Don"t despair of the Republic."[910] And when Crittenden proposed to the Senate that the people at large should be allowed to express their approval, or disapproval, of his amendments by a vote, Douglas cordially indorsed the suggested referendum in a speech of great power.
There was dross mingled with the gold in this speech of January 3d.
Not all his auditors by any means were ready to admit that the attempt of the Federal government to control the slavery question in the Territories, regardless of the wishes of the inhabitants, was the real cause of Southern discontent. Nor were all willing to concede that "whenever Congress had refrained from such interference, harmony and fraternal feeling had been restored."[911] The history of Kansas was still too recent. Yet from these premises, Douglas drew the conclusion "that the slavery question should be banished forever from the Halls of Congress and the arena of Federal politics by an irrepealable const.i.tutional provision."[912]
The immediate occasion for revolution in the South was no doubt the outcome of the presidential election; but that it furnished a just cause for the dissolution of the Union, he would not for an instant admit. No doubt Mr. Lincoln"s public utterances had given some ground for apprehension. No one had more vigorously denounced these dangerous, revolutionary doctrines than he; but neither Mr. Lincoln nor his party would have the power to injure the South, if the Southern States remained in the Union and maintained full delegations in Congress. "Besides," he added, "I still indulge the hope that when Mr. Lincoln shall a.s.sume the high responsibilities which will soon devolve upon him, he will be fully impressed with the necessity of sinking the politician in the statesman, the partisan in the patriot, and regard the obligations which he owes to his country as paramount to those of his party."[913]
No one brought the fearful alternatives into view, with such inexorable logic, as Douglas in this same speech. While he denounced secession as "wrong, unlawful, unconst.i.tutional, and criminal," he was bound to recognize the fact of secession. "South Carolina had no right to secede; _but she has done it_. The rights of the Federal government remain, but possession is lost. How can possession be regained, by arms or by a peaceable adjustment of the matters in controversy? _Are we prepared for war?_ I do not mean that kind of preparation which consists of armies and navies, and supplies, and munitions of war; but are we prepared IN OUR HEARTS for war with our own brethren and kindred? I confess I am not."[914]
These were not mere words for oratorical effect. They were expressions wrung from a tortured heart, bound by some of the tenderest of human affections to the people of the South. Buried in the land of her birth rested the mother of his two boys, whom he had loved tenderly and truly. There in the Southland were her kindred, the kindred of his two boys, and many of his warmest personal friends. The prospect of war brought no such poignant grief to men whose a.s.sociations for generations had been confined to the North.
Returning to the necessity of concession and compromise, he frankly admitted that he had thrown consistency to the winds. The preservation of the Union was of more importance than party platforms or individual records. "I have no hesitation in saying to senators on all sides of this Chamber, that I am prepared to act on this question with reference to the present exigencies of the case, as if I had never given a vote, or uttered a word, or had an opinion upon the subject."[915]
Nor did he hesitate to throw the responsibility for disagreement in the Committee of Thirteen upon the Republican members. In the name of peace he pled for less of party pride and the pride of individual opinion. "The political party which shall refuse to allow the people to determine for themselves at the ballot-box the issue between revolution and war on the one side, and obstinate adherence to a party platform on the other, will a.s.sume a fearful responsibility. A war upon a political issue, waged by the people of eighteen States against the people and domestic inst.i.tutions of fifteen sister-States, is a fearful and revolting thought."[916] But Republican senators were deaf to all warnings from so recent a convert to non-partisan politics.
While the Committee of Thirteen was in session, Major Anderson moved his garrison from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor, urging repeatedly the need of reinforcements. At the beginning of the new year, President Buchanan was inspired to form a good resolution.
He resolved that Anderson should not be ordered to return to Moultrie but should be reinforced. On the 5th of January, the "Star of the West," with men, arms and ammunition, was dispatched to Charleston harbor. On the 9th the steamer was fired upon and forced to return without accomplishing its mission. Then came the news of the secession of Mississippi. In rapid succession Florida, Alabama, and Georgia pa.s.sed ordinances of secession.[917] Louisiana and Texas were sure to follow the lead of the other cotton States.
