Let us accept with Brochard the development of thought seen in Aenesidemus from the beginning to the end of his career, without agreeing with him that Aenesidemus ever consciously changed his basis. He was a Sceptic in the Academy. He left the Academy on that account, and he remained a Sceptic to the end, in so far as a man can be a Sceptic, and take the positive stand that Aenesidemus did.
Two things might account for his apparent dogmatism--
(i) The eclectic spirit of his time.
(ii) The psychological effect upon himself of this careful systemisation of the Sceptical teachings.
Let us consider the first of these causes. Aenesidemus, although not the first of the later Sceptics, was apparently the first to separate himself from the Academy. He was the founder of a new movement, the attempt to revive the older Scepticism as taught by Pyrrho and Timon, and separate it from the dogmatic teachings of the Stoics which were so greatly affecting the Scepticism of the New Academy. It was the spirit of his time to seek to sustain all philosophical teaching by the authority of as many as possible of the older philosophers, and he could hardly escape the tendency which his training in the Academy had unconsciously given him. Therefore we find him trying to prove that the philosophy of Herac.l.i.tus follows from Scepticism. It is not necessary either to explain the matter, as both Hirzel and Natorp so ingeniously attempt to do, by claiming that the truth of contradictory predicates which Aenesidemus accepted from Herac.l.i.tus referred only to phenomena. The history of philosophy gives us abundant proof of the impossibility of absolute Scepticism, and Aenesidemus furnishes us with one example of many of this impossibility, and of the dogmatism that must exist in connection with all thought. In the case of Aenesidemus, who evidently gave the best efforts of his life to establish the Sceptical School, the dogmatism was probably unconscious. That he remained to the end a Sceptic is shown by the fact that he was known as such to posterity. Nowhere do we find a change of basis referred to in regard to him, and s.e.xtus, in refuting the mistakes which he attributes to Aenesidemus, does it, as it were, to point out something of which Aenesidemus had been unconscious.
Let us consider here the second cause of Aenesidemus" Dogmatism, the psychological effect upon himself of formulating Sceptical beliefs. The work that he did for the Sceptical School was a positive one. It occupied years of his life, and stamped itself upon his mental development. In formulating Scepticism, and in advocating it against the many enemies of the School, and amidst all the excitement of the disruption from the Academy, and of establishing a new School, it was inevitable that his mind should take a dogmatic tendency. He remained a Sceptic as he had always been, but must have grown dogmatic in his att.i.tude towards the Sceptical formulae, and was thus able to adopt some of the teachings of Herac.l.i.tus, unconscious of their inconsistency.
Where should we find a modern writer who is consistent in all his statements? Could we read the works of Aenesidemus, we might better understand the connection between the apparently contradictory ideas in his teaching, but the inconsistencies in statement would probably remain. It is necessary to remember the position of Aenesidemus in breaking away from the Academy and in founding a new school, the full significance of which he could not foresee. There must necessarily be some crudeness in pioneer work, and some failure to see the bearing of all its parts, and a compiler like s.e.xtus could point out the inconsistencies which the two centuries since the time of Aenesidemus had made plain.
Aenesidemus was too positive a character to admit of absolute Sceptical consistency. He was nevertheless the greatest thinker the Sceptical School had known since the age of Pyrrho, its founder. In claiming a union between Pyrrhonism and the philosophy of Herac.l.i.tus, he recognised also the pre-Socratic tendency of the Sceptical School. The name of Socrates was all powerful in the Academy, but Aenesidemus comprehended the fact that the true spirit of Pyrrhonism was of earlier origin than the Academic Scepsis.
CHAPTER V.
_Critical Examination of Pyrrhonism_.
The distinct philosophical movement of which Pyrrho was the author bore his name for five centuries after his death. It had an acknowledged existence as a philosophical tendency, if indeed not a sect, for a great part of that time. Yet, when we carefully a.n.a.lyse the relation of Pyrrhonism, as presented to us by s.e.xtus, to the teachings of Pyrrho himself, in so far as they can be known, we find many things in Pyrrhonism for which Pyrrho was not responsible.
