CHAPTER VIII Confederate Invasion of Kentucky (1862)--Cincinnati Threatened, and "Squirrel Hunters" Called Out--Battles of Iuka, Corinth, and Hatchie Bridge--Movements of Confederate Armies of Bragg and Kirby Smith--Retirement of Buell"s Army to Louisville--Battle of Perryville, with Personal and Other Incidents
As we have seen, Halleck"s great army at Corinth was dispersed, the Army of the Ohio going eastward. It spent the month of June, 1862, in rebuilding bridges, including the great bridge across the Tennessee at Decatur, but recently burned under his direction, and soon again to be abandoned to the Confederates.
The Confederate authorities projected an invasion on two lines and with two armies,--one under General E. Kirby Smith and the other under General Braxton Bragg,--the Ohio River and the cities of Louisville and Cincinnati being the objective points; the design being, also, to recruit the Confederate armies in Kentucky, obtain supplies, and force the evacuation by the Union Army of Alabama and Tennessee, and especially of Nashville. Early in August, 1862, these two Confederate armies were a.s.sembled at Knoxville and Chattanooga and along the Upper Tennessee, Kirby Smith"s main force at the former and Bragg"s at the latter place. The objectives of these armies were soon known, and the Army of the Ohio was therefore ordered to concentrate from its scattered situation at Decherd and Winchester, Tennessee.
General Robert L. McCook, late Colonel of the 9th Ohio, commanding a brigade under General George H. Thomas, while riding in an ambulance at the head of his command, ill and helpless, was shot and mortally wounded, August 5th, about three miles eastward of New Market, Alabama, by a body of ambushed men, said to have been guerillas in citizens" dress. He died at 12 M., August 6th. His command, in retaliation, laid the country waste around the scene of his death.( 1) McCook had fought in Western Virginia; at Mill Springs (where he was wounded), at Shiloh, and elsewhere. He was one of the ten sons of Major Daniel McCook, who was killed (July 21, 1863), at sixty-five years of age, near Buffington"s Island, during the Morgan raid in Ohio, while leading a party to cut off Morgan"s escape across the Ohio River. Two brothers of his were killed in battle--Charles M., at Bull Run, July 21, 1861, and Daniel at Kenesaw, July 21, 1864. Alexander McDowell McCook commanded a corps, and all the brothers had honorable war records. Dr. John McCook, brother of the senior Daniel McCook, likewise served and died in the war. He had five sons, three of whom served with distinction in the volunteer army and two in the navy. I knew John"s son, General Anson George McCook, first in Mitchel"s division as Major and Lieutenant-Colonel of the 2d Ohio, then in the Forty- fifty, Forty-sixth, and Forty-seventh Congresses, and later as Secretary of the United States Senate.
The killing of General R. L. McCook, under the circ.u.mstances, was regarded as murder, and excited deep indignation both in and out of the army. Even Buell issued orders to arrest every able-bodied man of suspicious character within a radius of ten miles of the place where McCook was shot, to take all horses fit for service within that circuit, and to pursue and destroy bushwhackers.( 2) With the arrest of a few men and the taking of some horses, however, the incident closed so far as official action was concerned.
Memphis was taken, on June 6, 1862, by Flag Officer C. H. Davis, who had with him a Ram Fleet under Colonel Charles Ellet, Jr., and an Indiana brigade under Colonel G. N. Fitch.( 3)
The plan of the Confederate invasion, as already stated, was to operate on two lines. Kirby Smith from Knoxville was first to move on and take c.u.mberland Gap, then held by General George W. Morgan.
Bragg was at Tupelo, Mississippi, July 18th, but, fired with the idea that on Kentucky being invaded her people would flock to arms under the Confederate standard, he commenced transferring his army to the new field of operations and removed his headquarters, July 29th, to Chattanooga.
Kirby Smith took the field August 13th, moving on c.u.mberland Gap, but, finding it impregnable by direct attack, he left General Stevenson with a division to threaten it and advanced on Lexington.
John Morgan with a considerable body of cavalry preceded Smith into Middle Kentucky, and his incursion was taken as a forerunner of the greater one to follow. Alarm over the audacious movement was not limited to Kentucky; it spread to Ohio, and there were fears for the safety of Cincinnati.
