"We then went on to Artin Bey"s, where also we were entertained with great honour, and afterwards drove through the Clot Bey Road, the Mouski, and other parts of the town, while the people stood on both sides saying, "May G.o.d exalt you."
"At the end of the drive Arabi told me he was invited to dine with Seyd Ha.s.san Akkad, and took me with him, with all the pashas, officers, sheykhs, and Ulemas. Our host"s large house was crowded; Arabi, Mahmud Sami, Ahmed Pasha, Abdu, Nadim, and I were in the princ.i.p.al sitting-room, where we recited poetry, making or composing elegies and satires, and amusing ourselves at Ragheb"s expense. Arabi composed a satire, Abdu two, Nadim made four, and Sami two. At dinner I sat by Arabi. The courses were about thirty different Arab dishes, besides the European and Eastern cakes, sweetmeats and fruit.
"After dinner we talked freely about politics, and about different plans and forms of government. The republican form was preferred; and Mahmud Sami, who displayed great knowledge and ingenuity, endeavoured to show the advantage of a republican government for Egypt. He said: "From the beginning of our movement we aimed at turning Egypt into a small republic like Switzerland--and then Syria would have joined--and then Hejaz would have followed us.
But we found some of the Ulema were not quite prepared for it and were behind our time. Nevertheless we shall endeavour to make Egypt a republic before we die. We all hope to see the "Saturnia regna"
once more."
"_June 19._--Abdu, Nadim, Sami, and I were talking the night before last about the peaceful means to be taken to tide over the Egyptian difficulty. Abdu said that he has made up his mind to get together all the doc.u.ments he has in his possession, with others concerning Egyptian affairs, and go to England and depose them himself before Mr. Gladstone and the English Parliament. He would take also with him a worthy person as representative of the leading merchants of the land; and another who would represent the liberal fellahin.
Mahmud Sami approved the idea, and said he also wished he could go to Europe on such a mission, and Abdu is already preparing for the journey. So is Nadim and Seyyid Ha.s.san Moussa el Akkad, the leading Arab merchant of Cairo, a man of considerable wealth, influence, and patriotism.
"Ragheb is made Prime Minister, but his policy being Turkish n.o.body is pleased with him except the Circa.s.sians. People suspect some Ottoman intrigue in the matter and are very uneasy. I am trying to calm their minds and tell them to keep quiet.
"The last events have increased the hatred in the Arab heart against the Turks, Circa.s.sians, and the Sultan himself. I heard Sami and Abdu and Nadim curse the Sultans and all the Turkish generation from Genjis Khan to Holagu and down to Abdul Hamid. They are preparing the nation for a republican form of government. A large party is already formed and disposed; _crescit eundo_. They will seize upon the first occasion which presents itself. They expect the armed intervention of Turkish troops with pleasure in this last crisis. It would have been the signal for a complete independence from the Porte. But the cunning Turk saw the danger and abstained. Nadim told me yesterday, while we were coming from Shubra, that he must, before he dies, crush down the Sultan"s throne. ---- said: "This is my aim too--may G.o.d help us to succeed."
"I must tell you that I have been received here with such honour, respect, and politeness as I never could dream of. All the pashas, colonels, sheykhs, merchants receive me with open arms, and lavish upon me their kindness and hearty thanks. We have arranged with Nadim to give a dinner party to all the leaders of the National Party in your honour, and to thank you for the help given them in their struggle."
"Cairo, _June 22_.
"Last night I went to Mahmud Sami"s house, where I met all our friends and the Pashas and many other of the leaders. We talked politics all night, and I communicated to them the contents of your letters received to-day by Brindisi. I also gave them a summary of the English newspapers you and Lady Anne had sent me. Afterwards I presented to Mahmud Sami, in the presence of Nadim, a pet.i.tion on the part of the National Party, in which they ask Mr. Gladstone to send to Egypt a Consul who understands the affairs of their country. Sami approved the pet.i.tion and said they will have it signed when Arabi Pasha comes back to Cairo and present it to Mr.
