In the controversy as to whether the Union Army at Shiloh was surprised on the morning of the first day I do not care to enter.
The testimony of Sherman and his brigade commander, General Ralph P. Buckland, as well as that of Grant, will all of whom I have conversed on this point, should be taken as conclusive, that as early as the 4th of April they knew of the presence of considerable organizations of Confederate cavalry, and that on the evening of the 5th they had encountered such numbers of the enemy as to satisfy the Union officers on the field that the enemy contemplated making an attack; yet it is quite certain these officers did not know on the evening of April 5th that the splendidly officered and organized Confederate Army was in position in front and close up to Shiloh Church as a centre, in full array, with a definite plan, fully understood by all its officers, for a battle on the morrow. Nothing had gone amiss in Johnston"s plan, save the loss of _one day_, which postponed the opening of the attack from dawn of Sat.u.r.day to the same time on Sunday. The friends of the Confederacy will never cease to deplore the loss, on the march from Corinth of this _one_ day. Many yet pretend to think the fate of slavery and the Confederacy turned on it. Grant was not quite so well prepared for battle on Sat.u.r.day as on Sunday, and no part of the Army of the Ohio could or would have come to his aid sooner than Sunday.
Grant, however, says he did not despair of success without Buell"s army,( 7)
Grant, when the battle opened, was nine miles by boat from Pittsburg Landing, which was at least two more miles from Shiloh Church, where the battle opened. Up to the morning of the battle he had apprehensions that an attack might be made on Crump"s Landing, Lew Wallace"s position, with a view to the destruction of the Union stores and transports.( 7) He heard the first distant sound of battle while at Savannah eating breakfast,( 7) and by dispatch-boat hastened to reach his already fiercely a.s.sailed troops, pausing only long enough to order Nelson to march to Pittsburg Landing and, while _en route_, to direct Wallace, at Crump"s Landing, to put his division under arms ready for any orders. Certain it is that the Union division commanders at Shiloh did not, on retiring the night of the 5th, antic.i.p.ate a general attack on the next morning.
They took, doubtless, the usual precautions against the ordinary surprise of pickets, grand-guards, and outposts, but they made no preparation for a general battle, the more necessary as three of the five divisions had never been under fire, and most of them had little, if any, drill in manoeuvres or loading and firing, and few of the officers had hitherto heard the thunder of an angry cannon- shot or the whistle of a dangerous bullet. But it may be said the private soldiers of the Confederate Army were likewise inexperienced and illy disciplined. In a large sense this was true, though many more of the Confederate regiments had been longer subjected to drill and discipline than of the Union regiments, and they had great confidence in their corps and division commanders, many of whom had gained considerable celebrity in the Mexican and Indian Wars.
The corps organization of the Confederate Army, in addition to the division, gave more general officers and greater compactness in the handling of a large army. At this time corps were unknown in the Union Army. And of still higher importance was the fact that one army came out prepared and expecting battle, with all its officers thoroughly instructed in advance as to what was expected, and the other, without such preparation, expectancy, or instruction, found itself suddenly involved against superior numbers in what proved to be the greatest battle thus far fought on the American continent. The Confederate hosts in the early morning moved to battle along their entire front with the purpose of turning either flank of the imperfectly connected Union divisions, but their efforts were, in no substantial sense, successful. The reckless and impetuous a.s.saults, however, drove back, at first precipitately, then more slowly, the advance Union divisions, though at no time without fearful losses to the Confederates. These heavy losses made it necessary soon to draw on the Confederate reserves. The Union commanders took advantage of the undulations of the ground, and the timber, to protect their men, often posting a line in the woods on the edge of fields to the front, thus compelling their foes to advance over open ground exposed to a deadly fire. The early superiority of the attacking army wore gradually away, and while it continued to gain ground its dead and wounded were numerous and close behind it, causing, doubtless, many to straggle or stop to care for their comrades. It has been charged that much disorganization arose from the pillage of the Union captured camps.
The divisions of Hurlburt and W. H. L. Wallace were soon, with the reserve artillery, actively engaged, and, save for a brief period, about 5 P.M., and immediately after, and in consequence of the capture at that hour of Prentiss and about 2000 of his division, a continuous Union line from Owl Creek to Lick Creek or the Tennessee was maintained intact, though often retired.
