The position of the opposing armies the night of the 18th of October can be briefly stated.
The Union Army was encamped on each side of the turnpike, facing southward, and north of Cedar Creek, a tributary of the Shenandoah, which, flowing in general direction from northwest to southeast, empties into the river about two miles west of Strasburg. The north branch of the Shenandoah flows northward to Fisher"s Hill, thence bending to the eastward at the foot of and around the north end of Three Top (or Ma.s.sanutten) Mountain, thence, forming a junction with the south branch, past Front Royal to the west and again northward, emptying into the Potomac at Harper"s Ferry.
Crook"s two divisions, Colonel Joseph Thoburn and Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes commanding, were wholly to the east of the pike; Thoburn"s division well advanced, his front conforming to the course of the creek; the Nineteenth Corps (Emory"s), two divisions, lay on each side of the pike, covering the bridge and ford in its immediate front, and the Sixth was on Emory"s right. Ricketts, Wheaton, and Getty"s divisions of the Sixth were encamped in the order named from left to right. Meadow Brook (sometimes called Marsh Run), a small stream, with rugged banks, flowing from north to south and emptying into Cedar Creek, separated the left of Ricketts" division from the right of the Nineteenth Corps. The Sixth Corps" front conformed to the line of Cedar Creek; Getty"s division being retired, and consequently much nearer than the others to Middletown. My brigade was the left of the Sixth, and its left rested on Meadow Brook. Merritt"s cavalry was in close proximity to Getty"s right.
Custer was about one and a half miles to Merritt"s right, on the Back road beyond a range of hills and near the foot of Little North Mountain. The whole course of the Back road is through a rough country not adapted to cavalry operations. Powell"s cavalry division was near Front Royal. Army headquarters were at the Belle Grove House on the heights west of the pike, immediately in rear of the right of the Nineteenth Corps. Wright"s headquarters were a short distance to the rear of Sheridan"s.
The supply and baggage trains of our army were about one mile behind its right centre and about the same distance from Middletown, a village twelve miles south of Winchester, and about two miles north of the Cedar Creek bridge. Getty and Merritt"s camps were, in general, westward of Middletown. The front of our army covered about two miles; Custer"s and Thoburn"s divisions, on the right and left, being outside of this limit.
The Union Army was not intrenched, save a portion of the Nineteenth and Eighth Corps. Owing to reports that Early had withdrawn southward, Wright ordered a brigade of the Nineteenth Corps to start at daylight of the 19th to make a strong reconnoissance.
The Union troops, except only the usual guards and pickets, quietly slept in their tents the night of the 18th of October.
The Confederate Army was encamped on Fisher"s Hill, two miles south of Strasburg and about six miles from the centre of the Union Army, measured by the pike. Three Top Mountain was east and south of a bend of the Shenandoah; its north end ab.u.t.ting close up to the river. General J. B. Gordon and Captain Hotchkiss, from the Confederate signal station of Three Top, on the 18th, with field- gla.s.ses, marked the location of all the Union camps, and on their report Early decided to attack the next morning.( 3) Accordingly, Gordon, Ramseur, and Pegram"s divisions and Payne"s cavalry brigade were moved in the night across the river, thence along the foot of Three Top Mountain, and along its north end eastward to and again across the river at Bowman and McIntorf"s Fords below the mouth of Cedar Creek, and thence, by 4 A.M., to a position east of the main camp of Crook"s corps. These divisions were under Gordon. Kershaw and Wharton"s divisions marched by the pike to the north of Strasburg, and there separated; the former moving to the eastward, accompanied by Early. Kershaw crossed Cedar Creek at Robert"s Ford, about one and a half miles above its mouth, which brought him in front of Thoburn of Crook"s corps. Wharton, followed by all of Early"s artillery, continued on the pike and took position in advance of Hupp"s Hill, less than a mile south of the bridge over Cedar Creek.
He had orders to push across the bridge as soon as Gordon made an attack on the Union left and rear, and thus bring the artillery into action. Lomax"s cavalry division, theretofore posted in Luray Valley, was ordered to elude Powell"s cavalry, join the right of Gordon, and co-operate with him in the attack. Rosser"s cavalry divisions were pushed up the night of the 18th close in front of Custer, with orders to attack simultaneously with Gordon. The enemy did not know Sheridan was absent from his army, and Payne"s cavalry, which accompanied Gordon, was ordered to penetrate to the Belle Grove House and make him a prisoner.( 4)
Wright was in command of the army for all military operations, but otherwise it was commanded in Sheridan"s name, during his absence, by his staff. Few of the army knew Sheridan was away when the battle opened.
