The situation at this juncture was as follows: Shields was stretched out over five-and-twenty miles of road in the valley of the South Fork; Fremont was at Harrisonburg; Ewell"s division was near Cross Keys, and the main body of the Valley Army near Port Republic.
During his retreat Jackson had kept his attention fixed on Shields.
That ardent Irishman pictured his old enemy flying in confusion, intent only on escape. He would have been much astonished had he learned the truth. From the moment Jackson left Strasburg, during the whole time he was retreating, with the "bull-dogs" at his heels, he was meditating a counter-stroke, and his victim had already been selected. When Shields rushed boldly up the valley of the South Fork it seemed that an opportunity of avenging Kernstown was about to offer. On June 4, the day that the enemy reached Luray, Ewell was ordered to provide his men with two days" cooked rations and to complete their ammunition "for active service." The next day, however, it was found that Shields had halted. Ewell was ordered to stand fast, and Jackson wrote despondently to Lee: "At present I do not see that I can do much more than rest my command and devote its time to drilling." On the 6th, however, he learned that Shields"
advanced guard had resumed its march; and, like a tiger crouching in the jungle, he prepared to spring upon his prey. But Fremont was close at hand, and Shields and Fremont between them mustered nearly 25,000 men. They were certainly divided by the Shenandoah; but they were fast converging on Port Republic; and in a couple of marches, if not actually within sight of each other"s camps, they would come within hearing of each other"s guns. Yet, notwithstanding their numbers, Jackson had determined to deal with them in detail.
A few miles from the camp at Port Republic was a hill honeycombed with caverns, known as the Grottoes of the Shenandoah. In the heart of the limestone Nature has built herself a palace of many chambers, vast, silent, and magnificent. But far beyond the beauty of her mysterious halls was the glorious prospect which lay before the eyes of the Confederate sentries. Glimmering aisles and dark recesses, where no sunbeam lurks nor summer wind whispers, compared but ill with those fruitful valleys, watered by clear brown rivers, and steeped in the glow of a Virginian June. To the north stood the Ma.s.sanuttons, with their forests sleeping in the noon-day; and to the right of the Ma.s.sanuttons, displaying, in that transparent atmosphere, every shade of that royal colour from which it takes its name, the Blue Ridge loomed large against the eastern sky. Summit after summit, each more delicately pencilled than the last, receded to the horizon, and beneath their feet, still, dark, and unbroken as the primeval wilderness, broad leagues of woodland stretched far away over a lonely land.
No battle-field boasts a fairer setting than Port Republic; but, lover of Nature as he was, the region was attractive to Jackson for reasons of a sterner sort. It was eminently adapted for the purpose he had at heart.
1. The South Fork of the Shenandoah is formed by the junction of two streams, the North and South Rivers; the village of Port Republic lying on the peninsula between the two.
2. The bridge crosses the North River just above the junction, carrying the Harrisonburg road into Port Republic; but the South River, which cuts off Port Republic from the Luray Valley, is pa.s.sable only by two difficult fords.
3. North of the village, on the left bank of the Shenandoah, a line of high bluffs, covered with scattered timber, completely commands the tract of open country which lies between the river and the Blue Ridge, and across this tract ran the road by which Shields was marching.
4. Four miles north-west of Port Republic, near the village of Cross Keys, the road to Harrisonburg crosses Mill Creek, a strong position for defence.
By transferring his army across the Shenandoah, and burning the bridge at Port Republic, Jackson could easily have escaped Fremont, and have met Shields in the Luray Valley with superior force. But the plain where the battle must be fought was commanded by the bluffs on the left bank of the Shenandoah; and should Fremont advance while an engagement was in progress, even though he could not cross the stream, he might a.s.sail the Confederates in flank with his numerous batteries. In order, then, to gain time in which to deal with Shields, it was essential that Fremont should be held back, and this could only be done on the left bank. Further, if Fremont could be held back until Shields" force was annihilated, the former would be isolated. If Jackson could hold the bridge at Port Republic, and also prevent Fremont reaching the bluffs, he could recross when he had done with Shields, and fight Fremont without fear of interruption.
