Thigh-deep in cold water, Ken began the technical part of his clandestine work. His objective was to obtain samples of communications from the streams of high-speed data traffic flowing through the dozens of wires contained in each of the lead-sheathed cables. Although the CIA was confident that Krasnaya Pakhra communications were carried in one or more of the cables, Ken needed to identify the specific cable of primary interest by sampling signals from each of the dozen cables.
The sampling and monitoring device carried in the shabby backpack was engineered to pinpoint that cable. Designed by a private CIA contractor, the collection equipment had been shrunk down into a 25-pound package that looked like a rectangular portable radio with an array of indicator lights mounted on the top and leads set into one side to accommodate several probes simultaneously. The extracted data was recorded on what appeared to be a standard ca.s.sette tape, though capable of capturing high-quality signals on multiple tracks.
Pulling the device and various components from his backpack, he meticulously a.s.sembled the equipment before applying a probe to the first cable. The only indication of technical success for Ken, standing in the bottom of the manhole, would be if the tape moved and the light came on. If an indicator light failed or the tape malfunctioned, he had no way to troubleshoot the system and would need to abort the operation.
Ken placed the formfitting two-piece sensor, one section at a time, on either side of a cable and strapped it together with lengths of white fabric measuring a foot long by an inch wide. He then tightened and buckled the strap to hold the sensor in place. Ken"s twelve buckling straps were white by design. If he dropped one, white would be easier to spot in the poorly lit manhole. Twelve was also an easy number to remember when he inventoried the gear prior to leaving the hole. No evidence of an unauthorized entry could be left behind.
A grid of more than a dozen underground cables entered the chamber, although Ken"s attention focused on the well-protected, lead-sheathed, and gas-filled cables whose very design betrayed their significance.23 Since the data flow was often irregular, he needed to keep the monitors on each cable long enough to get an adequate sample. Since the data flow was often irregular, he needed to keep the monitors on each cable long enough to get an adequate sample.
Above, the noise of traffic whizzing by only a few yards away was a constant reminder of Ken"s vulnerability. If an inquisitive Soviet citizen crossed the road to look down the partially uncovered manhole, he would have come face to face with a CIA officer standing in ground water amid a thick cl.u.s.ter of cables.
It was tedious work. The position of each conduit and cable needed to be identified in a logical way. Working from a checklist, Ken collected samples, made identifying notations and then moved on to the next grouping. A small "bookkeeping" mistake of misidentifying a single cable could invalidate the sampling. Working methodically, he was conscious that each additional minute in the hole increased the chances of discovery, while haste could lead to unacceptable mistakes.
Infrared film combined with a Kodak Wratten 87C filter covering the flash allowed undetectable photography of doc.u.ments or objects under low-light and dark conditions.
Ken had a second mission, as well. While waiting for sample collection, he "cased" the chamber, photographing the conduit and cable layout using a 35mm camera outfitted with an infrared flash unit.24 This doc.u.mentation would provide a current and complete record of the underground chamber, including details that could a.s.sist in any final design changes of the collar for permanent installation. This doc.u.mentation would provide a current and complete record of the underground chamber, including details that could a.s.sist in any final design changes of the collar for permanent installation.
Finally satisfied that he had collected and recorded adequate samples of the data, Ken inventoried his tools, repacked the equipment, climbed up the ladder, and poked his head out. With no one in sight, he emerged from the manhole, quickly slid the heavy cover back into place, and retreated toward the narrow treeline where he removed the waders and stuffed them back into the rucksack.
Ken was some distance from his family but the preplanned route that returned him to the picnic area was more direct than the one that brought him to the target. After walking into the park with no evidence of surveillance, he found another secluded spot, changed out of the street disguise, and returned to his wife and children looking the same as when he left a little more than five hours before.
Sharon, although relieved to see Ken, understood the operation was not yet a success. If surveillance had paid attention to her and the kids and noticed Ken"s absence, that would raise questions. American men did not normally leave their families alone in a park for hours on end.
Wasting no time, they gathered up the children along with the picnic gear and headed back to the VW bus. Neither Ken nor Sharon relaxed on the drive home with the invaluable tape and tapping equipment in their possession. They drove carefully and continued observing cars behind and in front of their van, since no American was immune from accidental or KGB-staged automobile mishaps that could result in questioning or search.
No celebration awaited Ken, although the chief anxiously antic.i.p.ated a reason to return to his office that evening. While he had received no emergency signal from Sharon, he went to the office, opened the door, flipped on the light, and saw a sheet of paper torn from a government-issued notebook taped to the wall. Scrawled in pencil on the otherwise blank page was "#1." It was Ken"s simple signal announcing the success of a critical phase in the CIA"s most advanced technical operation in the USSR.
Based on the a.n.a.lysis of Ken"s sampling, CIA identified the primary target cable and authorized installation of a permanent tap. For several years CKTAW successfully recorded communications between Krasnaya Pakhra and the Soviet Ministry of Defense. Then, in the spring of 1985, something went wrong. An officer sent to recover the tapes from the recording device aborted his mission when remote interrogation of the unit returned a "tamper indicated" signal.25 After a few weeks, a second trip to the site did recover the tapes, but the system had ceased functioning and the entire operation was shut down. After a few weeks, a second trip to the site did recover the tapes, but the system had ceased functioning and the entire operation was shut down.26 What had gone wrong? For years, the virtually trouble-free American penetration of top secret Soviet data streams had gone undetected before suddenly coming to a halt. CIA counterintelligence officers speculated the reason behind CKTAW"s loss was more sinister than just simple "bad luck."27 Had the KGB discovered the tap because of an error with a case officer"s tradecraft during infrequent trips to recover tapes? Could the KGB have a spy who was privy to one of the CIA"s most tightly held operations? As with the roll-up of an agent, the failure of the device left a host of questions, though for CIA counterintelligence the answers were not long in coming. Had the KGB discovered the tap because of an error with a case officer"s tradecraft during infrequent trips to recover tapes? Could the KGB have a spy who was privy to one of the CIA"s most tightly held operations? As with the roll-up of an agent, the failure of the device left a host of questions, though for CIA counterintelligence the answers were not long in coming.