At 4 A.M. the still sleeping Union Army was aroused by sharp firing far off on its right. Rosser had attacked Custer; but though there was some surprise, Custer held his ground. This was the initial attack, but almost at the moment Rosser"s guns were heard came an a.s.sault on Thoburn by Kershaw, followed at once by Gordon with his three divisions and Payne"s cavalry on Hayes" division of Crook"s corps. Besides being surprised Crook"s divisions were largely outnumbered, and, consequently, after a short and desperate resistance, both divisions were broken and somewhat dispersed.
Thoburn was killed. The officers heroically did all in their power to rally the men, but some were captured, and seventeen pieces of artillery lost. Early soon joined Gordon with Kershaw, and together they fell on the left of the Nineteenth Corps, which was at the same time a.s.sailed in front by Wharton with all Early"s artillery.
The Nineteenth shared the fate of Crook"s corps, and was soon broken and flying to the rear. This brought Early"s five infantry divisions and his artillery together on the heights near the Belle Grove House, from whence they could operate against the Sixth Corps.
Sheridan"s headquarters were captured, his staff being forced to fly with such official papers as they could collect. Crook and Emory"s commands were routed before it was fully day-dawn. The position of our cavalry was such that it could render no immediate aid against the main attack. Gordon prolonged his line towards Middletown, facing generally to the westward, and was joined on his right by some irregular cavalry, part of which appeared north of Middletown. These forces threatened our ammunition and other trains. A thick fog helped to conceal the enemy"s movements. The disaster sustained must not be attributed to a want of skill and bravery on the part of the troops of the Eighth and Nineteenth.
Crook, aided by such gallant officers as Colonels Thoburn, Thomas M. Harris, and Milton Wells of the First, and Colonels R. B. Hayes, H. F. Devol, James M. Comly, and B. F. Coates of his Second Division, and Emory, a.s.sisted by Generals McMillen and Dwight and Colonels Davis and Thomas of his First, and Generals Grover and Birge and Colonels Porter, Molineux, Dan. McCauley, and Shunk of his Second Division, did all possible under the circ.u.mstances to avert calamity.
No braver or more skillful officers could be found. These corps were victims of a surprise. Their position was badly chosen, and not well protected by pickets and guards. There is no necessity to defend the good name of the officers and men who were so ingloriously routed. The battle, so successful thus far for Early, was, however, not over, nor was he to have continued good fortune.
Wright had retained the active command of the Sixth Corps, though by virtue of seniority he was in command of the army. He, as soon as the attack was made, turned his corps over to Ricketts, who turned the command of his division (Third) over to me, and I turned my brigade over to Colonel Wm. H. Ball of the 122d Ohio. My division was the next to be struck by Early"s troops. It had time, however, to break camp, form, and face about to the eastward. Before it was fairly daylight, my old brigade, under Colonel Ball, had crossed Meadow Brook by my order and was advancing up the heights near the Belle Grove House. Ball"s brigade was run through by the broken troops of the Nineteenth, and it was feared for a time it could not be held steady. The enemy swung across the Valley pike to my left and rear, and thus completely isolated my division from other Union troops. Notwithstanding this situation the division firmly held its exposed position. To cover a wider front the brigades were fought and manoeuvred separately in single battle line, and often faced in different directions. I soon found I was able to drive or hold back any enemy in front of any part of my command.
The fighting became general and furious and promised an early success to our arms. Wheaton, next on my right, and Getty next on his right as camped, likewise faced about and moved eastward towards the pike to meet the enemy already in possession of it immediately south of Middletown. Getty encountered some of Gordon"s infantry and cavalry among our trains. Getty and Wheaton were soon widely separated from each other, and Wheaton, the nearest, was still not within a half mile of my division, which was the farthest south.
The broken troops of the Eighth and Nineteenth Corps had retreated as far as Middletown, and some soon reached Newtown, pressing onward towards Winchester, carrying exaggerated reports of disaster to the whole army. Custer"s cavalry was still held in Cedar Creek Valley by Rosser. Merritt came gallantly to the rescue, and by 7 A.M. the enemy were confronted at every point and held at bay.