General Horatio G. Wright was a.s.signed to a new Department of the Ohio, composed of the States of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Kentucky east of the Tennessee River, including c.u.mberland Gap, and he a.s.sumed command of it August 23d, headquarters at Cincinnati.( 4) On the 16th, Buell had ordered General Wm.
Nelson from the vicinity of Murfreesboro, with some artillery and infantry, to Kentucky, to there organize troops to keep open communications and operate against John Morgan.( 5) Wright, on the 23d, ordered Nelson to Lexington to a.s.sume command of the troops in that vicinity and relieve General Lew Wallace. Nelson, with insufficient, and mainly new, undrilled, and undisciplined troops, moved to Richmond, Ky., where (August 30th) he was a.s.sailed by Kirby Smith"s army and his forces disastrously routed with much loss, princ.i.p.ally in captured. He was himself wounded in the leg by a musket ball. There were few organized Union troops now between Smith"s army and the Ohio River, and such organizations as could be a.s.sembled were new and unable to cope with the Confederate veterans. The news of the defeat at Richmond reached Cincinnati the same evening, and it was at once a.s.sumed that Lexington and Frankfort would soon be in the enemy"s hands, and Kirby Smith"s army would forthwith march on Covington, Newport, and Cincinnati.
The a.s.sumption proved correct, as the defeated troops retreated through Frankfort and Lexington.
The Mayor (George Hatch) and City Council of Cincinnati acted with courage and energy to meet the impending emergency, and the loyal people earnestly responded to all requirements and submitted to the military authorities, either to take up arms or to work on intrenchments. Lew Wallace, a.s.signed by Wright to the immediate command of the three cities, proclaimed martial law to be executed (until relieved by the military) by the police; and business generally was suspended.
The Mayor, with Wallace"s sanction, permitted the banks to remain open from 1 to 2 P.M.; bakers to pursue their occupation; physicians to attend their patients; employees of newspapers to pursue their business; funerals to be permitted, but mourners only to leave the city; all druggists were allowed to do business, but all drinking saloons, eating-houses, and places of amus.e.m.e.nt were to be kept closed. Governor David Tod, September 1st, authorized the reception of armed citizens from throughout the State, who were denominated "_Squirrel Hunters_." The patriotism of the people of Ohio and Indiana was heroically shown, and their rushing in large numbers to the defence of Cincinnati and other threatened cities may have had its influence, and was, at least, highly commendable; yet, if a real attack had been made on these cities, it is hardly likely that the "Squirrel Hunters" would have proved efficient as soldiers.
Kirby Smith entered Lexington, Ky., September 1st, and two days later he dispatched General Heth with about six thousand men to threaten Cincinnati. Heth was joined the next day by Morgan and his raiders. By the 10th these forces were near Covington and threatened a serious attack. There were some artillery shots fired and some light skirmishing, but the next day it was ascertained the Confederates had commenced a retreat, and in a few days the "_Squirrel Hunters_" returned to their homes amid the plaudits of a loyal people, and business was resumed in the Queen City. A single act of disorder is reported in Cincinnati on the part of some citizens who began tearing up a street railroad because it was believed to be invidious to allow it to do business "when lager- beer saloons could not."( 6)
The Legislature of Ohio authorized the presentation by the Governor of a lithographic discharge to each "_Squirrel Hunter_."
Before narrating the movements of Bragg"s army from the Tennessee to the vicinity of Louisville, and of Buell"s army in pursuit on Bragg"s flank and rear, an attempt by another Confederate column to co-operative with Bragg in carrying out his general plan of invading Kentucky should be mentioned.