On August 1, 1985, Commander Vitaly Sergeyevich Yurchenko,28 deputy chief of the First Department of the KGB"s First Chief Directorate (foreign intelligence), called the U.S. Emba.s.sy in Rome and offered to defect. deputy chief of the First Department of the KGB"s First Chief Directorate (foreign intelligence), called the U.S. Emba.s.sy in Rome and offered to defect.29 Later that afternoon Yurchenko provided the chief, Alan D. Wolfe, with information about two penetrations of U.S. intelligence, one at the National Security Agency and a second, code-named Later that afternoon Yurchenko provided the chief, Alan D. Wolfe, with information about two penetrations of U.S. intelligence, one at the National Security Agency and a second, code-named ROBERT, ROBERT, within the CIA itself. within the CIA itself. 30 30 Yurchenko claimed not to know ROBERT ROBERT"s true name, but offered two important clues: ROBERT ROBERT had sold cla.s.sified information to the KGB in Vienna in the fall of 1984 and trained for Moscow operations, but was taken off the a.s.signment just prior to departure. had sold cla.s.sified information to the KGB in Vienna in the fall of 1984 and trained for Moscow operations, but was taken off the a.s.signment just prior to departure.31 Two days after receiving Yurchenko"s information, the CIA"s Office of Security informed the FBI that Two days after receiving Yurchenko"s information, the CIA"s Office of Security informed the FBI that ROBERT ROBERT was almost certainly the former CIA officer Edward Lee Howard. was almost certainly the former CIA officer Edward Lee Howard. 32 32 Howard, who joined the CIA in 1981,33 had been selected in 1982 to become a case officer in Moscow. Since he had always been under cover as a CIA employee and had not been posted abroad, he was considered clean and less likely be identified as an American intelligence officer. had been selected in 1982 to become a case officer in Moscow. Since he had always been under cover as a CIA employee and had not been posted abroad, he was considered clean and less likely be identified as an American intelligence officer.34 In preparation for the Moscow a.s.signment, Howard and his wife, Mary, received six weeks of intensive training on the clandestine tradecraft necessary for operating against the KGB in their own backyard. In preparation for the Moscow a.s.signment, Howard and his wife, Mary, received six weeks of intensive training on the clandestine tradecraft necessary for operating against the KGB in their own backyard.35 Training in detecting and evading surveillance was particularly rigorous with field exercises conducted against FBI surveillance teams. Training in detecting and evading surveillance was particularly rigorous with field exercises conducted against FBI surveillance teams.36 Then, during a polygraph examination before his scheduled departure for Moscow, Howard admitted to drug and alcohol abuse, petty theft, and cheating during training. Then, during a polygraph examination before his scheduled departure for Moscow, Howard admitted to drug and alcohol abuse, petty theft, and cheating during training.37 The CIA fired Howard in early May of 1983. The CIA fired Howard in early May of 1983.38 Bitter and angry at the Agency, Howard moved to Santa Fe, New Mexico, where he took a job as an economic a.n.a.lyst with the state legislature. But his troubles with alcohol and debts continued.39 A series of bizarre telephone calls Howard made, including one to the U.S. Emba.s.sy in Moscow, were so troubling that on September 24, 1984, a former supervisor and a psychologist were dispatched to interview him at his home. A series of bizarre telephone calls Howard made, including one to the U.S. Emba.s.sy in Moscow, were so troubling that on September 24, 1984, a former supervisor and a psychologist were dispatched to interview him at his home.40 Howard revealed the unsettling news that in October of 1983 he loitered outside the Soviet Consulate in Washington, D.C., while considering whether to volunteer to the Soviets. Howard revealed the unsettling news that in October of 1983 he loitered outside the Soviet Consulate in Washington, D.C., while considering whether to volunteer to the Soviets.41 Following receipt on August 3, 1985, of the CIA information identifying Howard as ROBERT ROBERT, the FBI began surveilling Howard, but by the end of the month, Howard, sensitized by his training, detected the surveillance.42 In early September the FBI began monitoring his telephone conversations. In early September the FBI began monitoring his telephone conversations.43 Howard was under twenty-four-hour physical and technical surveillance. Howard was under twenty-four-hour physical and technical surveillance.44 A little more than two weeks later, on September 19, the FBI confronted Howard with information that he had been identified as a Soviet agent.45 To protect the real source, Yurchenko, the FBI attributed the information to KGB defector Oleg Gordievsky. To protect the real source, Yurchenko, the FBI attributed the information to KGB defector Oleg Gordievsky.46 Howard did not confess, but refused a polygraph test. Howard did not confess, but refused a polygraph test.47 Interviewed again the next day, he stated his intent to engage a criminal attorney over the weekend and agreed to another interview on Monday, a meeting he never intended to attend. Interviewed again the next day, he stated his intent to engage a criminal attorney over the weekend and agreed to another interview on Monday, a meeting he never intended to attend.
During his CIA countersurveillance training, Howard had learned to use the JIB and how to roll out of a moving car while slowly rounding a corner. 48 48 Lacking an OTS-designed JIB, he created a field-expedient version with a toilet plunger, coat hanger, and Calvin Klein field jacket taped to the top. The dummy"s head was a Styrofoam wig block and commercially available Jerome Alexander wig issued during his disguise training at "The Farm." Lacking an OTS-designed JIB, he created a field-expedient version with a toilet plunger, coat hanger, and Calvin Klein field jacket taped to the top. The dummy"s head was a Styrofoam wig block and commercially available Jerome Alexander wig issued during his disguise training at "The Farm."49 Howard and his wife departed for dinner at a local Santa Fe restaurant on Sat.u.r.day evening. While driving home they made a slow turn off Garcia Street onto Camino Corrales and Howard jumped from the car into the bushes.50 Mary propped up the makeshift JIB in the pa.s.senger"s seat, buckled it in place, and minutes later the FBI surveillance team clearly saw two "people" in Howard"s 1979 Oldsmobile as it entered their garage. Mary propped up the makeshift JIB in the pa.s.senger"s seat, buckled it in place, and minutes later the FBI surveillance team clearly saw two "people" in Howard"s 1979 Oldsmobile as it entered their garage.51 After spending the night at an airport hotel, the next morning Howard was on the first available flight from Albuquerque to Tucson, where he continued his secret journey to Moscow.52 The FBI did not discover his escape until some twenty-five hours after he jumped from the car. The FBI did not discover his escape until some twenty-five hours after he jumped from the car.53 Howard"s defection had a catastrophic impact on Moscow operations. His devastating betrayal exposed to the KGB collection systems, tradecraft techniques, covert equipment, and agent-handling methods inside the Soviet Union and specifically CKTAW.54 Howard had been one of the handful of officers to partic.i.p.ate in the CKTAW operation and, in fact, during the polygraph examination that led to his dismissal, admitted cheating during an exercise in the mock-up of the manhole by replacing the weights in his backpack with cardboard to make it easier to