This, however, was but the first act of the coming tragedy. On the 7th Lord Frederick Cavendish, a brother of Lord Hartington and an intimate friend of Gladstone"s, who had been appointed Chief Secretary in Forster"s place to carry out the new policy of conciliation, was a.s.sa.s.sinated at Dublin with Mr. Burke, the chief permanent official, by members of an Irish secret society, known as the "Invincibles." These were in reality quite unconnected with Parnell"s Parliamentary party, but the public did not discriminate between the two, and the result was a universal cry for strong measures against all forms of rebellion. For a moment Gladstone battled against this, and it was proposed to Dilke, who, as an advanced Radical, was with Chamberlain at that time friendly to the Parnellites, that he should take the post of danger at Dublin and continue, as Cavendish"s successor, the task of conciliating Ireland.
But Dilke did not like the look of things, and refused the post. It was found difficult to get any one to accept it. What, however, decided the abandonment of the policy of conciliation was the att.i.tude of Hartington. He took the matter of his brother"s death, which he felt deeply, as a personal wrong to be avenged, and from that moment became the most determined enemy of Irish Nationalism. Gladstone had to choose between resignation and the abandonment of his policy, and, seeing a majority of his Cabinet against him, he chose the latter. Trevelyan was sent to Dublin and new coercive measures were resolved on. And so, too, as to Egypt. Up to this point, in spite of the unconciliatory views of the Foreign Office, Gladstone, supreme in the Cabinet, had been able to put a veto on any active form of armed intervention. But now he found himself out-voted, and Egypt, too, was thrown to the wolves. "Look," his colleagues seem to have said to him, "where your policy of conciliation has led us in Ireland." If I have been rightly informed, a policy of coercion in Ireland and of intervention in Egypt was decided on at one and the same Cabinet in the second week of May. I quote some extracts from my Diary in ill.u.s.tration of the double situation.[12]
"_May 8._--In consequence of the ugly look of things in Egypt I have written an ultimatum to Gladstone begging him to relieve me of the dilemma I am in, caused by the Government"s silence. I have said that I must speak the whole truth if Lord Granville won"t. All the world, however, is agog about Ireland. Yesterday came the astounding news of Lord Frederick Cavendish"s and Mr. Burke"s murder at Dublin. At first it seemed as if the Government would have to resign, but to-day Parnell has written to disown all connection with the crime, and I think Gladstone will be the stronger for it. On Friday when I was in the lobby of the House of Commons Artie Brand (the Speaker"s son), who was there, pointed me out "the three Irish conspirators" talking together. Parnell is a tall, good-looking man of about 32, with nothing of the murderer about him. Dillon is tall and very pale and dark, and would do for Guy Fawkes in a cloak and dagger. They looked very much like gentlemen among the cads of the lobby.
"_May 11._--There is bad news from Egypt. The Khedive having refused to sign the Circa.s.sian sentences, Arabi has convoked the Chamber and they talk of deposing Tewfik. I went at once to Downing Street and saw G.o.dley, on whom I urged the necessity of Gladstone giving me an immediate answer. Gladstone is away at Lord Frederick"s funeral, and I have agreed to wait till to-morrow for an answer; but G.o.dley saw I was in earnest and promised it should be given. It is, of course, an unfortunate moment." I have a vivid recollection of G.o.dley"s sympathy on this occasion. I was myself deeply moved. It seemed to me so tragic a thing that the whole fate of a nation and of the best hopes of reform for a religion, both historic in the world, should depend on the possibility of securing the attention of one old man for half an hour, for I felt sure I could again persuade him. I did not, of course, know the exact position of the Cabinet, but G.o.dley must have known, and he seemed almost as much to feel it, as myself. I know he all along disapproved the Foreign Office policy in Egypt, and I think he felt deeply the disgrace of Mr. Gladstone"s share in it when, in spite of his Midlothian speeches, he came forward as the apologist of a war against Oriental freedom in the interests of finance. Very shortly after his chief"s change of policy he left his service for a permanent post elsewhere, and I have always fancied it was more or less in protest.
