"London parleys Dufferin. Egyptian Government"s desire to compromise lessened by thinking public opinion in England changed owing to Suliman Sami"s perjury."
_Broadley to Blunt, November 21st_:
"Important crisis imminent. The friends of the Egyptian Government a.s.sert intention of hanging Arabi. Remain in London."
_Broadley to Blunt, November 21st_:
"Nothing I could say could give you an idea of the infamous conduct of the Egyptian Government. They set our procedure rules at defiance, and say they do not care a curse, as they are treating diplomatically for the hanging of Arabi."
_Napier to Blunt, November 21st:_
"We are simply fighting all the force of the Egyptian Government single-handed, though I believe Lord Dufferin will come to the rescue. They are striving to procure the judicial murder of these prisoners, and it takes all our time to meet their many wiles.
Wilson and Dufferin are helping us, but they, the Egyptian Government, are quick and unscrupulous. We are necessarily more slow and cautious."
_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 26th:_
"Egyptian Government proposes to try Arabi alone. Telegraph your opinion."
_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 27th:_
"Letters explaining situation fully posted. Reason to believe if Arabi, Mahmud Sami and Toulba consent to admit formal charges of rebellion or continuing war against orders of the Khedive, the Egyptian Government will consent to exile or internment at the Cape of Good Hope, or elsewhere, some of the accused simple exile, the majority amnesty. I implore absolute secrecy. Napier and myself favourable to compromise seeing difficulty of proving efforts to prevent burning, etc."
_Blunt to Broadley, November 28th:_
"Cannot approve terms named--certainly not Cape, but am consulting friends to-night about funds. Our political position immensely strong. Definite answer later."
_Broadley to Blunt. Letter. November 27th, 1882_:
("_Private and most urgent._)
"MY DEAR BLUNT,
"I invite _all_ your prudence, calm consideration and tact to the subject of this letter. I have had a long interview [with] Dufferin to-day. He is most friendly. The dossier is before us. _Nothing_ presents difficulties but the burning of Alexandria. As regards this I believe the proof will fail as to Araby"s orders, but many ugly facts remain, viz.: no efforts to stop conflagration and loot. (2) Continued intimacy with Suliman Sami _afterwards_. (3) No punishment of offenders. (4) Large purchases petroleum. (5) Systematic manner of incendiarism by soldiers.
"This is _the rub_. Could Arabi have not stopped the whole thing?
Besides, some of his former speeches, etc., have a very burning appearance.
"If Arabi will plead _guilty formally to_ one _of the charges of rebellion_ (_i. e_., his continuing war after Khedive"s orders) he will be exiled.
"Cape of Good Hope under certain conditions with sufficient allowance. I think I can secure these terms for him, Mahmud Sami and Toulba. Rest, simple exile or pardon. Can I think secure _allowance_ or with forfeiture property--retention military rank.
"Against this we have enormous length trial--chances of turn public opinion--expense _and_ the five facts which I allude to above.
"If a word of this transpires you will do me incalculable injury.
Think over all this and remember our great and grave responsibility. Dufferin is charming. Please at once telegraph as follows: If you say "I accept the principle. Make best possible terms," say _pax_. I _advise_ this course as best. If you say, "Go on--no sort of compromise can be accepted," say _bellum_.
"I am prepared to fight manfully to the bitter end strongly as ever. I leave all to you--but think well over all the contingencies.
"Very faithfully yours, "A. M. BROADLEY."
_Napier to Blunt. Letter. November 27th_:
"Cairo, _Nov. 27th, 1882_.
"DEAR BLUNT,
"It is much to be regretted that the Post Office people have found out our correspondence, for they have, to my knowledge, opened your last letter to me registered and received last Friday. It contained the Borelli charges returned, and a short note from you. I do not think anything was abstracted. I shall send this by ordinary post under cover to H. H. Asquith, Temple, E. C., in the hope that it may escape their vigilance. I, of course, protested at once, but do not suppose that they will mend their ways. I also greatly regret that I have no time to keep copies of my own letters to you for reference. You must not be surprised therefore if you sometimes meet with repet.i.tion. I cannot tell you of all the tricks they have played upon us, as they would fill volumes. The letter had been obviously opened by being slit across above the seal, and gummed up again. It had been cleverly done, and I might not have discovered it but for the fact that the gum used was not quite set. It therefore opened along the line of the slit, and I at once found the gum where no gum should have been. I will send you a short note by the direct mail so that you shall not be surprised at the delay in the delivery of this. Although we have been hard at work since last mail, I do not know that anything of much importance has occurred except that we have been admitted to the defence of Mahmud Sami, with whom we have had several long conferences. Toulba is ill, suffering from nervous excitement, I think, and asthma. I do not know whether he will die, but I have done everything in my power to get him proper medical a.s.sistance, a change of room, a companion, and, if possible, a raised bed.