get into the small opening. Howard had been one of the handful of officers to partic.i.p.ate in the CKTAW operation and, in fact, during the polygraph examination that led to his dismissal, admitted cheating during an exercise in the mock-up of the manhole by replacing the weights in his backpack with cardboard to make it easier to get into the small opening.55 Almost a year later, on August 7, 1986, Ta.s.s announced that Howard had been granted political asylum in the USSR.56 Reportedly, Howard continued drinking heavily and died at age fifty, in July 2002. Russian news reported the cause of death as a broken neck from a fall. Neither the Russian nor American intelligence services mourned his death. Reportedly, Howard continued drinking heavily and died at age fifty, in July 2002. Russian news reported the cause of death as a broken neck from a fall. Neither the Russian nor American intelligence services mourned his death.57 The significance of the American spy technology the KGB recovered from the manhole and the nearby cache was not lost on Soviet leadership. In a 1990 article that described and decried U.S. technical espionage against the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General Nikolai Brusnitsyn, deputy of the State Technical Commission of the USSR, complained that collection systems like CKTAW were interfering with arms control and reduction efforts between the two superpowers.58 Brusnitsyn concluded by admitting to Soviet "anxiety over the ever-growing capabilities and scope of intelligence gathering and spying technology." Brusnitsyn concluded by admitting to Soviet "anxiety over the ever-growing capabilities and scope of intelligence gathering and spying technology."59 Almost ten years later, in 1999, veteran KGB counterintelligence officer Rem Kra.s.silnikov, author of The Phantoms of Tchaikovsky Street, The Phantoms of Tchaikovsky Street, provided a Soviet version of the CKTAW operation, which the KBG had code-named BILLIARD BALL. provided a Soviet version of the CKTAW operation, which the KBG had code-named BILLIARD BALL.60 Kra.s.silnikov described an "inductance data sensor" in the manhole as being connected to a metal box containing a tape recorder, control system to turn the recorder on and off during conversations, transceiver, and an internal power supply capable of operating the device for four to six months. Kra.s.silnikov described an "inductance data sensor" in the manhole as being connected to a metal box containing a tape recorder, control system to turn the recorder on and off during conversations, transceiver, and an internal power supply capable of operating the device for four to six months.61 According to Kra.s.silnikov"s account, the box was buried a half meter deep and located not far from the manhole cover. In this KGB version, the box was painted bright red with the Cyrillic inscription DANGER! HIGH VOLTAGE, protected by rodent repellent, and connected to a nearby ultra-shortwave (UKV) antenna. According to Kra.s.silnikov"s account, the box was buried a half meter deep and located not far from the manhole cover. In this KGB version, the box was painted bright red with the Cyrillic inscription DANGER! HIGH VOLTAGE, protected by rodent repellent, and connected to a nearby ultra-shortwave (UKV) antenna.
Kra.s.silnikov, citing the KGB"s technical a.n.a.lysis, reported the transceiver could be remotely interrogated up to 2.5 kilometers away. It responded with a coded signal indicating whether the unit had been disturbed, needed to have its tape changed, or required a replacement power supply.62 The a.n.a.lysis estimated that it was necessary for the CIA to service the unit only every four to six months. The a.n.a.lysis estimated that it was necessary for the CIA to service the unit only every four to six months.
CKTAW"s compromise did not diminish its achievement. For the CIA, the operation represented another remarkable fusion of technical reach and operational tradecraft, revealing vulnerabilities in the Soviet security apparatus. The imagination that conceived the operation, the engineering talent that built the system, and the operational execution represented a new kind of American technical collection capability. In the coming decades, the technologies developed during the CKTAW operation would be repeatedly applied to other equally critical targets.
SECTION IV.
LET THE WALLS HAVE EARS.
Crest of OTS audio operations officers, 1970s.
CHAPTER 12.
Cold Beer, Cheap Hotels, and a Voltmeter
If it ain"t audio, it ain"t s.h.i.t.
-Unofficial motto of audio techs They were called audio techs and for more than two decades-from the 1960s until the 1980s-they were at the top of an unofficial OTS caste system. Aggressively mounting hundreds of audio surveillance operations around the world, these few hundred officers worked on the frontline of Cold War espionage. Their missions took them from European capitals to the most remote destinations on the globe, responding to stations that saw an opportunity to "collect audio."
Although CIA audio operations inside the borders of the primary Cold War "hard targets" (the USSR, China, Cuba, North Korea, and North Vietnam) were severely limited by internal security services, conditions in Europe and Third World countries were far different. In these countries, clandestine audio operations could be launched against the residential quarters, official buildings, and emba.s.sy compounds of the hard-target countries. This was particularly true in the Third World where security was often less stringent than in major European cities.
When operations levied a "requirement," it was expected a tech would catch the next plane for Paris, Rome, West Berlin, or a Third World country in turmoil whose new name had yet to be printed on maps or the new leader"s visage on currency. The techs worked under aliases as businessmen, military personnel, or adventure-seeking vacationers, becoming whatever allowed them to blend in with other travelers and provided the most effective cover. A tech might get off a plane in a South Asian country, spend a week planting a bug, then fly home for the weekend, change ident.i.ties, and find himself in Africa by Monday evening.
Their exploits and sophisticated gadgetry rivaled the popular fictions of globetrotting intelligence officers. OTS audio techs slipped into bas.e.m.e.nts and sewers to tap phone and communication lines, moved silently over roof-tops, walked narrow beams through the crawl s.p.a.ces of attics, and scaled the walls of fashionable villas in the dead of night. They were sent into diplomatic compounds, business offices, residences, hotel rooms, limousines, airplanes, and boats to plant audio devices. Accurate and sometimes embellished accounts of their operational adventures established what would become known as the tech culture, eventually defining, for better or for worse, all OTS techs regardless of their clandestine discipline. Among the most enduring of these professional and personal attributes was the techs" seemingly unwavering fondness for cheap hotels and cold beer.1 There were practical reasons for what could be perceived as "less than sophisticated" tastes among these world travelers who commonly logged more than 100,000 air miles annually and were away from home 150 nights a year. Although government employees on official travel were not permitted to acc.u.mulate frequent flier miles, they were allowed to keep any funds left over from the daily government food and lodging allowance.2 The resourceful techs found they could supplement their modest salaries by staying at inexpensive hotels-a type of lodging that became known throughout the Agency as "tech hotels." The resourceful techs found they could supplement their modest salaries by staying at inexpensive hotels-a type of lodging that became known throughout the Agency as "tech hotels."