"_May 12._--Freycinet has declared he will not let the Turks intervene, so I feel easier.... Rode to George Howard"s who approved my plan (of publishing the whole truth). I have all ready now ... and the "Times"
will publish. It appears that Rothschild has been working hard with Freycinet to get the French Government to set up Halim instead of Tewfik.... In the meanwhile all that has actually been done is to order a fleet to be ready in a fortnight at Plymouth.... Saw Eddy Hamilton. He promises the answer to-night. The Howards are very angry with Dilke because he has refused the Chief Secretaryship for Ireland. "He will lose caste by this." They looked upon it as the shirking of a post of danger, but it is quite possible that Dilke was better pleased to remain where he was, at the Foreign Office, pulling the strings for Granville in Europe. It would have been well for Egypt if he had accepted.
"_May 13._--Gladstone"s answer has come; he cannot tell me any details, but Lord Granville will speak on Monday, and he begs me to wait till then. He only promises that the Liberal policy shall be in accordance with Liberal doctrines. So I am satisfied. I have written (to Gladstone) to offer to go out as mediator between Arabi and the Khedive. I have sent the following telegram to Arabi: "I entreat you have patience. Do nothing rashly or without Parliament sanction. Delay action against the Khedive. I am working hard for you, but must have time. There is real danger." At five o"clock I received an answer from Gladstone to say that he supposed my last letter was written before the arrival of recent news. I cannot understand what he means by that, as there is nothing in the evening papers.... Late at night an answer from Arabi: "Mai 13. Je vous remercie de vos conseils. Differend defere aux delegues.
Tranquillite complete. Certainement aucune crainte pour Europeens. Ahmed Arabi.""
The true history of the crisis which had taken place that first fortnight of May at Cairo, as I afterwards learned it, was this. On the second, the Khedive finding himself pressed by Arabi, his Minister of War, to sign the sentences of exile on the Circa.s.sian officers, some of whom were His Highness"s personal friends, called Malet to his counsels and received from him the advice, fortified by a promise of English support, that he should refuse his signature; and this must be considered the moment at which Tewfik first resolved to throw himself especially upon English protection in his quarrel with his Ministers.
Malet thereupon wrote an important despatch which is published in the Blue Books, extolling in high terms the character of the Khedive, as one deserving the full confidence of Her Majesty"s Government. The Khedive, therefore, refused to sign, though const.i.tutionally his signature to the decision of the court-martial could not be withheld.
The refusal, aggravated by the fact, which at once became known, that it had been suggested by a foreign Consul, angered the Nationalist Ministry, and letters were addressed by the Prime Minister, Mahmud Sami, to the members of the National Parliament requesting their attendance at Cairo. This was no doubt an irregular proceeding, inasmuch as the Parliament could only be legally summoned by the Khedive, and it gave umbrage to some of the members who were also annoyed at being called again to Cairo from their country homes at an inconvenient season of the year. Nevertheless, a large proportion of them came in answer to Mahmud Sami"s letters, and though they had no formal sitting, decided at a meeting held in Sultan Pasha"s house to support the Ministers, and it was resolved by forty-five to thirty, that, if Tewfik persisted in intriguing with the English and French Consuls against them, there was no other way than to impeach and depose him. Malet, however, having by this time received a telegram of approbation from the Foreign Office, and finding the Khedive wavering, informed him that the English and French fleets had been ordered to Alexandria on a plea of protecting European subjects. Upon this the Khedive sent for Sultan Pasha, the President of the Chamber, and exposed the situation to him, and so worked upon his fears, and upon a certain personal jealousy which he knew to have grown up in the Sultan"s mind toward Arabi, that he persuaded him to take part with him, and trust to European support rather than run the risk of war. Sultan then, at a new informal meeting of the Deputies, declared himself on the Khedive"s side against the Ministers, and obtained the adhesion of six other Deputies to his view, though the large majority of them remained faithful to the Ministry. It was at this juncture that my telegram to Arabi was received at Cairo, and it seems to have had some effect with Sultan, to whom it was doubtless shown. But the English papers of the thirteenth a.s.serted that the Chamber had joined the Khedive against Arabi, and on the fifteenth that Mahmud Sami had resigned. The following is from my journal.
"_May 14._--Sunday, at Crabbet. I see in the "Observer" that Sultan Pasha went yesterday to the Khedive to make terms between him and Arabi; so I conclude my telegram came just in time. The papers all say that he and the Chamber have sided against Arabi with the Khedive, but I will not believe that till I hear further. What is likely is that Sultan Pasha has been put out at the Chamber being invoked without a legal summons, and at an inconvenient time of the year. The army has had too much influence in the Ministry not to have made itself enemies. There is probably jealousy, but I do not believe in more. The whole thing has doubtless been fostered by Colvin and Malet. and the Circa.s.sians have been encouraged by the idea of Turkish intervention. They have ordered ships to Alexandria, which, if I am not mistaken, will have the effect of uniting all once more against the Europeans.