Getty met a strong force along Meadow Brook, near Middletown, but maintained himself, though his right flank was a.s.sailed by one of Gordon"s divisions. Wheaton fought his division in the interval between Getty"s and my divisions, he having frequently to change front, as had the other divisions, to meet flanking columns of the enemy. The complete isolation of the divisions of the Sixth Corps rendered it impossible for their commanders to know the real situation throughout the field, and neither of them had any a.s.surance of co-operation or a.s.sistance from the others. My division, being the farthest south, was in great danger of being cut off. Each division maintained, from 6 A.M. until after 9 A.M., a battle of its own. Neither division was, during that time, driven from its position by any direct attack made on it, and every change of position by any considerable part of the Sixth Corps was deliberately made under orders and while not pressed by the enemy in front.
Wright was with Getty or Wheaton until a.s.sured of their ability to cover the trains and to hold their ground. Ricketts, in command of the corps, after directing me to hold my position near Cedar Creek until further orders, left me, promising soon to return with a.s.sistance, but about 7 A.M. he fell pierced through the chest with a rifle ball, and was borne from the field.( 5) The command of the corps then devolved on Getty, and the command of his division of General L. A. Grant of Vermont.
About 8 A.M. Wright came to me with information of Getty and Wheaton"s success. He said he would soon have cavalry on the enemy"s right flank, and that he believed the battle could be won.
He was tranquil, buoyant, and self-possessed. He did not seem to pay any attention to a wound under his chin, made by a pa.s.sing bullet, though he was bleeding profusely. He had no staff officer with him, and was without escort.( 6) I ordered Captain Damon of my staff to report to him. Wright repeated Ricketts" order to hold my division behind Meadow Brook well down to Cedar Creek. This I had been enabled to do when not threatened on my left flank. It must be remembered that after 6 A.M. the divisions of the corps having been faced about, and the Eighth and Nineteenth Corps driven to the rear, Getty"s division became the left, Wheaton"s the centre, and my division the right of the army, the whole line facing, in general, eastward. In this position, isolated as before stated, the divisions maintained the battle. My greatest anxiety arose of the possibility of the ammunition of the men becoming exhausted.
One officer conducted to us through the fog, smoke, and confusion a considerable supply of cartridges in boxes strapped on mules.
Colonel Ball sent Captain R. W. Wiley of his staff to hasten forward another such mule-caravan. Owing to a change in the location of the brigade, he conducted it within the Confederate lines. Captain Wiley was the only officer of my division captured in the day"s battle.
Getty, who had successfully fought with his division near Middletown, took up a position before 10 A.M. with the left of his division resting on the turnpike north of the town about three fourths of a mile.
My division was fiercely engaged all the morning. Colonel Tompkins, Chief of Artillery of the Sixth Corps, a.s.sembled a number of guns on the plateau to my left under Captains McKnight and Adams. They were unsupported by infantry. The enemy approached under cover of the smoke and fog and captured most of them. Under my direction, Colonel W. H. Henry and Captain C. K. Prentiss with the 10th Vermont and 6th Maryland changed front and retook them after a fierce struggle. The guns not disabled were drawn off by hand. My position was in open ground along the crest of a ridge, right resting near Cedar Creek, covering Marsh Run (or Meadow Brook). The enemy forced a crossing of the Run near its mouth, but soon were driven back; then a fierce attack came on my left from a large force. This too was repulsed. The battle raged with alternate a.s.saults on the front and flanks of my division. They were each repulsed with considerable loss to the enemy. The situation grew so promising that about 9 A.M. I ordered a general charge along the whole line.
This was promptly made, and the enemy were driven to the east of Marsh Run, and complete success seemed a.s.sured, when a large force of the enemy again appeared on my left in the direction of Middletown.
The charge had to be suspended and combinations made to meet the new danger. The battle still raged with great fury, my line being frequently compelled to change front to meet the flank attacks.
Sometimes a portion of it faced northward, another eastward, and another southward. The enemy was at no time able to drive us.
All changes of position were made under my orders and after the enemy had been repulsed in his direct attacks. The importance of uniting the divisions of the Sixth Corps was kept in mind, and as the enemy was driven back on my left, my command slowly moved northward towards Getty and Wheaton"s battles. My battle had been maintained, in general, a mile and more southwestward of Middletown and in the vicinity of our camps of the night before. Getty and Wheaton had thus far fought their divisions near Marsh Run to the south of Middletown. Before 10 A.M., I reached the Woollen Mill road that ran parallel to the general line my troops were then holding and almost at right angles to the turnpike, westward to Cedar Creek from the south end of Middletown. At this time the enemy was in my front, and our flanks were no longer threatened.