More important, the techs" choices when it came to accommodations and beverage made sound operational sense.3 Whereas case officers traveling abroad needed to match their selection of accommodations with their cover position and operational role, techs usually wanted to get in and out of town while keeping the lowest possible profile. As a rule, they maintained erratic schedules, working when the target was accessible, regardless of time, weather, or holidays. If that meant access to a consulate or emba.s.sy could be obtained only after it closed for business, then the tech"s workday would likely begin at nightfall and end before dawn. Whatever bargain lodgings may have lacked in comfort or basic amenities, such as heat, hot water, or a private bathroom, they made up for by way of discretion. Whereas case officers traveling abroad needed to match their selection of accommodations with their cover position and operational role, techs usually wanted to get in and out of town while keeping the lowest possible profile. As a rule, they maintained erratic schedules, working when the target was accessible, regardless of time, weather, or holidays. If that meant access to a consulate or emba.s.sy could be obtained only after it closed for business, then the tech"s workday would likely begin at nightfall and end before dawn. Whatever bargain lodgings may have lacked in comfort or basic amenities, such as heat, hot water, or a private bathroom, they made up for by way of discretion.
Luxury or business traveler hotels tended to boast large, attentive staffs that would notice an American businessman leaving late in the evening and returning in the early hours of the morning with traces of plaster dust on his shoes or paint flecks in his hair. On the other hand, tech hotel staff conveniently overlooked the comings and goings of their guests. If an American departed in the early evening and returned just before dawn with his hair matted with sweat and in need of a bath, it would not be the first time such a thing happened.
One technical operations officer realized he had ventured too far down the hostelry pecking order when the desk clerk asked incredulously, "You mean you want the room for the entire night?" Another tech found his own limits of frugality tested when he and his partner checked into a hotel offering a double bed for $3.50 a night. "You know, if we shared a room, we could cut the cost in half," the aggressively thrifty tech suggested.
As for their reputed penchant for beer-well, beer just tasted good and made other deficiencies seem less important. It was also safe. In countries where drinking the local water was a health risk, beer served double duty as thirst-quenching beverage and "water" for brushing teeth. During one operation that confined six techs in a target facility for several days, the team member in charge of providing food provisioned generous quant.i.ties of beer, canned tuna-and nothing else. In the sweltering heat of the empty warehouse, the odor produced by a sustained diet of tuna and beer led to a unanimous vote to prohibit that particular tech from outfitting the team with provisions again. Ever.
Despite living and working in these austere conditions, techs brought "technical magic" to operations. Their sophisticated gear tapped into secrets hidden behind the high walls and closed doors of secure installations. Their equipment combined with expert installation captured the private conversations of people to whom the Agency had no other access. The moods, personal doubts, and aspirations of potential recruitment targets held on reels of audiotape offered case officers a unique peek into their professional and personal world. Recordings of official discussions of policy and diplomatic strategies provided CIA a.n.a.lysts and policy makers with well-sourced, hard strategic intelligence as well as tactical counterintelligence that supported law enforcement.
None of this was lost on the techs themselves-neither the excitement of the operations nor the value of the intelligence take. "If it ain"t audio, it ain"t s.h.i.t," became their unofficial motto and was proudly displayed on the desk of the audio chief during the 1970s. They were the "top guns" of the OTS and none of them doubted it for a second. However, the colorful tech culture, the technology, and the intelligence that flowed from it did not materialize overnight. The advanced technology, like the tech culture, evolved over two decades. The devices as well as the expertise to make them work were built from the ground up.
The Technical Services Staff was not a year old in 1952 when the CIA received information about an alarming audio discovery in Moscow. During an electronic sweep, the countermeasures team discovered a device secreted in the wooden replica of the Great Seal of the United States that hung behind Amba.s.sador George Kennan"s desk in his residence at Spaso House, barely a mile from the Kremlin, at No. 10 Spasopeskovskaya Square.4 The seal had been hanging there seven years, after a group of Soviet Young Pioneers presented it as a token of friendship on July 4, 1945, to then U.S. Amba.s.sador, W. Averell Harriman. The gift, presented by smiling children in neatly pressed uniforms, concealed a listening device that would baffle and frustrate the Agency for years. "The Englishmen will die of envy," Valentin Berezhkov, Stalin"s personal translator, whispered to Amba.s.sador Harriman during presentation. The seal had been hanging there seven years, after a group of Soviet Young Pioneers presented it as a token of friendship on July 4, 1945, to then U.S. Amba.s.sador, W. Averell Harriman. The gift, presented by smiling children in neatly pressed uniforms, concealed a listening device that would baffle and frustrate the Agency for years. "The Englishmen will die of envy," Valentin Berezhkov, Stalin"s personal translator, whispered to Amba.s.sador Harriman during presentation.5 That the Soviets bugged the U.S. Amba.s.sador"s office should have come as no surprise to anyone. When American diplomats first arrived in Moscow in 1934, they discovered that listening devices inside their offices and residences would be the way of life within the Soviet Union.6 U.S. Amba.s.sador Llewellyn Thompson, posted to Moscow between 1957 and 1962, and again between 1966 and 1969, would walk in Red Square for private conversations. U.S. Amba.s.sador Llewellyn Thompson, posted to Moscow between 1957 and 1962, and again between 1966 and 1969, would walk in Red Square for private conversations. 7 7 As a young diplomat in the 1930s, Kennan personally played amateur spy hunter in Spaso House by hiding in the billiard room overnight-with a partner in the attic-in an unsophisticated attempt to catch the Soviet techs planting devices. As a young diplomat in the 1930s, Kennan personally played amateur spy hunter in Spaso House by hiding in the billiard room overnight-with a partner in the attic-in an unsophisticated attempt to catch the Soviet techs planting devices.8 Further evidence of the Soviet"s use of eavesdropping was demonstrated by the NKVD"s (forerunner to the KGB) aggressive operations during World War II. In the late fall of 1941, as German forces approached Moscow, the Soviet government ordered foreign diplomats out of the city to the relative safety of Kuybyshev (Samara). Then, with foreign emba.s.sies standing empty or hosting only skeleton staffs, the NKVD hardwired virtually every Western emba.s.sy in the city with embedded microphones. After the German army"s advance halted just twenty miles outside Moscow in early 1942, the diplomats were allowed to return to the Soviet capital and their bugged emba.s.sies.9
The bugged Great Seal of the United States that hung over the U.S. Amba.s.sador"s desk in Moscow contained a pa.s.sive cavity resonator and went undetected for seven years, from 1945 to 1952. The CIA had no comparable audio technology at the time.