In spite of these untoward events, the Republican senators remained obdurate. Their answer to the Crittenden referendum proposition was the Clark resolution, which read, "The provisions of the Const.i.tution are ample for the preservation of the Union, and the protection of all the material interests of the country; it needs to be obeyed rather than amended."[918] On the 21st of the month, the senators of the seceding States withdrew; yet Douglas could still say to anxious Union men at the South, "There is hope of adjustment, and the prospect has never been better than since we first a.s.sembled."[919] And Senator Crittenden concurred in this view. On what could they have grounded their hopes?
Douglas still believed in the efficacy of compromise to preserve the Union. Through many channels he received intelligence from the South, and he knew well that the leaders of public opinion were not of one mind. Some, at least, regarded the proposed Southern confederacy as a means of securing a revision of the Const.i.tution. Men like Benjamin of Louisiana were still ready to talk confidentially of a final adjustment.[920] Moreover, there was a persistent rumor that Seward was inclining to the Crittenden Compromise; and Seward, as the prospective leader of the incoming administration, would doubtless carry many Republicans with him. Something, too, might be expected from the Peace Convention, which was to meet on February 4th, in Washington.
Meantime Douglas lent his aid to such legislative labors as the exigencies of the hour permitted. Once again, he found himself acting with the Republicans to do justice to Kansas, for Kansas was now a suppliant for admission into the Union with a free const.i.tution. Again specious excuses were made for denying simple justice. Toward the obstructionists, his old enemies, Douglas showed no rancor: there was no time to lose in personalities. "The sooner we close up this controversy the better, if we intend to wipe out the excited and irritated feelings that have grown out of it. It will have a tendency to restore good feelings."[921] But not until the Southern senators had withdrawn, was Kansas admitted to the Union of the States, which was then hanging in the balance.
Whenever senators from the slave States could be induced to name their tangible grievances, and not to dwell merely upon antic.i.p.ated injuries, they were wont to cite the Personal Liberty Acts. In spite of his good intentions, Douglas was drawn into an altercation with Mason of Virginia, in which he cited an historic case where Virginia had been the offender. Recovering himself, he said ingenuously, "I hope we are not to bandy these little cases backwards and forwards for the purpose of sectional irritation. Let us rather meet the question, and give the Const.i.tution the true construction, and allow all criminals to be surrendered according to the law of the State where the offense was committed."[922]
As evidence of his desire to remove this most tangible of Southern gravamina, Douglas introduced a supplementary fugitive slave bill on January 28th.[923] Its notable features were the provision for jury trial in a Federal court, if after extradition a fugitive should persist in claiming his freedom; and the provisions for the payment of damages to the claimant, if he should lose through violence a fugitive slave to whom he had a valid t.i.tle. The Federal government in turn might bring suit against the county where the rescue had occurred, and the county might reimburse itself by suing the offenders to the full amount of the damages paid.[924] Had this bill pa.s.sed, it would have made good the most obvious defects in the much-defamed legislation of 1850; but the time had long since pa.s.sed, when such concessions would satisfy the South.
Douglas had to bear many a gibe for his publicly expressed hopes of peace. Mason denounced his letter to Virginia gentlemen as a "puny, pusillanimous attempt to hoodwink" the people of Virginia. But Douglas replied with an earnest reiteration of his expectations. Yet all depended, he admitted, on the action of Virginia and the border States. For this reason he deprecated the uncompromising att.i.tude of the senator from Virginia, when he said, "We want no concessions."
Equally deplorable, he thought, was the spirit evinced by the senator from New Hampshire who applauded that regrettable remark. "I never intend to give up the hope of saving this Union so long as there is a ray left," he cried.[925] Why try to force slavery to go where experience has demonstrated that climate is adverse and where the people do not want it? Why prohibit slavery where the government cannot make it exist? "Why break up the Union upon an abstraction?"