"In the afternoon a perplexing telegram from Abdu, "Il n"y a pas discorde entre Sultan Pasha et le Parlement. Le loup (meaning the ex-Khedive Ismal) dont partic.i.p.ation dans le complot Circa.s.sian est suppose dans ma lettre a Sabunji, est en effet complice. Differend princ.i.p.al est defere aux delegues. Tranquillite publique n"est pas menacee.""
Van Benningsen, the distinguished Dutch judge, author, under the t.i.tle of "Un Juge Mixte," of one of the most valuable works about Egypt under the Dual Control, was staying with me at Crabbet at the time, and I found him an ardent sympathizer with the Nationalists.
The next day, 15th May, was that of the long promised explanation by the Government of their Egyptian policy, and I went up to London in high hopes of something good, being fortified by the telegram I had received.
I was doomed, however, to a new disappointment. Though the matter of Egypt was discussed in the House of Lords, Granville had nothing better to promise the Egyptians than a repet.i.tion of the old menace of Gambetta"s Joint Note, and the statement, which I felt certain was untrue, that the Deputies at Cairo and the whole country were supporting the Khedive in his quarrel with his Ministers. This, then, was the famous "Liberal policy" Hamilton had promised me. I felt myself absolved from all obligation of reticence towards Gladstone, who seemed to have played with and deceived me. I left the House of Lords as soon as I had heard the speech, in great anger, and resolved henceforth to act without further reference to prudence on my part or the Government"s convenience. After thinking the matter over during the night in much perplexity, I decided upon a bold step. I was resolved to defeat the intrigue I knew was going on. As soon as the telegraph offices were open in the morning, 16th May, I sent the following message to Cairo:
"To Arabi Pasha, Minister of War. Lord Granville states in Parliament that Sultan Pasha and the Deputies have joined the Khedive against you.
If untrue, let Sultan Pasha telegraph me contradiction. United you have nothing to fear. Could you not form a Ministry with Sultan Pasha as Prime Minister? But stand firm."
"To Sultan Pasha, President of the Chamber of Deputies. I trust that all who love Egypt will stand together. Do not quarrel with Arabi. The danger is too great."
Also to each of the following Deputies: "Butros Pasha, Abu Yusuf, and Mahmud Pasha Falaki. Parti national, est il actuellement content d"Arabi? Le Gouvernement Anglais pretend le contraire. Si vous vous laissez desunir de l"annee, l"Europe vous annexera."
And I sent the same last telegram to Mohammed Abdu, to Sheykh el Hajrasi, and to Abdallah Nadim, the orator. All the eight telegrams were signed with my name, and I knew that in thus sending them I was sure to incur the anger of the Foreign Office, if not of Mr. Gladstone, for it could hardly be unknown to the Agency at Cairo, as messages sent by the Eastern Telegraph Company were at that time pretty well common property there. I was resolved, however, to run the risk of this, my only doubt being how to express succinctly the nature of the danger against which I warned the Deputies. The words, "Europe will annex you," seemed to me to do this best, for though, perhaps, our Government had no immediate thought of annexation nor yet the French Government, the ultimate end seemed certain, and Colvin"s words rang in my ears; nor do I think that the event so far has otherwise than justified me. Then, having fired my shot, I went back to the country repose of Crabbet to wait for what should happen. The answer came sooner than I at all expected, and that very evening, as I was sitting down to dinner, I received the following from Sultan Pasha:
"Le differend qui existait entre le Khedive et les Ministres completement disparu. Nous sommes tous d"accord a maintenir le repos et la tranquillite et a appuyer le Ministere actuel. Sultan."
In delight I telegraphed it at once to Gladstone, and to the "Times" for publication.
"_May 17._--To London again in the highest spirits, and on my way received new answers."
From the Sheykh el Islam, el Embabeh:
"Le differend entre le Khedive et le Ministere est applani. Le Parti National est content d"Arabi. Le nation et l"armee sont unies."
Another unsigned, but no doubt from one of the Deputies:
"Tout le pays avec Arabi and le Ministere Sami. Fellahs, Bedouins, Ulemas, tous sont unis. Il n"y a qu"un seul d"entre nous qui soit contre la liberte Egyptienne et qui tache de fausser l"opinion publique."
