[5] Fabricius on _Hyp._ I. 36; Cap. XIV. G.
[6] Diog. IX. 11, 79-108.
[7] Aristocles _Euseb. praep. ev._ X. 14, 18.
[8] Fabricius on _Hyp._ I. 36.
All authorities unite in attributing to Aenesidemus the work of systematizing and presenting to the world the ten Tropes of [Greek: epoche]. He was the first to conceive the project of opposing an organized philosophical system of Pyrrhonism to the dogmatism of his contemporaries.[1] Moreover, the fact that Diogenes introduces the Tropes into his life of Pyrrho, does not necessarily imply that he considered Pyrrho their author, for Diogenes invariably combines the teachings of the followers of a movement with those of the founders themselves; he gives these Tropes after speaking of Aenesidemus" work ent.i.tled _Pyrrhonean Hypotyposes_, and apparently quotes from this book, in giving at least a part of his presentation of Pyrrhonism, either directly or through, the works of others. Nietzsche proposes a correction of the text of Diogenes IX. 11, 79, which would make him quote the Tropes from a book by Theodosius,[2] author of a commentary on the works of Theodas. No writer of antiquity claims for the Tropes an older source than the books of Aenesidemus, to whom Aristocles also attributes them.[3] They are not mentioned in Diogenes" life of Timon, the immediate disciple of Pyrrho.
Cicero has no knowledge of them, and does not refer to them in his discussion of Scepticism.
[1] Compare Saisset _Op. cit._ p. 78.
[2] Brochard _Op. cit._ 254, Note 4.
[3] Aristocles _Eus. praep. ev._ XIV. 18. 8.
Aenesidemus was undoubtedly the first to formulate these Tropes, but many things tend to show that they resulted, in reality, from the gradual cla.s.sification of the results of the teachings of Pyrrho, in the subsequent development of thought from his own time to that of Aenesidemus. The ideas contained in the Tropes were not original with Aenesidemus, but are more closely connected with the thought of earlier times. The decidedly empirical character of the Tropes proves this connection, for the eight Tropes of Aetiology, which were original with Aenesidemus, bear a far stronger dialectic stamp, thus showing a more decided dialectic influence of the Academy than is found in the Tropes of [Greek: epoche]. Many of the ill.u.s.trations given of the Tropes also, testify to a time of greater antiquity than that of Aenesidemus. The name Trope was well known in ancient times, and the number ten reminds us of the ten opposing principles of Pythagoras, and the ten categories of Aristotle, the fourth of which was the same as the eighth Trope. The terminology, however, with very few exceptions, points to a later period than that of Pyrrho. Zeller points out a number of expressions in both Diogenes" and s.e.xtus" exposition of the Tropes, which could not date back farther than the time of Aenesidemus.[1] One of the most striking features of the whole presentation of the Tropes, especially as given by s.e.xtus, is their mosaic character, stamping them not as the work of one person, but as a growth, and also an agglutinous growth, lacking very decidedly the symmetry of thought that the work of one mind would have shown.
[1] Zeller _Op. cit._ p. 25.
At the time of the separation of Pyrrhonism from the Academy, no other force was as strong in giving life to the school as the systematic treatment by Aenesidemus of the Ten Tropes of [Greek: epoche]. The reason of this is evident. It was not that the ideas of the Sceptical Tropes were original with Aenesidemus, but because a definite statement of belief is always a far more powerful influence than principles which are vaguely understood and accepted. There is always, however, the danger to the Sceptic, in making a statement even of the principles of Scepticism, that the psychological result would be a dogmatic tendency of mind, as we shall see later was the case, even with Aenesidemus himself. That the Sceptical School could not escape the accusation of dogmatizing, from the Dogmatics, even in stating the grounds of their Scepticism, we know from Diogenes.[1] To avoid this dogmatic tendency of the ten Tropes, s.e.xtus makes the frequent a.s.sertion that he does not affirm things to be absolutely true, but states them as they appear to him, and that they may be otherwise from what he has said.[2]
[1] Diog. IX. 11, 102.
[2] _Hyp._ I. 4, 24.
s.e.xtus tells us that "Certain Tropes, ten in number, for producing the state of [Greek: epoche] have been handed down from the older Sceptics."[1] He refers to them in another work as the "Tropes of Aenesidemus."[2] There is no evidence that the substance of these Tropes was changed after the time of Aenesidemus, although many of the ill.u.s.trations given by s.e.xtus must have been of a later date, added during the two centuries that elapsed between the time of Aenesidemus and s.e.xtus. In giving these Tropes s.e.xtus does not claim to offer a systematic methodical cla.s.sification, and closes his list of them, in their original concise form, with the remark, "We make this order ourselves."[3] The order is given differently by Diogenes, and also by Favorinus.[4] The Trope which s.e.xtus gives as the tenth is the fifth given by Diogenes, the seventh by s.e.xtus is the eighth given by Diogenes, the fifth by s.e.xtus, the seventh by Diogenes, the tenth by Diogenes, the eighth by s.e.xtus. Diogenes says that the one he gives as the ninth Favorinus calls the eighth, and s.e.xtus and Aenesidemus the tenth. This statement does not correspond with the list of the Tropes which s.e.xtus gives, proving that Diogenes took some other text than that of s.e.xtus as his authority.[5] The difference in the order of the Tropes shows, also, that the order was not considered a matter of great importance. There is a marked contrast in the spirit of the two presentations of the Tropes given by s.e.xtus and Diogenes. The former gives them not only as an orator, but as one who feels that he is defending his own cause, and the school of which he is the leader, against mortal enemies, while Diogenes relates them as an historian.
[1] _Hyp._ I. 36.
[2] _Adv. Math._ VII. 345.