General Sterling Price, hitherto operating in Arkansas and Missouri, immediately after Shiloh, had been transferred with his army to Corinth to reinforce Beauregard, and when Bragg, who succeeded Beauregard, decided upon his plan of invasion, and had concentrated the bulk of his army at Chattanooga for that purpose, he a.s.signed General Earl Van Dorn to the District of Mississippi and Price to the District of Tennessee, the latter to hold the line of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, and both were to confront and watch Grant and prevent him from sending reinforcements to Buell. Price was left at Tupelo, Mississippi, with about 15,000 men. Later, September 11th, President Davis ordered Van Dorn to a.s.sume command of both his own and Price"s army, the latter then on its march to Iuka, Mississippi, intending to move thence into Middle Tennessee if it should be found, as Bragg was led to believe, that Rosecrans (who, June 11th, had succeeded Pope in command of the Army of the Mississippi) had gone with his army to Nashville to reinforce Buell.
Two of Grant"s divisions, Paine"s and Jeff C. Davis", had gone there, leaving the force for the defence of North Mississippi much reduced. Price entered Iuka September 14th, the garrison retiring without an engagement. Price, on learning that Rosecrans had retired on Corinth, telegraphed Van Dorn that he would turn back and co-operate in an attack on Corinth. Bragg telegraphed him to hasten towards Nashville. Rosecrans wired Grant to "watch the old wood-p.e.c.k.e.r or he would get away from them." September 17th, Halleck telegraphed Grant to prevent Price from crossing the Tennessee and forming a junction with Bragg. Grant telegraphed he would "do everything in his power to prevent such a catastrophe,"
and he began concentrating his troops against Price at Iuka.
General E. O. C. Ord was moved to Burnsville, where Grant established his headquarters, and Rosecrans marched his two divisions to Jacinto, with orders to move on Iuka, flank Price, and cut off his retreat.
General Stephen A. Hurlburt was ordered to make a strong demonstration from Bolivar, Tennessee, against Van Dorn, then near Grand Junction with about 10,000 effective men, and lead him to believe he was in immediate danger of an attack, and thus prevent him from making a diversion in aid of Price by marching on Corinth. This ruse was successful. Orders were given by Grant and preparation was made by Ord to attack Price at Iuka as soon as Rosecrans" guns on the Jacinto road were heard. About 4 P.M., September 19th, C. S.
Hamilton"s division, under Rosecrans, attacked Little"s division of Price"s army on the Jacinto road, and a severe combat ensued until night, with varying success, both sides at dark claiming a victory. Neither Grant nor Ord heard the sound of the battle in consequence of the intervening dense woods and an unfavorable wind.
Rosecrans did not or could not advise Grant of the state of affairs, and the latter did not learn of the battle until 8.30 A.M. of the 20th. Price retreated in the night with his forces towards Baldwyn, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, whither Grant ordered Ord with Hamilton"s and Stanley"s divisions and the cavalry to pursue. The pursuit was ineffectual. The battle of Iuka was fought after 4 P.M., princ.i.p.ally by two opposing brigades, each about 4000 strong.
The Union loss was, killed 141, wounded 613, missing 36, total 790.
The Confederate loss, as reported, was, killed 85, wounded 410, missing 40, total 535.( 7)
After Iuka Rosecrans was placed in command at Corinth, Grant having established his headquarters at Jackson, Tennessee. Hurlburt was at Bolivar, Tennessee, with his division. Though Halleck had partly constructed defensive works around Corinth on occupying it in May, 1862, they were too remote from the town and too elaborate for a small army.
Grant had, more recently, partly constructed some open batteries with connecting breastworks on College Hill. These Rosecrans further completed, and also constructed some redoubts to cover the north of the town.
From Ripley, Mississippi, September 29th, Van Dorn, with his own and Price"s army, his force numbering about 25,000, by a rapid march advanced on Corinth, where Rosecrans could a.s.semble not exceeding 18,500 men, consisting of the divisions of Generals David S. Stanley and C. S. Hamilton and the cavalry division of Colonel John K. Mizner, of the Army of the Mississippi, and the divisions of Generals Thomas A. Davies and Thomas J. McKean, of the Army of the Tennessee. It was not known certainly until the 3d of October whether Van Dorn designed to attack Bolivar, Jackson, or Corinth.
The advance of Van Dorn and Price was met on the Chewalla road by Oliver"s brigade of McKean"s division, which was steadily driven back, together with reinforcements until, at 10 A.M., all the Union troops were inside the old Halleck intrenched line, and by 1.30 P.M. the Confederates had taken it and were pushing vigorously towards the more recently established inner line of intrenchments.
