THEAETETUS: True.
STRANGER: And now, since there has been shown to be false speech and false opinion, there may be imitations of real existences, and out of this condition of the mind an art of deception may arise.
THEAETETUS: Quite possible.
STRANGER: And we have already admitted, in what preceded, that the Sophist was lurking in one of the divisions of the likeness-making art?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
STRANGER: Let us, then, renew the attempt, and in dividing any cla.s.s, always take the part to the right, holding fast to that which holds the Sophist, until we have stripped him of all his common properties, and reached his difference or peculiar. Then we may exhibit him in his true nature, first to ourselves and then to kindred dialectical spirits.
THEAETETUS: Very good.
STRANGER: You may remember that all art was originally divided by us into creative and acquisitive.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
STRANGER: And the Sophist was flitting before us in the acquisitive cla.s.s, in the subdivisions of hunting, contests, merchandize, and the like.
THEAETETUS: Very true.
STRANGER: But now that the imitative art has enclosed him, it is clear that we must begin by dividing the art of creation; for imitation is a kind of creation--of images, however, as we affirm, and not of real things.
THEAETETUS: Quite true.
STRANGER: In the first place, there are two kinds of creation.
THEAETETUS: What are they?
STRANGER: One of them is human and the other divine.
THEAETETUS: I do not follow.
STRANGER: Every power, as you may remember our saying originally, which causes things to exist, not previously existing, was defined by us as creative.
THEAETETUS: I remember.
STRANGER: Looking, now, at the world and all the animals and plants, at things which grow upon the earth from seeds and roots, as well as at inanimate substances which are formed within the earth, fusile or non-fusile, shall we say that they come into existence--not having existed previously--by the creation of G.o.d, or shall we agree with vulgar opinion about them?
THEAETETUS: What is it?
STRANGER: The opinion that nature brings them into being from some spontaneous and unintelligent cause. Or shall we say that they are created by a divine reason and a knowledge which comes from G.o.d?
THEAETETUS: I dare say that, owing to my youth, I may often waver in my view, but now when I look at you and see that you incline to refer them to G.o.d, I defer to your authority.
STRANGER: n.o.bly said, Theaetetus, and if I thought that you were one of those who would hereafter change your mind, I would have gently argued with you, and forced you to a.s.sent; but as I perceive that you will come of yourself and without any argument of mine, to that belief which, as you say, attracts you, I will not forestall the work of time. Let me suppose, then, that things which are said to be made by nature are the work of divine art, and that things which are made by man out of these are works of human art. And so there are two kinds of making and production, the one human and the other divine.
THEAETETUS: True.
STRANGER: Then, now, subdivide each of the two sections which we have already.
THEAETETUS: How do you mean?
STRANGER: I mean to say that you should make a vertical division of production or invention, as you have already made a lateral one.
THEAETETUS: I have done so.
STRANGER: Then, now, there are in all four parts or segments--two of them have reference to us and are human, and two of them have reference to the G.o.ds and are divine.
THEAETETUS: True.
STRANGER: And, again, in the division which was supposed to be made in the other way, one part in each subdivision is the making of the things themselves, but the two remaining parts may be called the making of likenesses; and so the productive art is again divided into two parts.
THEAETETUS: Tell me the divisions once more.
STRANGER: I suppose that we, and the other animals, and the elements out of which things are made--fire, water, and the like--are known by us to be each and all the creation and work of G.o.d.
THEAETETUS: True.
STRANGER: And there are images of them, which are not them, but which correspond to them; and these are also the creation of a wonderful skill.
THEAETETUS: What are they?
STRANGER: The appearances which spring up of themselves in sleep or by day, such as a shadow when darkness arises in a fire, or the reflection which is produced when the light in bright and smooth objects meets on their surface with an external light, and creates a perception the opposite of our ordinary sight.
THEAETETUS: Yes; and the images as well as the creation are equally the work of a divine hand.
STRANGER: And what shall we say of human art? Do we not make one house by the art of building, and another by the art of drawing, which is a sort of dream created by man for those who are awake?
THEAETETUS: Quite true.
STRANGER: And other products of human creation are also twofold and go in pairs; there is the thing, with which the art of making the thing is concerned, and the image, with which imitation is concerned.
THEAETETUS: Now I begin to understand, and am ready to acknowledge that there are two kinds of production, and each of them twofold; in the lateral division there is both a divine and a human production; in the vertical there are realities and a creation of a kind of similitudes.
STRANGER: And let us not forget that of the imitative cla.s.s the one part was to have been likeness-making, and the other phantastic, if it could be shown that falsehood is a reality and belongs to the cla.s.s of real being.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
STRANGER: And this appeared to be the case; and therefore now, without hesitation, we shall number the different kinds as two.
THEAETETUS: True.
STRANGER: Then, now, let us again divide the phantastic art.
THEAETETUS: Where shall we make the division?
STRANGER: There is one kind which is produced by an instrument, and another in which the creator of the appearance is himself the instrument.