The foundation elements of the movement, the spirit of Empirical doubt that lay underneath and caused its development in certain directions rather than others, are due to Pyrrho. The methods of the school, however, were very foreign to anything found in the life or teachings of Pyrrho. Pyrrho was eminently a moralist. He was also to a great degree an ascetic, and he lived his philosophy, giving it thus a positive side wanting in the Pyrrhonism presented to us by s.e.xtus. Timon represents him as desiring to escape from the tedious philosophical discussions of his time--
[Greek: o geron o Purrhon, pos e pothen ekdusin heures latreies doxon te kenophrosunes te sophiston;]
and again he speaks of his modest and tranquil life--
[Greek: touto moi, o Purrhon, himeiretai etor akousai pos pot" aner et" ageis panta meth" hesuchies mounos d"anthropoisi theou tropon hegemoneueis ..... pheista meth" hesuchies aiei aphrontistos kai akinetos kata tauta me prosech" indalmois hedulogou sophies.][1]
Pyrrho wished more than anything else to live in peace, and his dislike of the Sophists[2] may well have made him try to avoid dialectic; while, on the contrary, in the Pyrrhonean School of later times discussion was one of the princ.i.p.al methods of contest, at least after the time of Agrippa. Pyrrhonism seems to have been originally a theory of life, like the philosophy of Socrates, to whom Pyrrho is often compared,[3] and Pyrrho, like Socrates, lived his philosophy. Our knowledge of Pyrrho is gained from Aristocles, s.e.xtus Empiricus, and Diogenes, and from the Academic traditions given by Cicero. Diogenes gives us details of his life which he attributes to Antigonus of Carystius, who lived about the time of Pyrrho.[4] Pyrrho was a disciple and admirer of Democritus,[5] some of whose teachings bore a lasting influence over the subsequent development of Pyrrhonism. He accompanied Alexander the Great to India, where he remained as a member of his suite for some time, and the philosophical ideas of India were not without influence on his teachings. Oriental philosophy was not unknown in Greece long before the time of Pyrrho, but his personal contact with the Magi and the Gymnosophists of the far East, apparently impressed upon his mind teachings for which he was not unprepared by his previous study and natural disposition. In his indifference to worldly goods we find a strong trace of the Buddhistic teaching regarding the vanity of human life. He showed also a similar hopelessness in regard to the possibility of finding a satisfactory philosophy, or absolute truth. He evidently returned from India with the conviction that truth was not to be attained.[6]
[1] Diog. IX. 11, 65. Given from Mullach"s edition of Timon by Brochard, _Pyrrhon et le Scepticism primitive_, p. 525.
[2] Diog. IX. 11, 69.
[3] Lewes _Op. cit._ p. 460.
[4] Diog. IX. 11, 62.
[5] Diog. IX. 11, 67.
[6] Compare Maccoll _Op. cit._
After the death of Alexander and Pyrrho"s return to Greece, he lived quietly with his sister at Elis, and Diogenes says that he was consistent in his life, a.s.serting and denying nothing, but in everything withholding his opinion, as nothing in itself is good or shameful, just or unjust.[1] He was not a victim of false pride, but sold animals in the market place, and, if necessary, washed the utensils himself.[2] He lived in equality of spirit, and practised his teachings with serenity. If one went out while he was talking he paid no attention, but went calmly on with his remarks.[3] He liked to live alone, and to travel alone, and on one occasion, being knocked about in a vessel by a storm at sea, he did not lose his imperturbability, but pointed to a swine calmly eating on board, and said that the wise man should have as much calmness of soul as that. He endured difficult surgical operations with indifference,[4] and when his friend Anaxarchus was once unfortunate enough to fall into a mora.s.s, he went calmly by without stopping to help him, for which consistency of conduct Anaxarchus afterwards praised him. There are two instances given by Diogenes when he lost control of himself; once in getting angry with his sister, and once in trying to save himself when chased by a dog. When accused of inconsistency, he said it was difficult to entirely give up one"s humanity.[5] He was greatly venerated by the people among whom he lived, who made him high priest, and on his account exempted all philosophers from taxation,[6] and after his death erected a statue to his memory. These facts testify to his moral character, and also to fulfil the functions of high priest a certain amount of dogmatism must have been necessary.
[1] Diog. IX. 11, 61, 62.
[2] Diog. IX. 11, 66.
[3] Diog. IX. 11, 63.
[4] Diog. IX. 11, 67.
[5] Diog. IX. 11, 66.
[6] Diog. IX. 11, 64.
According to Diogenes, "We cannot know," said Pyrrho, "what things are in themselves, either by sensation or by judgment, and, as we cannot distinguish the true from the false, therefore we should live impa.s.sively, and without an opinion." The term [Greek: epoche], so characteristic of Pyrrhonism, goes back, according to Diogenes, to the time of Pyrrho.[1] Nothing is, in itself, one thing more than another, but all experience is related to phenomena, and no knowledge is possible through the senses.[2] Pyrrho"s aim was [Greek: ataraxia] and his life furnished a marked example of the spirit of indifference, for which the expression [Greek: apatheia] is better suited than the later one, [Greek: ataraxia]. The description of his life with his sister confirms this, where the term [Greek: adiaphoria] is used to describe his conduct.[3] He founded his Scepticism on the equivalence of opposing arguments.[4]
[1] Diog. IX. 11, 61.