To reverse the order, and to annihilate Fremont before falling upon Shields, was out of the question. Whether he advanced against Fremont or whether he stood still to receive his attack, Jackson"s rear and communications, threatened by Shields, must be protected by a strong detachment. It would be thus impossible to meet Fremont with superior or even equal numbers, and an army weaker on the battlefield could not make certain of decisive victory.
Jackson had determined to check Fremont at Mill Creek. But the situation was still uncertain. Fremont had halted at Harrisonburg, and it was possible that he might advance no further. So the Confederates were divided, ready to meet either adversary; Ewell remaining at Cross Keys, and the Stonewall division encamping near Port Republic.
June 8.
On the morning of June 8, however, it was found that Fremont was moving. Ewell"s division was already under arms. At 8.30 A.M. his pickets, about two miles to the front, became engaged, and the Confederate regiments moved leisurely into position.
The line ran along the crest of a narrow ridge, commanding an open valley, through which Mill Creek, an insignificant brook, ran parallel to the front. The further slopes, open and un.o.bstructed except for scattered trees and a few fences, rose gently to a lower ridge, about a mile distant. The ground held by the Confederates was only partially cleared, and from the Port Republic road in the centre, at a distance of six hundred yards on either flank, were woods of heavy timber, enclosing the valley, and jutting out towards the enemy. The ridge beyond the valley was also thickly wooded; but here, too, there were open s.p.a.ces on which batteries might be deployed; and the forest in rear, where Ashby had been killed, standing on higher ground, completely concealed the Federal approach.
The pickets, however, had given ample warning of the coming attack; and when, at 10 A.M., the hostile artillery appeared on the opposite height, it was received with a heavy fire. "Eight and a half batteries," says Fremont, "were brought into action within thirty minutes." Against this long array of guns the Confederates ma.s.sed only five batteries; but these commanded the open ground, and were all in action from the first.
Ewell had with him no more than three brigades. The Louisiana regiments had bivouacked near Port Republic, and were not yet up. The whole strength of the troops which held the ridge was no more than 6000 infantry, and perhaps 500 cavalry. Fremont had at least 10,000 infantry, twelve batteries, and 2000 cavalry.
It was then against overwhelming numbers that Ewell was asked to hold his ground, and the remainder of the army was four miles in rear.
Jackson himself was still absent from the field. The arrangements for carrying out his ambitious plans had met with an unexpected hitch. In the Luray Valley, from Conrad"s Store northwards, the s.p.a.ce between the Blue Ridge and the Shenandoah was covered for the most part with dense forest, and through this forest ran the road. Moving beneath the spreading foliage of oak and hickory, Shields" advanced brigade was concealed from the observation of the Confederate cavalry; and the signallers on the mountain, endangered by Fremont"s movement, had been withdrawn.
North of Port Republic, between the foot-hills of the Blue Ridge and the Shenandoah, lies a level tract of arable and meadow, nearly a mile wide, and extending for nearly three miles in a northerly direction. On the plain were the Confederate pickets, furnished by three companies of Ashby"s regiment, with their patrols on the roads towards Conrad"s Store; and there seemed little chance that Shields would be able to reach the fords over the South River, much less the Port Republic bridge, without long notice being given of his approach. The cavalry, however, as had been already proved, were not entirely to be depended on. Jackson, whose headquarters were within the village, had already mounted his horse to ride forward to Cross Keys, when there was a distant fire, a sudden commotion in the streets, and a breathless messenger from the outposts reported that not only had the squadrons on picket been surprised and scattered, but that the enemy was already fording the South River.