Gladstone through you. At the end of the _soiree_ I was informed that Sir E. Malet has for the fourth time urged Tewfik to arrest Abdu, Nadim, Mahmud Sami, and myself.
"_June 23._--As soon as Ragheb Pasha was confirmed by the Khedive as Prime Minister, his first act and order was to call me to Alexandria with Nadim. On Monday night the Under-Secretary sent his carriage to my hotel with his man, who informed me that Ha.s.san Pasha Daramalli wished to see me, and had sent his carriage. I went with Nadim, not trusting myself to go alone. When we got there we were received courteously, and afterwards he informed me that Ragheb Pasha had charged him with a message that he wished me to go and meet him at Alexandria at the Divan of the Administration. I replied "very well," and Nadim said he, too, would go with me. And so we left the house with the firm intention of having nothing to do with Ragheb.
"Thus at the very time I was telegraphing to you, "for G.o.d"s sake save Malet or he will be murdered by fanatics," he was urging the Khedive to arrest me. Often, when hot-headed young Egyptians were discussing Malet and Colvin"s death, I endeavoured to convince them of their folly, and that no possible good result could come of it to the National cause.
"_June 24._--Mahmud Pasha Fellaki, who had deserted the National cause on account of his not having received a place in Mahmud Sami"s Ministry, has now been reconciled and has received from Arabi the post of Minister of Public Works."
(Sabunji then describes the crisis preceding Mahmud Sami"s resignation, Arabi"s appeal to the Sultan, Dervish"s mission and Osman Bey"s mission, and how they flattered Abdul Hamid with professions of zeal for the Caliphate.) "As to their real convictions, however, they care for Abdul Hamid as much as they would care for a man in the moon. They would make use of him as long as he can be useful to them and until they are strong enough to declare themselves an independent republic. This has been the basis of their program from the beginning. But they have prudently chosen to proceed by degrees. Mahmud Pasha Sami a.s.sured me in Nadim and Abdu"s presence that before they die they must declare themselves independent of the Porte, and Egypt a republic. Nadim"s efforts are employed to instill this idea in the minds of the young generation.
Since I came here I and Nadim have been together night and day. We sit talking and devising plans till one or two every morning. We mix in every society. Sheykhs, Ulemas, Notables, merchants, and officers receive us with open arms, and we talk to them of your endeavours and of the service which you have rendered to the National cause. They all long to see you and present you with their hearty thanks. Indeed, people so good and sincerely kind deserve every attention and help."
I am not able to fix an exact date to the moment when Gladstone finally hardened his heart against the Egyptians and resolved on military operations--he persuaded himself that it would not be war--but it must have been some time between the 20th June and the end of the month. The considerations that seem to have decided him were, first, of course, parliamentary ones. His Whig followers were on the point of a revolt, and Chamberlain was pressing him with tales of the impatience of the provinces. The diplomatic defeat of the Foreign Office was becoming too plain to be concealed. Granville, with his little maxims of procrastination and using a threat as if it were a blow, had "dawdled it out" in Egypt till England had become the laughing-stock of Europe. On the Stock Exchange things were looking badly and trade was suffering from the long crisis. What were called the "resources of civilization,"
that is to say, lying, treachery and fraud, had been tried by the Foreign Office to more than their extreme limit, and one and all had proved absolutely of no use against the Nationalist obstinacy. Arabi had been ordered by all the majesty of England to leave Egypt, and he had not gone. On the contrary he had gained an immense reputation throughout the Mohammedan East at England"s expense. It seemed to many that there would be a Pan-Islamic revolt in India. England, as I had said on Waterloo day, had never looked so foolish. Serious officials were alarmed at this, and all the jingoism of the Empire, asleep since Disraeli"s parliamentary defeat in 1880, was suddenly awake and crying for blood. Mr. Gladstone hardened his heart and let his conscience go, not, I think, by any deliberate decision saying that this or that should be done, but simply by leaving it to the "departments," and to the "men on the spot," that is to say, the Admiralty, Sir Beauchamp Seymour, and Colvin (for Malet had been withdrawn) to work out a solution their own way. We had won our diplomatic game against the Foreign Office too thoroughly. It was to be the turn now of England"s fighting forces.