In the afternoon, so desperate had grown the Confederate situation, and so anxious was Johnston to destroy the Union Army before night and reinforcements came, that he led a brigade in person to induce it to charge as ordered, during which he received a wound in the leg, which, for want of attention, shortly proved fatal. To his fall is attributed the ultimate Confederate defeat, though his second, Beauregard, had written and was familiar with the order of battle, and had then much reputation as a field general. He had, in part at least, commanded at Bull Run. Beauregard now a.s.sumed command, and continued the attack persistently until night came.
No reinforcements arrived for either army in time for the Sunday battle. Through some misunderstanding of orders, and without any indisposition on his part, General Lew Wallace did not reach the battle-field until night, and after the exhausted condition of the troops of both armies had ended the first day"s conflict. The Army of the Tennessee, with a princ.i.p.al division away, had n.o.bly and heroically met the hosts which sought to overwhelm it; some special disasters had befallen two of its five divisions in the battle; General W. H. L. Wallace was mortally wounded, and Prentiss captured, both division commanders; the Union losses in officers and men were otherwise great, probably reaching 7000 (first day of battle), yet when night came the depleted Army of the Tennessee stood firmly at bay about two miles in rear of its most advanced line of the morning.
Colonel Webster, of Grant"s staff, had ma.s.sed, near and above Pittsburg Landing, about twenty pieces of artillery (pointed generally south and southwest) on the crest of a ridge just to the north of a deep ravine extending across the Union left and into the Tennessee. Hurburt"s division was next on the right of this artillery, extending westward almost at right angles with the river.
A few troops were placed between the artillery and the river. The gunboats _Tyler_ and _Lexington_, commanded, respectively, by naval Lieutenants Grim and Shirk, were close to the mouth of the ravine, and when the last desperate attack came their fire materially aided in repulsing it. Next on Hurlburt"s right came McClernand"s division, also extending westward; then Sherman"s, making almost a right angle by extending its right northward towards Snake Creek, to the overflowed lands and swamp just below the mouth of Owl Creek.
Broken portions of other divisions and organizations were intermixed in this line, the three divisions named being the only ones on the field still intact.( 8) In this position Grant"s army received at sunset and repelled the last Confederate a.s.sault, hurling back, for the last time on that memorable Sunday, the a.s.sailing hosts.
Dismayed, disappointed, disheartened, if not defeated, the Confederate Army was withdrawn for bivouac for the night to the region of the Union camps of the morning. After firing had ceased, Lew Wallace reached the field on Sherman"s right.
It is known that many stragglers appeared during the day in the rear of the Union Army, and soon a.s.sembled near the Tennessee in considerable numbers. The troops were new and undisciplined, and it was consequently hard for the officers to maintain the organizations and keep the men in line; but it is doubtful whether the number of stragglers, considering the character of the battle, was greater than usual, and they were not greater than, if as great as, in the rear of the Confederate Army. An advancing and apparently successful army in battle usually has comparatively few stragglers in the rear, but the plan of fighting adopted by Johnston and Beauregard, in ma.s.ses, often in close column by regiments, proved so destructive of life as to cause brave men to shrink from the repeated attacks.
However, the gallantry displayed by the attacking force, and the stubborn defensive battle maintained by the Union Army, have seldom, if ever, been excelled or equalled by veteran troops in any war by any race or in any age.
Union officers of high rank may perhaps be justly criticised for not having been better prepared for the battle by intrenchments, concentration, etc., but certainly both officers and soldiers deserve high commendation for their heroic, b.l.o.o.d.y, and successful resistance after the conflict began. About twenty-five per cent.
of those actually engaged fell dead or wounded, and at least a like number of the enemy was disabled. Napoleon fought no single battle in one day where the proportionate losses, dead and wounded, in either contending army were so great; and no battle of modern times shows so great a proportionate loss in the numerically weaker army, which was forced to retire steadily during an entire day, and yet at night was still defiantly standing and delivering battle, and its commander giving orders to a.s.sume the offensive at dawn on the morrow.
Grant was not perfection as a soldier at Shiloh, but who else would or could have done so well? If not a war genius, he was the personification of dogged, obstinate persistency, never allowing a word of discouragement or doubt to escape during the entire day, not even to his personal staff, though suffering excruciating pain from the recent injury from the fall of his horse. To him and to the valor of his officers and soldiers the country owes much for a timely victory, though won at great cost of life and limb. To him and them are due praise, not blame.