Price"s army formed on the Confederate left and Van Dorn"s on the right. The brunt of the afternoon battle fell on McKean"s and Davies" divisions. General Hackleman of Davies" division was killed, and General Richard J. Oglesby of the same division was severely wounded. The Union troops engaged lost heavily. One brigade of Stanley"s division and Sullivan"s brigade of Hamilton"s division late in the day came to the relief of the heavily pressed Union troops. The coming of night put an end to the battle, but with the Confederate Army within six hundred yards of Corinth and the Union troops mainly behind their inner and last line of defence.
The situation was critical. The morning of the 4th found Rosecrans"
army formed, McKean on the left, Stanley and Davies to his right in the order named, one brigade of Hamilton on the extreme right and the rest of Hamilton"s division in reserve behind the right.( 8)
Van Dorn opened fire at 4.30 A.M. with artillery, but he did not advance to the real attack until about 8 A.M. It came from north of town and fell heaviest on Davies" division. His front line gave way, and later his command was broken, and some of the Confederates penetrated the town and to where the reserve artillery was ma.s.sed.
Stanley"s reserves, however, speedily fell on them and drove them out with great loss. Then the attack came on Battery-Robinett, to the westward near the Union centre. Three successive charges were made in column on this battery and on the centre with the greatest determination, and much close fighting occurred until the last a.s.sault was repulsed about 11 A.M. (October 4, 1862), when the enemy fell back under cover beyond cannon-shot. Van Dorn had hoped to take Corinth on the 3d, and now, being repulsed at every point, he beat a retreat, knowing Grant would not be inactive. It was not until about 2 P.M. that Rosecrans ascertained the enemy had commenced a retreat.( 9) General James B. McPherson arrived, October 4th, from Jackson with five regiments, but too late for the battle. The engagement was a severe one; both armies fought with desperation and skill; the Union troops, being outnumbered, made up the disparity by fighting, in part, behind breastworks.
The losses were heavy, especially in officers of rank. The Union loss was, killed 27 officers and 328 men, wounded 115 officers and 1726 men, captured or missing 5 officers and 319 men; grand total, 2520.(10) The Confederate loss (as stated in Van Dorn"s report (11)), including casualties at Hatchie Bridge (October 5th), was, killed 594, wounded 2162, prisoners or missing 2102; grand total, 4858.
Grant, besides sending McPherson to Rosecrans" support, had directed Hurlburt at Bolivar to march with his division on the enemy"s rear.
Hurlburt started on the 4th by way of Middletown and Pocahontas.
At the former place he encountered the enemy"s cavalry and forced them by night to and across the Big Muddy, where the division encamped, one brigade having taken and crossed the bridge to the east side. Hurlburt"s orders from Grant were to reach Rosecrans at all hazards.(12) The situation for Hurlburt was critical. He had in front of his single division both Van Dorn and Price. But the situation was in a high degree desperate for the retreating army. If its retreat were arrested long enough for Rosecrans"
column to a.s.sail it in the rear it must be lost or dispersed. It was this that Grant confidently calculated on. On the morning of the 5th Hurlburt pushed vigorously forward to Davis" Bridge over the Hatchie. General Ord arrived about 8 A.M. and took command of Hurlburt"s forces. The movement had hardly commenced when strong resistance was met with. Ord pushed the enemy back for about three miles with General Veatch"s brigade, taking a ridge--Metamora--about one mile from the Hatchie. Here a severe battle ensued, the enemy was driven from the field across the bridge, and a portion of Ord"s command gained a position just east of the river, though not without much loss. Ord was himself wounded at the bridge, and the command again devolved on Hurlburt. The latter soon thereafter secured a permanent lodgement on the east of the Hatchie, thus effectively stopping the retreat of Van Dorn by that route and forcing him to fall back and find another less desirable one. Under cover of night Van Dorn retreated upon another road to the southward, and crossed the Hatchie at Crum"s Mill, six miles farther up the river.(13)
The success of Ord and Hurlburt was so complete that Grant believed Van Dorn"s army should have been destroyed.(14)
Rosecrans did not move from Corinth until the morning of the 5th of October, and then not fast or far enough to overtake Van Dorn in the throes of battle with Ord and Hurlburt or in time to cut off his retreat by another route. Rosecrans gave as an excuse the exhausted condition of his troops after the battle of the 4th. At 2 P.M., the last day of the battle, he was certain the enemy had decided to retreat, yet he directed the victorious troops to proceed to their camps, provide five days" rations, take food and rest, and be ready to move early the next morning.(15) McPherson, having arrived with a fresh brigade, could have been at once pushed upon the rear of Van Dorn"s exhausted troops. Rosecrans" army went into camp again in the afternoon of the 5th, while Ord and Hurlburt were fighting their battle. Although the pursuit was resumed by Rosecrans on the 6th, and thereafter continued to Ripley, it was after the flying enemy had pa.s.sed beyond reach. But while it is possible that Rosecrans could have done better, it is certain that he and his troops did well; Van Dorn"s diversion in favor of Bragg"s grand, central invasion, at any rate, failed amid disaster.