"_June 19._--A Stock Exchange scare of Bright and Chamberlain having resigned" (a scare which showed the ignorance of the public as to Chamberlain"s position, cla.s.sing him still with Bright).
"_June 20._--A more reasonable article in the "Daily News." Frederic Harrison strongly advises me to write Gladstone a public letter and have it printed. He is prepared to answer for its effect in the provinces. I have accordingly begun one.
"_June 21._--Finished my letter and took it to the Howards for approval.
He (George Howard) made me modify some sentences, so as not to compromise Gladstone personally. She warmly approved. Frank Lascelles was there. I then arranged with b.u.t.ton to publish it tomorrow, or Friday at latest, and sent it in to Gladstone.
"_June 22._--To b.u.t.ton early. We think they mean mischief after all.
Harry Brand writes that if the French hold out on the Note the Government mean to act in Egypt, notwithstanding Germany. I doubt, however, if France is prepared for this. I shall follow up my letter (to Gladstone) with other letters, if necessary. I am certain that if England lands troops anywhere in Egypt, the Sultan will proclaim a Jehad and that the Mussulmans will rise in India. Things are in a pretty pa.s.s."
My letter to Gladstone appeared in the "Times" on the following day, 23rd June, the very day the Conference met at Constantinople. It created a great sensation. It stands thus:
"_June 21st, 1882._
"SIR,
"The gravity of the present situation in Egypt, and the interests of honour and advantage to the English nation which are there engaged, impel me to address you publicly on the subject of the diplomatic steps which have led to this imbroglio, and to put on record certain facts which, in the case of any new departure taken by the Powers at the approaching Conference, should not be lost sight of.
"You are aware, sir, that during the past winter I was engaged as mediator in a variety of unofficial but important negotiations carried on between Sir Edward Malet and Sir Auckland Colvin on the one hand, and the chiefs of the National Egyptian party on the other, negotiations in which I engaged my personal honour to the loyalty of Her Majesty"s agents; also that I have been in close communication with those chiefs since my return to England, and that I am consequently in a position to speak with certainty and authority as to the character and intentions of the popular movement in Egypt. You know, moreover, that I have from time to time warned Her Majesty"s Government of the danger they were running from a false appreciation of facts, and that I have repeatedly urged the necessity of their coming to a rapid understanding with those in whose hands the guidance of the movement lay. Finally, you know that in the interests of right and justice, and in accordance with a promise made by me to the Egyptians, I have counselled them to the best of my ability in the recent crisis, and spared no pains to urge them to come to that settlement of their difficulties with the Khedive, Mohammed Tewfik, at which they have now happily arrived. In this I took upon myself a great responsibility, but one which, I think, the event has already justified.
"The main points in the past which I would state are these:
"1. In the month of December last I a.s.sisted the National Party to publish a program of their views, which was just and liberal, and to which they have since rigidly adhered. At this time, and down to the publication of the Dual Note of the 8th of January, the Egyptians had no quarrel whatever with England or the English.
Neither had they any real quarrel with the Khedive or the Control, trusting in these to permit the development of political liberty in their country in the direction of Parliamentary and const.i.tutional self-government. Their aim was, and is, the resumption by Egypt of her position as a nation, the redemption of her debt, and the reform of justice. They trusted then, as now, to the army, which was and is their servant, to secure them these rights, and to their Parliament to secure them these ends; and they were prepared to advance gradually, and with moderation, in the path they had traced.