Thus far the Army of the Ohio is given no credit for partic.i.p.ation in the Sunday battle. Buell and Nelson"s division of that army were at Savannah on the evening of the 5th, but Buell refrained from attempting to report his presence to Grant until the next morning. Grant had then departed for the battle-field. Grant was eating his breakfast at Savannah when the battle opened, and at first determined to find Buell before going to his army; but the sound of guns was so continuous, he felt that he should not delay a moment, and hence left a note for Buell asking him to hasten with his reinforcements to Pittsburg Landing, gave an order for Nelson to march at once, and then proceeded by boat up the river. Buell, after reiterating Grant"s instructions to Nelson to march to opposite the Landing, himself about noon proceeded by boat to that place with his chief of staff, Colonel James B. Fry.( 9)
Buell seems to have been much impressed by the number and temper of the stragglers he saw on his arrival, and he made some inquiry as to Grant"s preparations for the retreat of his army. Grant, learning that Buell was on board a steamboat at the Landing, sought him there, hastily explained the situation and the necessity for reinforcements, and again departed for the battle-field. He had before that been in the thick of the fight, where his sword and scabbard had been shot away. Not until 1 or 1.30 P.M.( 9) did the head of Nelson"s column move, Ammen"s brigade leading, for Pittsburg Landing, and then by a swampy river road over which artillery could not be hauled. The artillery went later by boat.
At 5 or 6 P.M. the advance,--eight companies of the 36th Indiana (Col. W. Grose)--reached a point on the river opposite the Landing.
These companies were speedily taken across the Tennessee in steamboats and marched immediately, less than a quarter of a mile to the left of the already ma.s.sed artillery, to the support of Grant"s army, then engaged in its struggle to repel the last a.s.sault of the Confederates for the day. Other regiments (6th Ohio, Colonel N.
L. Anderson, 24th Ohio, Colonel F. C. Jones) of Ammen"s brigade followed closely, but only the 36th Indiana partic.i.p.ated in the engagement then about spent. This regiment lost one man killed.(10) The expected arrival of the Army of the Ohio and the presence of such of it as arrived may have had a good moral effect, but its late coming gives to it little room to claim any credit for the result of the first day"s battle.
As always, those who only see the rear of an army during a battle gain from the sight and statements of the demoralized stragglers exaggerated notions of the condition and situation of those engaged.
That Grant"s army was in danger, and in sore need of reinforcements, cannot be doubted. That the Confederate Army had been fearfully punished in the first day"s fighting is certain. Beauregard reports that he could not, on Monday, bring 20,000 men into action (11)-- less than half the number Johnston had when the battle began. The arrival of Nelson"s and Lew Wallace"s divisions six hours earlier would have given a different aspect, probably, to the fist day"s battle. The Army of the Ohio was then composed, generally, of better equipped, better disciplined and older troops, though unused to battle, than the majority of those of the Army of the Tennessee.
Though night had come, dark and rainy, when the four divisions of Buell"s army reached the west bank of the Tennessee, and Lew Wallace"s division arrived on the right, Grant directed the ground in front to be examined and the whole army to be put in readiness to a.s.sume the offensive at daybreak next morning. Wallace was pushed forward on the extreme right above the mouth of Owl Creek, and Sherman, McClernand, and Hurlbut, in the order named, on Wallace"s left, then McCook (A. McD.),(12) Crittenden (Thomas T.), and Nelson (Wm.) were a.s.signed positions in the order named, from Hurlburt to the left, Nelson on the extreme left, well out towards Lick Creek; all advanced (save McCook) during the night a considerable distance from the position of the Army of the Tennessee at the close of the battle.(13)
Buell"s artillery arrived and went into battery during the night.
General George H. Thomas" division and one brigade of General Thomas J. Wood"s division did not arrive in time for the battle. There were present, commanding brigades in the Army of the Ohio, Brigadier- Generals Lovell H. Rosseau, J. T. Boyle, Colonels Jacob Ammen, W.
Sooy Smith, W. N. Kirk (34th Illinois), and William H. Gibson (49th Ohio). These Colonels became, later, general officers.