And a third of like character from Mohammed Abdu.
Moreover, in confirmation of the glorious news, the morning papers announced that in the afternoon of yesterday the Khedive, through Sultan Pasha"s mediation, had forgiven the Ministry. It was clear that I had won a first diplomatic victory. With such powerful proofs in my hand, I went with a light heart to Downing Street and showed my telegrams, and found Hamilton and G.o.dley, who congratulated me on my success. I told them the telegrams I had sent had cost me 20, and Hamilton said they ought to be repaid me out of the Secret Service Fund. Though this was, of course, said jokingly, it proves that, at least on Mr. Gladstone"s side of Downing Street the result I had gained against the Foreign Office was cordially approved. Moreover, as I had not seen Gladstone himself, Hamilton and G.o.dley advised me to write him another formal letter and press home my point against the Foreign Office, on the ground of their false information, and I agreed to do so, and spent the night at this work, having first arranged with b.u.t.ton that, if need should be, the letter should be published in the "Times," and in the meanwhile I sent Sultan a telegram begging him to congratulate the Khedive.
The morning, nevertheless, was to bring me a sharp reverse, if not yet a defeat. At a very early hour, having slept in London at my then town house, 10, James Street, Buckingham Gate, I sent for the morning papers, and found in all of them a Reuter"s telegram from Cairo giving the text of my telegram to the Deputies, the one ending "Europe will annex you,"
as having been addressed by me to the Sheykh el Islam, and stating that the Sheykh el Islam had since recanted the telegram he had sent me in reply. Also in the "Standard" there was a telegram from its correspondent at Cairo saying that he was authorized by Sultan Pasha to contradict the telegram from him which had been published in the "Times"
of yesterday, the same having been written under military intimidation.
I consequently at once wrote a second letter to Gladstone, and sent him the two by the same messenger before noon, with a note to Hamilton saying, that I considered it necessary both should be published. I had found b.u.t.ton at home, and had shown him the letters, which he promised should appear in the morrow"s "Times." He was delighted with them, and a.s.sured me they would make a sensation.[13]
Nevertheless, though they had already been put in type, for I had left copies of them with b.u.t.ton, the two letters were not published. The reason for this is given in my diary. At six o"clock I found a note from Eddy Hamilton saying he would be at home all the afternoon, so I went to him. He said he thought the telegram to the Sheykh el Islam an unfortunate one, and advised me strongly not to publish. "I asked him what a.s.surance he could give me that nothing violent was intended at Alexandria. He said he understood that the fleet going there only meant the securing of the lives of British subjects. He did not think it at all likely there would be any demand made for the disbanding of the Egyptian army or any disembarkation of troops. Also he a.s.sured me that a Commission, such as I had proposed, would be sent to Egypt. I am quite satisfied with this, and have sent David (my servant) to the "Times"
office to stop the publication of the letters."
I do not doubt that the a.s.surances given me in Downing Street on this occasion were given in good faith, but they were soon belied by the Foreign Office, and my silence as to the telegrams did me, from that time forth, an injury with the public. The "St. James"s Gazette" spoke of me that very evening as an "incendiary," and other journals, seeing I did not reply, followed suit. Their language re-acted on the Government, and doubtless also on Gladstone, though he knew the truth, which the public as yet did not. I continued, it is true, my communications and visits to Downing Street, but they became inevitably on a less and less intimate footing. For this reason I regret that I allowed myself to be persuaded, and that the letters did not appear, as had been arranged that night, in the "Times." Had they done so I cannot help thinking that the fatal ultimatum of 25th May would not have been issued.
FOOTNOTES:
[12] See Lord Eversley"s letter quoted in the Preface.
[13] These two letters are practically embodied in my letter subsequently published on June 20. See Chapter XIV.
CHAPTER XII
INTRIGUES AND COUNTER INTRIGUES
The history of the next six weeks in Egypt, from the arrival of the English and French fleets at Alexandria to the bombardment of the city is that of a desperate attempt by our diplomacy one way or another to regain its lost footing of influence, and failing that to bring about a conflict; and of a no less desperate and unscrupulous attempt by the Foreign Office at home to force Gladstone"s hand to an act of violence.
