THEAETETUS: If that is the case, we cannot possibly catch the Sophist.
STRANGER: Shall we then be so faint-hearted as to give him up?
THEAETETUS: Certainly not, I should say, if we can get the slightest hold upon him.
STRANGER: Will you then forgive me, and, as your words imply, not be altogether displeased if I flinch a little from the grasp of such a st.u.r.dy argument?
THEAETETUS: To be sure I will.
STRANGER: I have a yet more urgent request to make.
THEAETETUS: Which is--?
STRANGER: That you will promise not to regard me as a parricide.
THEAETETUS: And why?
STRANGER: Because, in self-defence, I must test the philosophy of my father Parmenides, and try to prove by main force that in a certain sense not-being is, and that being, on the other hand, is not.
THEAETETUS: Some attempt of the kind is clearly needed.
STRANGER: Yes, a blind man, as they say, might see that, and, unless these questions are decided in one way or another, no one when he speaks of false words, or false opinion, or idols, or images, or imitations, or appearances, or about the arts which are concerned with them; can avoid falling into ridiculous contradictions.
THEAETETUS: Most true.
STRANGER: And therefore I must venture to lay hands on my father"s argument; for if I am to be over-scrupulous, I shall have to give the matter up.
THEAETETUS: Nothing in the world should ever induce us to do so.
STRANGER: I have a third little request which I wish to make.
THEAETETUS: What is it?
STRANGER: You heard me say what I have always felt and still feel--that I have no heart for this argument?
THEAETETUS: I did.
STRANGER: I tremble at the thought of what I have said, and expect that you will deem me mad, when you hear of my sudden changes and shiftings; let me therefore observe, that I am examining the question entirely out of regard for you.
THEAETETUS: There is no reason for you to fear that I shall impute any impropriety to you, if you attempt this refutation and proof; take heart, therefore, and proceed.
STRANGER: And where shall I begin the perilous enterprise? I think that the road which I must take is--
THEAETETUS: Which?--Let me hear.
STRANGER: I think that we had better, first of all, consider the points which at present are regarded as self-evident, lest we may have fallen into some confusion, and be too ready to a.s.sent to one another, fancying that we are quite clear about them.
THEAETETUS: Say more distinctly what you mean.
STRANGER: I think that Parmenides, and all ever yet undertook to determine the number and nature of existences, talked to us in rather a light and easy strain.
THEAETETUS: How?
STRANGER: As if we had been children, to whom they repeated each his own mythus or story;--one said that there were three principles, and that at one time there was war between certain of them; and then again there was peace, and they were married and begat children, and brought them up; and another spoke of two principles,--a moist and a dry, or a hot and a cold, and made them marry and cohabit. The Eleatics, however, in our part of the world, say that all things are many in name, but in nature one; this is their mythus, which goes back to Xenophanes, and is even older. Then there are Ionian, and in more recent times Sicilian muses, who have arrived at the conclusion that to unite the two principles is safer, and to say that being is one and many, and that these are held together by enmity and friendship, ever parting, ever meeting, as the severer Muses a.s.sert, while the gentler ones do not insist on the perpetual strife and peace, but admit a relaxation and alternation of them; peace and unity sometimes prevailing under the sway of Aphrodite, and then again plurality and war, by reason of a principle of strife.
Whether any of them spoke the truth in all this is hard to determine; besides, antiquity and famous men should have reverence, and not be liable to accusations so serious. Yet one thing may be said of them without offence--
THEAETETUS: What thing?
STRANGER: That they went on their several ways disdaining to notice people like ourselves; they did not care whether they took us with them, or left us behind them.
THEAETETUS: How do you mean?
STRANGER: I mean to say, that when they talk of one, two, or more elements, which are or have become or are becoming, or again of heat mingling with cold, a.s.suming in some other part of their works separations and mixtures,--tell me, Theaetetus, do you understand what they mean by these expressions? When I was a younger man, I used to fancy that I understood quite well what was meant by the term "not-being," which is our present subject of dispute; and now you see in what a fix we are about it.
THEAETETUS: I see.
STRANGER: And very likely we have been getting into the same perplexity about "being," and yet may fancy that when anybody utters the word, we understand him quite easily, although we do not know about not-being.
But we may be; equally ignorant of both.
THEAETETUS: I dare say.
STRANGER: And the same may be said of all the terms just mentioned.
THEAETETUS: True.
STRANGER: The consideration of most of them may be deferred; but we had better now discuss the chief captain and leader of them.
THEAETETUS: Of what are you speaking? You clearly think that we must first investigate what people mean by the word "being."
STRANGER: You follow close at my heels, Theaetetus. For the right method, I conceive, will be to call into our presence the dualistic philosophers and to interrogate them. "Come," we will say, "Ye, who affirm that hot and cold or any other two principles are the universe, what is this term which you apply to both of them, and what do you mean when you say that both and each of them "are"? How are we to understand the word "are"? Upon your view, are we to suppose that there is a third principle over and above the other two,--three in all, and not two? For clearly you cannot say that one of the two principles is being, and yet attribute being equally to both of them; for, if you did, whichever of the two is identified with being, will comprehend the other; and so they will be one and not two."
THEAETETUS: Very true.
STRANGER: But perhaps you mean to give the name of "being" to both of them together?
THEAETETUS: Quite likely.
STRANGER: "Then, friends," we shall reply to them, "the answer is plainly that the two will still be resolved into one."
THEAETETUS: Most true.
STRANGER: "Since, then, we are in a difficulty, please to tell us what you mean, when you speak of being; for there can be no doubt that you always from the first understood your own meaning, whereas we once thought that we understood you, but now we are in a great strait. Please to begin by explaining this matter to us, and let us no longer fancy that we understand you, when we entirely misunderstand you." There will be no impropriety in our demanding an answer to this question, either of the dualists or of the pluralists?
THEAETETUS: Certainly not.
STRANGER: And what about the a.s.sertors of the oneness of the all--must we not endeavour to ascertain from them what they mean by "being"?
THEAETETUS: By all means.