Soon after 5 o"clock in the morning the entire Union Army went forward, gaining ground steadily until 6 A.M., when the strong lines of Beauregard"s army with his artillery in position were reached, and the battle became general and raged with more or less fury throughout the greater part of the day, and until the Confederate Army was beaten back at all points, with the loss of some guns and prisoners, besides killed and wounded. The last stand of the enemy was made about 3 P.M. in front of Sherman"s camp preceding the first day"s battle. Both Grant and Buell accompanied the troops, often personally directing the attacks, as did division and brigade commanders. Grant, late in the day, near Shiloh Church, rode with a couple of regiments to the edge of a clearing and ordered them to "_Charge_." They responded with a yell and a run across the opening, causing the enemy to break and disperse. This practically ended the two days" memorable battle at the old log church where it began.(14)
The Confederate Army of the Mississippi which came, but four days before, so full of hope and confidence, from its intrenched camp at Corinth, was soon in precipitate retreat. Its commander was dead; many of its best officers were killed or wounded; its columns were broken and demoralized; much of its material was gone; hope and confidence were dissipated, yet it maintained an orderly retreat to its fortifications at Corinth. Beauregard claimed for it some sort of victory.(15)
From Monterey, on the 8th of April, Beauregard addressed Grant a note saying that in consequence of the exhausted condition of his forces by the extraordinary length of the battle, he had withdrawn them from the conflict, and asking permission to send a mounted party to the battle-field to bury the dead, to be accompanied by certain gentlemen desiring to remove the bodies of their sons and friends. To this Grant responded that, owing to the warmth of the weather, he had caused the dead of both sides to be buried immediately.(16)
The total losses, both days, in the Army of the Tennessee, were 87 officers and 1426 enlisted men killed, 336 officers and 6265 enlisted men wounded, total killed and wounded 8114. The captured and missing were 115 officers and 2318 men, total 2433, aggregate casualties, 10,547.(16)
The total losses in the Army of the Ohio were 17 officers and 224 privates killed, 92 officers and 1715 privates wounded, total 2048.
The captured were 55.(16) The grand total of the two Union armies killed, wounded, captured, or missing, 12,650.
The first reports of casualties are usually in part estimated, and not accurate for want of full information. The foregoing statement of losses is given from revised lists. Grant"s statement of losses does not materially differ from the above.(17)
The losses of the Confederate Army in the two days" battle, as stated in Beauregard"s report of April 11th, were, killed 1728, wounded 8012; total killed and wounded, 9740, missing 959, grand total, 10,699.(16) Grant claimed that Beauregard"s report was inaccurate, as above 1728 were buried, by actual count, in front of Sherman"s and McClernand"s divisions alone. The burial parties estimated the number killed at 4000.(17)
Besides Johnston, the army commander, there were many Confederate officers killed and wounded. Hon. George W. Johnson, then a.s.suming to act as (Confederate) Provisional Governor of Kentucky, was killed while fighting in the ranks on the second day; General Gladden was killed the first day, and Generals Cheatham, Clark, Hindman, B. R.
Johnson, and Bowen were wounded.
Thenceforth during the war there was little boasting of the superior fighting qualities of Southern over Northern soldiers. Both armies fought with a courage creditable to their race and nationality.
Americans may always be relied upon to do this when well commanded.
I have already taken more s.p.a.ce than I originally intended in giving the salient features of the battle of Shiloh, and I cannot now pursue the campaign further than to say General Halleck arrived at Pittsburg Landing April 11th, and a.s.sumed command, for the first and only time in the field. He soon drew to him a third army (Army of the Mississippi), about 30,000 strong, under General John Pope.