[2] Diog. IX. 11, 61-62.
[3] Diog. IX. 11. 66.
[4] Diog. IX. 11. 106.
The picture given of Pyrrho by Cicero is entirely different from that of Diogenes, and contrasts decidedly with it.[1] Cicero knows Pyrrho as a severe moralist, not as a Sceptic. Both authors attribute to Pyrrho the doctrine of indifference and apathy, but, according to Cicero, Pyrrho taught of virtue, honesty, and the _summum bonum_, while Diogenes plainly tells us that he considered nothing as good in itself, "and of all things nothing as true."[2] Cicero does not once allude to Pyrrhonean doubt. We see on the one hand, in Cicero"s idea of Pyrrho, the influence of the Academy, perhaps even of Antiochus himself,[3]
which probably colored the representations given of Pyrrho; but, on the other hand, there is much in Diogenes" account of Pyrrho"s life and teachings, and in the writings of Timon, which shows us the positive side of Pyrrho. Pyrrho, in denying the possibility of all knowledge, made that rather a motive for indifference in the relations of life, than the foundation thought of a philosophical system. His teaching has a decided ethical side, showing in that respect the strong influence of Democritus over him, who, like Pyrrho, made happiness to consist in a state of feeling.[4] The one motive of all of Pyrrho"s teaching is a positive one, the desire for happiness.
[1] _De orat._ III, 62.
[2] Diog. IX. 11, 61.
[3] Compare Natorp _Op. cit._ p. 71.
[4] Zeller _Grundriss der Griechischen Phil._ p. 70.
The essence of Pyrrhonism as given by Timon is as follows:[1]
Man desires to be happy. To realise his desire he must consider three things:
(i) What is the nature of things?
(ii) How should man conduct himself in relation to them?
(iii) What is the result to him of this relation?
The nature of things is unknown. Our relation to them must be one of suspension of judgment, without activity, desire, or belief,--that is, an entirely negative relation. The result is that state of having no opinion, called [Greek: epoche], which is followed in turn by [Greek: ataraxia].
[1] Aristocles _ap. Eusebium Praep. Ev._ XIV. 18.
[1]The problem of philosophy is here proposed very nearly in the terms of Kant, but not with the positive motive, like that of the great philosopher of Germany, of evolving a system to present the truth. Yet the importance of these questions shows the originality of Pyrrho. The earnestness of Pyrrho is further shown by an example given by Diogenes. Once on being found talking to himself alone, he said, when asked the reason, that he was meditating how to become a good man ([Greek: chrestos]),[2] thus showing an entirely different spirit from anything found in s.e.xtus" books. The explanation of his life and teachings is to be found largely in his own disposition. Such an att.i.tude of indifference must belong to a placid nature, and cannot be entirely the result of a philosophical system, and, while it can be aimed at, it can never be perfectly imitated.
One of his disciples recognised this, and said that it was necessary to have the disposition of Pyrrho in order to hold his doctrines.[3] Diogenes tells us that he was the first to advance any formulae of Scepticism,[4] but they must have been very elementary, as Pyrrho himself wrote nothing. We find no trace of formulated Tropes in Pyrrho"s teachings, yet it is probable that he indicated some of the contradictions in sensation, and possibly the Tropes in some rudimentary form. Of the large number of sceptical formulae, or [Greek: phonai], the three which seem to have the oldest connection with Scepticism are the [Greek: antilogia], the [Greek: ouden horizo], and the [Greek: ou mallon].[5] We know from Diogenes that Protagoras is the authority for saying that in regard to everything there are two opposing arguments.[6] The saying "to determine nothing" is quoted from Timon"s _Python_ by Diogenes,[7] and the other two mentioned are also attributed to him by Aristocles.[8] We have also in the [Greek: ou mallon] a direct connection with Democritus, although the difference in the meaning which he attributed to it is shown by s.e.xtus.[9] So while the expression is the same, the explanation of it given by Pyrrho must have been different. It would seem probable that Pyrrho used all of these three sayings, from the account of Diogenes, and that even then they gave rise to the accusation of the Dogmatics, that simply by possessing such sayings the Sceptics dogmatised,[10]
for the refutation of this used by s.e.xtus occurs in the old account of the sayings, namely, that these formulae include also themselves in the meaning, as a cathartic removes itself together with other harmful objects.[11]
[1] Compare Maccoll _Op. cit._ p. 21.