Let the one side give up its demand for protection and the other for prohibition; and let them unite upon an amendment to the Const.i.tution which shall deny to Congress the power to legislate upon slavery everywhere, except in the matter of fugitive slaves and the African slave-trade. "Do that, and you will have peace; do that, and the Union will last forever; do that, and you do not extend slavery one inch, nor circ.u.mscribe it one inch; you do not emanc.i.p.ate a slave, and do not enslave a free-man."[926]
In the course of his eloquent plea for mutual concession, Douglas was repeatedly interrupted by Wigfall of Texas, whose State was at the moment preparing to leave the Union. In ironical tones, Wigfall begged to be informed upon what ground the senator based his hope and belief that the Union would be preserved. Douglas replied, "I see indications every day of a disposition to meet this question now and consider what is necessary to save the Union." And then, antic.i.p.ating the sneers of his interrogator, he said sharply, "If the senator will just follow me, instead of going off to Texas; sit here, and act in concert with us Union men, we will make him a very efficient agent in accomplishing that object."[927] But to the obdurate mind of Wigfall this Union talk was "the merest balderdash." Compromise on the basis of non-intervention, he p.r.o.nounced "worse than "Sewardism," for it had hypocrisy and the other was bold and open." There was, unhappily, only too much truth in his pithy remark that "the apple of discord is offered to us as the fruit of peace."
It was a sad commentary on the state of the Union that while the six cotton States were establishing the const.i.tution and government of a Southern Confederacy, the Federal Senate was providing for the territorial organization of that great domain whose acquisition had been the joint labor of all the States. Three Territories were projected. In one of these, Colorado, a provisional government had already been set up by the mining population of the Pike"s Peak country. To the Colorado bill Douglas interposed serious objections.
By its provisions, the southern boundary cut off a portion of New Mexico, which was slave Territory, and added it to Colorado. At the same time a provision in the bill prevented the territorial legislature from pa.s.sing any law to destroy the rights of private property. Was the new Territory of Colorado to be free or slave?
Another provision debarred the territorial legislature from condemning private property for public uses. How, then, could Colorado construct even a public road? Still another provision declared that there should be no discrimination in the rate of taxation between different kinds of property. How, then, could Colorado make those necessary exemptions which were to be found on all statute books?[928]
In his encounter with Senator Green, who had succeeded him as chairman of the Committee on Territories, Douglas did not appear to good advantage. It was easy to prove his first objection idle, as there was no slave property in northern New Mexico. As for the other objectionable provisions, all--by your leave!--were to be found in the Washington Territory Act, which had pa.s.sed through Douglas"s committee without comment.[929]
Douglas proposed a subst.i.tute for the Colorado bill, nevertheless, which, besides rectifying these errors,--for such he still deemed them to be,--proposed that the people of the Territory should elect their own officers. He reminded the Senate that the Kansas-Nebraska bill had been sharply criticised, because while professing to recognize popular sovereignty, it had withheld this power. At that time, however, the governor was also an Indian agent and a Federal officer; now, the two functions were separated. He proposed that, henceforth, the President and Senate should appoint only such officers as performed Federal duties.[930] When Senator Wade suggested that Douglas had experienced a conversion on this point, because he happened to be in opposition to the incoming administration, which would appoint the new territorial officers, Douglas referred to his utterances in the last session, as proof of his disinterestedness in the matter.[931]
Even in his role of peace-maker, Douglas could not help remarking that the bill contained not a word about slavery. "I am rejoiced," he said, somewhat ironically, "to find that the two sides of the House, representing the two sides of the "irrepressible conflict," find it impossible when they get into power, to practically carry on the government without coming to non-intervention, and saying nothing upon the subject of slavery. Although they may not vote for my proposition, the fact that they have to avow the principle upon which they have fought me for years is the only one upon which they can possibly agree, is conclusive evidence that I have been right in that principle, and that they have been wrong in fighting me upon it."[932]
In the House the Colorado bill was amended by the excision of the clause providing for appeals to the United States Supreme Court in all cases involving t.i.tle to slaves. Douglas promptly pointed out the significance of this omission. The decisions of the territorial court regarding slavery would now be final. The question of whether the territorial legislature might, or might not, exclude slavery, would now be decided by territorial judges who would be appointed by a Republican President.[933] The Republicans now in control of the Senate were eager to press their advantage. And Douglas had to acquiesce. After all, the practical importance of the matter was not great. No one antic.i.p.ated that slavery ever would exist in these new Territories.