Island No. 10, in the bend of the Mississippi above New Madrid, was occupied early by the Confederates with a strong force, well fortified, with the hope that it could be held and thus close the Mississippi River against the Union forces from the North. Early after Fort Donelson was taken, Flag Officer Foote took his fleet of gunboats into the Mississippi, and in conjunction with the army under General John Pope sought the capture of the island. Pope moved about 20,000 men to Point Pleasant, on the west bank of the river, March 6, 1862, which compelled the Confederates, on the 14th, to evacuate New Madrid, on the same side of the river, about ten miles above Point Pleasant and the same distance below the island. Pope cut, or "_sawed_," a ca.n.a.l from a point above Island No. 10 through a wood to Wilson"s and St. John"s Bayou, leading to New Madrid.(18) The position of the Confederates was still so strong with their batteries and redoubts on the eastern sh.o.r.e of the river that Pope with his army alone could not take it. Attacks were made with the gunboats from the north, but they failed to dislodge the enemy. Foote, though requested by Pope, did not think it possible for a gunboat to steam past the batteries and go to the a.s.sistance of the army at Point Pleasant. With the a.s.sistance of gunboats Pope could cross his army to the east side and thus cut off all supplies for the Confederate Army on the island.
Captain Henry Walke, U.S.N., having expressed a willingness to attempt to pa.s.s the island and batteries with the _Carondelet_, was given orders to do so. He accordingly made ready, taking on board Captain Hottenstein and twenty-three sharpshooters of the 42d Illinois. The sailors were all armed; hand-grenades were placed within reach, and hoses were attached to the boilers for throwing scalding water to drive off boarding parties. Thus prepared, the _Carondelet_, on the night of April 4th, "in the black shadow of a thunderstorm," safely pa.s.sed the island and batteries. It was fired on, but reached New Madrid without the loss of a man. The _Pittsburg_, under Lieutenant-Commander Thompson, in like manner ran the gauntlet without injury, also in a thunderstorm, April 7th.
These two gunboats the same day attacked successfully the Confederate batteries on the east sh.o.r.e and covered the crossing of Pope"s army. Seeing that escape was not possible, the garrison on the island surrendered to Flag Officer Foote on April 7th, the same day the Confederates were driven from the field of Shiloh. Pope pursued and captured, on the morning of the 8th, nearly all the retreating troops. General W. W. Mackall, commanding at Island No. 10, and two other general officers, over 5000 men, 20 pieces of heavy artillery, 7000 stand of arms, and quant.i.ties of ammunition and provisions were taken without the loss of a Union soldier.(19)
Not until April 30th did Halleck"s army move on Corinth. Grant, though nominally in command of the right wing, was little more than an observer, as orders were not even sent through him to that wing.
For thirty days Halleck moved and intrenched, averaging not to exceed two thirds of a mile a day, until he entered Corinth, May 30th, to find it completely evacuated. He commenced at once to build fortifications for 100,000 men. But the dispersion of this grand army soon commenced; the Army of the Ohio (Buell"s) was sent east along the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, with orders to repair the road as it proceeded. We shall soon meet this army and narrate its future movements to the Ohio River--in retreat _after_ Bragg"s army.
Grant, chafing under his treatment, on Corinth being occupied, at his own request was relieved from any duty in Halleck"s department.
Later, on Sherman"s advice, he decided to remain, but to transfer his headquarters to Memphis, to which place he started, June 21st, on horseback with a small escort.
Halleck was, July 11, 1862, notified of his own appointment to the command of all the armies, with headquarters at Washington. Grant was therefore recalled to Corinth again. He reached that place and took command, July 15th, Halleck departing two days later, never again to take the field in person. The latter was not under fire during the war, nor did he ever command an army in battle.
We here leave Grant and his brilliant career in the West. We shall speak of him soon again, and still later when in command of all the armies of the Union (Halleck included), but with headquarters in the field with the Army of the Potomac.
( 1) _War Records_, vol. vii., pp. 904, 911.
( 2) _Ibid_., vol. x., Part I., p. 398 (396).
( 3) _Ibid_., vol. x., Part I., p. 112.
( 4) _War Records_, vol. x., Part I., pp. 392-7.
( 5) _War Records_, atlas, Plate XII.
( 6) _Ibid_., vol. x., Part I., p. 112.
( 7) _Battles and Leaders_, vol. i., p. 466.
( 8) For maps showing positions of troops of each army both days see _Battles and Leaders_, vol. i., pp. 470, 508.
( 9) General Ammen"s diary, Nelson"s and Ammen"s reports, _War Records_, vol. x., Part I., pp. 323, 328, 332.
(10) Ammen, _Ibid_., vol. x., Part I., pp. 334,337.
(11) _War Records_, vol. x., Part I., p. 391 (398).
(12) McCook did not arrive until early on the 7th. _War Records_, vol. x., Part I., p. 293.