[Footnote 383: _Globe,_32 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 70-71.]
[Footnote 384: See speech by Breckinridge of Kentucky in _Globe_, 32 Cong., 1 Sess., App., pp. 299 ff.]
[Footnote 385: Pike, First Blows of the Civil War, p. 115.]
[Footnote 386: Statement by Richardson of Illinois in reply to J.C.
Breckinridge of Kentucky, March 3, 1852. _Globe_, 32 Cong., 1 Sess., App., p. 302.]
[Footnote 387: "What with his Irish Organs, his Democratic reviews and an armful of other strings, each industriously pulled, he makes a formidable show." Pike, First Blows of the Civil War, p. 115.]
[Footnote 388: MS. Letter, February 25, 1852.]
[Footnote 389: Pike, First Blows of the Civil War, p. 118.]
[Footnote 390: Burke-Pierce Correspondence, printed in _American Historical Review_, X, pp. 110 ff. See also Stanwood, History of the Presidency, p. 248, and Rhodes, History of the United States, I, pp.
251-252.]
[Footnote 391: Proceedings of Democratic National Convention of 1852.]
[Footnote 392: See Rhodes, History of the United States, I, pp.
424-425.]
[Footnote 393: To attribute to Douglas, from this time on, as many writers have done, a purpose to pander to the South, is not only to discredit his political foresight, but to misunderstand his position in the Northwest and to ignore his reiterated a.s.sertions.]
[Footnote 394: Richmond _Enquirer_, quoted in Illinois _Register_, August 3, 1852.]
[Footnote 395: Illinois _State Register_, December 23, 1852.]
[Footnote 396: Washington _Union_, November 30, 1852. On a joint ballot of the legislature Douglas received 75 out of 95 votes. See Illinois _State Register_, January 5, 1853.]
[Footnote 397: Illinois _State Register_, December 23, 1852.]
[Footnote 398: Smith, Parties and Slavery, pp. 88-93.]
[Footnote 399: MacDonald, Select Doc.u.ments of the History of the United States, No. 77.]
[Footnote 400: _Globe_, 32 Cong., 2 Sess., App., p. 170.]
[Footnote 401: Douglas declined to serve on the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, because he was opposed to the policy of the majority, so he afterward intimated. _Globe_, 32 Cong., 2 Sess., App., p. 268.]
[Footnote 402: _Globe_, 32 Cong., 2 Sess., App., p. 173.]
[Footnote 403: _Globe_, 32 Cong., Special Sess., p. 261.]
[Footnote 404: _Ibid._, p. 262.]
[Footnote 405: _Globe_, 32 Cong., Special Sess., p. 276.]
[Footnote 406: _Ibid._, p. 262.]
[Footnote 407: _Globe_, 32 Cong., Special Sess., p. 275.]
[Footnote 408: _Globe_, 32 Cong., Special Sess., p. 273.]
[Footnote 409: Sheahan, Douglas, pp. 443-444.]
[Footnote 410: Sheahan, Douglas, pp. 444-445.]
[Footnote 411: Major McConnell in the Transactions of the Illinois Historical Society, IV, p. 48; Linder, Early Bench and Bar of Illinois, pp. 80-82.]
[Footnote 412: Sheahan, Douglas, p. 444.]
[Footnote 413: Conversation with Judge R.M. Douglas.]
[Footnote 414: Washington _Union_, and Illinois _State Register_, May 26 and November 6, 1853.]
CHAPTER XI
THE KANSAS-NEBRASKA ACT
With the occupation of Oregon and of the gold fields of California, American colonization lost temporarily its conservative character.
That heel-and-toe process, which had hitherto marked the occupation of the Mississippi Valley, seemed too slow and tame; the pace had lengthened and quickened. Consequently there was a great waste--No-man"s-land--between the western boundary of Iowa, Missouri and Arkansas, and the scattered communities on the Pacific slope. It was a waste broken only by the presence of the Mormons in Utah, of nomadic tribes of Indians on the plains, and of tribes of more settled habits on the eastern border. In many cases these lands had been given to Indian tribes in perpetuity, to compensate for the loss of their original habitat in some of the Eastern States. With strange lack of foresight, the national government had erected a barrier to its own development.
As early as 1844, Douglas had proposed a territorial government for the region of which the Platte, or Nebraska, was the central stream.[415] The chief trail to Oregon traversed these prairies and plains. If the United States meant to a.s.sert and maintain its t.i.tle to Oregon, some sort of government was needed to protect emigrants, and to supply a military basis for such forces as should be required to hold the disputed country. Though the Secretary of War indorsed this view,[416] Congress was not disposed to antic.i.p.ate the occupation of the prairies. Nebraska became almost a hobby with Douglas. He introduced a second bill in 1848,[417] and a third in 1852,[418] all designed to prepare the way for settled government.