The subst.i.tute which Douglas offered for the Colorado bill, and subsequently for the other territorial bills, deserves more than a pa.s.sing allusion. Not only was it his last contribution to territorial legislation, but it suggested a far-reaching change in our colonial policy. It was the logical conclusion of popular sovereignty practically applied.[934] Congress was invited to abdicate all but the most meagre power in organizing new Territories. The task of framing an organic act for the government of a Territory was to be left to a convention chosen by adult male citizens who were in actual residence; but this organic law must be republican in form, and in every way subordinate to the Const.i.tution and to all laws and treaties affecting the Indians and the public lands. A Territory so organized was to be admitted into the Union whenever its population should be equal to the unit required for representation in the lower house of Congress. The initiative in taking a preliminary census and calling a territorial convention, was to be taken by the judge of the Federal court in the Territory. The tutelage of the Federal government was thus to be reduced to lowest terms.
Congress was to confine itself to general provisions applicable to all Territories, leaving the formation of new Territories to the caprice of the people in actual residence. This was a generous concession to popular sovereignty; but even so, the paramount authority was still vested in Congress. Congress, and not the people, was to designate the bounds of the Territory; Congress was to pa.s.s judgment upon the republicanism of the organic law, and a Federal judge was to set the machinery of popular sovereignty in motion. Obviously the time had pa.s.sed when Congress would make so radical a departure from precedent.
Least of all were the Republican members disposed to weaken the hold of the Federal government upon Territories where the question of slavery might again become acute.
While the House was unwilling to vote for a submission of the Crittenden propositions to a popular vote, it did propose an amendment denying to Congress the power to interfere with the domestic inst.i.tutions of any State. Not being in any sense a concession, but only an affirmation of a widely accepted principle, this amendment pa.s.sed the House easily enough. Yet in his role of compromiser, Douglas made much of this vote. He called Senator Mason"s attention to two great facts--"startling, tremendous facts--that they [the Republicans] have abandoned their aggressive policy in the Territories and are willing to give guarantees in the States." These "ought to be accepted as an evidence of a salutary change in public opinion at the North."[935] Now if the Republican party would only offer a similar guarantee, by a const.i.tutional amendment, that they would never revive their aggressive policy toward slavery in the Territories!
As the February days wore away, Douglas became less hopeful of peaceable adjustment through compromise. If he had counted upon large concessions from Seward, he was disappointed. If he had entertained hopes of the Peace Conference, he had also erred grievously. He became more and more a.s.sured that the forces making against peace were from the North as well as the South. He told the Senate on February 21st, that there was "a deliberate plot to break up this Union under pretense of preserving it."[936] Privately he feared the influence of some of Mr. Lincoln"s advisers, who were hostile to Seward. "What the Blairs really want," he said hotly to a friend, "is a civil war."[937]
With many another well-wisher he deplored the secret entrance of Mr.