He had suspended further attacks with his infantry, but concentrated on us a heavy artillery fire which our guns returned. We had lost few prisoners; even the wounded of the division had been brought off. The men were in compact order and no demoralization had taken place. The captured and missing from the division the entire day was two officers and thirty-four men.( 7) From this last position I leisurely moved the division to the left and rear over the Old Forge road (which extended west from the Valley pike at the north end of Middletown over Middle Marsh Brook and a ridge to the Creek), pa.s.sing Wheaton"s front, and united with Getty"s right. Emerson"s brigade of the division through a mistake temporarily moved a short distance north of the line designated, but the error was promptly corrected. Colonel Ball was then, by me, directed to cover the front of the entire division with a heavy line of skirmishers, and he accordingly deployed the 110th Ohio and 138th Pennsylvania under Lieutenant-Colonel Otho H. Binkley, and moved them about three hundred yards to the front along the outskirts of a woods, with orders to hold the enemy in check as long as possible if attacked.
Orders were at once given to resupply the troops with ammunition.
Wheaton"s division soon formed on my right, and for the first time after the battle opened the Sixth Corps was united.
The enemy was now in possession of the camps (except of the cavalry) of our army, and was flushed with success. Wright had given orders for all the broken troops to be re-organized, and for Merritt and Custer"s cavalry to move from the right to the left of the army,( 8) and the division commanders were told the enemy would be attacked about 12 M.
We left Sheridan at Winchester. He remained there the night of the 18th of October. Before rising in the morning an officer on picket duty in front of the city reported artillery firing in the direction of his army. Sheridan interpreted this as a strong reconnoissance in which the enemy was being felt. He had been notified the night before that Wright had ordered such a reconnoissance.
Further reports of heavy firing having reached him, he, at 8.30 A.M. started to join his army. When he reached Mill Creek just south of Winchester, with his escort following, he distinctly heard the continuous roar of artillery, which satisfied him his army was engaged in strong battle. As he approached Kearnstown and came upon a high place in the road, he caught sight of some demoralized soldiers, camp followers, and baggage and sutler wagons, in great confusion, hurrying to the rear. There were in this mixed ma.s.s sutlers and their clerks, teamsters, b.u.mmers, cow-leaders, servants, and all manner of camp followers. The sight greatly disturbed Sheridan; it was almost appalling to him. Such a scene in greater or less degree may usually be witnessed in the rear of any great army in battle. The common false reports of the army being all overwhelmed and in retreat were proclaimed by these flying men as justification of their own disgraceful conduct. Sheridan, notwithstanding his experience as a soldier, was impressed with the belief that his whole army was defeated and in retreat.( 9) He formed, while riding through these people, erroneous impressions of what had taken place in the morning battle which were never removed from his mind. The steady roar of guns and rattle of musketry should have told him that some organized forces were, at least, baring their b.r.e.a.s.t.s bravely to the enemy and standing as food for shot and sh.e.l.l. Sheridan mistook the disorganized horde he pa.s.sed through for substantial portions of a wholly routed army, and this mistake prevented him, even later, from clearly understanding the real situation.
He first met Torbert, his Chief of Cavalry, and from him only learned what had taken place to the left of and around Middletown.
Torbert, who had not been to the right, where the battle with infantry had raged for hours, a.s.sumed that demoralization extended over that part of the field. Next Sheridan came to Getty"s division (10.30 A.M.),(10) and finding it and its brave commander in unbroken line, facing the foe, a.s.sumed without further investigation that no other infantry troops were doing likewise. He justly gives Getty"s division and the cavalry credit for being "in the presence of and resisting the enemy."(11) Getty, though theretofore in command of the Sixth Corps, did not pretend to know the position or the previous movements of the army. He had remained constantly with his division, and wisely held the turnpike, covering our left flank and trains. This, too, was according to Wright"s order.
When Sheridan arrived Getty was not actually engaged, but the enemy were, at long range, firing artillery. A shot pa.s.sed close to Sheridan as he approached Getty. After the first salutation, Sheridan said to Getty: "Emory"s corps is four miles to your rear, and Wheaton"s division of your corps is two miles in your rear.
I will form them on your division." Sheridan then said nothing of Crook"s corps, or of the Third Division of the Sixth, which I commanded.(12)
Up to this time Sheridan had not met Wright, who was on the right of the army, nor could Sheridan see from the pike the troops of my division nor of Wheaton"s, still to my right. My division was at no time as far to the rear as the left of Getty"s line. Wright confirms my recollection of the position of my division at the time of Sheridan"s arrival, but his recollection is that Wheaton had not completed a connection with my right.(13)
Colonel Ball, in his report dated the day after the battle, speaking of the final movement of the Second Brigade of my division to connect with Getty"s division, correctly says: "We were ordered to move obliquely to the _left and rear_ and connect with the right of the Second Division." Instead of having to _advance_ to form line with Getty it was necessary to move obliquely to the _rear_.