Between the two rivers, south-west of Port Republic, were the Confederate trains, parked in the open fields. Here was Carrington"s battery, with a small escort; and now the cavalry had fled there were no other troops, save a single company of the 2nd Virginia, on this side the Shenandoah. The squadron which headed the Federal advanced guard was accompanied by two guns. One piece was sent towards the bridge; the other, unlimbering on the further bank, opened fire on the church, and the hors.e.m.e.n trotted cautiously forward into the village street. Jackson, warned of his danger, had already made for the bridge, and crossing at a gallop escaped capture by the barest margin of time. His chief of artillery, Colonel Crutchfield, was made prisoner, with Dr. McGuire and Captain Willis,* (* All three of these officers escaped from their captors.) and his whole staff was dispersed, save Captain Pendleton, a sterling soldier, though hardly more than a boy in years. And the danger was not over. With the trains was the whole of the reserve ammunition, and it seemed that a crushing disaster was near at hand. The sudden appearance of the enemy caused the greatest consternation amongst the teamsters; several of the waggons went off by the Staunton road; and, had the Federal cavalry come on, the whole would have been stampeded. But Carrington"s battery was called to the front by Captain Moore, commanding the company of infantry in the village. The picket, promptly put into position, opened with a well-aimed volley, and a few rounds checked the enemy"s advance; the guns came rapidly and effectively into action, and at this critical moment Jackson intervened with his usual vigour.* (* According to General Shields"
account his cavalry had reported to him that the bridge at Port Republic had been burned, and he had therefore ordered his advanced guard to take up a defensive position and prevent the Confederates crossing the Shenandoah River. It was the head of the detachment which had dispersed the Confederate squadrons.) From the left bank of the North River he saw a gun bearing on the bridge, the village swarming with blue uniforms, and more artillery unlimbering across the river. He had already sent orders for his infantry to fall in, and a six-pounder was hurrying to the front. "I was surprised," said the officer to whose battery this piece belonged, "to see a gun posted on the opposite bank. Although I had met a cavalry man who told me that the enemy were advancing up the river, still I did not think it possible they could have brought any guns into the place in so short a time. It thereupon occurred to me that the piece at the bridge might be one of Carrington"s, whose men had new uniforms something like those we saw at the bridge. Upon suggesting this to the general, he reflected a moment, and then riding a few paces to the left and front, he called out, in a tone loud enough to be heard by the enemy, "Bring that gun up here!" but getting no reply, he raised himself in his stirrups, and in a most authoritative and seemingly angry tone he shouted, "Bring that gun up here, I say!" At this they began to move the trail of the gun so as to bring it to bear on us, which, when the general perceived, he turned quickly to the officer in charge of my gun, and said in his sharp, quick way, "Let "em have it!" The words had scarcely left his lips when Lieutenant Brown, who had his piece charged and aimed, sent a shot right among them, so disconcerting them that theirs in reply went far above us."* (* Related by Colonel Poague, C.S.A.)
The Confederate battalions, some of which had been formed up for inspection, or for the Sunday service, when the alarm was given, had now come up, and the 87th Virginia was ordered to capture the gun, and to clear the village. Without a moment"s hesitation the regiment charged with a yell across the bridge, and so sudden was the rush that the Federal artillerymen were surprised. The gun was double-shotted with canister, and the head of the column should have been swept away. But the aim was high and the Confederates escaped.
Then, as the limber came forward, the horses, terrified by the heavy fire and the yells of the charging infantry, became unmanageable; and the gunners, abandoning the field-piece, fled through the streets of Port Republic. The 87th rushed forward with a yell. The hostile cavalry, following the gunners, sought safety by the fords; and as the rout dashed through the shallow water, the Confederate batteries, coming into action on the high bluffs west of the Shenandoah, swept the plain below with shot and sh.e.l.l.
The hostile artillery beyond the stream was quickly overpowered; horses were shot down wholesale; a second gun was abandoned on the road; a third, which had only two horses and a driver left, was thrown into a swamp; and a fourth was found on the field without either team or men.
The Federal infantry was not more fortunate. Carroll"s brigade of four regiments was close in rear of the artillery when the Confederate batteries opened fire. Catching the contagion from the flying cavalry, it retreated northward in confusion. A second brigade (Tyler"s) came up in support; but the bluffs beyond the river were now occupied by Jackson"s infantry; a stream of fire swept the plain; and as Shields" advanced guard, followed by the Confederate cavalry, fell back to the woods whence it had emerged, five miles away on the other flank was heard the roar of the cannonade which opened the battle of Cross Keys.