In all this there was far less of statemanship, or even financial intrigue, than of personal pique. The tone neither in the Chancelleries of Europe nor of the Stock Exchange was so urgent as to make a peaceful treatment of the case impossible. France, under Freycinet, had withdrawn entirely from Gambetta"s aggressive designs, and would readily have made the best at any moment of a political situation by no means hopeless at Cairo, while Germany and Austria, representing the financial interests, especially of the Rothschilds, were for a repet.i.tion of the remedy found efficacious in 1879, the Sultan"s intervention in the form of a new firman, subst.i.tuting Halim for Tewfik. This would have been an easy solution of the quarrel which had arisen between Tewfik and his Ministers, and though not the ideal to which the Nationalist leaders looked, would have been accepted by all parties as an ending of the crisis. The other countries of Europe were for the most part in sympathy with the National movement, Switzerland and Belgium strongly so, while Italy was so enthusiastic that at one time, in spite of the Government, which supported English policy, a corps of volunteers was being enrolled under Menotti Garibaldi to help Arabi. It was only in England that public opinion, worked upon systematically through the Press primed by our diplomacy, was at all excited or called for vigorous action.
The personal element in the struggle is easy to understand. Malet and Colvin had committed themselves at the time of the change of Ministry in February to an att.i.tude of uncompromising hostility to the Nationalists, and any solution of the crisis which should leave these in power at Cairo they knew would mean their own disgrace. Colvin would certainly have had to follow his French colleague, de Blignieres, into retirement, and Malet would have been removed to some minor post in the service where his blundering would have been of less grave consequence. The Foreign Office, too, had its own _amour propre_ to save. Dilke was an ambitious man, and did not mean to fail, and even old Granville, fond as he was of his ease, had his public phrases to make good. Thus from the middle of May to the 11th of July, the date of the bombardment, we have the spectacle of a series of diplomatic manoeuvres wholly indefensible by any valid plea of necessity, absolutely at variance with all the avowed principles of Mr. Gladstone"s Midlothian policy, and so cynically unscrupulous that I doubt if in the annals of our Foreign Office anything comparable to them exists.
On the other hand, in native Egypt, we see the National Party just at the moment when it had secured for the country the right of self-government and an existence of personal and civil freedom which it had never before in all its history enjoyed, when its Parliament had met, and after a first happy session had adjourned, when its mind was busy with projects of reform and when the general desire was to rest and be thankful, at peace with all the world, hurried from its att.i.tude of calm into a sea of apprehension from without, and of treachery, backed by foreign intrigue, from within. Three letters written to me at the beginning of the crisis, the first two from Arabi himself, the third from that gallant old Swiss gentleman, John Ninet, who alone of the European sympathizers with the National fellah cause remained on in Egypt and took part with the army during the war, will show what the earlier feeling in native Cairo was.
"Cairo, _May 15, 1882_.
"_To my dear and sincere friend Mr. Blunt._
"Praise be to G.o.d, your letter of the 20th April duly reached me.
We have read it with great pleasure. Let us hope that the fruit of your endeavour will soon be gathered. Indeed, every sound-minded lover of freedom bears witness to your philanthropic efforts. My pleasure was increased by learning from you that my two letters reached you in a favourable hour. May G.o.d in his mercy give peace to our minds, and better the condition of affairs, and lead us to what he thinks for the good of our country.
"As to the publication of my two letters I only wished to refute the attacks made upon me by my enemies, those who accused me of being a man extravagant in his ideas and seeking after despotic power. These are mere calumnies, as you know full well. I like better to remind you that as a member of the Egyptian Government I am responsible as Minister of War for the acts of my office, as we all are responsible for our departments. I have but one voice in the Cabinet, and I act according to the policy imposed upon me by the Prime Minister, as shown in the letter he presented to the Khedive when he first formed the Ministry. You may reply upon my truthful word that we are all of us in anxious watch over our country, and trying to rule it according to just principles, and we have made up our minds, by G.o.d"s help, to overcome all difficulties. If any among the European nations, who love mankind and love civilization, will take us by the hand and help us in our struggle, we shall be infinitely grateful to them. If not we have to thank G.o.d only, who has been our support from the beginning.
"As to the state of the country, it is in perfect peace. Our only perplexity is caused by the lies published by unscrupulous men in the European press. This is a gratuitous hostility, but we hope that soon the veil of prejudice will fall from their eyes.
"AHMED ARABI."
"Cairo, _May 21, 1882_.