The NKVD bugged the rooms and conversations of President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill during the Tehran and Yalta summit meetings.10 In Tehran, in 1943, Stalin maneuvered the American President into staying in the Russian compound amid rumors of a German a.s.sa.s.sination plot. At the 1945 Yalta conference, the NKVD techs employed an early version of a directional microphone to capture Roosevelt"s private outdoor conversations at a distance of fifty to one hundred meters. In Tehran, in 1943, Stalin maneuvered the American President into staying in the Russian compound amid rumors of a German a.s.sa.s.sination plot. At the 1945 Yalta conference, the NKVD techs employed an early version of a directional microphone to capture Roosevelt"s private outdoor conversations at a distance of fifty to one hundred meters.11 When Churchill"s daughter, Sarah, made an off-hand comment that lemons might be just the thing with caviar (in another version of the story Sarah suggested lemons with tea), a lemon tree reportedly appeared in the orchard overnight. When Churchill"s daughter, Sarah, made an off-hand comment that lemons might be just the thing with caviar (in another version of the story Sarah suggested lemons with tea), a lemon tree reportedly appeared in the orchard overnight.
After receiving the audio take from these operations, Stalin pushed his intelligence service for more and more information, insisting they report even the tone of voice in transcripts. After devouring the raw intelligence delivered each morning with his breakfast, Stalin would then act taciturn, even bored, during the actual meetings.12 However, what was discovered hanging behind the Amba.s.sador"s desk in 1952 was revolutionary in the technology of listening devices. Implanted in the middle of the carved wood of the Great Seal, cleverly hidden behind an air pa.s.sage formed by the American eagle"s nostril, was a device that was alarming as much for the technology it employed as the fact it had been active for more than half a decade. Indeed, four American amba.s.sadors-Averell Harriman, Walter Smith, Alan Kirk, and George Kennan-presumably had their secret conversations picked up by the bug.
Differing significantly in design and function from any piece of covert listening equipment previously known, the device was constructed of precision-tooled steel and comprised a long pencil-thin antenna with a short cylindrical top. Agency engineers could not understand exactly how it worked. The stand-alone unit, apparently, did not require a battery or any other visible power source. It had no wires or tubes, nothing that identified the device as a piece of electronic equipment. If the oddly shaped length of metal was transmitting conversations, then how was it doing it?
"The Thing," as it was soon dubbed, bounced among the Agency"s lab, the FBI, and private contractors for evaluation and reverse engineering. No one could offer anything beyond an educated guess as to how The Thing The Thing worked, and somewhere in its travels from lab to lab it was damaged from either improper handling or shipping. worked, and somewhere in its travels from lab to lab it was damaged from either improper handling or shipping.13 The Thing was eventually sent to Peter Wright, the princ.i.p.al scientist for MI5, the British intelligence service responsible for counterintelligence operations. Wright worked for more than two months to solve the mystery before eventually coaxing it into operation. He dubbed it a "pa.s.sive cavity resonator." was eventually sent to Peter Wright, the princ.i.p.al scientist for MI5, the British intelligence service responsible for counterintelligence operations. Wright worked for more than two months to solve the mystery before eventually coaxing it into operation. He dubbed it a "pa.s.sive cavity resonator."14 The Thing The Thing, as Wright discovered, worked by reflecting radio waves, then picking those echoes up with a radio receiver.
To operate the device, the NKVD aimed a continuous 800 MHz radio signal at the seal from a listening post in the building across from Spaso House.15 The Thing The Thing"s thin diaphragm at the top, which Wright had repaired, vibrated with the sound of a voice. Those vibrations were carried by an interior tuning post to the antenna. Then, as the vibrations. .h.i.t the antenna, they altered the reflected radio signal that bounced back to the listening post.16 The Thing The Thing did not require internal power in the same way a mirror does not require power to reflect light. The radio transmitter and receiver, code named LOSS (or REINDEER by the Russian techs), were a marvel of signal processing, considering the technology available at the time. did not require internal power in the same way a mirror does not require power to reflect light. The radio transmitter and receiver, code named LOSS (or REINDEER by the Russian techs), were a marvel of signal processing, considering the technology available at the time.
According to Wright"s own account, once he understood the principle and made the device work, he took another eighteen months to create a similar system for British intelligence. Called Satyr Satyr, his device featured aerials-transmitter and receiver-disguised as two proper British umbrellas. 17 17 Satyr Satyr proved to be a great success and Wright called it "black magic." proved to be a great success and Wright called it "black magic."18 Then, as he observed, "the Americans promptly ordered twelve sets and rather cheekily copied the drawings and made twenty more." Then, as he observed, "the Americans promptly ordered twelve sets and rather cheekily copied the drawings and made twenty more."19 The American version of the device, according to Wright, was called The American version of the device, according to Wright, was called Easy Chair Easy Chair (also (also Mark Mark2 and and Mark Mark3).20 The concept behind The Thing The Thing represented a remarkable leap forward in eavesdropping technology. Viewed as a wake-up call at CIA for audio operations, it was the clandestine equivalent to Sputnik. The Agency had to play technological catch-up in RF audio as well as in s.p.a.ce. represented a remarkable leap forward in eavesdropping technology. Viewed as a wake-up call at CIA for audio operations, it was the clandestine equivalent to Sputnik. The Agency had to play technological catch-up in RF audio as well as in s.p.a.ce.
Ironically, although they did not know it at the time, many of the scientists who had worked and failed to decipher The Thing The Thing"s mystery would probably have recognized the name of its creator, Lev Sergeyevich Theremin. 21 21 A musical prodigy and physicist, Theremin was born in czarist Russia in the late 1800s, excelled at some of Russia"s finest universities, and his genius was recognized by the Soviet regime. He lived in New York City during the 1920s and 1930s where he demonstrated the electronic instrument that bore his name. The theremin was played without touching it and enjoyed a brief life as a serious instrument. In the 1930s it captured the imagination of the avant-garde of the jazz age, though eventually it was relegated to creating the spooky sounds heard in horror and science-fiction films. A musical prodigy and physicist, Theremin was born in czarist Russia in the late 1800s, excelled at some of Russia"s finest universities, and his genius was recognized by the Soviet regime. He lived in New York City during the 1920s and 1930s where he demonstrated the electronic instrument that bore his name. The theremin was played without touching it and enjoyed a brief life as a serious instrument. In the 1930s it captured the imagination of the avant-garde of the jazz age, though eventually it was relegated to creating the spooky sounds heard in horror and science-fiction films.