By about 10 A.M., the divisions of the Sixth Corps were united, the organized troops of our army were in line, and the enemy"s flank movements were over. Thenceforth he had to meet us in front.
Our trains were protected, and there was no thought of further retiring. The Sixth Corps had not lost any of its camp equipage, not a wagon, nor, permanently, a piece of artillery. Its organization was perfect, and there were no stragglers from its ranks. A strong line of skirmishers had been thrown forward and the men resupplied with ammunition.
An incident here occurred which came near causing my dismissal from the army. Colonel J. W. Snyder, of the 9th New York Heavy Artillery, on being ordered to hold his command ready for an early advance, notified me his men were practically out of ammunition, and that the ordnance officer reported there were no cartridges to be had of suitable size. This was the only regiment in the command armed with smooth-bore .69 calibre muskets. They required buck and ball.
The other troops were armed with rifles, .58 calibre. I ordered the Colonel to instruct his men to throw away their muskets as fast as rifles could be found on the field to take their places. This his men eagerly did, and Colonel Snyder soon reported his regiment ready for action, with rifles in their hands and forty rounds of cartridges. This regiment, a very large and splendid one (three battalions, four companies each), was thus kept in line to partic.i.p.ate in the impending conflict. After the incident had been almost forgotten a letter came through the army channels from the Chief of Ordnance at Washington, advising me that the captains of companies of the 9th New York had reported, severally, that their men had thrown away their muskets "October 19, 1864, by order of Colonel Keifer, division commander," and asking me for an explanation of the reprehensible order. I plead guilty and stated the circ.u.mstances giving rise to the unusual order, but soon received a further communication from the same officer informing me that my name had been sent to the President, through the Secretary of War, for dismissal. I was told some correspondence arose over the matter, in which Generals Sheridan and Wright approved my action fully.
This incident serves now to enable me to remember that Wright proposed to attack Early at 12 M.
Two or three statements of Sheridan deserve special mention.
Speaking of his appearance on the field, he says:
"When nearing the Valley pike, just south of Newtown, I saw about three fourths of a mile west of the pike a body of troops, which proved to be Ricketts and Wheaton"s divisions of the Sixth Corps."
And speaking of a time after he had met Getty and Wright, he says:
"I ordered Custer"s division back to the right flank, and returning to the place where my headquarters had been established, I met near them Ricketts" division under General Keifer and General Frank Wheaton"s division, both marching to the front."(14)
The distance from Newtown to Middletown is five miles. My division was at no time on that day within four miles of Newtown. This is also true, I am sure, of Wheaton"s division. Sheridan was deceived by false reports received before his arrival, and by the sight of magnified numbers of broken troops of other corps, who had continued to the rear. It was impossible for Sheridan to have met Wheaton and myself leading our divisions to the front; besides, our divisions were not at any time within a mile of his then headquarters.
Wheaton"s and the right of my division were farther advanced than any part of Getty"s division. This is proved by the recollection of Wright, Getty, and others, also by the reports written soon after the battle by many officers.(15) Sheridan, when he wrote, must have remembered meeting Wheaton and myself when we, together, rode to him from the right to tell him of the position and situation of our respective commands, and to a.s.sure him we could hold our ground and advance as soon as ordered. This ride brought Wheaton and me nearer Newtown than we were at any other time that day.
Sheridan was so impressed by the circ.u.mstances attending his coming to the field, and by his first meeting with Torbert and Getty, and the previous reports to him, that he a.s.sumed a condition of things which did not exist. It has been stated that my division joined Getty on his right. It, however, turned out that a portion of Hayes" division of Crook"s corps had united with Getty"s right, though not at first distinguished by me from the latter"s troops.
Years after the battle, ex-President Hayes referred to some statements in Sheridan"s _Memoirs_ thus:
"In speaking of that fight he says that, pa.s.sing up the pike, sometimes on one side, and sometimes on the other, coming to Cedar Creek, he struck the First Division of Getty, of the Sixth Corps; that he pa.s.sed along that division a short distance, when there arose out of a hollow before him a line consisting entirely of officers of Crook"s Army of West Virginia and of color-bearers.