From the hurried flight of the Federals it was evident that Shields"
main body was not yet up; so, placing two brigades in position to guard the bridge, Jackson sent the remainder to Ewell, and then rode to the scene of action.
Fremont, under cover of his guns, had made his preparations for attack; but the timidity which he had already displayed when face to face with Jackson had once more taken possession of his faculties.
Vigorous in pursuit of a flying enemy, when that enemy turned at bay his courage vanished. The Confederate position was undoubtedly strong, but it was not impregnable. The woods on either flank gave access under cover to the central ridge. The superior weight of his artillery was sufficient to cover an advance across the open; and although he was without maps or guide, the country was not so intersected as to render manoeuvring impracticable.
In his official report Fremont lays great stress on the difficulties of the ground; but reading between the lines it is easy to see that it was the military situation which overburdened him. The vicious strategy of converging columns, where intercommunication is tedious and uncertain, once more exerted its paralysing influence. It was some days since he had heard anything of Shields. That general"s dispatch, urging a combined attack, had not yet reached him: whether he had pa.s.sed Luray or whether he had been already beaten, Fremont was altogether ignorant; and, in his opinion, it was quite possible that the whole of the Confederate army was before him.
A more resolute commander would probably have decided that the shortest way out of the dilemma was a vigorous attack. If Shields was within hearing of the guns--and it was by no means improbable that he was--such a course was the surest means of securing his co-operation; and even if no help came, and the Confederates maintained their position, they might be so crippled as to be unable to pursue. Defeat would not have been an irreparable misfortune. Washington was secure.
Banks, Saxton, and McDowell held the approaches; and if Fremont himself were beaten back, the strategic situation could be in no way affected. In fact a defeat, if it had followed an attack so hotly pressed as to paralyse Jackson for the time being, would have been hardly less valuable than a victory.
"Fortune," it has been well said, "loves a daring suitor, and he who throws down the gauntlet may always count upon his adversary to help him." Fremont, however, was more afraid of losing the battle than anxious to win it. "Taking counsel of his fears," he would run no risks. But neither could he abstain from action altogether. An enemy was in front of him who for seven days had fled before him, and his own army antic.i.p.ated an easy triumph.
So, like many another general who has shrunk from the nettle danger, he sought refuge in half-measures, the most d.a.m.ning course of all. Of twenty-four regiments present on the field of battle, five only, of Blenker"s Germans, were sent forward to the attack. Their onslaught was directed against the Confederate right; and here, within the woods, Trimble had posted his brigade in a most advantageous position. A flat-topped ridge, covered with great oaks, looked down upon a wide meadow, crossed by a stout fence; and beyond the hollow lay the woods through which the Federals, already in contact with the Confederate outposts, were rapidly advancing. The pickets soon gave way, and crossing the meadow found cover within the thickets, where Trimble"s three regiments lay concealed. In hot pursuit came the Federal skirmishers, with the solid lines of their brigade in close support. Steadily moving forward, they climbed the fence and breasted the gentle slope beyond. A few scattered shots, fired by the retreating pickets, were the only indications of the enemy"s presence; the groves beyond were dark and silent. The skirmishers had reached the crest of the declivity, and the long wave of bayonets, following close upon their tracks, was within sixty paces of the covert, when the thickets stirred suddenly with sound and movement.
The Southern riflemen rose swiftly to their feet. A sheet of fire ran along their line, followed by a crash that resounded through the woods; and the German regiments, after a vigorous effort to hold their ground, fell back in disorder across the clearing. Here, on the further edge, they rallied on their reserves, and the Confederates, who had followed up no further than was sufficient to give impetus to the retreat, were once more withdrawn.
A quarter of an hour pa.s.sed, and as the enemy showed no inclination to attempt a second advance across the meadow, where the dead and wounded were lying thick, Trimble, sending word to Ewell of his intention, determined to complete his victory. More skilful than his enemies, he sent a regiment against their left, to which a convenient ravine gave easy access, while the troops among the oaks were held back till the flank attack was fully developed. The unexpected movement completely surprised the Federal brigadier. Again his troops were driven in, and the Confederates, now reinforced by six regiments which Ewell had sent up, forced them with heavy losses through the woods, compelled two batteries, after a fierce fight, to limber up, routed a brigade which had been sent by Fremont to support the attack, and pressing slowly but continuously forward, threw the whole of the enemy"s left wing, consisting of Blenker"s eleven regiments, back to the shelter of his line of guns. Trimble had drawn the "bulldog"s" teeth.