Lincoln into the capital. It seemed to him both weak and undignified, when the situation called for a conciliatory, but firm, front.[938]
With an absence of personal pique which did him credit, he determined to take the first opportunity to warn Mr. Lincoln of the dangers of his position. Douglas knew Lincoln far better than the average Washington politician. To an acquaintance who lamented the apparent weakness of the President-elect, Douglas said emphatically, "No, he is not that, Sir; but he is eminently a man of the atmosphere which surrounds him. He has not yet got out of Springfield, Sir.... He he does not know that he is President-elect of the United States, Sir, he does not see that the shadow he casts is any bigger now than it was last year. It will not take him long to find it out when he has got established in the White House."[939]
The ready tact of Mrs. Douglas admirably seconded the initiative of her husband. She was among the first to call upon Mrs. Lincoln, thereby setting the example for the ladies of the opposition.[940] A little incident, to be sure; but in critical hours, the warp and woof of history is made up of just such little acts of thoughtful courtesy.
Washington society understood and appreciated the gracious spirit of Adele Cutts Douglas; and even the New York press commented upon the incident with satisfaction.
That Seward and his friends were no less alarmed than Douglas, at the prospect of Lincoln"s falling under the influence of the coercionists, is a matter of record.[941] There were, indeed, two factions contending for mastery over the incoming administration. So far as an outsider could do so, Douglas was willing to lend himself to the schemes of the Seward faction, for in so doing he was obviously promoting the cause of peace.[942] Three days after Lincoln"s arrival Douglas called upon him; and on the following evening (February 27th) he sought another private interview.[943] They had long known each other; and politics aside, Lincoln entertained a high opinion of Douglas"s fairmindedness and common sense.[944] They talked earnestly about the Peace Conference and the efforts of extremists in Congress to make it abortive.[945] Each knew the other to be a genuine lover of the Union. Upon this common basis of sentiment they could converse without reservations.
Douglas was agitated and distressed.[946] Compromise was now impossible in Congress. He saw but one hope. With great earnestness he urged Lincoln to recommend the instant calling of a national convention to amend the Const.i.tution. Upon the necessity of this step Douglas and Seward agreed. But Lincoln would not commit himself to this suggestion, without further consideration.[947] "It is impossible not to feel," wrote an old acquaintance, after hearing Douglas"s account of this interview, "that he [Douglas] really and truly loves his country in a way not too common, I fear now, in Washington."[948]
The Senate remained in continuous session from Sat.u.r.day, March 2d, until the oath of office was taken by Vice-President Hamlin on Monday morning. During these eventful hours, the Crittenden amendments were voted down;[949] and when the venerable senator from Kentucky made a final effort to secure the adoption of the resolution of the Peace Congress, which was similar to his own, it too was decisively defeated.[950] In the closing hours of the session, however, in spite of the opposition of irreconcilables like Sumner, Wade, and Wilson, the Senate adopted the amendment which had pa.s.sed the House, limiting the powers of Congress in the States.[951]
While Union-loving men were thus wrestling with a forlorn hope, Douglas was again closeted with Lincoln. It is very probable that Douglas was invited to call, in order to pa.s.s judgment upon certain pa.s.sages in the inaugural address, which would be delivered on the morrow. At all events, Douglas exhibited a familiarity with portions of the address, which can hardly be accounted for in other ways. He expressed great satisfaction with Lincoln"s statement of the invalidity of secession. It would do, he said, for all const.i.tutional Democrats to "brace themselves against."[952] He frankly announced that he would stand by Mr. Lincoln in a temperate, resolute Union policy.[953]
On the forenoon of Inauguration Day, Douglas told a friend that he meant to put himself as prominently forward in the ceremonies as he properly could, and to leave no doubt in any one"s mind of his determination to stand by the administration in the performance of its first great duty to maintain the Union. "I watched him carefully,"
records this same acquaintance. "He made his way not without difficulty--for there was literally no sort of order in the arrangements--to the front of the throng directly beside Mr. Lincoln, when he prepared to read his address. A miserable little rickety table had been provided for the President, on which he could hardly find room for his hat, and Senator Douglas, reaching forward, took it with a smile and held it during the delivery of the address. It was a trifling act, but a symbolical one, and not to be forgotten, and it attracted much attention all around me."[954]