The army had been stampeded in the morning, but these people were not panic-stricken. They saluted him, but there was nothing now between the enemy and him and the fugitives but this division of Getty"s. Said he: "These officers seemed to rise right up from the ground." This was twenty-four years afterward, but he recollects it perfectly well except names. Among them, however, he recollects seeing one, Colonel R. B. Hayes, since President of the United States, and drops the story there, leaving the impression that there were no men there--no privates, no army--simply some color- bearers and some officers.
"The fact is that in the hollow, just in the rear, was a line of men, a thousand or twelve hundred, probably, and they had thrown up a little barricade and were lying close behind it. He came up and saw these officers and did not see the men, or seems not to have seen them; but I had no idea at the time that he did not see the private soldiers in that line. He now tells that singular story of a line of officers, a line of color-bearers, and no force.
The fact is that first came Getty"s division, and then mine, and then came General Keifer"s division, all lying down behind that barricade, but in good condition, except that there had been some losses in the morning. General Keifer was next to me, and then came the rest of the Sixth Corps, and farther down I have no doubt the Nineteenth Corps was in line. We had then been, I suppose, an hour or an hour and a half in that position."(16)
Pa.s.sing from disputed, though important, points relating to the battle, all agree that when Sheridan reached his army a battle had been fought and lost to all appearance, and that the Union Army had been forced to retire to a new position. It should also be regarded beyond controversy that the Sixth Corps had been united before his arrival, that broken troops of other commands were being formed on the Sixth, and that the enemy also had been forced to change front, and was arrested in his advance.
Sheridan"s presence went far towards giving confidence to his army, and to inspire the men with a spirit of success. While the army loved Wright, and believed in him, his temperament was not such as to cause him to work an army up to a high state of enthusiasm. A deep chagrin over the morning"s disaster pervaded our army, and had much to do with the subsequent efforts to win a victory.
Sheridan showed himself to the troops by riding along the front, and he was loudly cheered. He a.s.sured them of success before the day ended. During the lull in the day"s battle some of the broken troops of the Eighth and Nineteenth Corps were reorganized.
Wright resumed command of his corps and Getty his division. Before Sheridan came Wright had instructed his division commanders that he would a.s.sume the offensive, and it was understood our army would advance about 12 M., as soon as an ample resupply of ammunition could be issued. Sheridan, however, postponed the time for a.s.suming the offensive until 3 P.M. Early, still filled with high hopes of complete victory, about 1 P.M. pushed forward on our entire front.
He did not drive in the strong line of skirmishers, and the attack was easily repulsed. It seemed to me then, as it did to Wright and others, that our whole army should have been thrown against the enemy on this repulse, and thus decided the day. Sheridan, however, adhered to his purpose to act on the defensive until later in the day. A false report that a Confederate column was moving towards Winchester on the Front Royal road caused Sheridan to delay his attack until about 4 P.M.
Early promptly realized that the conditions had changed, that the armies must meet face to face. It will be kept in mind that our army was now fronting southward instead of eastward, and Early"s army was forced to face northward instead of westward, as in the morning"s battle.
Early, hoping to hold the ground already won and thus reap some of the fruits of victory, retired, on his repulse, beyond the range of our guns, and took up a strong position, with his infantry and artillery, mainly on a natural amphitheatre of hills, centre a little retired, extending from a point north of Cedar Creek near Middle Marsh Brook on his left to and across the turnpike near Middletown, protecting his flanks west of this brook and east of the town with his cavalry and horse artillery. Early employed his men busily for the succeeding two hours in throwing up lunettes or redans to cover his field guns. His men were skillfully posted behind stone fences, common in the Valley, and on portions of his line behind temporary breastworks.
Early, before 12 P.M., wired Richmond he had won a complete victory, and would drive the Union Army across the Potomac. At 4 P.M. our army went forward in single line, with no considerable reserves, but in splendid style. Getty, with his left still on the turnpike, was the division of direction. My orders were to hold my left on Getty"s right. Wheaton was to keep connection with my right, and the Nineteenth Corps with the right of the Sixth Corps; and the cavalry, Merritt east of Middletown and Custer on Cedar Creek, to cover the flanks. In verifying my position just before starting, I found troops of Hayes" command filling a s.p.a.ce of two or three hundred yards between Getty"s right and my left. I discovered Hayes temporarily resting on the ground a short distance in rear of his men, with his staff around him. From him I learned he had no orders to advance, whereupon I requested him to withdraw his men so I could close the interval before the movement commenced.