The Confederates had reached the outskirts of the wood. They were a mile in advance of the batteries in the centre; and the Federal position, commanding a tract of open ground, was strong in itself and strongly held. A general counterstroke was outside the scope of Jackson"s designs. He had still Shields to deal with. The Federal left wing had been heavily repulsed, but only a portion of Fremont"s force had been engaged; to press the attack further would undoubtedly have cost many lives, and even a partial reverse would have interfered with his comprehensive plan.
In other quarters of the battle-field the fighting had been unimportant. The Confederate guns, although heavily outnumbered, held their ground gallantly for more than five hours; and when they eventually retired it was from want of ammunition rather than from loss of moral. The waggons which carried their reserve had taken a wrong road, and at the critical moment there were no means of replenishing the supply. But so timid were Fremont"s tactics that the blunder pa.s.sed unpunished. While the battle on the left was raging fiercely he had contented himself elsewhere with tapping feebly at the enemy"s lines. In the centre of the field his skirmishers moved against Ewell"s batteries, but were routed by a bayonet charge; on the right, Milroy and Schenck, the two generals who had withstood Jackson so stubbornly at M"Dowell, advanced on their own initiative through the woods. They had driven in the Confederate skirmishers, and had induced Ewell to strengthen this portion of his line from his reserve, when they were recalled by Fremont, alarmed by Trimble"s vigorous attack, to defend the main position.
The Southerners followed slowly. The day was late, and Ewell, although his troops were eager to crown their victory, was too cool a soldier to yield to their impatience; and, as at Cedar Creek, where also he had driven back the "Dutch" division, so at Cross Keys he rendered the most loyal support to his commander. Yet he was a dashing fighter, chafing under the restraint of command, and preferring the excitement of the foremost line. "On two occasions in the Valley," says General Taylor, "during the temporary absence of Jackson, he summoned me to his side, and immediately rushed forward amongst the skirmishers, where sharp work was going on. Having refreshed himself, he returned with the hope that "Old Jack would not catch him at it.""* (*Destruction and Reconstruction, page 39.)
How thoroughly Jackson trusted his subordinate may be inferred from the fact that, although present on the field, he left Ewell to fight his own battle. The only instructions he gave showed that he had fathomed the temper of Fremont"s troops. "Let the Federals," he said, "get very close before your infantry fire; they won"t stand long." It was to Ewell"s dispositions, his wise use of his reserves, and to Trimble"s ready initiative, that Fremont"s defeat was due. Beyond sending up a couple of brigades from Port Republic, Jackson gave no orders. His ambition was of too lofty a kind to appropriate the honours which another might fairly claim; and, when once battle had been joined, interference with the plan on which it was being fought did not commend itself to him as sound generalship. He was not one of those suspicious commanders who believe that no subordinate can act intelligently. If he demanded the strictest compliance with his instructions, he was always content to leave their execution to the judgment of his generals; and with supreme confidence in his own capacity, he was still sensible that his juniors in rank might be just as able. His supervision was constant, but his interference rare; and it was not till some palpable mistake had been committed that he a.s.sumed direct control of his divisions or brigades. Nor was any peculiar skill needed to beat back the attack of Fremont. Nothing proves the Federal leader"s want of confidence more clearly than the tale of losses. The Confederate casualties amounted to 288, of which nearly half occurred in Trimble"s counterstroke. The Federal reports show 684 killed, wounded, and missing, and of these Trimble"s riflemen accounted for nearly 500, one regiment, the 8th New York, being almost annihilated; but such losses, although at one point severe, were altogether insignificant when compared with the total strength; and it was not the troops who were defeated but the general.* (* The Confederates at Kernstown lost 20 per cent.; the Federals at Port Republic 18 per cent. At Mana.s.sas the Stonewall Brigade lost 16 per cent., at Cross Keys Ewell only lost 8 per cent.
and Fremont 5 per cent.)