At least one pa.s.sage in the inaugural address was framed upon suggestions made by Douglas. Contrary to his original intention, Lincoln went out of his way to say, "I cannot be ignorant of the fact that many worthy and patriotic citizens are desirous of having the National Const.i.tution amended. While I make no recommendation of amendments, I fully recognize the rightful authority of the people over the whole subject, to be exercised in either of the modes prescribed in the instrument itself; and I should, under existing circ.u.mstances, favor rather than oppose a fair opportunity being afforded the people to act upon it. I will venture to add that to me the convention mode seems preferable, in that it allows amendments to originate with the people themselves, instead of only permitting them to take or reject propositions originated by others, not especially chosen for the purpose, and which might not be precisely such as they would wish to either accept or refuse. I understand a proposed amendment to the Const.i.tution--which amendment, however, I have not seen--has pa.s.sed Congress, to the effect that the Federal Government shall never interfere with the domestic inst.i.tutions of the States, including that of persons held to service. To avoid misconstruction of what I have said, I depart from my purpose, not to speak of particular amendments, so far as to say that, holding such a provision to now be implied const.i.tutional law, I have no objection to its being made express and irrevocable."[955]
In the original draft of his address, written before he came to Washington, Lincoln had dismissed with scant consideration the notion of a const.i.tutional amendment: "I am not much impressed with the belief that the present Const.i.tution can be improved. I am rather for the old ship, and the chart of the old pilots."[956] Sometime after his interview with Douglas, Lincoln struck out these words and inserted the paragraph already quoted, rejecting at the same time a suggestion from Seward.[957]
The curious and ubiquitous correspondents of the New York press, always on the alert for straws to learn which way the wind was blowing, made much of Douglas"s conspicuous gallantry toward Mrs.
Lincoln. He accompanied her to the inaugural ball and unhesitatingly defended his friendliness with the President"s household, on the ground that Mr. Lincoln "meant to do what was right." To one press agent, eager to have his opinion of the inaugural, Douglas said, "I defend the inaugural if it is as I understand it, namely, an emanation from the brain and heart of a patriot, and as I mean, if I know myself, to act the part of a patriot, I endorse it."[958]
On March 6th, while Republican senators maintained an uncertain and discreet silence respecting the inaugural address, Douglas rose to speak in its defense. Senator Clingman had interpreted the President"s policy in terms of his own emotions: there was no doubt about it, the inaugural portended war. "In no wise," responded Douglas with energy: "It is a peace-offering rather than a war message." In all his long congressional career there is nothing that redounds more to Douglas"s everlasting credit than his willingness to defend the policy of his successful rival, while men of Lincoln"s own party were doubting what manner of man the new President was and what his policy might mean.
Nothing could have been more adroit than Douglas"s plea for the inaugural address. He did not throw himself into the arms of the administration and betray his intimate acquaintance with the plans of the new President. He spoke as the leader of the opposition, critically and judiciously. He had read the inaugural with care; he had subjected it to a critical a.n.a.lysis; and he was of the opinion that it was characterized by ability and directness on certain points, but by lack of explicitness on others. He cited pa.s.sages that he deemed equivocal and objectionable. Nevertheless he rejoiced to read one clause which was evidently the key to the entire doc.u.ment:
"The course here indicated will be followed unless current events and experience shall show a modification or change to be proper, and in every case and exigency my best discretion will be exercised according to circ.u.mstances actually existing, and with a view and a hope of a peaceful solution of the national troubles, and the restoration of fraternal sympathies and affections."[959]
By the terms of his message, too, the President was pledged to favor such amendments as might originate with the people for the settlement of the slavery question,--even if the settlement should be repugnant to the principles of his party. Mr. Lincoln should receive the thanks of all Union-loving men for having "sunk the partisan in the patriot."
The voice of Douglas never rang truer than when he paid this tribute to his rival"s honesty and candor.
