sovereignty, were the people of the Territories vested with the power to determine their own concerns.
Beside these well-defined groups there were others which professed no doctrines and no policies. Probably the rank and file of the party were content to drift: to be non committal was safer than to be doctrinaire; besides, it cost less effort. Such was the plight of the Democratic party on the eve of a presidential election. If harmony was to proceed out of this diversity, the process must needs be accelerated.
The fate of Oregon had been a hard one. Without a territorial government through no fault of their own, the settlers had been repeatedly visited by calamities which the prompt action of Congress might have averted.[247] The Senate had failed to act on one territorial bill; twice it had rejected bills which had pa.s.sed the House, and the only excuse for delay was the question of slavery, which everybody admitted could never exist in Oregon. On January 10, 1848, for the fourth time, Douglas presented a bill to provide a territorial government for Oregon;[248] but before he could urge its consideration, he was summoned to the bed-side of his father-in-law.
His absence left a dead-lock in the Committee on Territories: Democrats and Whigs could not agree on the clause in the bill which prohibited slavery in Oregon. What was the true inwardness of this unwillingness to prohibit slavery where it could never go?
The Senate seemed apathetic; but its apathy was more feigned than real. There was, indeed, great interest in the bill, but equally great reluctance to act upon it. What the South feared was not that Oregon would be free soil,--that was conceded,--but that an unfavorable precedent would be established. Were it conceded that Congress might exclude slavery from Oregon, a similar power could not be denied Congress in legislating for the newly acquired Territories where slavery was possible.[249]
As a last resort, a select committee was appointed, of which Senator Clayton became chairman. Within a week, a compromise was reported which embraced not only Oregon, but California and New Mexico as well.
The laws of the provisional government of Oregon were to stand until the new legislature should alter them, while the legislatures of the prospective Territories of California and New Mexico were forbidden to make laws touching slavery. The question whether, under existing laws, slaves might or might not be carried into these two Territories, was left to the courts with right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.[250] The Senate accepted this compromise after a prolonged debate, but the House laid it on the table without so much as permitting it to be read.[251]
Douglas returned in time to give his vote for the Clayton compromise,[252] but when this laborious effort to adjust controverted matters failed, he again pressed his original bill.[253] Hoping to make this more palatable, he suggested an amendment to the objectionable prohibitory clause: "inasmuch as the said territory is north of the parallel of 36 30" of north lat.i.tude, usually known as the Missouri Compromise." It was the wish of his committee, he told the Senate, that "no Senator"s vote on the bill should be understood as committing him on the great question."[254] In other words, he invited the Senate to act without creating a precedent; to extend the Missouri Compromise line without raising troublesome const.i.tutional questions in the rest of the public domain; to legislate for a special case on the basis of an old agreement, without predicating anything about the future. When this amendment came to vote, only Douglas and Bright supported it.[255]
Douglas then proposed to extend the Missouri Compromised line to the Pacific, by an amendment which declared the old agreement "revived ...
and in full force and binding for the future organization of the Territories of the United States, in the same sense and with the same understanding with which it was originally adopted."[256] This was President Polk"s solution of the question. It commended itself to Douglas less on grounds of equity than of expediency. It was a compromise which then cost him no sacrifice of principle; but though the Senate agreed to the proposal, the House would have none of it.[257] In the end, after an exhausting session, the Senate gave way,[258] and the Territory of Oregon was organized with the restrictive clause borrowed from the Ordinance of 1787. All this turmoil had effected nothing except ill-feeling, for the final act was identical with the bill which Douglas had originally introduced in the House.
In the meantime, national party conventions for the nomination of presidential candidates had been held. The choice of the Democrats fell upon Ca.s.s; but his nomination could not be interpreted as an indors.e.m.e.nt of his doctrine of squatter sovereignty. By a decisive vote, the convention rejected Yancey"s resolution favoring "non-interference with the rights of property of any portion of the people of this confederation, be it in the States or in the Territories, by any other than the parties interested in them."[259]
The action of the convention made it clear that traditional principles and habitual modes of political thought and action alone held the party together. The Whig party had no greater organic unity. The nomination of General Taylor, who was a doubtful Whig, was a confession that the party was non-committal on the issues of the hour.
