"But the Proclamation, as law, either is valid or is not valid.
If it is not valid it needs no retraction. If it is valid it cannot be retracted, any more than the dead can be brought to life."
And still further:
"You say that you will not fight to free negroes. Some of them seem willing to fight for you; but no matter. Fight you, then, exclusively to save the Union. I issued the Proclamation on purpose to aid you in saving the Union... . I thought that whatever negroes can be got to do as soldiers leaves just so much less for white soldiers to do in saving the Union.
"The signs look better. The Father of Waters again goes unvexed to the sea. Thanks to the great Northwest for it; nor yet wholly to them. Three hundred miles up they met New England, Empire, Keystone, and Jersey, hewing their way right and left. The sunny South, too, in more colors than one, also lent a helping hand. On the spot, their part of the history was jotted down in black and white. The job was a great national one, and let none be slighted who bore an honorable part in it. And while those who have cleared the great river may well be proud, even that is not all. It is hard to say that anything has been more bravely and well done than at Antietam, Murfreesboro, Gettysburg, and on fields of less note.
Nor must Uncle Sam"s web feet be forgotten. At all the watery margins they have been present, not only on the deep sea, the broad bay, and the rapid river, but also up the narrow, muddy bayou, and wherever the ground was a little damp they have been and made their tracks. Thanks to all."
During my stay in New York my wife visited me, and accompanied me with the troops to Alexandria.
On the 6th of September the Ohio troops of my command took ship, and when landed at Alexandria, Virginia, marched to Fox"s Ford on the Rappahannock, and on the 14th rejoined the Third Corps, having been absent one month.
The next day the whole army moved across the river and encamped around Culpeper Court-House.
( 1) _Hist. of Rebellion_ (McPherson), p. 42.
( 2) _War Records_, vol. xxix., Part II., pp. 46, 54.
CHAPTER IV Advance of Lee"s Army, October, 1863 and Retreat of the Army of the Potomac to Centreville--Battle of Bristoe Station--Advance of the Union Army, November, 1863--a.s.sault and Capture of Rappahannock Station, and Forcing the Fords--Affair near Brandy Station and Retreat of Confederate Army Behind the Rapidan--Incidents, etc.
Events occurred elsewhere that affected the aspect of affairs in Virginia.
General Rosecrans, early in September, commenced to move the Army of the c.u.mberland across the Tennessee River into Georgia, his objective being Chattanooga. Burnside at about the same time began a movement towards Knoxville, and on the way recaptured c.u.mberland Gap. The Confederate authorities, fearing Bragg was in danger, decided to send large reinforcements to his army, and, on September 9, 1863, Longstreet, with two divisions of his corps and a complement of artillery, was dispatched by rail from Lee to reinforce Bragg.
The sanguinary battle of Chickamauga was fought on the 19th and 20th of September. It resulted in Rosecrans and his army gaining possession of Chattanooga, and Bragg and his army being left in possession of the battlefield. Rosecrans held Chattanooga in little less than a state of siege; his communications were in danger of being effectively cut off, and to aid his imperilled forces the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps of the Army of the Potomac were, on September 24th, ordered west, in command of General Joseph Hooker.
The loss of these corps reduced the relative strength of Meade"s army to Lee"s materially below what it was before Longstreet"s two divisions were detached from the latter"s army.
Elliott was relieved of the command of the Third Division, Third Corps of the Army of the Potomac, October 3, 1863, and ordered to report to Rosecrans. General Joseph B. Carr (Troy, N. Y.) succeeded him. Carr was a charming man socially, of fine appearance, amiable and lovable, but not strong as a soldier. He was understood to be a favorite of the President, who appointed him Brigadier-General September 7, 1862; the Senate, however, failing to confirm him, the President reappointed him in March, 1863, with rank from date of first appointment, thus giving him high rank in spite of the Senate. He was finally confirmed, on a third appointment in 1864, through some compromise, after a sharp controversy between the President and the Senate, but with junior rank, and then ordered to Butler"s army.( 1)
For a time active operations were not contemplated by Meade. But Lee, about the 9th of October, crossed the Rapidan and commenced a movement around Meade"s right, threatening his rear. This compelled Meade to retire across the Rappahannock, and by the 14th to Centreville and Union Mills, near the first Bull Run battle- field.