Ewell"s division bivouacked within sight of the enemy"s watch-fires, and within hearing of his outposts; and throughout the night the work of removing the wounded, friend and foe alike, went on in the sombre woods. There was work, too, at Port Republic. Jackson, while his men slept, was all activity. His plans were succeeding admirably. From Fremont, cowering on the defensive before inferior numbers, there was little to be feared. It was unlikely that after his repulse he would be found more enterprising on the morrow; a small force would be sufficient to arrest his march until Shields had been crushed; and then, swinging back across the Shenandoah, the soldiers of the Valley would find ample compensation, in the rout of their most powerful foe, for the enforced rapidity of their retreat from Winchester. But to fight two battles in one day, to disappear completely from Fremont"s ken, and to recross the rivers before he had time to seize the bridge, were manoeuvres of the utmost delicacy, and needed most careful preparation.
It was Jackson"s custom, whenever a subordinate was to be entrusted with an independent mission, to explain the part that he was to play in a personal interview. By such means he made certain, first, that his instructions were thoroughly understood; and, second, that there was no chance of their purport coming to the knowledge of the enemy.
Ewell was first summoned to headquarters, and then Patton, whose brigade, together with that of Trimble, was to have the task of checking Fremont the next day. "I found him at 2 A.M.," says Patton, "actively engaged in making his dispositions for battle. He immediately proceeded to give me particular instructions as to the management of the men in covering the rear, saying: "I wish you to throw out all your men, if necessary, as skirmishers, and to make a great show, so as to cause the enemy to think the whole army are behind you. Hold your position as well as you can, then fall back when obliged; take a new position, hold it in the same way, and I will be back to join you in the morning.""
Colonel Patton reminded him that his brigade was a small one, and that the country between Cross Keys and the Shenandoah offered few advantages for protracting such manoeuvres. He desired, therefore, to know for how long he would be expected to hold the enemy in check.
Jackson replied, "By the blessing of Providence, I hope to be back by ten o"clock."* (* Southern Historical Society Papers volume 9 page 372.)
These interviews were not the only business which occupied the commanding general. He arranged for the feeding of his troops before their march next day,* (* Rations appear to have been short, for General Ewell reports that when he marched against Shields the next day many of his men had been without food for four-and-twenty hours.) for the dispositions of his trains and ammunition waggons; and at the rising of the moon, which occurred about midnight, he was seen on the banks of the South River, superintending the construction of a bridge to carry his infantry dryshod across the stream.
An hour before daybreak he was roused from his short slumbers. Major Imboden, who was in charge of a mule battery,* (* The mule battery does not appear to have done much more than afford the Confederate soldiers an opportunity of airing their wit. With the air of men anxiously seeking for information they would ask the gunners whether the mule or the gun was intended to go off first? and whether the gun was to fire the mule or the mule the gun?) looking for one of the staff, entered by mistake the general"s room.
"I opened the door softly, and discovered Jackson lying on his face across the bed, fully dressed, with sword, sash, and boots all on.
The low-burnt tallow-candle on the table shed a dim light, yet enough by which to recognise him. I endeavoured to withdraw without waking him. He turned over, sat upon the bed, and called out, "Who is that?"
"He checked my apology with, "That is all right. It"s time to be up.
I am glad to see you. Were the men all up as you came through camp?"
""Yes, General, and cooking."
""That"s right; we move at daybreak. Sit down. I want to talk to you."
"I had learned never to ask him questions about his plans, for he would never answer such to anyone. I therefore waited for him to speak first. He referred very feelingly to Ashby"s death, and spoke of it as an irreparable loss. When he paused I said, "General, you made a glorious winding-up of your four weeks with yesterday." He replied, "Yes, G.o.d blessed our army again yesterday, and I hope with His protection and blessing we shall do still better to-day.""* (*
Battles and Leaders volume 2 page 293.) Then followed instructions as to the use of the mule battery in the forests through which lay Shields" line of advance.