The last of these was unique. Its provisions were designed, no doubt, to meet the unusual conditions presented by the overland emigration to California. Military protection for the emigrant, a telegraph line, and an overland mail were among the ostensible objects. The military force was to be a volunteer corps, which would construct military posts and at the same time provide for its own maintenance by tilling the soil. At the end of three years these military farmers were each to receive 640 acres along the route, and thus form a sort of military colony.[419] Douglas pressed the measure with great warmth; but Southerners doubted the advisability of "encouraging new swarms to leave the old hives," not wishing to foster an expansion in which they could not share,[420] nor forgetting that this was free soil by the terms of the Missouri Compromise. All sorts of objections were trumped up to discredit the bill. Douglas was visibly irritated. "Sir," he exclaimed, "it looks to me as if the design was to deprive us of everything like protection in that vast region ... I must remind the Senate again that the pointing out of these objections, and the suggesting of these large expenditures show us that we are to expect no protection at all; they evince direct, open hostility to that section of the country."[421]
It was the fate of the Nebraska country to be bound up more or less intimately with the agitation in favor of a Pacific railroad. All sorts of projects were in the air. Asa Whitney had advocated, in season and out, a railroad from Lake Michigan to some available harbor on the Pacific. Douglas and his Chicago friends were naturally interested in this enterprise. Benton, on the other hand, jealous for the interests of St. Louis, advocated a "National Central Highway"
from that city to San Francisco, with branches to other points. The South looked forward to a Pacific railroad which should follow a southern route.[422] A northern or central route would inevitably open a pathway through the Indian country and force on the settlement and organization of the territory;[423] the choice of a southern route would in all likelihood r.e.t.a.r.d the development of Nebraska.
While Congress was shirking its duty toward Nebraska, the Wyandot Indians, a civilized tribe occupying lands in the fork of the Kansas and Missouri rivers, repeatedly memorialized Congress to grant them a territorial government.[424] Dogged perseverance may be an Indian characteristic, but there is reason to believe that outside influences were working upon them. Across the border, in Missouri, they had a staunch friend in ex-Senator Benton, who had reasons of his own for furthering their pet.i.tions. In 1850, the opposition, which had been steadily making headway against him, succeeded in deposing the old parliamentarian and electing a Whig as his successor in the Senate. The _coup d"etat_ was effected largely through the efforts of an aggressive pro-slavery faction led by Senator David E.
Atchison.[425] It was while his fortunes were waning in Missouri, that Benton interested himself in the Central Highway and in the Wyandots.
His project, indeed, contemplated grants of land along the route, when the Indian t.i.tle should be extinguished.[426] Possibly it was Benton"s purpose to regain his footing in Missouri politics by advocating this popular measure; possibly, as his opponents hinted, he looked forward to residing in the new Territory and some day becoming its first senator; at all events, he came to look upon the territorial organization of Nebraska as an integral part of his larger railroad project.
In this wise, Missouri factional quarrels, Indian t.i.tles, railroads, territorial government for Nebraska, and land grants had become hopelessly tangled, when another bill for the organization of Nebraska came before Congress in February, 1853.[427] The measure was presented by Willard P. Hall, a representative from Missouri, belonging to the Benton faction. His advocacy of the bill in the House throws a flood of light on the motives actuating both friends and opponents.
Representatives from Texas evinced a poignant concern for the rights of the poor Indian. Had he not been given these lands as a permanent home, after being driven from the hunting ground of his fathers? To be sure, there was a saving clause in the bill which promised to respect Indian claims, but zeal for the Indian still burned hotly in the b.r.e.a.s.t.s of these Texans. Finally, Hall retorted that Texas had for years been trying to drive the wild tribes from her borders, so as to make the northern routes unsafe and thus to force the tide of emigration through Texas.[428] "Why, everybody is talking about a railroad to the Pacific. In the name of G.o.d, how is the railroad to be made, if you will never let people live on the lands through which the road pa.s.ses?"[429]
In other words, the concern of the Missourians was less for the unprotected emigrant than for the great central railroad; while the South cared less for the Indian than for a southern railroad route.
The Nebraska bill pa.s.sed the House by a vote which suggests the sectional differences involved in it.[430]
It was most significant that, while a bill to organize the Territory of Washington pa.s.sed at once to a third reading in the Senate, the Nebraska bill hung fire. Douglas made repeated efforts to gain consideration for it; but the opposition seems to have been motived here as it was in the House.[431] On the last day of the session, the Senate entered upon an irregular, desultory debate, without a quorum.
Douglas took an unwilling part. He repeated that the measure was "very dear to his heart," that it involved "a matter of immense importance," that the object in view was "to form a line of territorial governments extending from the Mississippi valley to the Pacific ocean." The very existence of the Union seemed to him to depend upon this policy. For eight years he had advocated the organization of Nebraska; he trusted that the favorable moment had come.[432] But his trust was misplaced. The Senate refused to consider the bill, the South voting almost solidly against it, though Atchison, who had opposed the bill in the earlier part of the session, announced his conversion,--for the reason that he saw no prospect of a repeal of the Missouri Compromise. The Territory might as well be organized now as ten years later.[433]
Disappointed by the inaction of Congress, the Wyandots took matters into their own hands, and set up a provisional government.[434] Then ensued a contest between the Missouri factions to name the territorial delegate,--who was to present the claims of the new government to the authorities at Washington. On November 7, 1853, Thomas Johnson, the nominee of the Atchison faction, was elected.[435] In the meantime Senator Atchison had again changed his mind: he was now opposed to the organization of Nebraska, unless the Missouri Compromise were repealed.[436] The motives which prompted this recantation can only be surmised. Presumably, for some reason, Atchison no longer believed the Missouri Compromise "irremediable."