"2. The Dual Note, drawn up by M. Gambetta with the view of making England a partner of his anti-Mussulman policy and understood by the Egyptians as the first step in a policy a.n.a.logous to that recently pursued in Tunis, changed this confidence into a sentiment of profound distrust. Instead of awing them, it precipitated their action. It caused them to insist upon the resignation of Sherif Pasha, whom they suspected of the design to betray them, and to a.s.sist with the Khedive in summoning a Nationalist Ministry to office. This insistence, though represented by the English journals as the work of the army, was, in fact, the work of the nation through their representatives the Notables. Of this I can furnish ample evidence.
"3. The unexpected fall of M. Gambetta prevented the execution of the threat of armed intervention implied by the Dual Note.
Nevertheless, a plan of indirect intervention was persisted in. The English and French Controllers-General protested against the Const.i.tution granted by the Khedive on the 6th of February, and the English and French Governments carefully withheld their a.s.sent to it, signifying only that the Article, giving to the Egyptian Parliament the right of voting that half of the Budget which was not affected to the payment of the Debt, was an infringement of international engagements. Their argument for this, based on certain firmans of the Porte, and certain decrees of the Khedive, has been constantly denied by the Egyptians.
"4. Acting, it must be presumed, in accordance with their instructions, the English agents at Cairo have for the past three months set themselves steadily to work to bring about a revolution counter to the will of the people and the liberties granted to them by the Viceroy. The English Controller-General, though a paid agent of the Egyptian Government, has not scrupled to take part in this; and the English Resident Minister has spared no pains to create a quarrel between the Khedive and his Ministers. The Controller-General, sitting in council with the Ministers as their official adviser, has withheld his advice, counting, it would seem, on the mistakes likely to be made by men new to office, and noting these in silence. The English press correspondents, hitherto held in check by the Resident, have been permitted full license in the dissemination of news injurious to the Ministry, and known to be false. I will venture to recall to you some of the scares reported at this time and disseminated through Europe--the scare of banditti in the Delta; the scare of the Bedouin rising; the scare of revolt in the Soudan; the scare of an Abyssinian war; the scare of huge military expenditure; the scare of a general refusal to pay taxes, of the resignation of the provincial governors, of the neglect of the irrigation works, of danger to the Suez Ca.n.a.l; the scare of Arabi Pasha having become the bribed agent, in turn, of Ismal, of Halim, and of the Sultan.
"For some of these a very slight foundation may have existed in fact; for most there was no foundation whatsoever.
"On the 20th of March I addressed Lord Granville, by Arabi Pasha"s request, on this subject, and pointed out to him the danger caused to peace in Egypt through the att.i.tude of the English agents urging that a Commission should be sent to Cairo to examine into Egyptian grievances.
"In the month of April advantage was taken by the English and French Consuls-General of the discovery of a plot to a.s.sa.s.sinate the National Ministry, and traced by these to an agent of Ismal Pasha"s, to induce the Khedive to put himself in open opposition to his Ministers. Those implicated in the plot and condemned to banishment were men of position, Turks and Circa.s.sians, and as such of the same race and society with the Khedive and he was unwilling to ratify their sentence, and suffered himself to be persuaded to refuse his signature. This led to the rupture which the previous diplomatic action of the Consuls-General had prepared. A summons was then sent by Mahmud Sami Pasha to the Deputies to come to Cairo and decide between the Ministers and the Khedive, and the Deputies came. Sultan Pasha, however, through jealousy, refused to preside at any formal sitting; and advantage was again taken of the circ.u.mstance by the Consuls-General to encourage all who were in opposition to the National Party to rally round the Khedive. A section of the rich Egyptians, fearing disturbance, sided with the Circa.s.sians, and the Consuls-General, deceived by appearances, ventured a _coup de main_. An _ultimatum_, dictated by them, was sent in to the Ministers, insisting on the resignation of the Ministry and Arabi Pasha"s departure from the country. The step for an instant seemed to have succeeded, for the Ministry resigned. It became, however, immediately apparent that the feeling of the country had been miscalculated by our diplomacy, and Arabi, by the manifest will of the nation, returned next day to power.