[3] _Hyp._ I. 38.
[4] Diog. IX. 11, 87.
[5] Diog. IX. 11, 87.
Pappenheim tries to prove[1] that Aenesidemus originally gave only nine Tropes in his _Pyrrhonean Hypotyposes_, as Aristocles mentions only nine in referring to the Tropes of Aenesidemus, and that the tenth was added later. Had this been the case, however, the fact would surely have been mentioned either by Diogenes or s.e.xtus, who both refer to the ten Tropes of Aenesidemus.
The Tropes claim to prove that the character of phenomena is so relative and changeable, that certain knowledge cannot be based upon them, and as we have shown, there is no other criterion of knowledge for the Sceptic than phenomena.[2] All of the Tropes, except the tenth, are connected with sense-perception, and relate to the difference of the results obtained through the senses under different circ.u.mstances. They may be divided into two cla.s.ses, _i.e._, those based upon differences of our physical organism, and those based upon external differences. To the first cla.s.s belong the first, second, third and fourth; to the second cla.s.s, the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth, and also the ninth. The eighth, or that of relation, is applied objectively both by s.e.xtus and Diogenes in their treatment of the Tropes, and is not used for objects of thought alone, but princ.i.p.ally to show the relation of outward objects to each other. The tenth is the only one which has a moral significance, and it has also a higher subjective value than the others; it takes its arguments from an entirely different sphere of thought, and deals with metaphysical and religious contradictions in opinion, and with the question of good and evil. That this Trope is one of the oldest, we know from its distinct mention in connection with the foundation theories of Pyrrho, by Diogenes.[3] In treating of the subjective reasons for doubt as to the character of external reality, the Sceptics were very near the denial of all outward reality, a point, however, which they never quite reached.
[1] Pappenheim, _Die Tropen der Griechen_, p. 23.
[2] _Hyp._ I. 22.
[3] Diog. IX. 11, 61.
There is evidently much of s.e.xtus" own thought mixed with the ill.u.s.trations of the Tropes, but it is impossible to separate the original parts from the material that was the common property of the Sceptical School. Many of these ill.u.s.trations show, however, perfect familiarity with the scientific and medical teachings of the time. Before entering upon his exposition of the Tropes, s.e.xtus gives them in the short concise form in which they must first have existed[1]--
(i) Based upon the variety of animals.
(ii) Based upon the differences between men.
(iii) Based upon differences in the const.i.tution of the sense organs.
(iv) Based upon circ.u.mstances.
(v) Based upon position, distance and place.
(vi) Based upon mixtures.
(vii) Based upon the quant.i.ties and const.i.tutions of objects.
(viii) Relation.
(ix) Based upon frequency or rarity of occurences.
(x) Based upon systems, customs and laws, mythical beliefs, and dogmatic opinions.
[1] _Hyp._ I. 36-38.
Although s.e.xtus is careful not to dogmatise regarding the arrangement of the Tropes, yet there is in his cla.s.sification of them a regular gradation, from the arguments based upon differences in animals to those in man, first considering the latter in relation to the physical const.i.tution, and then to circ.u.mstances outside of us, and finally the treatment of metaphysical and moral differences.
_The First Trope_.[1] That the same mental representations are not found in different animals, may be inferred from their differences in const.i.tution resulting from their different origins, and from the variety in their organs of sense. s.e.xtus takes up the five senses in order, giving ill.u.s.trations to prove the relative results of the mental representations in all of them, as for example the subjectivity of color[2] and sound.[3]
All knowledge of objects through the senses is relative and not absolute. s.e.xtus does not, accordingly, confine the impossibility of certain knowledge to the qualities that Locke regards as secondary, but includes also the primary ones in this statement.[4] The form and shape of objects as they appear to us may be changed by pressure on the eyeball. Furthermore, the character of reflections in mirrors depend entirely on their shape, as the images in concave mirrors are very different from those in convex ones; and so in the same way as the eyes of animals are of different shapes, and supplied with different fluids, the ideas of dogs, fishes, men and gra.s.shoppers must be very different.[5]
[1] _Hyp._. I. 40-61.
[2] _Hyp._. I. 44-46.
[3] _Hyp._. I. 50.
[4] _Hyp._. I. 47.
[5] _Hyp._. I. 49.
In discussing the mental representations of animals of different grades of intelligence, s.e.xtus shows a very good comprehension of the philogenetic development of the organs of sense, and draws the final conclusion that external objects are regarded differently by animals, according to their difference in const.i.tution.[1] These differences in the ideas which different animals have of the same objects are demonstrated by their different tastes, as the things desired by some are fatal to others.[2] The practical ill.u.s.trations given of this result show a familiarity with natural history, and cognizance of the tastes and habits of many animals,[3] but were probably few of them original with s.e.xtus, unless perhaps in their application; that this train of reasoning was the common property of the Sceptic School, we know from the fact that Diogenes begins his exposition of the first Trope in a way similar to that of s.e.xtus.[4] His ill.u.s.trations are, however, few and meagre compared with those of s.e.xtus, and the scientific facts used by both of them may mostly be found in other authors of antiquity given in a similar way.[5] The logical result of the reasoning used to explain the first Trope, is that we cannot compare the ideas of the animals with each other, nor with our own; nor can we prove that our ideas are more trustworthy than those of the animals.[6] As therefore an examination of ideas is impossible, any decided opinion about their trustworthiness is also impossible, and this Trope leads to the suspension of judgment regarding external objects, or to [Greek: epoche.][7]
[1] _Hyp._. I. 54.
[2] _Hyp._. I. 55.
[3] _Hyp._. I. 55-59.
[4] Diog. IX. 11, 79-80.
[5] Pappenheim _Erlauterung Pyrr. Grundzuge Par_. 41.