Those who crowded ballrooms and concert halls to hear Theremin"s thoroughly modern instrument, or caught glimpses of him amid Manhattan"s high society, never suspected that the socially sophisticated "Russian genius" was also covertly working for Soviet intelligence. Just before the Soviet Union"s entry into World War II, Stalin summoned Theremin back to Moscow where he was summarily sent to a Siberian prison camp. Later he was transferred into one of the KGB"s secret laboratories-a sharashka sharashka-to work on creating spy gear. After developing The Thing, The Thing, Theremin was awarded one of the Soviet Union"s highest honors, the Stalin Prize First Cla.s.s, along with the equivalent of $20,000, a fortune in Soviet society, but remained imprisoned. Theremin was awarded one of the Soviet Union"s highest honors, the Stalin Prize First Cla.s.s, along with the equivalent of $20,000, a fortune in Soviet society, but remained imprisoned.22 At its formation in September of 1951, the CIA Technical Services Staff employed fewer than fifty people. Its scientists and engineers were housed in a makeshift lab at Indian Head, Maryland, thirty miles south of Washington, D.C. The facility, a one-time gun test facility for the Navy, sat on a large peninsula that jutted out into the Potomac.
"Somehow the Agency begged, borrowed or stole some s.p.a.ce down there, but conditions were bad. We had to do our own janitorial service. We complained, but we did it," remembered Kurt Beck, an engineer who worked in that first lab. "When we started, there were a dozen people overall and maybe six to eight people working in the audio program."
The Thing arrived at the TSS lab in 1952, but the audio engineers had no point of reference against which to a.s.sess the device or understand how it worked. Data on covert listening and transmitting devices, comparable to research on military weapons systems or private sector consumer products, simply did not exist. Cataloging data on technical collection devices was a new concept for American intelligence and the Soviet pa.s.sive resonator technology exceeded anything TSS could even attempt. arrived at the TSS lab in 1952, but the audio engineers had no point of reference against which to a.s.sess the device or understand how it worked. Data on covert listening and transmitting devices, comparable to research on military weapons systems or private sector consumer products, simply did not exist. Cataloging data on technical collection devices was a new concept for American intelligence and the Soviet pa.s.sive resonator technology exceeded anything TSS could even attempt.
However, like all "finds" (discoveries of clandestine devices), The Thing The Thing revealed certain key capabilities of its host service. revealed certain key capabilities of its host service.23 The first was the cleverness of design. The first was the cleverness of design. The Thing The Thing demonstrated that Soviet intelligence possessed a technical expertise not matched by the CIA. Second, the construction suggested that the Soviet engineering approach relied on creating one-off custom-made pieces specifically produced for each operation. The device was not ma.s.s-produced or made in a serial production of fifty or a hundred identical units with interchangeable components. To the TSS engineers, demonstrated that Soviet intelligence possessed a technical expertise not matched by the CIA. Second, the construction suggested that the Soviet engineering approach relied on creating one-off custom-made pieces specifically produced for each operation. The device was not ma.s.s-produced or made in a serial production of fifty or a hundred identical units with interchangeable components. To the TSS engineers, The Thing The Thing looked to be expertly crafted and built entirely by hand. looked to be expertly crafted and built entirely by hand.
The Thing underscored deficiencies in U.S. technical capabilities compared to the Soviets as well as highlighting some Soviet weak points, such as a lack of technical innovations spurred by a consumer-based economy. Without private industries to offset some of the costs of building laboratories or production facilities, the Soviets" intelligence service had to underwrite all the costs for developing spy gear. This contrasted sharply to the OSS tradition of recruiting private industry to support intelligence. There could also be little doubt that underscored deficiencies in U.S. technical capabilities compared to the Soviets as well as highlighting some Soviet weak points, such as a lack of technical innovations spurred by a consumer-based economy. Without private industries to offset some of the costs of building laboratories or production facilities, the Soviets" intelligence service had to underwrite all the costs for developing spy gear. This contrasted sharply to the OSS tradition of recruiting private industry to support intelligence. There could also be little doubt that The Thing The Thing was the product of Russia"s long involvement with espionage dating back to the time of the czars while America"s espionage capability, particularly in the technological sense, was still in its infancy. was the product of Russia"s long involvement with espionage dating back to the time of the czars while America"s espionage capability, particularly in the technological sense, was still in its infancy.
The engineers at Indian Head recognized the huge gap as well as the larger, more basic and immediate question facing them: Precisely, how do you go about building a better bug?
The state of available technology in the 1950s limited the CIA"s audio operations to little more than running a microphone wire or a telephone line to a set of headphones. Even among the war surplus equipment there was little of real value. The OSS technical staff had concentrated its efforts on creating special weapons and explosive devices for equipping partisan forces and operatives behind enemy lines. Few of the wartime agency"s resources were devoted to technical aids for agent operations and even less to developing eavesdropping equipment.24 The U.S. Army Signal Corps had produced a bugging kit but, at more than a decade old, it was sorely outdated. The U.S. Army Signal Corps had produced a bugging kit but, at more than a decade old, it was sorely outdated.
While some equipment such as microphones and amplifiers was available on the commercial market, these devices were bulky and generally not suitable for covert duty. As a result, the Agency"s supply of devices was limited to obsolete military surplus and whatever Kurt and his colleagues could scrounge, a.s.semble, or modify from the telephone company or recording industry.
There was also little experience among the TSS staff. Most of the engineers, like Kurt, were just out of college, and in their mid-twenties or a little older if they had served in the war. The older TSS engineers" wartime experience tended toward equipment like radar, sonar, and large shipboard systems rather than clandestine audio surveillance. It would take the young engineers time, and trial and error to learn the new business of covert audio operations. And the world was on the verge of a technological revolution that put them in the right place at precisely the right time.
In 1947, scientists at Bell Labs demonstrated the germanium transistor and patented it the next year. By 1952, transistors were being used in specialty devices, such as hearing aids and military systems. Two years later, Texas Instruments, along with a small Indianapolis company, I.D.E.A, introduced the first transistorized "pocket radio." Called the Regency TR-1, it sold for $49.95 and appeared in stores just in time for Christmas.25 The age of the transistor had arrived. The age of the transistor had arrived.
Through these electronic miracles, everyday consumer electronics could now be made smaller, less power hungry, and more reliable. For clandestine operations, the transistor"s impact would prove equally profound. The same transistor-"solid state"-technology that allowed teenagers to listen to Elvis at the beach would provide the foundation for new capabilities in audio surveillance operations. Yet the transistor solved only half the problem for the CIA. TSS still lacked the necessary in-house laboratory facilities and engineering expertise to conduct basic development work, and the funding to pay for it. In response, TSS revived the OSS model of forming cla.s.sified partnerships with industry and academia to develop technology, then contracting with companies to design and produce the systems.