But we must return to Bragg and Buell, the princ.i.p.al actors in the march to Kentucky.
Bragg"s army commenced to cross the Tennessee at Chattanooga August 26, 1862, and immediately set out to the northward, his cavalry, under Wheeler, keeping well towards the foot of the mountains to the westward, covering and masking the real movement. Buell"s army, as we have stated, was concentrated in the neighborhood of Dechard, Tennessee, with detachments of it still holding Huntsville, Battle Creek, and Murfreesboro.
Numerous and generally unimportant skirmishes took place at Battle Creek and other places. Murfreesboro was surprised and disgracefully surrendered to Forrest"s cavalry July 13th, and Morgan"s forces captured Gallatin, Tennessee, August 12th; but these places were not held.
Bragg continued his march through Pikeville and Sparta, Tennessee, crossing the c.u.mberland at Carthage and Gainesborough. Uniting his army at Hopkinsville, Kentucky, he proceeded through Glasgow to Munfordville, on Green River, where there was a considerable fortification, occupied by Colonel J. T. Wilder with about 4000 men.
Buell, after having sent some of his divisions as far east into the mountains as Jasper, Altamont, and McMinnville, with no results, moved his army to Nashville, thence with the reinforcements from Grant (two divisions), leaving two divisions and some detachments under Thomas to hold that city, through Tyree Springs and Franklin to Bowling Green, Kentucky, the advance arriving there September 11th.(16) Bragg was then at Glasgow. General James R. Chalmers and Colonel Scott, each with a brigade, the former of infantry, the other of cavalry, attacked, and Chalmers" brigade a.s.saulted Wilder"s position September 14th. The a.s.sault was repelled with much slaughter, Chalmers" loss being 3 officers and 32 men killed and 28 officers and 225 men wounded.(17) Chalmers then retired to Cave City, but returned with Bragg"s main army on the 16th. Bragg having his army up, and Polk"s corps north of Munfordville and Hardee"s south of the river, opened negotiations for the surrender of the place. Being completely surrounded, with heavy batteries on all sides, Wilder capitulated, including 4133 officers and men.
Chalmers was designated to take possession of the surrendered works on the morning of the 17th. Had Buell marched promptly on Munfordville from Bowling Green he would have found Bragg with one half of his army south of Green River and Polk with the other half north of it, and Wilder still holding a position on the river between the two.
Bragg, after the surrender, concentrated his army south of Green River opposite Munfordville along a low crest of hills. He had not yet formed a junction with Kirby Smith, and his force then in position probably did not much exceed 20,000.(18)
The position had no special advantages, was well known to many of Buell"s officers, and should have been to Buell himself. In case of defeat, Bragg"s army must have been lost and Kirby Smith"s left to the same fate. Green River, pa.s.sable in few places in Bragg"s rear and to the north, would have rendered retreat impossible for a defeated army, and, besides, Bragg had no base north to retreat to. The situation was well understood in our army, except by Buell, who seemed to fear a junction with Kirby Smith had been formed, though Wilder (just paroled) and others of his officers on the day of the surrender informed Buell that no junction had been made.