There was much opposition to both candidates. Many anti-slavery Whigs could not bring themselves to vote for Taylor, who was a slave-owner; Democrats who had supported the Wilmot Proviso, disliked the evasive doctrine of Ca.s.s.
The disaffected of both parties finally effected a fusion in the Free-Soil convention, and with other anti-slavery elements nominated Van Buren as their presidential candidate. With the cry of "Free soil, free speech, free labor, and free men," the new party threatened to upset the calculations of politicians in many quarters of the country.
The defeat of the Democratic party in the election of 1848 was attributed to the war of factions in New York. Had the Barnburners supported Ca.s.s, he would have secured the electoral vote of the State.
They were accused of wrecking the party out of revenge. Certain it is that the outcome was indecisive, so far as the really vital questions of the hour were concerned. A Whig general had been sent to the White House, but no one knew what policies he would advocate. The Democrats were still in control of the Senate; but thirteen Free-Soilers held the balance of power in the House.[260]
Curiosity was excited to know what the moribund administration of the discredited Polk would do. Douglas shared this inquisitiveness. He had parted with the President in August rather angrily, owing to a fancied grievance. On his return he called at the White House and apologized handsomely for his "imprudent language."[261] The President was more than glad to patch up the quarrel, for he could ill afford now, in these waning hours of his administration, to part company with one whom he regarded as "an ardent and active political supporter and friend." Cordial relations resumed, Polk read to Douglas confidentially such portions of his forthcoming message as related to the tariff, the veto power, and the establishment of territorial governments in California and New Mexico. In the spirit of compromise he was still willing to approve an extension of the Missouri Compromise line through our new possessions. Should this prove unacceptable, he would give his consent to a bill which would leave the vexing question of slavery in the new Territories to the judiciary, as Clayton had proposed. Douglas was now thoroughly deferential. He gratified the President by giving the message his unqualified approval.[262]
However, by the time Congress met, Douglas had made out his own programme; and it differed in one respect from anything that the President, or for that matter anyone else, had suggested. He proposed to admit both New Mexico and California; _i.e._ all of the territory acquired from Mexico, into the Union _as a State_. Some years later, Douglas said that he had introduced his California bill with the approval of the President;[263] but in this his memory was surely at fault. The full credit for this innovation belongs to Douglas.[264] He justified the departure from precedent in this instance, on the score of California"s astounding growth in population. Besides, a territorial bill could hardly pa.s.s in this short session, "for reasons which may be apparent to all of us." Three bills had already been rejected.[265]
Now while California had rapidly increased in population, there were probably not more than twenty-six thousand souls within its borders, and of these more than a third were foreigners.[266] One would naturally suppose that a period of territorial tutelage would have been peculiarly fitting for this distant possession. Obviously, Douglas did not disclose his full thought. What he really proposed, was to avoid raising the spectre of slavery again. If the people of California could skip the period of their political minority and leap into their majority, they might then create their own inst.i.tutions: no one could gainsay this right, when once California should be a "sovereign State." This was an application of squatter sovereignty at which Calhoun, least of all, could mock.
The President and his cabinet were taken by surprise. Frequent consultations were held. Douglas was repeatedly closeted with the President. All the members of the cabinet agreed that the plan of leaving the slavery question to the people of the new State was ingenious; but many objections were raised to a single State. In repeated interviews, Polk urged Douglas to draft a separate bill for New Mexico; but Douglas was obdurate.[267]
To Douglas"s chagrin, the California bill was not referred to his committee, but to the Committee on the Judiciary. Perhaps this course was in accord with precedent, but it was noted that four out of the five members of this committee were Southerners, and that the vote to refer was a sectional one.[268] An adverse report was therefore to be expected. Signs were not wanting that if the people of the new province were left to work out their own salvation, they would exclude slavery.[269] The South was acutely sensitive to such signs. Nothing of this bias, however, appeared in the report of the committee. With great cleverness and circ.u.mspection they chose another mode of attack.
The committee professed to discover in the bill a radical departure from traditional policy. When had Congress ever created a State out of "an unorganized body of people having no const.i.tution, or laws, or legitimate bond of union?" California was to be a "sovereign State,"
yet the bill provided that Congress should interpose its authority to form new States out of it, and to prescribe rules for elections to a const.i.tutional convention. What sort of sovereignty was this?