In the booming postwar economy, compet.i.tion was keen and companies were adding R&D engineers as fast as they could in an effort to feed industrial and consumer markets hungry for innovation. The decision to use cla.s.sified contracts with private industry seemed a practical way to get the maximum "bang for their buck," or in this case, the smallest, most efficient audio devices for the dollar. TSS eagerly adapted new technologies from commercial research as well as spin-offs from the larger government programs to meet its operational requirements.
Because of the premium placed on reliability for clandestine devices, TSS bet that conventional and proven equipment, like transistors, microphones, and recorders, which worked well in the consumer and commercial markets, could be repackaged, reduced in size, and adapted to covert use. The same a.s.sembly processes used for making consumer products could also be redirected toward the production of spy gear.26 Companies that lent staff to the OSS during World War II were now asked by TSS for access to their proprietary research and their best engineering minds. At times it was a tough sell, just as it had been for Stanley Lovell. TSS was not as lucrative as the "big ticket" items like satellites, radar systems, missiles, submarines, and airplanes. The needs of TSS were relatively small-decimal dust-compared to billion-dollar military and satellite procurement programs. The CIA did not need production runs of 10,000 or 50,000 units. Fifty or a hundred small, reliable devices were enough and the companies could not publicly acknowledge or promote what had been produced. For large companies, in particular, these contracts and their limited production runs were marginally profitable in the short term and offered little potential commercial payoff over the long term.
Budgetary troubles severely limited TSS"s audio program in the early years. One tech remembers the entire budget for worldwide audio equipment in 1956 was under $200,000, enough to buy a few tape recorders, microphones, and some other commercial equipment, but not nearly enough to mount either an effective engineering effort or aggressive operations. Many of the new prototype devices developed by private contractors and research projects never left the labs because TSS simply did not have the funds to order even a small production run.
Then in 1957, a CIA Inspector General (IG) report addressed the issue of whether audio surveillance would be a core CIA mission and a primary future method of collecting intelligence. The report urged the DDP and TSS to make audio operations a "top priority" and forever changed TSS"s financial picture.27 A post-World War II engineer working in the audio equipment branch at the time, Tom Grant recalled that soon after the IG"s report was issued, he received an unannounced visit from a senior CIA official. Asked about the state of audio surveillance equipment, Grant replied that both he and the research staff were frustrated and then outlined the problems in detail. For instance, when lab equipment broke down, Grant explained, he could not order a new unit because the limited funds available were needed for gear to support ongoing operations.
The visitor listened for some time, and then abruptly concluded the conversation by saying, "I"m willing to authorize ten times your current budget." Grant immediately renamed his guest "Mister Moneybags from Headquarters."
The additional funding, for a new program code named EARWORT, arrived in increments as TSS spent it.28 To the techs, it seemed as if the financial floodgates had opened. Grant"s job turned from scrounging the cheapest equipment possible to talking with development engineers about new mechanical and electronic devices to aid clandestine operations and ordering the most promising. Not every item was successful when put to operational testing, but at long last TSS was seriously in the audio surveillance game. To the techs, it seemed as if the financial floodgates had opened. Grant"s job turned from scrounging the cheapest equipment possible to talking with development engineers about new mechanical and electronic devices to aid clandestine operations and ordering the most promising. Not every item was successful when put to operational testing, but at long last TSS was seriously in the audio surveillance game.
With new equipment coming online, the need for trained engineers to deploy and service the systems around the world was evident. Prior to 1958, TSS had only a handful of technical operations officers capable of planting bugs and setting up listening posts where the audio take was initially processed. 29 29 Tech equipment, cameras, microphones, and recorders were typically issued to case officers in the same way as concealments and one-time pads. TSS received an "equipment order," and then delivered the devices to the case officer along with some basic instruction. Tech equipment, cameras, microphones, and recorders were typically issued to case officers in the same way as concealments and one-time pads. TSS received an "equipment order," and then delivered the devices to the case officer along with some basic instruction.
However, the new, more complex-and delicate-devices brought with them the need for an increased expertise. For example, the first over-the-air audio transmitters incorporated gla.s.s vacuum tubes in their amplifiers, requiring special care in handling. Something as simple as a b.u.mpy ride in the trunk of a car could play havoc with tubes mounted on a galvanized cha.s.sis amid the internal bird"s nest of wiring. If a case officer opened a crate containing a large reel-to-reel tape recorder and found it did not work "out of the box," the entire system was shipped back to headquarters or a tech dispatched to troubleshoot the problem.
No body of knowledge, experience, manuals or testing protocols, either in-house or with the contractors, existed for those early systems. TSS had no method of doc.u.menting or benchmarking electronics destined for clandestine operations. The development and deployment processes were ones of trial and error-with a host both of trials and unforeseen errors. The most frustrating challenges were with technical devices that worked perfectly on the test bench, but then failed when installed for an operation.
In one early mishap, modified reel-to-reel tape recorders intended for telephone taps were designed to accommodate the waiting period between calls by turning the machine off when the line was not in use. In concept, this innovation saved recording tape, limited the need for constant monitoring at a listening post, and improved the efficiency of transcription. The recorders would start when the call began and switch off when the call ended. In testing, the system met the engineering requirements. It was only after deployment was a serious problem recognized. Neither the manufacturer nor the Agency antic.i.p.ated the long wait times between calls. When a call ended, the recorders turned off the motors that advanced the tape, but did not disengage the magnetic heads. The recording heads, it was discovered, heated up after long periods in the pause mode and eventually melted the motionless recording tape pressed against them.
For an engineer, this was a small problem easily solved with a screwdriver and a quick change of relays to retract the head from the tape when not recording. However, for a nontechnical case officer in South America, the only solution was to call for a traveling tech to change the relays of each recorder at each station.
The installation of concealed listening devices sometimes unintentionally pitted the case officers against the techs. No technical skills were required for a case officer to pa.s.s a one-time pad and shortwave radio along with instructions for its use to an agent. However, the most basic mic and wire operation, which generally included concealing a microphone, tapping a power line, and running the wire back to the listening post, required a level of technical expertise beyond the typical case officer.
While the case officers designed the nontechnical elements of every operation, their limited understanding of the technical requirements for a successful installation did not pa.s.s without notice. "What are the two biggest lies techs tell?" went the question, followed by the punch line, "The time of my commute to work and the amount of time we tell the case officer the installation will take."