"I do not wish it to be inferred," he said in conclusion,... "that I have any political sympathy with his administration, or that I expect any contingency can happen in which I may be identified with it. I expect to oppose his administration with all my energy on those great principles which have separated parties in former times; but on this one question--that of preserving the Union by a peaceful solution of our present difficulties; that of preventing any future difficulties by such an amendment of the Const.i.tution as will settle the question by an express provision--if I understand his true intent and meaning, I am with him."[960]
But neither President Lincoln nor Douglas had committed himself on the concrete question upon which hung peace or war--what should be done about Fort Sumter and Fort Pickens. The point was driven home with relentless vigor by Wigfall, who still lingered in the Senate after the secession of his State. "Would the Senator who is speaking for the administration say explicitly, whether he would advise the withdrawal of the troops from the forts?" The reply of Douglas was admirable: "As I am not in their counsels nor their confidence, I shall not tender them my advice until they ask it.... I do not choose either, to proclaim what my policy would be, in view of the fact that the Senator does not regard himself as the guardian of the honor and interests of my country, but is looking to the interests of another, which he thinks is in hostility to this country. It would hardly be good policy or wisdom for me to reveal what I think ought to be our policy, to one who may so soon be in the counsels of the enemy, and the command of its armies."[961]
Douglas did admit, however, that since the garrison of Fort Sumter had provisions for only thirty days, he presumed no attempt would be made to reinforce it. Under existing circ.u.mstances the President had no power to collect the revenues of the government and no military force sufficient to reinforce Sumter. Congress was not in session to supply either the necessary coercive powers or troops. He therefore drew the conclusion that not only the President himself was pacific in his policy, but the Republican party as well, despite the views of individual members. "But," urged Mason of Virginia, "I ask the Senator, then, what is to be done with the garrison if they are in a starving condition?" "If the Senator had voted right in the last presidential election," replied Douglas good-naturedly, "I should have been in a condition, perhaps, to tell him authoritatively what ought to be done."
From this moment on, Douglas enjoyed the confidence of President Lincoln to an extraordinary degree. No one knew better than Lincoln the importance of securing the cooperation of so influential a personage. True, by the withdrawal of Southern senators, the Democratic opposition had been greatly reduced; but Douglas was still a power in this Democratic remnant. Besides, the man who could command the suffrages of a million voters was not a force lightly to be reckoned with. After this speech of the 6th, Lincoln again sent for Douglas, to express his entire agreement with its views and with its spirit.[962] He gave Douglas the impression that he desired to gain time for pa.s.sions to cool by removing the causes of irritation. He felt confident that there would soon be a general demand for a national convention where all existing differences could be radically treated. "I am just as ready," Douglas reported him to have said, "to reinforce the garrisons at Sumter and Pickens or to withdraw them, as I am to see an amendment adopted protecting slavery in the Territories or prohibiting slavery in the Territories. What I want is to get done what the people desire to have done, and the question for me is how to find that out exactly."[963] On this point they were in entire accord.
The patriotic conduct of Douglas earned for him the warm commendation of Northern newspapers, many of which had hitherto been incapable of ascribing honorable motives to him.[964] No one who met him at the President"s levees would have suspected that he had been one of his host"s most relentless opponents. A correspondent of the New York _Times_ described him as he appeared at one of these functions. "Here one minute, there the next--now congratulating the President, then complimenting Mrs. Lincoln, bowing and sc.r.a.ping, and shaking hands, and smiling, laughing, yarning and saluting the crowd of people whom he knew." More soberly, this same observer added, "He has already done a great deal of good to the administration."[965] It is impossible to find the soured and discomfited rival in this picture.
The country was anxiously awaiting the development of the policy of the new Executive, for to eight out of every ten men, Lincoln was still an unknown man. Rumors were abroad that both Sumter and Pickens would be surrendered.[966] Seward was known to be conciliatory on this point; and the man on the street never once doubted that Seward would be the master-mind in the cabinet. Those better informed knew--and Douglas was among them--that Seward"s influence was menaced by an aggressive faction in the cabinet.[967] Behind these official advisers, giving them active support, were those Republican senators who from the first had doubted the efficacy of compromise.