Moreover, since Texas claimed a part of New Mexico, endless litigations would follow. In the judgment of the committee, it would be far wiser to organize the usual territorial governments for California and New Mexico.[270]
To these sensible objections, Douglas replied ineffectively. The question of sovereignty, he thought, did not depend upon the size of a State: without doing violence to the sovereignty of California, Congress could surely carve new States out of its territory; but if there were doubts on this point, he would move to add the saving clause, "with the consent of the State." He suggested no expedient for the other obstacles in the way of State sovereignty. As for precedents, there were the first three States admitted into the Union,--Kentucky, Vermont, and Tennessee,--none of which had any organized government recognized by Congress.[271] They never furnished their const.i.tutions to Congress for inspection. Here Douglas. .h.i.t wide of the mark. No one had contended that a State must present a written const.i.tution before being recognized, but only that the people must have some form of political organization, before they could be treated as const.i.tuting a State in a const.i.tutional sense.[272]
At the same time, halting as this defense was, Douglas gave ample proof of his disinterestedness in advocating a State government for California. "I think, Sir," he said, "that the only issue now presented, is whether you will admit California as a State, or whether you will leave it without government, exposed to all the horrors of anarchy and violence. I have no hope of a Territorial government this session. No man is more willing to adopt such a form of government than I would be; no man would work with more energy and a.s.siduity to accomplish that object at this session than I would."[273] Indeed, so far from questioning his motives, the members of the Judiciary Committee quite overwhelmed Douglas by their extreme deference.[274]
Senator Butler, the chairman, a.s.sured him that the committee was disposed to treat the bill with all the respect due to its author; for his own part, he had always intended to show marked respect to the Senator from Illinois.[275] Douglas responded somewhat grimly that he was quite at a loss to understand "why these a.s.surances came so thick on this point."
Most men would have accepted the situation as thoroughly hopeless; but Douglas was nothing if not persistent. In quick succession he framed two more bills, one of which provided for a division of California and for the admission of the western part as a State;[276] and then when this failed to win support, he reverted to Folk"s suggestion--the admission of New Mexico and California as two States.[277] But the Senate evinced no enthusiasm for this patch-work legislation.[278]
The difficulty of legislating for California was increased by the disaffection of the Southern wing of the Democratic party. Calhoun was suspected of fomenting a conspiracy to break up the Union.[279] Yet in all probability he contemplated only the formation of a distinctly Southern party based on common economic and political interests.[280]
He not only failed in this, because Southern Whigs were not yet ready to break with their Northern a.s.sociates; but he barely avoided breaking up the solidarity of Southern Democrats, and he made it increasingly difficult for Northern and Southern Democrats to act together in matters which did not touch the peculiar inst.i.tution of the South.[281] Thenceforth, harmonious party action was possible only through a deference of Northern Democrats to Southern, which was perpetually misinterpreted by their opponents.
Senator Hale thought the course of Northern representatives and senators pusillanimous and submissive to the last degree; and no considerations of taste prevented him from expressing his opinions on all occasions. Nettled by his taunts, and no doubt sensitive to the grain of truth in the charge, perplexed also by the growing factionalism in his party, Douglas retorted that the fanaticism of certain elements at the North was largely responsible for the growth of sectional rancor. For the first time he was moved to state publicly his maturing belief in the efficacy of squatter sovereignty, as a solvent of existing problems in the public domain.
"Sir, if we wish to settle this question of slavery, let us banish the agitation from these halls. Let us remove the causes which produce it; let us settle the territories we have acquired, in a manner to satisfy the honor and respect the feelings of every portion of the Union.... Bring those territories into this Union as States upon an equal footing with the original States. Let the people of such States settle the question of slavery within their limits, as they would settle the question of banking, or any other domestic inst.i.tution, according to their own will."[282]
And again, he said, "No man advocates the extension of slavery over a territory now free. On the other hand, they deny the propriety of Congress interfering to restrain, upon the great fundamental principle that the people are the source of all power; that from the people must emanate all government; that the people have the same right in these territories to establish a government for themselves that we have to overthrow our present government and establish another, if we please, or that any other government has to establish one for itself."[283]
Not the least interesting thing about these utterances, is the fact that even Douglas could not now avoid public reference to the slavery question. He could no longer point to needed legislation quite apart from sectional interests; he could no longer treat slavery with a.s.sumed indifference; he could no longer affect to rise above such petty, local concerns to matters of national importance. He was now bound to admit that slavery stood squarely in the way of national expansion. This change of att.i.tude was brought about in part, at least, by external pressure applied by the legislature of Illinois.