Wilder, however, had an exaggerated opinion of Bragg"s strength at Munfordville. The junction of the two Confederate armies did not take place until October 9th, at Harrodsburg, the day succeeding the battle of Perryville.(19)
Buell had, south of Bragg, not less than 50,000 effective men. He since admits he had 35,000 men present before he ordered Thomas"
division and other troops up from Nashville.(19) Thomas arrived on the 19th and 20th. There was some skirmishing on the 20th, and Bragg was then permitted to withdraw without further molestation across the river, whence he marched northward. The slowness of the movement of Buell"s army from Nashville to Bowling Green and, after delaying there five days, thence towards Munfordville, was freely commented on by his army at the time. It was composed of seasoned and experienced troops, eager to find the enemy and give him battle.(20) In the history of no war was a more favorable opportunity presented to fight and reap a victor"s fruits than at Green River, but the time and men for great and controlling success were not yet come.
The water supply northward of Bowling Green, already spoken of, was at best poor and deficient, especially in the hot September weather. The pools or ponds, befouled by the shooting in the February preceding of diseased and broken-down animals of Hardee"s army on its retirement from Bowling Green, contained the most noxious and revolting water, yet it was at one time, for a large part of the army, all that was to be had for man or beast. I remember Colonel John Beatty and I, on one occasion near Cave City, stood in a hard rain storm holding the corners of a rubber blanket so as to catch a supply of water to slake our thirst. The army, however, as was generally the case when moving, suffered little from sickness.
The wagon train of Buell"s army was dispatched with a cavalry guard from Bowling Green on a road to the westward of Munfordville through Brownsville, Litchifield, and Big Spring to West Point at the mouth of Salt River on the Ohio, thence to Louisville.(21)
Bragg continued his march unmolested and unresisted north from Green River along the railroad to near Nolin, thence northwestward by Hodgensville to Bardstown, then through Perryville to Harrodsburg, some part of his army going as far as Lawrenceburg, Lexington, and Frankfort.(21)
Buell marched _after_ Bragg to near Nolin, thence keeping to the west through Elizabethtown and West Point to Louisville, the advance, General Thomas" division, arrived there September 25th, and the last division the 29th. Both train and army reaching the city in safety had the effect, at least, of relieving the place from further danger of capture, and for this Buell had due credit, though the country and the authorities at Washington were highly displeased with the result of his campaign.
c.u.mberland Gap, for want of supplies, was, on the night of the 17th of September, evacuated by General George W. Morgan, and though pursued by General Stevenson and John Morgan"s cavalry, he made his way through Manchester, Booneville, West Liberty, and Grayson to Greenup, on the Ohio, arriving there the 2d of October. Stevenson then rejoined Kirby Smith at Frankfort.
It is true Nashville was still held of the Union forces, but Northern Alabama and nearly all else in Middle Tennessee occupied during the campaigns of the previous spring were lost or abandoned. Grant alone held his ground in Northern Mississippi and Western Tennessee, and his army had been dangerously depleted to reinforce Buell.
Clarksville, on the c.u.mberland below Nashville, in Grant"s department, was captured, August 18th, 1862, and some steamboats and some supplies were there taken and destroyed. Colonel Rodney Mason (71st Ohio) was in command, and had under him at the time only about 225 men. His position was not a good one for defence; he had no fortifications, and was without cavalry to give him information of the approach or strength of the enemy. It was variously claimed that Mason surrendered to only a few irregular cavalry with no artillery, and without firing a gun, on being deceived into the belief that he was surrounded by a superior force with six pieces of artillery.(22) The War Department, somewhat hastily, August 22d, by order, without trial, dismissed Colonel Mason from the service. This order was revoked March 22, 1866.(22) Twelve officers of the regiment signed a statement to the effect that they had advised the surrender. For this the War Department mustered them out August 29, 1862. The President directed the order revoked as to Captain Sol. J. Houck, because he signed the statement under a misapprehension of its contents.(23) The order dismissing the others was revoked after the war, except as to Lieutenant Ira L.