Most problems boiled down to understanding the capabilities and limits of the technology. Nontechnical case officers, seeing new technologies emerging in the 1950s and 1960s, were p.r.o.ne to either underestimating capabilities or overestimating benefit. Impractical operations proposed by case officers soon became part of the unofficial lore of techs who diplomatically described the most fanciful of these operations as "high-risk options." One courageous case officer suggested a bugging operation that would have had him lowered by helicopter onto the balcony of the target"s apartment in a major European city. Although dramatic-even movie worthy-it failed the basic audio operational standard that surrept.i.tious entry be clandestine. A helicopter hovering in central Madrid with a case officer dangling from a rope ladder would likely be noticed. Another proposal involved a tunneling operation in which the managing case officer suggested that the tons of dirt and debris generated could be flushed down toilets and carried away by the city"s sewer system.
The growing awareness that technical devices offered enormous potential for intelligence collection demanded a new type of case officer-technical officer interface. If case officers were not qualified for the technical phase of most operations, engineers in the lab were equally untrained and unsuited in the basic tradecraft required for field operations. Laboratory engineers had neither the training nor experience to plan surveillance detection routes or select usable dead drop sites.
As more audio operations were conducted in the 1960s, case officers and audio techs found themselves dependent on each other"s skills. Audio techs planting bugs were often in apartments without the knowledge of the resident or on the property of another government. They usually worked under time constraints and the stress of possible discovery. Mistakes and miscalculations were costly because second opportunities for an entry were rare and no traces of their work could be left behind.
Installations of audio devices also frequently called for technical improvisation when the operation was not accurately described in the planning phase or if equipment simply failed.30 Troubleshooting a short-circuit in the bug with a voltmeter at 0200 hours in the bas.e.m.e.nt of a foreign consulate, then cobbling together a fix from a limited selection of spare parts required a special personality. What the Agency needed was a hybrid of the technically oriented, creative, street smart, and pragmatic individual who thrived on adventure. Troubleshooting a short-circuit in the bug with a voltmeter at 0200 hours in the bas.e.m.e.nt of a foreign consulate, then cobbling together a fix from a limited selection of spare parts required a special personality. What the Agency needed was a hybrid of the technically oriented, creative, street smart, and pragmatic individual who thrived on adventure.
TSS cast its net wide, seeking out likely recruits among telephone companies, military bases, technical schools, and commercial radio stations along with the emerging television industry. They placed ads in popular technical and science publications without identifying the prospective employer. 31 31 While these first tech recruits may not have known how to design a new audio device from scratch, they knew how to read a schematic and their way around a soldering iron. They were natural tinkerers who grew up taking radios and cars apart, and then putting them back together. As kids, they played with erector sets and read magazines like While these first tech recruits may not have known how to design a new audio device from scratch, they knew how to read a schematic and their way around a soldering iron. They were natural tinkerers who grew up taking radios and cars apart, and then putting them back together. As kids, they played with erector sets and read magazines like Popular Electronics. Popular Electronics. Several were amateur radio operators who understood the basics of transmitting, antennas, and frequencies. Several were amateur radio operators who understood the basics of transmitting, antennas, and frequencies.
Grant"s entrance into spying was typical of that first cla.s.s. In 1952, he graduated from an electronics school in Kansas City and found a good job as a video engineer at the New Orleans television station WDSU. Then, a few days after receiving his draft notice, whether coincidentally or with other knowledge, a CIA recruiter called with an offer. Although he had turned down the recruiter once before, Grant now responded enthusiastically, took the job, and went on to serve in TSS, TSD, and OTS for more than thirty years.
The intelligence contribtution of techs like Grant, who thrived on fixing and experimenting with electronics, was imperfectly understood by the Agency"s senior management. Dr. Herbert Scoville, the Deputy Director for Research in 1962 and 63, reportedly referred to TSD as "those tinkerers" at a staff meeting. The patronizing label received wide circulation within TSD and served to reinforce the techs" identification with the Directorate of Plans rather than with the new Directorate of Research.32 There was virtually no legacy of experience and TSS engineers and technicians received little or no formal training in audio operations. Whatever clandestine expertise they acquired occurred on the job. Many of these techs were technically intuitive and given to modifying consumer electronics for their clandestine work.
On an a.s.signment overseas in the early 1960s, at a time when public address systems were often built into cla.s.srooms, offices, and hotels, a newly deployed tech realized the job of bugging every room in a large hotel was beyond the scope of a single person. However, within hours he had jerry-rigged a small circuit that turned the rooms" wall-mounted speakers into pa.s.sable microphones that picked up conversations at the flip of a switch.33 The innovation had security advantages beyond efficiency since the room speakers (usually used for announcements and fire alarms) were part of the woodwork and ignored by patrons. The innovation had security advantages beyond efficiency since the room speakers (usually used for announcements and fire alarms) were part of the woodwork and ignored by patrons.
Wall-mounted speakers were not the only type of in-place speakers whose wiring could be reversed. Television sets and table radios could be wired so that their speakers, when not in use, were turned into microphones. The techs could use televisions and radios as concealments for small microphones hidden behind the cloth or grill in front of the speaker. With the transmitter"s circuitry masked by existing wiring, the audio device drew power whenever the set was plugged into an electrical outlet.
When a tech was directed to bug an apartment but could not enter it nor drill through the wall or ceiling to create an air pa.s.sage, the solution came in the form of a contact microphone. Working on the principle that all hard surfaces in a room vibrate in the presence of voices and noise, placing a sensitive contact microphone on the reverse side of a wall or floor would pick up these vibrations and feed them to an amplifier and tape recorder. The design of the mic was similar to a traditional phonograph cartridge with the needle removed. The tech could hollow out a small furrow in the floor of the apartment above the target, place the microphone in the groove, and cover it with putty to eliminate ambient vibrations.
"Audio techs had to have a little larceny in their hearts to master skillsneeded in the field, including picking locks, duplicating keys, tapping phones, and surrept.i.tious entry, to gain access to the target sites. Did we do anything illegal?" Grant recalled. "I guess, most of it."
MAKING THE KEY IMPRESSION.
Use of a Key Impressioning Kit was often the first step in copying original or master keys for surrept.i.tious entry into buildings and rooms.
Arriving in South America in 1958, an audio tech prepared for an operation to bug the trade office of an Eastern Bloc country. These government-controlled trade offices, functioning primarily outside the diplomatic community, posed as Western-style commercial companies and provided convenient cover for the intelligence officers.
The Soviets used both Amtorg, a trading organization, and Aeroflot, their national airline, as covers for espionage. From Amtorg offices, the Soviets conducted industrial as well as political espionage. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviets sought America"s advanced technology by targ