With no little chagrin, he was forced to present resolutions from his own State legislature, instructing him and his colleagues in Congress to use their influence to secure the prohibition of slavery in the Mexican cession.[284] It was not easy to harmonize these instructions with the principle of non-interference which he had just enunciated.
Ten days before the close of the session, the California question again came to the fore. Senator Walker of Wisconsin proposed a rider to the appropriations bill, which would extend the Const.i.tution and laws in such a way as to authorize the President to set up a quasi-territorial government, in the country acquired from Mexico.[285] It was a deliberate hold-up, justified only by the exigencies of the case, as Walker admitted. But could Congress thus extend the Const.i.tution, by this fiat? questioned Webster. The Const.i.tution extends over newly acquired territory _proprio vigore_, replied Calhoun.[286] Douglas declined to enter into the subtle questions of const.i.tutional law thus raised. The "metaphysics" of the subject did not disturb him. If the Senate would not pa.s.s his statehood bill, he was for the Walker amendment. A fearful responsibility rested upon Congress. The sad fate of a family from his own State, which had moved to California, had brought home to him the full measure of his responsibility. He was not disposed to quibble over points of law, while American citizens in California were exposed to the outrages of desperadoes, and of deserters from our own army and navy.[287]
While the Senate yielded to necessity and pa.s.sed the appropriations bill, rider and all, the House stubbornly clung to its bill organizing a territorial government for California, excluding slavery.[288] The following days were among the most exciting in the history of Congress. A conference committee was unable to reach any agreement.
Then Douglas tried to seize the psychological moment to persuade the Senate to accept the House bill. "I have tried to get up State bills, territorial bills, and all kinds of bills in all shapes, in the hope that some bill, in some shape, would satisfy the Senate; but thus far I have found their taste in relation to this matter too fastidious for my humble efforts. Now I wish to make another and a final effort on this bill, to see if the Senate are disposed to do anything towards giving a government to the people of California."[289]
Both Houses continued in session far into the night of March 3d.
Sectional feeling ran high. Two fist-fights occurred in the House and at least one in the Senate.[290] It seemed as though Congress would adjourn, leaving our civil and diplomatic service penniless. Douglas frankly announced that for his part he would rather leave our office-holders without salaries, than our citizens without the protection of law.[291] Inauguration Day was dawning when the dead-lock was broken. The Senate voted the appropriations bill without the rider, but failed to act on the House bill.[292] The people of California were thus left to their own devices.
The outcome was disheartening to the chairman of the Committee on Territories. His programme had miscarried at every important point.
Only his bill for the organization of Minnesota became law.[293] A similar bill for Nebraska failed to receive consideration. The future of California remained problematic. Indeed, political changes in Illinois made his own future somewhat problematic.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 247: This was Benton"s opinion; see _Globe_, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 804.]
[Footnote 248: _Ibid._, pp. 136, 309.]
[Footnote 249: See remarks of Mason of Virginia, _Globe_, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 903.]
[Footnote 250: _Ibid._, p. 950. The bill is printed on pp. 1002-1005.]
[Footnote 251: _Ibid._, p. 1007.]
[Footnote 252: _Ibid._, p. 1002.]
[Footnote 253: _Ibid._, p. 1027.]
[Footnote 254: _Globe_, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 1048.]
[Footnote 255: _Ibid._, p. 1061.]
[Footnote 256: _Ibid._, pp. 1061-1062.]
[Footnote 257: _Ibid._, pp. 1062-1063.]
[Footnote 258: Douglas voted finally to recede from his amendment, _Ibid._, p. 1078.]
[Footnote 259: Stanwood, History of the Presidency, p. 236.]