"The last evidence in the question of the burning of Alexandria has not been communicated to us except through the medium of the Egyptian Gazette, which may or may not be correct. It is not formidable in itself, but it is quite sufficient to give colour to a finding against the prisoner on that charge. It becomes, therefore, of the most vital importance to consider whether there is no way out other than through the portals of the court martial.
There is no doubt that we could discredit the evidence, and even smash it up in cross-examination. And besides, on the other charges of Rebellion and Ma.s.sacre of June 11th I feel sure we could make it hot for the prosecution, but there is an opinion in a very high quarter that there is a strong determination to execute if the Court should find guilty. a.s.sume, therefore, that the Court Martial find the prisoner (for I am only speaking of the chief now) guilty, it will be for the English Government to reverse the sentence. I am of opinion that it would be dangerous to trust them to carefully examine the evidence and the manner in which it has been obtained.
I think it possible that that matter would be hastily disposed of in the Foreign Office, and that they might leave the prisoner to the Court, declaring that everything had been done to secure a fair trial, and that they could not interfere with a verdict deliberately arrived at after the fullest opportunity given to the defence. And besides, it is more than probable that they would allow _some_ sentence to pa.s.s--any sentence suffered here would be most dangerous to the prisoner. After careful consideration I dare not advise the prisoner to trust to the trial if he have an alternative. If terms of banishment are offered, with proper safeguards and provision for maintenance, I shall be strongly in favour of accepting them. To sum up: If found guilty by the Court, some punishment, perhaps death, certainly a serious one, will be inflicted: If acquitted, either voluntary banishment without means, or remaining in the country at the mercy of the Government here. If he leaves the country under a compromise all charges except that of rebellion would have to be withdrawn, and provision for his life in a suitable place would have to be accorded. I have reason to believe that the course of a compromise finds favour with all but Riaz, and is also favourably regarded by Dufferin.
"Give us your opinion, and believe me ever very sincerely yours,
"MARK NAPIER.
"P. S.--As far as the case goes nothing could be better. In law, in fact, and in the infamous manner it has been conducted. _But_ there are the dangers and considerations I have alluded to. Broadley has in my opinion conducted all the different discussions with the Court and Dufferin with the greatest energy, skill, and judgment.
The law of the case is perfect for us, _but_ it is a case which will be decided in the Cabinet and not in the Court. It is impossible to rebut hearsay, and as I have had no opportunity to consider the whole evidence, I will not offer an opinion on that now."
_Broadley and Napier to Blunt. Telegram. November 28th, 7.42 p.
m._:
"Long interview with Dufferin. I entreat you give us discretion to obtain best terms possible. We know delay fatal. Rely on our judgment. Foreign Office"s support unreliable. Dufferin disposed to exceed his instructions on our behalf. Dufferin rules Egyptian Government. Defense case burning Alexandria suspicious. Hence anxiety. Embrace present moment. Dufferin"s good offices absolutely necessary. Telegraph instantly full discretion. Interview Dufferin ten to-morrow.
"BROADLEY, NAPIER."
_Napier to Blunt. Same date_:
"I give you my honour I most strongly concur in our telegram herewith. Strongest cause for full immediate discretion. Every personal interest contrary to our request. NAPIER, private."
_Blunt to Broadley, November 28th midnight_:
"Cannot approve terms less than honourable exile--not internment--Aden, Malta, Cyprus. Within these limits use discretion."
_Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 29th_:
"Arabi gives us written authority to act with discretion in concert with Dufferin, who proposes Arabi pleads guilty on formal charge of rebellion--others abandoned. Sentence read commuting punishment to exile--exile simple on parole--good place which you can settle with the Foreign Office--perhaps Azores. Suitable allowance granted and compensation for loss of property entailed by sentence. You probably fail to realize difficulty of reb.u.t.ting case of burning Alexandria and obtaining evidence for defence. Foreign Office certainly indisposed to interfere in any Egyptian sentence short of death--for example, long detention in an Egyptian prison. Am convinced ultimate result inevitably worse, dreading great responsibility, having full knowledge of the position of affairs. I trust you will leave us discretion, to avoid possible disaster."