On the 13th, while my brigade, with a New York battery temporarily attached to it, was holding "Three Mile Station," near Warrenton, and skirmishing with the enemy, ballot-boxes were opened, and a _regular_ election was held for the Ohio troops, both the boxes and ballots being carried to the voters along the battle-line so they might vote without breaking it.( 2)
The Third Corps was encamped that night at Greenwich. The next morning I was ordered with my brigade and Captain McKnight"s battery (N. Y.) to cover, as a rear-guard, the retreat of the Third Corps to Mana.s.sas Heights _via_ Bristoe Station. My orders were to avoid anything like a general engagement, but to beat back the advancing enemy whenever possible, prevent captures, and baffle him in his endeavors to delay or reach the main column. The successful conduct of a rear-guard of a retreating army, when pursued by an energetic foe, requires not only bravery but skill and tact. After the main body of my corps had left camp on its march towards Bristoe, and soon after daylight, the head of Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill"s corps appeared from the direction of Warrenton. I displayed my troops with as much show of strength as possible, and with a few shots from the battery forced the enemy to halt his head of column and form line of battle. I thereupon retired by column quickly, and resumed the march until the enemy again pushed forward by the flank too near for my safety, when, in a chosen position, my troops were again speedily brought into line and a fire opened, which necessarily compelled him to halt and again make disposition for battle. This movement was frequently repeated. At each such halt the enemy necessarily consumed much time, thus giving the main body of the corps ample opportunity to proceed leisurely towards its destination. The weak or broken-down men of the rear-guard were not required to halt and fight, but were allowed to make such speed as they could. The day was almost spent when a courier reached me from French with the information that the corps had pa.s.sed Bristoe Station, and was on the north side of Broad Run. Having now no further responsibility than for the safety of my own command, I moved more rapidly, and by 4 P.M. I had safely pa.s.sed Bristoe Station to the high ground north of Broad Run, from whence I could, from a distance of less than a mile, see Bristoe, and, for a considerable distance, the line of railroad running, in general direction, north and south. The Third Corps had moved on out of sight towards the heights at Mana.s.sas. My command was much wearied, and I halted it for a short rest, but I soon ordered it forward where it took position in obedience to an order of General Meade to cover a blind road over which he feared the enemy might march to seize the heights.
General A. P. Hill, in his report of the day, says:
"From this point (Greenwich) to Bristoe we followed close upon the rear of the Third Corps, picking up about 150 [?] stragglers. Upon reaching the hills this side of Broad Run, and overlooking the plain on the north side, the Third Corps was discovered resting, a portion of it just commencing the march toward Mana.s.sas. I determined that no time must be lost, and hurried up Heth"s division, forming it in line of battle along the crest of the hills and parallel to Broad Run. Poague"s battalion was brought to the front and directed to open on the enemy. They were evidently taken by surprise, and retired in the utmost confusion [?]. Seeing this, General Heth was directed to advance his line until he reached the run, and then to move by the left flank, cross at the ford, and press the enemy. This order was being promptly obeyed, when I perceived the enemy"s skirmishers making their appearance on this side of Broad Run, and on the right and rear of Heth"s division.
Word was sent to General Cooke, commanding the right brigade of Heth"s division, to look out for his right flank, and he promptly changed front of one of his regiments and drove the enemy back... .
In the meantime I sent back General Anderson to send McIntosh"s battalion to the front, and to take two brigades to the position threatened and protect the right flank of Heth... . The three brigades advanced in beautiful order and quite steadily, Cooke"s brigade, upon reaching the crest of the hill in their front, came within full view of the enemy"s line of battle behind the railroad embankment (the Second Corps), and of whose presence I was unaware."( 3)
Hill was unexpectedly caught in a fatal trap. He was mistaken about seeing any considerable portion of the Third Corps north of Broad Run, or as to any of it being taken by surprise and retiring in confusion. But for my halting my command to rest he would have seen little of it. We had baffled the head of his column all day, and had pa.s.sed beyond danger for the time, and, according to his report, we had killed and wounded many more than we had lost. The stragglers he reported captured could not have been of my command, as it left no men behind.
The fortuitous circ.u.mstance of Warren arriving at Bristoe with the head of the Second Corps moving on a road paralleling the railroad, just at the moment Hill was deploying his forces for an attack on the Third Corps, led to a serious and b.l.o.o.d.y battle. When the rear- guard of the Third Corps pa.s.sed Bristoe Station, no part of the Second was in sight. I saw no part of it until after Hill commenced arraying his troops on the crest of the hills south of Broad Run.
