word person, when it relates to the woman claiming the right to vote, does not confer upon her that right.
The language is: No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of any citizen of the United States. Nevertheless, a Republican Circuit Judge held this language did not ent.i.tle Mrs. Minor to vote. A democratic Supreme Court of Missouri held the same, and the Supreme Court of the United States, in an able opinion written by men known as the friends of women, conclusively demonstrated that these const.i.tutional guarantees did not confer upon woman the right to vote. Why? Because, from time immemorial, this right had not obtained in favor of woman, and these words of common gender should not be so construed as to confer this right, since it was not intended when made to affect their status in this regard.
THE END