"I cannot understand that the action of our Consul-General in this matter was justified by any principle of Liberal policy; it has certainly not been justified by success.
"6. When the Fleet was ordered to Alexandria, I endeavoured to convey a warning, as my private opinion, based upon all I had witnessed last winter of the temper of the Egyptian people, that the presence of English men-of-war at that moment in the port of Alexandria, especially if their crews should be allowed on any pretence to land, would be exceedingly likely to provoke a serious disturbance and it was my intention to go myself to Egypt to do what I could towards mitigating what I feared would be the results.
"7. About the same time the English Government consented to the despatch of a Turkish Commissioner to Cairo. It was supposed that the authority of the Sultan was so great in Egypt that obedience would be shown to whatever orders his representative might bring, or that, at any rate, little opposition would be offered. In any case, the Porte was authorized to act in its own way. Dervish Pasha was sent; and it is lamentable to record that the English Foreign Office at that time seems to have counted mainly on the fact that he was a man notoriously unscrupulous in his method of dealing with rebels. I have reason to know that what was expected of him was, that he should summon Arabi Pasha to Constantinople; that, failing this, he should have recourse to bribery; and that in the extreme resort, he should arrest or shoot the Minister of War as a mutineer with his own hand. Whether these were really Dervish Pasha"s instructions or intentions I will not argue. The Porte seems to have been as little prepared as Her Majesty"s Government were for the strength of the National feeling in Egypt; and only the union and courage shown by the people would seem to have convinced the Sultan that methods such as those formerly used by Dervish against the Albanians would here be out of place. Humaner counsels have in any case prevailed, and peace has been recommended between the Khedive and his people.
"Such, sir, is shortly the history of England"s diplomatic action in Egypt during the past six months. It is one of the most deplorable our Foreign Office has to record. The future, however, in some measure remains to us, though, when the Conference a.s.sembles, England"s will be only one of many voices raised in the settlement. It is not for me to suggest the words which should there be spoken; but I will venture to express my conviction that if Her Majesty"s representative then comes forward with an honest confession of the mistakes made, and a declaration of England"s sympathy with Egyptian freedom, England will regain her lost ground. In spite of the just anger of the Egyptians at the unworthy tricks which have been played upon them by our Foreign Office, they believe that a more generous feeling exists in the body of the English nation, which would not suffer so vast a public wrong to be committed as the subjugation of their country for a misunderstood interest in Egyptian finance and in the Suez Ca.n.a.l. They have, over and over again, a.s.sured me, and I know that they speak truly, that their only aim is peace, independence, and economy; and that the Suez Ca.n.a.l cannot be better protected for England, as for the rest of the world, than by the admission of the Egyptian people into the comity of nations. Only let the hand of friendship be held out to them freely, and at once, and we shall still earn their grat.i.tude.
"I am, Sir, your obedient Servant,
"WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT."
FOOTNOTES:
[19] Arabi, in answer to a question of mine as to this matter, told me many years afterwards that he had never heard of any offer of a pension _as made him by the Rothschilds_. He said, however, that soon after the ultimatum of 26th May, he received a visit from the French Consul, who, having asked what was the amount of his then pay, had offered him the double--that is to say, E500 a month--from the French Government, if he would consent to leave Egypt and go to Paris to be treated there as Abd-el-Kader had been treated. He refused, however, to have anything to do with it, telling him that it was his business if necessary to fight and die for his country, not to abandon it. I have a note of this conversation but without date. Compare also the "Pall Mall" of 18th May: "Ourabi is said to be thinking of visiting Europe to recruit his health--a commendable intention, and no harm would be done if he were alotted a handsome travelling allowance on condition that he did not return."
CHAPTER XV
THE BOMBARDMENT OF ALEXANDRIA