Seeing a battle was on, and my own command too far on its way and too much exhausted to be recalled in time to partic.i.p.ate in it, I dismounted from a tired horse and, with a single staff officer, ate a lunch from my orderly"s haversack ( 4) and watched the progress of the engagement. It is a rare occurrence that any person has an opportunity to quietly witness the whole of a considerable battle.
From my position I could see between the lines of the opposing forces; I could note the manoeuvres of each separate organization; and I could almost antic.i.p.ate to a certainty the result of the attacks and counter attacks. It was at first plainly evident that each commander knew little of what he had to meet. Lieutenant- General Hill"s formation, as described by him in his report, was arranged with reference to a supposed force north of Broad Run, and was consequently very faulty. Warren had no notice of the presence of an enemy until Hill ran unexpectedly into his line of march. Hill seemed to be eager for a fight with the Third Corps, then far beyond his reach, and found one with the Second Corps, which was quietly marching to a concentration near Centreville.
General Warren"s command was strung out upon the road, and he had no order of battle. Hill, with two divisions, and others soon to arrive, was better prepared, though his formation was bad, to meet the Second Corps. Warren wisely used the slightly raised railroad bed for a breastwork, and promptly opened the battle without giving the enemy time for a change of position or for new formations.
The battle was at first with musketry, but artillery soon arrived on both sides and opened fire at short range. Warren, in his report, after describing the preliminary movements of his command for position, says:
"A more inspiring scene could not be imagined. The enemy"s line of battle boldly moving forward, one part of our own steadily awaiting it, and another moving against it at double-quick, while the artillery was taking up a position at a gallop and going into action... . Under our fire the repulse of the enemy soon became a.s.sured, and Arnold"s battery arrived in time to help increase the demoralization and reach the fugitives.
"The enemy was gallantly led, as the wounding of three of his general officers in this attack shows, and even in retiring many retired but sullenly. An advance of a thin line along our front secured 450 prisoners, two stand of colors, and five field pieces."( 5)
The battle was of short duration, but owing to the exposed position of the Confederates their losses were great, and out of proportion to short engagements generally. General Warren and his officers justly won honors for meeting the emergency so handsomely.
Hill"s command was so signally defeated that the Second Corps remained in possession of the field until 9 P.M., when it pursued its march unmolested to a junction with the main army. Hill reported his loss, killed, wounded, and missing, at 1378,( 6) but it was claimed on good authority to have been much larger. The loss in the Second Corps at Bristoe is not given separately, but its total losses in two engagements of the day, including Bristoe, were 546.( 6)
Hill"s conduct was criticised, and his report bears, of dates in November, 1863, the following indors.e.m.e.nts:
"General Hill explains how, in his haste to attack the Third Army Corps of the enemy, he overlooked the presence of the Second, which was the cause of the disaster that ensued.
"R. E. Lee, General."
"The disaster at Bristoe Station seems due to a gallant but over- hasty pressing on of the enemy.
"J. A. Seddon, Secretary of War."
"There was a want of vigilance, by reason of which it appears the Third Army Corps of the enemy got a position, giving great advantage to them.
"J. D." (Davis) ( 7)
The last two indors.e.m.e.nts do not show that Seddon and Davis clearly comprehended the real situation.
Lee by continued flank movements indicated a purpose to force the Union Army back into its intrenchments at Alexandria, but this plan was abandoned after the disaster at Bristoe. Soon the Confederates commenced falling back towards the Rappahannock, destroying the railroad track and bridges, and Lee finally put his army into camp on the Botts plantation, near Brandy Station. He built winter quarters there, keeping possession of the fords of the Rappahannock, and strongly fortifying north of the river at Rappahannock Station.
The Union Army commenced a cautious forward movement on the 19th of October, keeping close to the Orange and Alexandria Railroad.
On the 21st I encamped on the battlefield of Bristoe, and we finished the burial of the dead. On the 26th, about 9 P.M., an order came advising me that General John Buford"s cavalry division was threatened and in peril near Catlett"s Station, and directing me to go to his relief. My brigade, with a battery attached, reached him about midnight, and under his direction formed line of battle, my left resting on the railroad, the cavalry on the flanks. He had been attacked at dark by what seemed to be an overwhelming force of infantry and cavalry, but he had stubbornly held his ground. Buford was an accomplished soldier and a hard fighter. He it was who opened the battle of Gettysburg on Seminary Hill.
When the best possible dispositions had been made for the expected attack of the morning, he invited me to an excuse for a headquarters, consisting of a tattered tent-fly. The night was dark and rainy, and everybody was wet and uncomfortable. The bronzed old soldier, from some hidden recess, had an orderly produce a bottle of whisky, the corkage of which was perfect, and, in the absence of a corkscrew, presented a problem. He said, "All right, you hold the candle."
He then held the bottle in his left hand, and with his sword in the right struck the neck of it so skillfully as to cut it off smoothly. The problem was solved. Further details are unnecessary.
I understood the art of making drinking-cups by cutting a bottle in two with a strong string, but this feat of Buford"s was new to me.( 8)
John Buford died of disease, December 16, 1863, a Major-General of Volunteers. He had won great renown as an able, fighting soldier.
Lee was not to be allowed to rest in his chosen winter quarters.
On the 7th of November the Army of the Potomac moved to the fords on the Rappahannock, and preparation was made to pa.s.s then, although they were strongly defended by the enemy. The Third Corps ma.s.sed at Kelly"s Ford, some five miles below Rappahannock Station. This corps forced a crossing about 5 P.M., and ma.s.sed in battle order on the bluffs near the river. My command did no fighting this day.
The Third Brigade, with some a.s.sistance from the Second Brigade of the First Division of the Sixth Corps, at dusk, under the leadership of the accomplished General David A. Russell, gallantly a.s.saulted and carried the strongly fortified _tete-de-pont_ on the north of the river at Rappahannock Station. The princ.i.p.al parts of Hoke"s and Hays" brigades of Early"s division of Ewell"s corps were captured, numbering, including killed and wounded, 1630. Russell"s loss in this affair, all told, was 327. He captured seven battle flags and Green"s battery of four rifled guns.( 9) Lee had intended to hold this position as a centre, and then fall, alternately, on the divided portions of the Army of the Potomac after they crossed the river above and below it.(10) Its loss forced him to retire from the river and take position in front of Culpeper Court-House, with his right resting on Mount Pony.
The next day the princ.i.p.al part of Meade"s army, having succeeded in crossing the river, was moved forward to tender battle. Late in the afternoon I was ordered to dislodge the enemy from a hill (Miller"s) about two miles in front of Brandy Station. The place was held by artillery and infantry, flanked by cavalry. This was Lee"s most advanced position, and it was held firmly as a point of observation. My command was disposed for the attack in the following order: The 138th Pennsylvania (Colonel McClennan) was moved on the left of the railroad to threaten the enemy on his right; the 122d Ohio (Colonel W. H. Ball) followed in support. The 110th Ohio (Lieutenant-Colonel Foster) was put on the right of the railroad, with orders to move directly on the height occupied by the enemy; the 6th Maryland (Colonel John W. Horn) in support, but some distance to the right. There was no artillery at hand, and the attack was ordered at once. The distance to the hill was about one half mile.
The 138th drew the enemy"s artillery fire, but continued its advance.
The 6th pushed forward into a wood on the right to make a demonstration, and in person I led the 110th to the real work. Not a gun was fired by my men as they advanced to the charge. I made every exertion possible to hasten the troops, but when they reached the foot of the hill the enemy"s artillery was withdrawn, and his infantry made a precipitate retreat. I was the first to gain the crest, being mounted, and with pistol fired on the retiring troops not two hundred feet away. A Confederate was reported wounded with a pistol ball at this place. This is the nearest I can come to having personally injured, in any way, any person in battle. We pushed on to Brandy Station without further orders, driving the enemy until we met a more formidable force, with several batteries of artillery, which compelled us to halt. Night came on, and the day"s work ended by our going into bivouac at the Station. Captain Andress of the 138th was the only officer of my command killed, and my loss was otherwise light. We made the charge with the commanding General--Meade--and much of his army looking on. It was Meade"s belief that behind the heights a.s.saulted would be found Lee"s army arrayed for battle.
Though Lee had selected a strong position (as already stated) in front of Culpeper Court-House, and fortified it somewhat, he decided it was not a good one, and therefore declined battle north of the Rapidan,(11) and, by the morning of the 9th of November, his army was south of this historic stream.
The Army of Northern Virginia never again crossed the Rapidan or Rappahannock. Henceforth it was to be confined to a narrower theatre of operations, and a closer defence of the capital of the Confederate States, but this defence was still to be most memorable and b.l.o.o.d.y, even in comparison with what had gone before.